Mihai Isac: Sofia should be much more involved in the Republic of Moldova

Vladimir Mitev

Summary

• NATO 3.0 Summit and Black Sea security: The Ankara meeting reaffirms the desire for cooperation between Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey (demining missions, aerial surveillance, infrastructure protection). However, the Montreux Convention prevents a permanent presence of NATO ships from outside the region, and the Black Sea remains, in the opinion of analyst Mihai Isac, insufficiently utilised strategically by Western partners.
• Romanian-Turkish defence cooperation: Turkey has achieved a high degree of self-sufficiency in its defence industry. Romania wishes to capitalise on its close diplomatic relationship for the procurement and production of armaments, although their strategic interests differ in some respects (Bucharest wants a permanent NATO presence, whilst Ankara prefers to keep the sea closed to non-littoral states).
• The Romanian-Bulgarian partnership: Although the Romanian and Bulgarian armed forces cooperate very well at a technical level, there is a lack of vision at a political level. The two countries will jointly host the European security hub on the Black Sea, but are missing out on opportunities due to a lack of joint industrial and infrastructure projects (such as the development of a combined Danube military fleet or joint procurement).
• Internal political instability: Both Romania (marked by political rivalries, the risk of snap elections and the management of internal crises) and Bulgaria have suffered from political instability. This situation is holding back long-term projects and high-level bilateral dialogue.
• Airspace security incidents: The shooting down of foreign drones by the Romanian Air Force signals a shift in attitude and greater resolve on the part of the authorities in Bucharest, although the use of fighter jets against low-cost drones raises issues of long-term economic sustainability.
• The government transition in Chișinău: The Republic of Moldova is undergoing a change of government against a backdrop of corruption scandals and social unrest. The new Tofan Cabinet faces pressure to reform the judiciary without the benefit of the usual grace period.
• Moldova’s European path: Although technical integration and Maia Sandu’s diplomacy are making progress, Moldova remains vulnerable to external geopolitical blockades and the consequences of population outflow. There is a need to strengthen direct bilateral relations with all European capitals, including Sofia.
• Sofia’s relationship with the Bulgarian community in Bessarabia: Bulgaria has a historical duty towards ethnic Bulgarians in the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine. Mihai Isac argues that Sofia should become much more actively involved through investment and direct educational and cultural support in the region (such as the university project in Taraclia), in order to prevent their assimilation or permanent departure from the area.

Interview

Introduction

Mihai Isac is a journalist based in Chișinău, Moldova. With nearly two decades’ experience in the media in the Republic of Moldova and Romania, he is a journalist at TVR Moldova and a regular guest on the channel’s weekly foreign affairs programme ‘Global Impact’. He also contributes regularly to media outlets in Bulgaria, Turkey, Romania, Ukraine, Poland, the Republic of Moldova, Italy, Serbia and Spain as a political analyst, focusing in particular on the former Soviet space, the wider Black Sea region and the Middle East.

The NATO Summit and Defence Relations in the Black Sea Region

Mr Isac, this month, July 2026, the NATO summit took place in Ankara, which was conceived as the summit of a new type of NATO, known as NATO 3.0. Of course, it was a very important event for our region as well. How has the situation in the Black Sea, as well as the outlook and defence relations relating to the Black Sea region, changed as a result of this summit?

The recent drone incidents have demonstrated the importance of Romania and Bulgaria’s status as NATO member states. In the short term, we cannot yet see these changes, apart from a much clearer political will on the part of NATO member states in the region. Of course, we are seeing an expansion of cooperation between Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey regarding the protection of strategic infrastructure. In practice, we are witnessing the formalisation of security measures previously implemented by the Joint Maritime Group, as well as by other military structures in these three countries. Because, it is true, we are seeing the Joint Naval Group’s mine-clearing operations, but at the same time — according to unofficial information from sources — there are numerous collaborative efforts regarding joint air surveillance, the activities of military and civilian intelligence services, special forces operations and, of course, we are also talking about certain joint strategies drawn up by the three NATO states with access to the Black Sea to respond to security threats. And here we are not just talking about the major threat posed by the Russian Federation, but also about the activities of non-state terrorist entities, and more besides.

