Georgi Markov, BNR, 29 February 2024
On February 29, 2024, the host of “Something More” on Bulgarian National Radio’s Orizont programme, Georgi Markov, interviewed Vladimir Mitev from the Romanian section of Radio Bulgaria about Romanian-Ukrainian and Romanian-Moldovan relations two years after the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The conversation focused on the relations of the Romanian NGO sector, the Romanian state and Romanian sovereigns with Ukraine, the Romanian intentions to participate in the post-war reconstruction of Ukraine and the future of Romanian-Ukrainian and Romanian-Moldovan relations.
Romanian NGO activists called for continued support for the Ukrainian people. They presented their views on the issue at a conference in Bucharest, attended by representatives of Romanian institutions and Ukrainian refugees. Vladimir Mitev, a colleague from the Romanian editorial office of Radio Bulgaria, also participated in the forum. He is already our interlocutor. Have a nice day!
Good day!
Let’s start by asking you what support Romanian civil society and the NGO sector in the country is giving to Ukraine.
Since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, assistance to Ukrainian refugees in Romania has largely been provided through NGOs. And, in fact, at the forum I saw one of their prominent representatives, Radu Hossu, who is probably the most important activist on Ukrainian issues in Romania. He said that so far 15,000 Romanians have donated to his donation campaign for Ukraine, and the total amount he announced he has raised is over 750,000 euros. Of course, the help is multi-pronged. There is also a discourse that the Romanian state has moved a little slower and has therefore reacted in a more cumbersome and bureaucratic way, whereas NGOs have the capacity to act quickly, and that is their usefulness.
And how are the Romanian authorities helping the government in Kiev?
The Romanian authorities also have a clear position in support of Ukraine. Suffice it to recall that last autumn a strategic partnership was concluded between Romania and Ukraine, which represents a new stage in the relationship with Ukraine. Until now, there has traditionally been a certain distance and contradiction between the two countries. We see that at the end of last year, progress was made on an issue which was somewhat of an obstacle from Romania’s point of view. Finally, in Ukraine, it was decided that what they called the Moldovan language should be considered a Romanian language, which is important for Romania. And the assistance that is given is on several levels. Of course, there is military aid, the exact amount of which is not known, but there will be, for example, training of Ukrainian pilots on F-16s, which will be done in Romania. There is also aid that is in the economic sense. It is quoted in the Romanian press that about 60% of Ukrainian grain exports went through Romania.
We understand that Romania is also prepared to cooperate with Ukraine in its post-war reconstruction. Is there now more information about where this partnership could go?
I think it is still too early to talk about concrete actions, as the war is not over, but indeed, also at the end of December 2023, there was a conference organised by the New Strategy Centre. This is a leading Romanian think-tank, which brought together perhaps the greatest security experts, and the conference was specifically dedicated to the reconstruction of Ukraine. I mean, Romania is clearly at the elite level looking to play a role in this and, starting now, perhaps doing some diplomacy and creating these bonds of trust with Ukrainian institutions that will be beneficial at some point in the future when the war is over.
But what is the future of Romanian policy towards Ukraine? I ask this question for a reason, because there are parliamentary elections in Romania in December. To what extent could these elections play a role in the support Bucharest is currently giving to Kiev?
I believe that Romanian elites, especially those associated with the current Klaus Iohannis government, are pursuing a sustainable course of support for Ukraine. There is a nuance that should perhaps be commented on in our press. We seem to come across it less often. In Romania, around 20-25% of voters have sovereignist positions, which, in the case of Ukraine, means that they have somewhat anti-Ukrainian attitudes. And, for example, one of the leaders of the main sovereignist party, AUR, has made some form of territorial claims. He recently demanded, for example, the return of Northern Bukovina to Romania. So you could say that there is a certain anti-Ukrainian sentiment, but nevertheless, at the moment, what we see is that the dominant position is Euro-Atlantic and it is likely to remain so, simply because Romanian society is playing an important role on NATO’s eastern flank, and this role has been built up over time.
Yes, it was interesting: to hear what the mood of public opinion in Romania is about this support that is being given. And the question is about the public mood on the support given by the NGO sector on the one hand and the Romanian authorities on the other. How do they influence this support? Yes, you have already mentioned that 25%, if I heard correctly, are people who have sovereignist views on this. But do you have any idea what lies beyond these attitudes?
I see that lately there has been a lot of talk in Romanian society about the leader of these sovereignists, George Simion, including accusations that he has somehow put himself at the service of the Russian state. So it is difficult for attitudes perceived as Russophile to penetrate Romanian society at a deeper level. However, there is clearly a certain disillusionment or other feeling in Romania – perhaps because money from EU funds or from links with Western business probably does not reach all members of society equally or sufficiently, and some people, perhaps in smaller towns, feel alienated from this model that has developed so far, which is based on links with Western European capital. I would like to leave the question open. Romanian society will clarify, I suppose, within itself, what feelings will prevail. At the moment, it is obvious, having concluded a strategic partnership with Ukraine, that the state is counting on the fact that the partnership with Ukraine will continue, that it will not be a one-off, a one-year thing, that it will be something lasting.
And let’s talk about the Republic of Moldova, because Romania insists so much on special treatment. What is that supposed to mean?
We have to bear in mind that there has been some renewed speculation, literally these days, that perhaps Transnistria might announce some form of annexation to Russia, asking for help from Russia for its security. And in this context, the Republic of Moldova remains in a complicated situation. We know that there is a ruling party there which has a strong pro-European orientation, which is also trying to make judicial reform and fight corruption. Romania has traditionally provided Moldova with funds to support itself economically. Romania has helped, including when energy flows to Moldova have been severely hampered by the war in Ukraine and Russia’s attitude. So Romania, as a country that speaks the same language as the people of the Republic of Moldova, has enduring interests there and, whatever happens, I believe that Romania will seek support for the Republic of Moldova and its path towards Europe.
That is how we will end. I would like to thank journalist Vladimir Mitev from the Romanian section of Radio Bulgaria for this analysis. He and I have been commenting in the last few minutes more on the aid that the NGO sector and the Romanian authorities are giving to Ukraine.
Photo: Radu Hossu speaks on February 23, 2024 at the Centre for Social Dialogue in Bucharest, during a meeting on Romania’s commitment to Ukraine’s security and prosperity (source: Vladimir Mitev)
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