Romania, Türkiye’s gateway to SAFE billions. How Ankara can replicate the Otokar model in the EU and join Europe’s defense efforts

Adrian A, B1 TV, 15 July 2026

Summary

Ankara is utilizing a localized industrial strategy to enter the European defense market and access the EU’s SAFE program—a military procurement loan mechanism providing up to €150 billion to member states. By acquiring European factories and forming joint ventures, Turkish defense firms are transitioning from external suppliers to localized EU manufacturers, bypassing formal political restrictions.

Key Pillars of Türkiye’s Strategy

1. The Romanian Model (Otokar)

• The Acquisition: Otokar acquired 96.77% of Romania’s Automecanica Mediaș for €85 million, transforming it into a regional hub for armored vehicles.
• The Blueprint: Through a contract for 1,059 COBRA II vehicles for the Romanian Army, nearly 800 will be produced locally. While this specific contract predates SAFE, the established infrastructure positions Otokar to qualify for future SAFE-funded projects through local certification by Bucharest.

2. Replication Across Europe (Italy and Poland)

• Italy: Baykar acquired Piaggio Aerospace and partnered with defense giant Leonardo to form LBA Systems (a 50/50 joint venture) to manufacture unmanned aerial systems.
• Poland: Cooperation is progressing from direct drone purchases to deeper defense industry collaboration.
• Target Markets: Türkiye targets EU nations that have high SAFE allocations, underfunded domestic factories, and an urgent need for cost-effective military equipment.

The SAFE Program barriers & loopholes

The SAFE framework imposes strict eligibility criteria for third-country entities:

• At least 65% of component costs must originate within the EU, Ukraine, or EEA-EFTA states.
• Production infrastructure must be located within these regions.
• Foreign-controlled entities must clear strict investment screenings and provide security guarantees regarding classified data and operational independence.

The Loophole: The regulation allows third-country-controlled firms to participate if the host EU member state verifies the investment and accepts the security guarantees, making countries like Romania the “gateway” for Turkish entry.

Strategic Motivations and Risks

Why the EU is Accommodating Türkiye

• Production Deficits: European defense manufacturers are struggling with slow delivery times and high costs.
• Pragmatism: Turkish companies deliver combat-tested, NATO-compliant drones, armored vehicles, and ammunition rapidly and at competitive prices.

Strategic Risks for Europe

• Autonomy Concerns: Localized assembly does not equal strategic independence. Critical components, software updates, intellectual property, and long-term maintenance remain controlled by parent companies in Türkiye.
• Geopolitical Misalignment: Türkiye maintains economic ties with Russia and shares only a 4% alignment with the EU’s foreign and security policy, raising fears of supply chain blockades during political crises.

Safeguards for Host Nations (The Romanian Blueprint)

To ensure these partnerships yield genuine domestic value rather than just financing Turkish expansion, host nations must enforce strict conditions on future contracts:

• Mandatory technology transfer and access to full technical documentation.
• Local production of critical components and full domestic repair/maintenance capabilities.
• Clear export rights for the localized factories.
• Legal protections ensuring no external political vetoes can restrict the deployment or modification of the equipment.

Article

Romania risks becoming the case study through which Türkiye demonstrates that it can enter the European defense market even before Ankara gains full political access to the SAFE program. Otokar’s acquisition of Automecanica Mediaș, the local production of armored vehicles, and the growing military ties between Bucharest and Ankara are shaping a model that could be replicated in other member states: Turkish companies are buying European factories, creating joint ventures, and attempting to transition from being external suppliers to local manufacturers.

The stakes are enormous. SAFE provides EU member states with loans of up to 150 billion euros for military procurement and production, and Romania receives one of the largest allocations, approximately 16.7 billion euros. Türkiye cannot directly access these funds, but it can attempt to secure contracts financed through companies based within the EU.

Romania: The First Major Test for Türkiye’s Industrial Strategy

The current focus is on Otokar’s acquisition of Automecanica Mediaș. The Turkish company acquired 96.77% of the Romanian firm’s equity for approximately 85 million euros and transformed the factory into a regional hub for the production of armored vehicles.

This move is linked to the contract to deliver 1,059 COBRA II vehicles to the Romanian Army, valued at approximately 4.26 billion lei, excluding VAT. According to Otokar, nearly 800 of the vehicles are to be produced in Romania. Otokar – the Automecanica acquisition and COBRA II production

The COBRA II contract should not automatically be confused with a SAFE-funded project. It was signed in November 2024, before the SAFE regulation came into effect. However, the industrial infrastructure established in Mediaș can be leveraged for future European contracts.

This is the strategic element: Otokar is no longer merely a Turkish exporter, but the owner of a factory in an EU member state, with Romanian employees, local infrastructure, and production capabilities compliant with NATO standards.

A company acquired in Romania does not automatically become eligible for SAFE

Simply registering a subsidiary in an EU member state is not sufficient to access SAFE contracts.

The program is a lending instrument, not a grant fund. The Commission borrows on behalf of the EU, and the beneficiary states must repay the amounts.

Only member states receive funding; companies benefit through the contracts they enter into. EU Council – How SAFE Works

The rules stipulate that:

• at least 65% of the cost of components must originate from the EU, Ukraine, or EEA-EFTA states;
• the infrastructure used for the contract must, in principle, be located in these states;
• companies controlled by entities from third countries must undergo investment screening or provide security guarantees;
• third-country access to classified information must be prevented;
• for complex systems, the manufacturer must be able to modify the equipment without restrictions imposed from outside the EU.