At the same time, the domestic policies of all the states in the region prevent a permanent NATO naval presence in the Black Sea. Of course, the Montreux Convention is a double-edged sword. It provides a sense of security, so to speak, by not allowing military vessels that do not belong to littoral states to enter the Black Sea. But, at the same time, we must understand that NATO, as a politico-military organisation, has member states with strong naval traditions, such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Italy, Spain and others — states which could, through their naval presence in the Black Sea, make up for the shortfalls we currently face.

Of course, we also viewed this summit as a foreign policy triumph for President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. For Romania, it was a reaffirmation of Turkey’s status as a privileged ally within Romania’s Black Sea security architecture. Romania recently acquired a military vessel from Turkey to make up for the lack of a modern naval fleet. At present, unfortunately, the Romanian Naval Forces remain the Cinderella of the military structures, as the necessary funds have not been allocated for decades. There have also been a number of problems with the procurement procedures for new vessels, the most recent being the frigate scandal.

But it also reaffirms the fact that this military diplomacy may be far more advanced in terms of cooperation between Ankara, Sofia and Bucharest than in other areas. To discuss this summit and its actual outcomes, we will need to have another discussion in a few months’ time, because, even though a number of decisions have been announced, it remains to be seen whether they can actually be implemented — such as, for example, Turkish firms’ access to the SAFE programmes despite Greece’s opposition, or policy changes in certain countries, including the recent political developments in Sofia. It is, in any case, a step forward. We can see that the Ankara summit is effectively a continuation of last year’s summit, and we look forward to seeing the concrete results in a few months’ time.

For the Pontic region, however, this summit did not, in my view, yield the expected outcome, as the Black Sea should have been a much more prominent topic. We are no longer a peripheral region; we are a strategically important region, but there is still no clear understanding of this on the part of Western states. There are also certain issues, such as, for example, the funding of NATO’s military activities in the region and those of the European Union, because the protection provided by Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey in this area also safeguards the economic interests of other states, such as Italy, Spain or Greece. It would be a positive development if these costs were to be borne to some extent by other states as well, in order to provide better protection, which would, of course, result in significantly lower economic costs – costs that may be incurred due to rapid security developments.

Romanian-Turkish cooperation in the field of defence

This month, we have also noticed an increase in the number of articles in the Romanian press concerning Romanian-Turkish cooperation regarding Romania’s defence and the development of the defence industry. You yourself mentioned that it seems Turkey hopes to gain access, through such cooperation, to SAFE funds. What is the current state of this Romanian-Turkish cooperation? What further developments can we expect in this partnership?

According to certain studies, Turkey has now reached a level of self-sufficiency of 70–80 per cent, but it still faces challenges in implementing advanced programmes, such as fifth-generation aircraft. Turkey has distinguished itself through the rapid development of drone systems — we recall the famous Bayraktar drones, which played a significant role in halting Russian armoured offensives in 2022–2023. We are also witnessing the rapid expansion of Turkey’s military presence around the world: we are talking about a massive military presence in Somalia, Libya, Qatar and other regions. We know that Turkey plays a privileged role in the foreign policy of the Balkan states.

Romania is currently cooperating with Turkey in various fields, including the production of various weapon systems. This cooperation could be taken much further if certain measures were taken to grant Turkey access to the SAFE programmes. The issue of Turkey’s integration into the European Union’s defence strategy is more political than technical. It is clear that the European Union and its Member States would stand to gain from this, but at the same time, we must ensure that this cooperation with Turkey does not turn into a dependence on the Turkish defence industry, which, as we know, can be very easily influenced by the political decisions of President Erdoğan or those who may succeed him in this role.

