Vladimir Mitev, Malgorzata Kulbaczewska-Figat, Cross-border Talks, 2 March 2024
Romanian political analyst Mihai Isac joins Cross-Border Talks to discuss the recent Congress of Deputies of All Levels held in Tiraspol, the capital of the unrecognised Republic of Transnistria. The congress called on Russia to support Transnistria in its dispute with the government of Moldova, to which the region legally belongs. Mihai Isac explains why, in his view, the congress was actually a ‘non-event’ with no practical consequences, or a propaganda operation by Tiraspol’s Russian protectors. He discussed the context of current relations between Chișinău and Tiraspol and possible future attempts to reunify Moldova. He also commented on the reaction of the Moldovan and Romanian authorities to this “non-event”. Finally, he shared his views on the attitudes of Moldovan and Transnistrian society towards the war and the country’s EU course.
Vladimir Mitev: Welcome to another cross-border conversation, where we will focus our attention on a recent event or occurrence in Transnistria, the autonomous region of the Republic of Moldova, where the congress on 28 February 2024 adopted a position calling for Russian support in negotiations with the Republic of Moldova and taking a critical line towards increasing the influence of the central government in Chișinău in Transnistria, which is also related to the application of the Moldovan Customs Code in Transnistria. This application means that more money from Transnistria would go to the budget of the central government in Chișinău.
We are going to discuss what has happened and how significant it really is with Mihai Isac, a Romanian expert on the Black Sea region, a political analyst who works a lot with the media in the countries of the region. Mihai, could you start by describing the background to the Transnistrian congress and the new Moldovan policy towards Transnistria?
Mihai Isac: Transnistria is the eastern region of Moldova that has been under illegal Russian military occupation for over three decades. This is not the first time that the authorities in this region, supported and financed by Russia, have held such meetings and called for integration with the Russian Federation. In 2006 there was a referendum on this issue and almost 100% of the so-called participants in this illegal referendum voted for future integration with the Russian Federation or even for independence. Because of this military presence of Russian so-called peacekeepers in the region, the old efforts of the last three decades to reintegrate the Trans-Dniester region into the constitutional space of the Republic of Moldova didn’t have much chance of success. And of course, because in Chisinau over the last three decades there have been periods when the government has been formed by pro-Russian forces, let’s say the Communist Party of Mr Voronin or the Socialist Party led by Mr Dodon, this region is used by the Russian secret services and by local political and economic elites with ties to the Russian secret services to promote a lot of smuggling.
And this Transnistrian region somehow had a special status in Moldovan legislation, because when we’re talking about legislation on customs duties, the businesses in the transit region didn’t pay as much as those registered in the territory controlled by the authorities. And, you know, so it was positive discrimination for the businesses in Transnistria, and a lot of businessmen from the right side of the Nistru – under the control of the Republic of Moldova – went and set up their businesses in Transnistria. So Moldova lost a few billion Moldovan lei, just a few tens of millions of euros a year, because the businesses in Transnistria didn’t pay taxes. And when we say businesses in Transnistria, we are mostly talking about the businesses under the Sheriff conglomerate, because Transnistria is also called the Republic of Sheriff or the Sheriff Republic. Everything is linked to the Sheriff companies, which are run by people with proven links to the former KGB, Mr Bușan and Mr Kazmaili, who is an ethnic Gagauz who has lived in Transnistria for over four decades. We see a lot of propaganda around these issues, but as of 1 January 2024, this new customs code has been introduced for the whole of Moldova, not just for Transnistria. There is no special section for Transnistrian businesses. Of course, all the big players in the region have registered with the Moldovan authorities. But they do not want to lose this money from the local regional budget, which covers a lot of the expenses of this illegal regime. And of course they started organising so-called protests. But where official protests were organised under the former ruler of Tiraspol, Igor Smirnov, and the new ruler, Mr Krasnoselski, there were a lot of threats against Moldovan companies operating in the region or even against Moldovan citizens visiting Transnistria. This kind of public bashing of Moldova has increased in the region’s media. Of course, no one in the region wants to lose this status, but because of this special status there was a lot of corruption between the left and the right bank of Nistru before 1 January. This kind of legislation was a stepping stone to bolder political moves by Chișinău towards this region. Tiraspol, of course, doesn’t like it. And with the help of their geopolitical masters from Moscow, they tried to force Chișinău to grant them more and more privileges. But because of this local situation in Moldova, we also have an election year, this year for presidential elections and, more importantly, next year for parliamentary elections.