The regulation does, however, allow a company established in the EU but controlled by an entity from a third country to participate if the member state verifies the investment and accepts the guarantees offered. The SAFE Regulation – Eligibility Conditions

Consequently, Romania cannot automatically include Otokar in SAFE simply because the company owns a factory in Mediaș. But Bucharest can play a decisive role in certifying the local structure, verifying the guarantees, and developing joint projects compatible with European rules.

This is the “gateway” that Türkiye is trying to open.

Türkiye may replicate this model in other EU countries

The Romanian scenario is no exception. In Italy, the strategy is even more advanced.

Baykar, the manufacturer of Bayraktar drones, has received approval from Italian authorities to acquire Piaggio Aerospace, a company engaged in the design, production, and maintenance of aircraft and engines. Italian Ministry of Industry – Piaggio Aerospace acquisition

Subsequently, Baykar and Leonardo established LBA Systems, a joint venture in which each partner holds a 50% stake, with its legal and operational headquarters in Italy. The company will design, manufacture, and maintain unmanned aerial systems for the European and international markets. Leonardo – the joint venture with Baykar

In Romania, the approach involves acquiring a factory and taking control. In Italy, we have both an acquisition and an alliance with one of the major European manufacturers. In Poland, discussions have progressed from the purchase of Bayraktar drones to cooperation between the defense industries. Polish Ministry of Defense – cooperation with Türkiye

This model can be replicated in countries that simultaneously have:

• significant allocations or projects through SAFE;
• factories in need of capital and orders;
• a shortage of technology or production capacity;
• functional political relations with Ankara;
• an urgent need for cheaper and readily available equipment.

Türkiye does not necessarily need to secure a general agreement with Brussels from the outset. It can move forward factory by factory and contract by contract, building its industrial presence from within the European market.

What Erdogan Is After

Ankara’s objective is not merely access to a portion of the 150 billion euros. Türkiye aims to change the way its industry is treated.

Erdogan wants Turkish companies to no longer be seen as mere external suppliers, vulnerable to political vetoes and European restrictions.

If Baykar, Otokar, Aselsan, or Roketsan manufacture in the EU alongside local partners, excluding them becomes much more difficult.

Türkiye would thus gain:

• long-term European contracts;
• access to technology and certification;
• revenue from maintenance and modernization;
• influence over European military standards;
• access to Ukraine’s reconstruction;
• political legitimacy in its relationship with Brussels;
• arguments for negotiating its own agreement to participate in SAFE.

At the NATO summit in Ankara, Erdogan insisted that Europe’s security cannot be imagined without Türkiye. The presence of Turkish companies in Romania and Italy now allows him to argue that even the European defense industry can no longer be built without Ankara.

Why would the EU accept this compromise with Türkiye

Europe has strict rules, but also an urgent problem: it isn’t producing fast enough.

Turkish industry can deliver drones, armored vehicles, ammunition, ships, and electronic systems at a pace and at costs that many Western manufacturers struggle to match. Moreover, Turkish equipment is already in use by NATO countries and has been tested in real conflicts.

For some European governments, the choice may come down to pragmatism: wait years for more expensive Western capabilities, or accept localized Turkish production, jobs, and rapid deliveries.

If Türkiye agrees to European oversight of classified information, a significant share of EU-produced components, and the freedom to modify the systems, Brussels may view the cooperation as an acceptable compromise.

The Risk: Europe Is Funding the Strengthening of a Power It Does Not Control

The problem is that localizing production does not automatically mean European autonomy.

A factory in Romania may assemble vehicles, but critical components, intellectual property, software, export rights, and decisions regarding modernization may remain with the parent company in Türkiye.

In the event of a political crisis between Ankara and the EU, dependence could arise in:

• the delivery of spare parts;
• software updates;
• the supply of ammunition;
• export authorization;
• access to technical documentation;
• long-term maintenance.

There is also the issue of Türkiye’s relationship with Russia. Ankara does not enforce European sanctions against Moscow, and the European Commission’s 2025 report indicated a level of alignment of only 4% with the EU’s foreign and security policy. European Commission – Report on Türkiye

For France, Greece, or Cyprus, the expansion of Turkish companies into European industry may seem like a way for Erdoğan to reap the benefits of membership without accepting the Union’s political obligations.

What Romania Should Demand from Türkiye

For Bucharest, Turkish investment can be profitable if Romania is not left with just the factory buildings, wages, and the obligation to repay SAFE loans.

Future contracts should ensure:

• the integration of Romanian suppliers;
• verifiable technology transfer;
• full local repair capacity;
• access to technical documentation;
• the right to modify and modernize equipment;
• local production of critical components;
• export rights for the Romanian factory;
• protection of classified information;
• elimination of the possibility of an external political veto on the use of the products.

Without these conditions, Romania could end up financing the expansion of a Turkish company through European loans, while technological control and the lion’s share of the profits would remain outside the country.

Türkiye wants to enter SAFE through the back door. Romania could be one of those doors

It is highly likely that Türkiye will try to replicate the Romanian model in other countries as well. In fact, the case of Italy shows that the process has already begun.

Ankara’s strategy is consistent: acquiring European industrial capacity, creating joint ventures, and localizing production in countries that will receive SAFE loans. At the same time, Erdoğan will continue to apply political pressure for an agreement that would grant Turkish industry broader eligibility.

Romania stands to gain factories, technology, jobs, and military capability. But it could also set a precedent whereby Türkiye enters the European market without aligning itself politically with the EU.

The question is not whether Turkish companies should be allowed access. The question is who will control the technology, production, and strategic decision-making once the loans have been spent.

Photo: (source: B1, AI-generated)

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