The European Union, as you are well aware, has a special relationship with Turkey. We are talking about important political issues, ranging from the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus to the migrant crisis and other geopolitical matters. But Romania has an interest in cooperating with Turkey. Unfortunately, we see that there is not a great deal of openness or interest in initiating military cooperation with Bulgaria, despite the fact that Bulgaria’s defence industry is much stronger than Romania’s, employing, according to official figures, approximately 65–70 thousand people and serving as one of the sources of armaments for Ukraine, thereby also bolstering the Bulgarian national budget, which has received several billion every year since 2022. I know it sounds very cynical when we talk in figures, but we must understand that the need to strengthen our defence is paramount. We can no longer be blackmailed by Russia with the threat of war and forced to make political concessions that could endanger our own democracy in the future. At present, we are investing in our own democracy, as long as we see no glimmer of hope that the Russian Federation will become democratic. It is clear that we must prepare for the worst.

However, as regards military cooperation between Romania and Turkey, there are a great many negotiations and a great many meetings, both official and unofficial, and Romania is trying, in a way, to capitalise on its privileged political and economic relations with Turkey to extend them to the military sphere as well. The Turkish state has been directly involved in the protection of Romanian airspace through air policing missions. There is good cooperation between the Romanian and Turkish armed forces, and we can expect that in future the Turkish side may sell certain weapons systems to the Romanian side.

We must understand that Turkey’s interests and Romania’s interests regarding the framework for ensuring security in the Black Sea are, in my view, somewhat different. Whilst Romania would like a permanent NATO military presence, we see that Turkey continues to use the provisions of the 1936 Montreux Convention to keep this sea closed to non-littoral states. Furthermore, the construction of the new canal linking the Sea of Marmara and the Black Sea will provide a new strategic advantage to Turkey, which possesses an impressive naval fleet and will be able to move military units much more easily between the Aegean Sea, the Sea of Marmara and the Black Sea.

But, once again, it would be a mistake for NATO’s defence to be dependent on just one state, or two states (editor’s note: Romania and Bulgaria), or even three states, including Turkey, in the region; the Black Sea needs to become a second Baltic Sea in terms of security guarantees and the military and civilian instruments made available to ensure security. Turkey, of course, has an interest in selling as many weapons systems as possible, including for financial reasons and to exert political influence. In the short term, we can meet these needs through arms purchases, but without strengthening a Romanian defence industry that forms part of this wider European military ecosystem, it will be very difficult for Romania to remain a major market leader or a political leader, because we recognise that the scale of the defence industry confers an important political role upon a state.

The examples of Turkey and Bulgaria are also significant. Bulgaria plays a key role in supporting Ukraine, and this affords Sofia a certain degree of manoeuvre in its relations with Brussels. We have recently witnessed the developments between Sofia and Brussels regarding the inclusion of Russian Patriarch Kirill’s name on the sanctions list – and not just his. So we have a sign in this regard and, at the risk of discussing this at greater length than intended, we must mention that it is a pity that Romania and Bulgaria have not yet had any clear military projects, given that, for example, the Danube is an important area for both countries. Romania has the strongest riverine military fleet within the NATO bloc, but Bulgaria’s experience in this field is also not to be overlooked; for instance, we could discuss a possible programme to strengthen the defence of both countries and of NATO in this area – perhaps joint naval projects – but, of course, these matters can be better developed by specialists.

The European security hub in the Black Sea, co-hosted by Romania and Bulgaria

It is likely that Romanian-Bulgarian cooperation in the defence industry does not have the same scope as that between Romania and Turkey might have, because Romania and Bulgaria need to modernise their defence industries or upgrade their existing systems; and, in this respect, they may not be able to offer the same to their neighbour, which faces a similar challenge. But you can see that Romanian-Bulgarian cooperation is, in a way, progressing with regard to, for example, this joint Black Sea demining operation. On the other hand, it was recently decided that Romania and Bulgaria will jointly host a security hub on the Black Sea. What can be said about this hub, and what sort of press coverage or reactions are emerging on the Romanian side regarding these existing collaborations between Romanians and Bulgarians?