The authorities in Tiraspol and the pro-Russian forces in the Republic of Moldova also use this kind of rhetoric and this kind of meetings to push their political agenda, because the citizens of the Transnistrian region are known to vote for pro-Russian forces in Moldovan elections. And if you go back a few years, you can see various stories in the media about the political corruption of this, this, this electoral pond.
As far as this congress is concerned, this congress is nothing more than a gathering of MPs and officials from this region. They were bussed in from all over, from all the villages in Transnistria and from other cities. And it was a demonstration mainly for the public in the interior and, of course, for Russia. But when you see there, even the Transnistrian so-called authorities and the Moldovans, they said that this will not be a gathering to ask for annexation to Russia, because everybody knows that between the border of Moldova through the Republic of Moldova and the border of Russia there are a couple of hundred thousand Ukrainian soldiers who are well trained and well armed in the Odessa region. The Odessa region is a fortress. And in order to get past Odessa and into Transnistria, the Russian forces would have to suffer a lot of casualties here, in a strange way, because Ukraine respects the integrity of Moldova. The Ukrainian army didn’t want to go into Transnistria and wipe out the Russian military there because there are only a few thousand Russian military, most of them recruited from the local population in Transnistria. And that wouldn’t be very difficult for the Ukrainian army to finish off this threat behind their lines if they wanted to, because the Ukrainian army of 2024 is not the same Ukrainian army of 2014.
So this congress started as a way to put pressure on the Moldovan authorities. But of course in a few months we will study this case as a very efficient fake news and propaganda operation of the Russian propaganda machine in Moldova. These kinds of congresses are used by the authorities in the region and also in Transnistria to exert pressure whenever the interests of the local elites are threatened by legislation, because, for example, most of the businesses in Transnistria registered with the Moldovan authorities even before the date of the introduction of the new rules. Because if they want to export to the European Union, and the European Union is the main market for Transnistria at the moment, not Russia, but the European Union, including Romania, most of the companies don’t want to lose this market, and they have done the necessary paperwork to continue exporting to the, to the European Union. So, yes, you can also see it as a test for the Moldovan authorities because, as I said, it’s an election year. And of course the pro-Russian forces would like to derail this kind of pro-European course that Moldova has taken. And because the President of the Republic of Moldova, Mrs Maia Sandu, wants to organise a referendum on European integration. So the pro-Russian forces in Moldova are trying to divert attention from everything, to put pressure on everything and to create chaos that could be used by the pro-Russian forces in these two election years.
Malgorzata Kulbaczewska-Figat: You have already answered some of the questions I wanted to ask. So the question of what the Transnistrian authorities wanted to achieve with their declaration. I would like to ask you something else instead. You mentioned that this move by Transnistrian companies, or other companies that have registered on the left bank of the Dniester for economic reasons, is only a signal that Moldova will take even bolder steps against that part of Moldova that constitutes itself as an illegal, unrecognised republic. So what might these further steps be?
If you look at the seven demands of the so-called Congress, which met in Tiraspol on Wednesday, you will see that they are trying to push the Republic of Moldova to take part in the so-called five plus two negotiations with Tiraspol. But this mechanism, it’s not efficient at all, because they allow the Transnistrian government, which considers itself equal to Chișinău, to take its time and not to implement anything, any agreement that they reach. So in some political circles there is a kind of feeling that now it’s time to put more pressure on the separatist authorities on some basic things like human rights. If you look at, um, the work of some NGOs in Moldova, like PROMO-LEX, you will see that a lot of local people from Transnistria are being held on various absurd charges and put in jail for years. And the prisons in Transnistria are the hellholes of Europe.
