Paul Hurmuz: Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey are on the right track on security in the Black Sea

Vladimir Mitev, Mediapool, 21 March 2024

Paul Hurmuz is a Romanian general in reserve who is also one of the respected security experts in the Romanian media space. He was Romania’s Defence Attaché in the UK from 2003 to 2007, and from 2013 to 2016 he was Deputy Director of the Intelligence Division at NATO Headquarters in Brussels. Between 2016 and 2017, he was Undersecretary of State for Defence Policy and Planning in the Romanian Ministry of Defence.

Paul Hurmuz is a member of the Centre for New Strategy, a leading Romanian think tank of experts in international relations and security.

This article was published on 21 March 2024 on the Bulgarian website Mediapool and reprinted with a change of title. Two days earlier, Romanian TV Digi24 reported that the Mihail Kogălniceanu military base in Constanta county will be expanded and modernised to become the largest NATO military base in Europe. The cost of the project is estimated at $2.7 billion. Work has already begun on the access roads and the high-capacity electricity network, Digi24 reports.

The new military base will cover an area of almost 3,000 hectares and will be the largest in Europe, larger than the German Ramstein air base, which covers about 2,000 hectares. In addition to the military infrastructure, the Kogălniceanu base will include schools, kindergartens, shops and even a hospital and will be able to accommodate 10 000 soldiers and their families.

Mr Hurmuz, thank you for this interview. First of all, the dynamics of the military conflict in Ukraine are changing and Russia is now going on the attack. How is this change in dynamics perceived by Romania and to what extent is Romania seeking a further response to this? 

Yes, thank you for the question. I think we have to start from the fact that there are several areas of the struggle in this conflict triggered by Russia against Ukraine on 24 February 2022 there were also several phases. And I think your question, in principle, refers to the ground domain, where, indeed, after the failure of the Ukrainian offensive last summer, we saw a Russian offensive, particularly in Donbas. And what is significant for what has happened particularly since last November and until now, is Russia’s willingness, if you like, to incur huge losses, both human and material in terms of technique and weapons, in order to achieve tactical objectives which at the moment do not have a decisive impact on the fate of the war. From this point of view, it is obvious that for Ukraine it is essential to properly organise the defence against this Russian offensive and to receive as urgently as possible the arms and ammunition needed to achieve this objective. Obviously, artillery ammunition, 155 millimetre ammunition, is essential from this point of view, and so far we are seeing some positive signs that have not yet materialised. 

Notably the initiative of the President of the Czech Republic Peter Pavel, who, incidentally, was Chairman of the NATO Military Committee during the time I was at NATO HQ as Deputy Director of the Intelligence Division there (2013-2016, Pavel becomes Chairman of the Military Committee in 2015 – editor’s note). He was basically my boss. And to close the parenthesis, it’s a positive sign that the President of the Czech Republic took this initiative, but it seems to be taking some time. It is equally important that many European countries, particularly Western European countries, have welcomed and not only welcomed, they have also decided to contribute financially to the completion of this contract to supply Ukraine with 155 mm artillery ammunition. 

I am still hopeful that in the United States, in Congress, things will be unblocked and, finally, the necessary ammunition and the necessary armament. Because it’s not just the artillery ammunition. It is also about the Patriot anti-aircraft missiles, which are badly needed to repel the drone and missile attacks from Russia against Ukraine. It has intensified and it is necessary for the Ukrainians to have the military means to protect both their population and strategic points, including the defence industry, where it exists, and the troops that are in contact. 