The Romanian and Bulgarian sides have been waging a veritable behind-the-scenes battle over this Black Sea security hub. The European Union has tried to have it both ways by offering both countries resources to implement this programme. For the time being, we do not see any clear results, but nor can we expect immediate results, given that we are talking about an ambitious programme that requires a longer period of time to implement.

I believe that the situation of the defence industry in Bulgaria and Romania is an issue that could also be resolved by accessing European or other funds to launch joint projects. Because, we must understand, with political will anything is possible, and we are now paying the price, three decades on, for the lack of clear interest on the part of political actors on both sides of the Danube in this regard, even though, at one point, there may have been some discussions. For example, Romania and Bulgaria could have joint naval units on the Danube; here we could be talking about marines, or units for the protection and surveillance of strategic Danube infrastructure, given that there is so much talk about bridges, pipelines and other types of critical infrastructure. So, if the political will were there, it could be done.

The Romanian and Bulgarian armies cooperate far more effectively than politicians do, and this has been particularly true since 2007. A great many Romanian and Bulgarian soldiers have taken part in international peacekeeping missions. Romanian and Bulgarian military units participate jointly in a great many exercises, both within the two countries and elsewhere. This camaraderie between soldiers could be translated into the political sphere, if the will were there. But, of course, we are talking about certain economic interests.

And, first and foremost, when we talk about the defence industries, it is true that there should also be impetus from the business community. Because, after all, part of the arms industry in Bulgaria or Romania consists of privately-owned companies. So we must not be overly lenient with our political class in this regard, because it is clear that most politicians lack the necessary background to understand this importance, and so a push is needed.

But things can always be done better. We are currently witnessing a resurgence of intentions to collaborate from other states: we are seeing statements from Germany regarding cooperation with Romania, and statements from other states that would like to launch military projects with Romania, naturally within the framework of SAFE, but we must examine such intentions very carefully, so that the region does not become dependent on imports of defence equipment from other countries.

And even now, speaking with you, I realise just how much funding Romania and Bulgaria have lost due to a lack of political will. Even though the defence industry in both countries has not been modernised, certain sectors of the defence industry could still have been developed by accessing funding or through specific joint initiatives. We can talk about artificial intelligence, we can talk about drones, we can talk about robotic combat systems, or we can talk about the development of light weapon systems and the construction of military vessels – both river and sea-going – given that both countries have experience in this area. For example, ships were built in Romania for the naval fleet of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. So there is such experience that could be utilised.

Just last week, we saw the Indian President’s visit to the Republic of Moldova, the Republic of North Macedonia and Romania. We know that India is a key leader in the Global South, a country with significant nuclear capabilities, and one with interests in the defence industry. Perhaps it would have been better if this visit had not been organised via Chișinău, Skopje and Bucharest, but rather if the President of India had been welcomed jointly by his counterparts from Bulgaria and Romania. Unfortunately, however, there is still no clear understanding of just how much Bulgaria can mean to Romania, and just how much Romania can mean to Bulgaria.

We do, of course, have certain historical ties which are currently being neglected. We focus more on problems than on solutions, and more on the things that divide us than on the things that unite us. And it is only a matter of time before other countries, with far more skilful political leadership, take advantage of this.

But there are many initiatives, particularly private ones, which can bring the two banks of the Danube closer together. Unfortunately, however, a great deal of water will flow down the Danube before we see any results that truly make a difference.

The political crisis in Romania

It is probably very important, first and foremost, for cooperation, that we have stable governments, and that this recurring political crisis in our countries does not occur so frequently. Here I would like to ask about the development of the political crisis in Romania, which began in the spring and is still ongoing — and it seems it will continue for some time yet; some say even until September and so on. How will this political crisis end? How likely is it that there will be snap elections in Romania — something which, I believe, has never happened before? What is the nature of this political crisis, actually? Why is it so difficult for the various parties, which have worked together so closely, to see eye to eye?