As far as the political status of Transnistria is concerned, there have to be some negotiations, because for 30 years there have been various attempts to discuss this political aspect. There have been some initiatives funded by the West in the field of democratic societies. They tried to see how different models of European autonomy, like Åland in Finland or Tyrol in Italy, Wales in the UK or even Catalonia and the Basque Country in Spain, could be taken as an example to be implemented in Transnistria. But Tiraspol and of course Moscow, when I say Tiraspol, I mean Moscow, always drag their feet. And they didn’t want to talk about this kind of thing because their goal is not to make Transnistria an autonomous region with a lot of cultural and economic political rights like in other parts of Europe. But they want to make the whole of Moldova into one big Transnistria. If you look back at the discussion before the pandemic and before the escalation of the war in Ukraine by the Russian invasion, you will see that they are proposing the federalisation of the country. But in Moscow’s plans, this kind of federalisation would mean that any political or foreign policy decision, even this European integration, could be vetoed by Transnistria or by Russia, which is another very pro-Russian region in the southern part of Moldova.
Other things that Moldova would like to do is to talk about the removal of the huge ammunition depot in Transnistria, in the Kolbasna region. And, of course, every time the pro-European governments in Chișinău call for the withdrawal of the Russian so-called peacekeepers in Moldova and the demilitarisation of Transnistria, and perhaps calling in an EU-led civilian peacekeeping mission or the UN.
For many people in Moldova these days, the conflict in Transnistria is not a priority, because after three decades people have got used to living with this kind of situation. But because of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, this all started to feel like a big problem again for a lot of people. We should also talk about the internal ethnic cleansing that took place in Transnistria for three decades. Any people, any man, woman or child who does not share the Russian Mir vision of the so-called authorities in Tiraspol is forced to leave, and this is not an issue that is much discussed in Moldova, but we have a few hundred thousand internally displaced people from the region. If you look at Transnistria, you will see that they also control the town of Tighina, the town of Bender, on the right bank of the river. If you go there and if you go to different parts of Transnistria, like Kamenka or Slobozia, you will see that a large part of the population has left the region, of course for economic reasons, but also because there is no recognised Romanian identity. They use this stereotypical so-called Moldovan Soviet identity. It’s very difficult for people to leave. So you see this tactic being used in Ukraine. It is ethnic and political cleansing. So anybody who has a different political opinion from the pro-Russian regime is forced to leave the region with, let’s say, the clothes on their back and they lose any right to their property there. And, of course, any friends or family who remain in the region are subject to the local KGB – the so-called Russian-inspired MGB tactics.
The reaction of the Moldovan government to the events in Tiraspol was surprisingly calm for those commentators in Poland who even said that the declaration from Tiraspol was a good thing, that it could be tantamount to welcoming Russian troops. So, as you argue, in fact nothing of the sort happened in Tiraspol, the events in Tiraspol had mainly propaganda significance and the Moldovan government spokesman said that nothing happened and in fact the world media should not even have covered this event because it was so insignificant. Do you think it was just a propaganda operation or is there something behind it that we may not be able to see at the moment?
They don’t need to call in the Russian army because the Russian army is already there. I think there are almost 2,000 Russian soldiers in the region. And of course, over the last three decades, they have built up the local militia, which has a couple of thousand more soldiers. They have a local Cossack formation, another couple of thousand members. So they don’t have to call in the Russian army. The Russian army is there. But, as I said, a lot of their members are recruited from the local population, against international rules, and only the top leadership of these organisations is made up of officers from Russia, from the Russian Federation proper. And, of course, Transnistria is a great threat to Moldova, Romania and even Poland, because there is a physical and technical presence of all the major intelligence services of the Russian Federation, from the foreign intelligence service SVR to military intelligence and, of course, the FSB.
So if you’re talking about Transnistria, the physical threat from Transnistria, it’s quite a big problem for Ukraine as well. Ukraine is forced to keep a few thousand soldiers, I think two brigades, near Transnistria and the border, to quell any possible problem with Transnistria. But these soldiers could be useful for Ukraine in other parts of Ukrainian territory, against Russia of course.