So this is a dimension that you probably referred to and I am at the moment, so to speak, optimistic but cautious about their development. I think Ukraine still has enough resources to be able to stop Russia from trying to develop this offensive. There are indeed some problems with this law that is still languishing in the Ukrainian parliament on mobilisation for war, possibly related to lowering the mobilisation age for men, in particular. But I am also optimistic in another area and I think it is important, especially for Romania and Bulgaria, to see this phenomenon in the Black Sea. Ukraine has an advantage even though it does not have naval forces, because they were either destroyed or captured by Russia earlier. The extensive use of aerial, naval and underwater drones, including missiles produced by Ukraine – I am referring now to the ones with which they managed in 2022 to sink the Moskva cruiser, including some of the long-range strike munitions that have been provided to them by Western allies have enabled Ukraine to achieve many successes, including the fact that Russia has been forced to withdraw most of its naval vessels from Crimea on the eastern Black Sea coast precisely to protect them from Ukrainian attack. The fact that, after Russia stopped that agreement to export grain through the Black Sea, Ukraine still managed to secure the transport of that grain and get it almost back to where it was before. This is a positive sign, and here I think we should also focus on the good news that we have. The fact that the western Black Sea, including the area on the Bulgarian and Romanian side, are now open and Russia is not managing to gain a foothold there. So that’s kind of how I see the nuanced, different situation in the land area and in the maritime area. 

At the end of last year, the New Strategy Center – a leading think tank in Romania – organised a conference that dealt with the reconstruction process in Ukraine, and we see that an agreement for a strategic partnership between Romania and Ukraine was signed last autumn. In what ways is Romania currently helping or supporting Ukraine?

The only thing I can say about Romania’s military aid to Ukraine is that it exists and is consistent. I cannot give you more details on this, because the Romanian authorities at the highest level have decided to keep this military support confidential. But even from some interventions by President Zelinski and other Ukrainian officials, it appears that Romania has provided Ukraine with very substantial military support, and it remains to be seen when the Romanian authorities will decide to make this information public. What is public, however, is the fact that Romania has provided an air base in Fetești, where a European training centre for the F-16 aircraft has been established since last November for Romanian pilots, as well as other pilots from NATO countries and even Ukraine. So, from this point of view, the centre is advanced. I know that many things have been done and I also know that the Ukrainian side is very pleased about this, especially as the Ukrainians have been asking for a very long time to have this F-16 capability in order to face Russia, which still has an advantage in the air. 

Romania has also made its infrastructure available to allow the transfer of grain from Ukraine. And from this point of view, I dare say that Romania has made the greatest effort among the countries of the European Union. I know that Bulgaria has also done a great deal in this respect, and this has enabled Ukraine to export its grain and to solve certain problems, including in developing countries in the world, which have been very dependent on Ukrainian grain. 

So, from this point of view, I would say that Romania has facilitated in a consistent and significant way the resolution of these problems both for Ukraine and for countries in the third world, in Africa and in other areas where these Ukrainian grains have been exported. Also, from a political point of view, the Romanian authorities have provided important support to Ukraine. They have supported all the steps towards Ukraine’s integration into the European Union and NATO, and in humanitarian terms, the effort that Romanians, both in their official capacity and as private individuals, have made for Ukrainian refugees from the very beginning has been remarkable. I hope I have not missed any area I should have mentioned. Also, to conclude this topic, I believe that in Romania, great efforts are being made to combat Russian disinformation and propaganda, which we can see have managed to penetrate quite strongly in many countries, including Western ones.

The war in Ukraine has led to greater defence cooperation between Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey, and do you personally, from what I understand, participate in this effort? What is happening now with this collaboration between the three countries? What are its prospects? How satisfied are you as a Romanian expert with what is happening in this part of the Black Sea where the three countries are?

Yes, we have to admit that one of the criticisms that the three countries on the Black Sea have received particularly from our Western allies has been that we have not been able to be as vocal from the very first moment as Poland and the Baltic countries were when the Russian aggression against Ukraine started back in 2014 and I even asked the question to some former high ranking officials from Western countries at a conference last year. And the answer pretty much was this: “You have not shouted or screamed so loudly that people understand what is happening in the Black Sea area”. 

How shall I put it? It’s a situation that happened to me myself in 2014, when I was in Brussels and in an informal discussion with senior military and political officials at NATO HQ, they were discussing measures and countermeasures to be taken at NATO level after the invasion of Crimea in 2014 and at some point, me being pretty much the only one from the Black Sea area in that discussion I was also asked and seeing that all the countermeasures that were being discussed there referred only to the Baltic Sea, I told the participants, who were basically my bosses at the time, that I didn’t know that Crimea was actually in the Baltic Sea and not in the Black Sea. Now I know! 