The Moldovan authorities were, let’s say, surprised by this great interest in the media. Personally, I have also had some discussions on the Internet with international media, including from Poland. And you can see how the media works. They wanted a scoop. They wanted to discover something that other media had not reported. But what happened shows the insecurity of the Moldovan media, because we can’t say that the international media is making a big deal out of nothing. The media started to use the statement of one person. So all this fake news and propaganda operation started from one man, Gennady, who was an official in the interim administration, after that he left the Transnistrian Republic and went to the territory controlled by Chișinău, he started to call himself the leader of the Russian opposition or civil activists/politicians. But to speak of an opposition in Transnistria is a joke. Oleg Khorzhan, the last person who could be, let’s say, an internal opposition, the former leader of the Communist Party, was found dead in Transnistria last year. So it’s not very good for your health to be an opposition leader in Transnistria. And the reaction of the Moldovan government is typical of the reaction of most governments in the East, because they don’t know how to communicate. They should have a more open communication strategy when it comes to not only Transnistria but other problems in Moldova.
It’s also a big problem for the Moldovan media. This hunt for click-bait news and, of course, the pressure from the editors and the owners of this kind of media takes its toll on journalists because they are forced to look for things and perhaps present in a more abrupt way what is happening in some region. But this is also a very good opportunity for the Moldovan government to put more pressure on its allies from the European Union and NATO to start an information campaign about Transnistria, because the transmission problem, it’s all over three decades. It’s not every day that you get this kind of coverage of Transnistria. The last time the international media was so interested in Transnistria, from Al Jazeera to CNN and other media organisations, was when some people from the BBC said that they could buy weapons like rockets from a guy in Transnistria. So these kinds of opportunities could be used by the Moldovan government.
But also the disinformation specialists should look very closely at the way this news was spread, because in my opinion I think this congress was used by the Russian Federation to start something in the Republic of Moldova, but not on the physical part of things, not like a military confrontation. These discussions about Transnistria have covered up a lot of other important things about what the Russians are doing in Moldova. So it was a very successful deception campaign by the Russian Federation against Moldova and against its allies, who used their own media for this Russian disinformation campaign.
You commented on the international and Moldovan reactions or attitudes. But Romania is also an important country when there are discussions about Moldova and Transnistria, and we saw that a former Prime Minister of Romania – Nicolae Ciucă, was even in Chișinău yesterday – on 1 March 2024
And today he is also in Chișinău.
How do you assess the Romanian reactions at the level of institutions and experts to this declaration of the Transnistrian Congress?
Even though the main language in Moldova is Romanian and many Romanian experts know something about Moldova, the reaction of the Romanian media was the same as the reaction of the Western media. We see this kind of desire to have a scoop, to have a big title and to be ahead of everything else. You could see on Romanian television, like Digi 24 or other important news media, a lot of political analysts, experts, military experts, who took on this problem but did not look behind it because, as I said, in 2006 they had a referendum on this issue in the region.
If you just go to Wikipedia or Google something about Transnistria, you will see these results. But because of the Russian war of aggression against the Republic of Moldova, and because in the Republic of Moldova we have over 1 million people from Moldova who have taken the Romanian citizenship course, and there are also tens of thousands of citizens from Bulgaria, Portugal, Italy, France, Germany and the other members of the European Union, the attitude of the Romanian media is easier to understand. Because they want to make news out of it.
For example, this week, from Monday to yesterday, I counted at least 7 or 8 TV teams from Romania that came because of this congress, and this shows a lack of attention of the Romanian media towards the Republic of Moldova in the periods when you do not have this kind of Russian provocation. Of course it’s good that they come to Moldova and talk to people and understand the situation better, because the war in Ukraine occupies most of the daily events of the daily news in Romania, when we talk about foreign policy and foreign policy aspects. There is an increased interest of the Romanian media and Romanian authorities in Moldova. Of course, our President, Mr Klaus Iohannis, the Prime Minister, Mr Ciolacu, they all made a public statement that Romania is behind Moldova, that Moldova has an ally in Romania. So their reaction was what I expected. And of course it was also the reaction of other leaders of European countries.
Moldova has very good relations with European countries. The former Foreign Minister, Mr Nicu Popescu, managed to bring a lot of attention to Moldova through peer-to-peer diplomacy. And his good personal relations with various heads of state or various important decision-makers from the political world in Europe have helped the Republic of Moldova. Let’s not forget that last year, just a few kilometres away from the Russian military base in Bulboaca, there was a big political event for the European political community on 1 June, when tens of heads of state from Germany, France and all over the world came to Moldova and for one day Moldova was the capital of European diplomacy and political power.