We have to admit that from this point of view there was an imbalance after the invasion of Crimea, between the measures taken in the Baltic Sea and those in the Black Sea. As you know, at the NATO summit in Warsaw, it was decided to establish those battle groups. They were decided only for the Baltic countries and Poland. At the time before the summit and pretty much throughout the period after the invasion of Crimea, Romania made exceptional efforts, I might say, I mean very great efforts, both militarily and politically, to convince the allies that it was necessary to organise something, to take certain measures in the Black Sea area as well. But I admit that we did not succeed. Romania failed at the time to convince Bulgaria and Turkey of the need for these measures. However, at the Warsaw Summit in 2016 it was decided to take those “tailored forward presence” measures. However, they were not similar to those in the Baltic Sea, where the measures were practically very strong. 

The invasion of Ukraine by Russia on 24 February 2022, I think that was the moment when everybody understood that we could no longer go with these tailored measures and it was decided to quickly deploy the NATO Response Force, i.e. the French contingent, to Romania plus the other allies, to increase the allied air presence, with fighter jets in both Romania and Bulgaria, including the subsequent deployment of the Italian contingent to Bulgaria. These actions show that things have worked out, but only to some extent. 

From my point of view, a very important initiative was that of the New Strategy Center in Romania, which, in February 2023, organised a first meeting with the Sofia Security Forum in Bulgaria and the Centre for Economic and Foreign Policy Studies in Turkey with the aim of having an initial security assessment of developments in the Black Sea. I am very pleased that after several months of intensive work, this report, entitled “NATO’S role in addressing Security Threats and Challenges in the Black Sea: time for a Comprehensive Strategic Approach for the Region?”, has been finalised. It too was presented on 6 November 2023 by the three research institutes at NATO Headquarters in Brussels. There I want to tell you that there are many interesting things, many proposals. I will mention only three of them, which I think are more significant: 

• The need for the three countries, Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey, to develop their so-called A2AD (Anti-Access/Area-Denial) capabilities to combat Russian military capabilities when necessary. 
• to develop their anti-submarine capabilities, including with airborne, naval and underwater drones
• develop cooperation to defend national interests in exclusive economic zones, especially after the discovery of those natural gas reserves in the Black Sea, which Turkey has already started to exploit and Romania aims to start exploiting in 2027. Similarly, Bulgaria also has reserves there; seeing the actions that Russia has taken since last year, by blocking areas of Bulgaria’s exclusive economic zone for a long period of time, urgent action is needed by the three NATO countries in the Black Sea. 

It makes us think very seriously about how we need to act in order to be able to defend these gas fields. In the areas identified by Turkey, Bulgaria and Romania. That is why I say we are on the right track. Including the agreement that was signed relatively recently by the three countries to collaborate in a joint de-mining mission in the territorial waters of the Black Sea. I think it is also a positive signal and obviously there are many other areas in which the three countries can work together and obviously bring the other allies into these initiatives.

You talk about our part of the Black Sea area and NATO, going well on security. But what are your expectations or what could change or be disrupted if Donald Trump becomes US president again? We’ve already had some statements from him that created the impression that NATO could somehow be blocked if Trump is the American president and that he will not defend his allies on the Eastern front. So, how do you see a possible Donald Trump presidency and what could it mean for Black Sea security?

From my point of view, and I’m just expressing my personal opinion, most of these statements and including those of some members of his election campaign should be seen from exactly this perspective, as an electoral issue. At the same time, I’ve studied, I’ve watched a lot of position papers and it doesn’t seem that at this point it’s very clear in the Republican camp what former President Trump’s statements would entail – whether this is just a campaign slogan to attract more votes or whether it’s really a serious issue. Most experts believe that only after the end of the campaign, after the declaration of victory, should Donald Trump emerge as the winner, could a serious discussion begin. 

If we look at President Trump’s previous course in the relationship with NATO and Europe, we eventually find certain messages that the American side under many presidents, both Democrats and Republicans, have had in the sense of dissatisfaction with the efforts made by the European side in the field of defense, in allocating the necessary funds and achieving the necessary capabilities for their own defense. As you know, the North Atlantic Treaty does not only have Article 5, which requires all allies to defend each other and when one is attacked, the other allies come to its support, to help it, according to the musketeer principle of “all for one and one for all”. 

There is also Article 3 in the same treaty, which obliges allied states to prepare the necessary capabilities to be able to defend themselves in the event of aggression. I mean, what I want to say to you, and I think it’s a very important message for everybody who’s watching developments, is that once you join the North Atlantic Alliance, it doesn’t mean that you no longer have the responsibility to defend yourself. On the contrary, once you join the North Atlantic Alliance, the responsibilities to defend yourself, with the forces and means that you have at the national level, are very important. 

Obviously, allies may come in at that time with certain capabilities that you lack. Neither Romania nor Bulgaria have satellites, they don’t have other capabilities, but that doesn’t mean that Romania and Bulgaria don’t have to develop the land, naval and air forces necessary for their own defense. What is also important to understand is that once you join NATO, you are automatically under the Alliance’s nuclear umbrella. And I think it is also important for Romania and Bulgaria to understand exactly what this nuclear umbrella entails, what obligations we have, because in order to maintain NATO’s nuclear deterrence, even if only a few countries have nuclear forces (the United States, Great Britain and France), other countries must contribute to the so-called “Dual-Capable Aircraft”. As you know, the United States has tactical nuclear munitions in several allied countries. Those countries where these munitions are deployed – Turkey, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany – have committed themselves to providing fighter aircraft on which these tactical nuclear bombs can be mounted. 

Likewise, other allied air forces, including from Romania and Bulgaria, must participate in exercises that are conducted with nuclear weapons, because those allied aircraft that have nuclear weapons on board do not fly alone, they must be protected. Obviously, we have to understand, and I would not want those listening or watching this interview with you to be concerned that anyone necessarily thinks that we would end up in such a situation. But in order to maintain deterrence, it is very important that these capabilities are maintained, that they are operational and that there is the necessary resolve at the level of the Alliance to deter any adversary, I’m not saying enemy, but in this case, obviously, we’re talking about Russia, from ever using nuclear weapons. We are not only talking about strategic ones, which are very destructive, but also tactical ones, which were discussed several times during the conflict in Ukraine. From this point of view, I say that we should be a little concerned about President Trump’s statements, but no more concerned than necessary. 

That is why it is important that from these messages and discussions and comments we get the essential point, which is that each allied country must achieve at least 2% in the defense budget, that these funds are used in an intelligent way to achieve the necessary capabilities. And let us not forget that it is not enough just to buy planes, tanks, artillery pieces and so on. All these weapons systems must have the necessary infrastructure and the expenditure in this area of infrastructure is enormous. And at the same time, we must have sufficient quantities of ammunition, as the war in Ukraine has shown us. I will give you just one example to understand the scale of ammunition consumption in Ukraine. In 17 years, the US ground troops and the US Marines received 970 000 155 mm artillery shells. In 2022 alone, the United States supplied Ukraine with one million 155 mm artillery shells. So, if we have very modern technology, but we do not have spare parts, systems for maintenance and repair of this technique, qualified personnel, necessary ammunition, and necessary infrastructure is not enough. That is why we have to be very realistic, figure out where we are and what we need to do to have modern weapons and combat technology and all the things that are necessary to ensure that any adversary is deterred from ever attacking a NATO country.

In the first week of March 2024, the signing of a defence pact between France and Moldova was announced, shortly after French President Emmanuel Macron proposed sending Western troops to Ukraine, an announcement that provoked many statements from Western decision-makers to the contrary. How do you see a stronger French involvement beyond NATO’s borders in the Black Sea area?

The Defence Cooperation Agreement signed by France and the Republic of Moldova on 7 March 2024 creates the necessary legal framework for assistance in the areas of training, dialogue and consultations and information/intelligence exchange. 

A mission from the French Ministry of Defence will arrive in Chișinău in the summer to assess the needs of the Republic of Moldova and initiate discussions on possible arms contracts.

France’s efforts are consistent with commitments made in the region after 24 February 2022, when a French contingent was deployed to Romania, forming the NATO Battle Group base in our country.

Photo: Paul Hurmuz (source: Paul Hurmuz)

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