Moldova has many friends in the West, but of course Romania remains the main ambassador of Moldova’s European ambitions. When we talk about the European Union, Romania will continue to play an important role in Moldova’s development. But Romania respects its status as a member of the European Union and NATO and will not take any action that could jeopardise the European development of the Republic of Moldova. But of course, as I said, we have election years in Moldova in 2024 and 2025. And it remains to be seen whether the Moldovan electorate will be able to understand that, in addition to the local political scandals and this stalemate, when we talk about reforms, votes must not be given to pro-Russian forces, especially those financed by the fugitive oligarch Ilan Shor.
You mentioned the stalemate on reforms. I would like you to elaborate on this. How is Moldova progressing with the reforms that are supposed to bring it closer to the European Community? If Moldova has friends all over Europe, if many countries declare their support for Moldova’s future European integration, how is the process going at the moment?
It’s not going anywhere. These days they have cancelled the procedure to elect the Prosecutor General of the Republic of Moldova. It’s a big problem, especially the reform of the judicial system. If you don’t have a reformed judiciary, it’s very difficult to reform other parts of society. The European Union, the United States, Romania and other political friends of Moldova had said that they had to carry out these reforms in the judiciary, in the human rights sector and in other important sectors. But so far the reform of the judiciary has been blocked by vested interests in the judiciary, the legal caste of prosecutors and judges who don’t want to lose their grip, their power in the Republic of Moldova. Of course, some political mistakes on the part of the governing party in Moldova have contributed to this kind of tactic to delay this reform as long as necessary. And because we’re going into an election period in Moldova, it’s going to be very difficult to move forward with reforms in the judicial system. Every area in Moldova needs reform, from security and the army to the judiciary and public administration. Moldova has a huge bureaucracy. And they also want to reform the administration. But it’s very difficult because there are different interest groups at the regional level and, of course, at the national level. Every party that has been in power has used this bureaucratic machine to influence every decision in different areas. But when we talk about reform in Moldova, it’s a big problem. And unfortunately, I do not think that we will see any major changes in this regard this year or in the next few years. The European Union has been very patient with Chisinau and hasn’t put a lot of pressure on Moldova. They don’t threaten, for example, not to give money to Moldova if there are no reforms. The money keeps coming.
But unfortunately, various political interests in the ruling party, economic interests and even some Russian interests are delaying this reform, because in Moldova, as in eastern Ukraine, Russia is using criminal elements to propagate its agenda. We have this example of a fugitive oligarch, now living in Israel, who is giving a lot of money to political parties with pro-Russian sentiments. A few years ago, two years ago, they started organising mass demonstrations against the government. They try to take over the main government buildings and they use every opportunity to demonstrate the incompetence of the Moldovan government.
Of course, as I said, Moldova is not very good at communicating. It’s very easy for this oligarch to try to influence things in Moldova. But if Vladimir Plahotniuc and other oligarchs in Moldova, who now live in Turkey or in Israel or in Britain, are being used by the Russian secret services to politically influence the internal life of Moldova. They are using the electoral process to gain power, using a lot of illegal money. This has been proven by various media reports. There’s a very close relationship between the criminal elements in Moldova and Russian political and intelligence interests. Unfortunately, we are going to have very interesting election years in Moldova. But reform will unfortunately come to a standstill in almost all areas. Even when we talk about police reform, judicial reform, administrative reform, economic reform, there are a lot of mistakes made by the government. And these mistakes are compounded by various interest groups that want to keep things the way they are so that the members of these interest groups can prosper more. And of course there’s a lot of cooperation between criminal elements from Transnistria and Moldova. Even if reunification is not possible today, the reunification of the criminal world on both sides of the Dniester is quite complete, that’s a well-known fact. Unfortunately, the Russian presence in Moldova’s public life has become a security risk not only for Moldova, but also for Ukraine, Romania, Poland and other members of the European Union and NATO.
For the last question, I’d like us to move away from the political lights we’ve been discussing and take a look at the social and political attitudes of society. What does Moldovan society think about all this? Are people afraid that the war will escalate? Are they? Are they tired of the lack of reforms, or are they just trying to survive because Moldova is not a prosperous country?
Very good questions, all true. Everybody wants a better life. We have this kind of economic migration towards the European Union. People are very tired of the slow pace of reform, of this kind of no reform phase that we are in. And the pro-European political parties try to use this reform message when we talk about the economy, when we talk about election years. But yes, the population is very tired. Many Moldovan citizens don’t want to live in such a country. And we see a lot of young people, when I say young, I mean the generation from, let’s say, 20 to 40-50 years old, leaving Moldova in droves. And this economic displacement of the population creates a lot of problems for the Moldovan economy. You can’t have a sustainable economy if you don’t have people to work in different sectors.
Moldova was one of the first countries to be affected by this war, with over 1 million Ukrainian refugees passing through Moldova in a matter of weeks. So it’s a big burden for the country. But the people of Moldova have really gone beyond themselves. And they are also organising in Romania. The reaction of the authorities, of course, as in Romania and other countries, has not been very quick. So a lot of local authorities or local organisations started to help Ukrainian refugees. If you look at the political discourse in Moldova, the Russian forces use the slogan ‘we want peace’ without saying who started the war. And the discourse about peace in Moldova is used by pro-Russian forces who say they want peace today, but without talking about how this peace could be achieved by Russian withdrawal from Ukraine.
But if you look at their discourse, they say we want peace. Of course, the people of Moldova are tired of this war. We have some cases of Ukrainian refugees being attacked. But these kinds of actions, if you look very carefully, you find that the authors are in one way or another linked to the Russian Federation. And most of the Ukrainian refugees in Moldova are women and children. So there are also a lot of economic problems that started when the Russians invaded Ukraine on a large scale with a large army.
Speaking from my own experience, prices have been rising since the war started. The prices of basic things like housing and food have gone up. In Romania, in Poland, we have protests organised by farmers against Ukrainian grain coming into the Moldovan market. And now people are starting to get used to this war. You see, many of us in Moldova are now, I think, 116,000 Ukrainian refugees registered with the authorities in Moldova. There is a large community of ethnic Romanians in Ukraine. And many of them have links with Moldova. Some of them have Moldovan or Romanian citizenship. And these people, if they don’t register with the authorities, are no longer considered refugees. So the actual number of people from Ukraine in Moldova could be higher.
And, of course, when we talk about the expectations of Moldova’s pro-European politicians and people. They agree that European integration is the best way forward for Moldova. They are grateful for Ukraine’s resistance to Russian aggression, because Moldovans who believe in the European Union and want to be part of it understand that if Ukraine fails, Moldova will be next. The freedom of the Republic of Moldova every day that the Republic of Moldova has as an independent country has a lot to do with Ukraine resisting Russian aggression, because people in Moldova should understand and politicians should understand that if the war in Ukraine enters a quieter phase, let’s say a ceasefire or some kind of peace, the attention of the Russian Federation will start, the attention of the Russian Federation will start to increase when we talk about the Republic of Moldova, because even with all the resources that are being drawn into the war against Ukraine, Russia is giving a lot of money and a lot of attention to the internal situation in the Republic of Moldova. And it’s only a matter of time before that attention starts to have an effect. And I hope that in a few years we won’t be talking about a government or an exile of the Republic of Moldova, or let’s say we won’t be talking about refugees from the war in Moldova. But yes, it is a big threat. And of course everybody jumps when we talk about this congress in Transnistria, but it has to be very clear that if Russian tanks, which I doubt, but let’s say, you know, history is always surprising, if Russian tanks reach the region of Transnistria, I think the Republic of Moldova will become a colony of the Russian Federation, because Russian propaganda has already conquered a lot of hearts and minds in the Republic of Moldova. And it’s very difficult for the European Union to make any headway in Moldova because, as I said, of the lack of reforms and, of course, the political scandals that are part of the daily life of a small country in Eastern Europe.
We have just had a conversation across the border with Mihai Isac, a Romanian political analyst who is very knowledgeable about international politics in the Black Sea region. It is important that the attention to this region is not only caused by geopolitical problems. And I think in this talk we also touched on some issues of people’s lives and the need for these societies here to develop and be secure and not just be a geopolitical ransom. Thank you very much for this talk. I would like to invite all our listeners to follow us on a number of social networks such as Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Spotify, Substack.
Photo: (source: Cross-border Talks)
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