Half in jest, half in earnest, we used to see frequent statements in the media about the ‘Romanianisation’ of political life in Bulgaria and the ‘Bulgarisation’ of political life in Romania. In Romania, the political crisis was triggered by personal interests and the ambitions of certain political leaders. Unfortunately, we see that these crises are being perpetuated by the ambiguity of the political ambitions of the leaders in Bucharest. We see attempts to shift the responsibility for this crisis onto the shoulders of others. At the same time, we are also witnessing worrying developments within the pro-European political camp.

I do not believe we will see the political situation stabilise any time soon. Perhaps a solution will be found for a caretaker government to steer Romania’s economic and political destiny for a few months. I believe early elections are drawing ever closer. The shocks that will follow this autumn and winter will be settled at the ballot box. It is highly likely that this strategy of forming a cordon sanitaire to keep populist forces at bay will no longer yield the desired result.

At the same time, we are seeing how the ambitions of petty individuals – for we cannot call them anything else – among certain political leaders are leading to a weakening of the Romanian state’s ability to function, and indeed of the Bulgarian state at a certain point. I believe that, at this point, Bulgaria has, to some extent, escaped the threat of a prolonged political crisis. The Radev government appears to have understood certain red lines that were drawn for the Orbán government and is navigating within those lines to maintain good relations with Brussels and access to European funds.

In Romania, for the time being, political leaders are hiding behind grand words and very grandiose statements, but they are not currently focused on resolving this crisis; their sole objective is to undermine the political opposition and the parties they regard as targets, and, of course, there is a complete shirking of responsibility for the situation that has arisen. I have not seen a single political leader take responsibility for any mistakes made, and, in practice, we are witnessing a game of attrition, waiting for something to happen, without being prepared to make concessions. But, as I was saying, we are talking about the personal ambitions of former Prime Minister Bolojan, the leaders of the Social Democratic Party, and President Nicușor Dan. So it is clear that we will have a few more weeks of apparent calm, but full of negotiations behind closed doors.

The Air Force has shot down drones over Romanian territory

The week we are discussing was also marked by the fact that, for the first time, the Romanian Air Force shot down foreign drones. What comes next following this incident? How do you view the reactions of the Romanian authorities, who were previously much more cautious about such actions? Can we expect this level of firmness in future when it comes to defending Romania’s borders?

It is clear that, following the NATO 3.0 summit and the developments on the propaganda front that we witnessed in the wake of the incidents in Galați and Constanța, the authorities have streamlined the way in which these situations are coordinated. In practice, we are seeing a change in the way crisis situations are managed. Just this Saturday morning, a second drone was shot down within two days. Subsequently, the Romanian side shot down another drone, and the Russian ambassador in Bucharest was summoned to the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The authorities in Bucharest decided to recall the Romanian ambassador to Moscow for consultations, as well as to expel a Russian diplomat. For its part, the Russian side has threatened to implement similar measures.

This firm stance can be understood in the context of the intentions of President Nicușor Dan (editor’s note: who is the commander-in-chief of the Romanian Armed Forces, in accordance with the Constitution), as well as those of the current government, to demonstrate to the Romanian public and the Romanian electorate that these drones are being intercepted. Following the incident in Galați, where two people were injured, and the incident in the port of Constanța, there is already widespread public outrage. Against a backdrop of ever-increasing defence spending – which, of course, should be better understood and explained to the public – such tough measures and the responses provided by the Romanian side are an attempt to implement as firm a strategy as possible in the face of the Russian Federation’s actions; but unfortunately, in the long term, this is not a viable strategy. Such a drone may cost several tens of thousands of euros or dollars, but the operating costs of an F-16 fighter jet or the cost of the missiles used to shoot down these drones are far higher than the cost of a single drone. From an economic point of view, it is not a viable strategy.

This is not the first time a Romanian F-16 pilot has shot down a drone. This also happened on the Baltic front, when a Romanian pilot from an air sub-unit that was part of the air policing mission in the region to protect the Baltic states – NATO member states – shot down a Russian drone. So it was only a matter of time before this began to happen more frequently in the Black Sea region as well. This is an area of the Black Sea that the Russian Federation has treated as its own backyard when it comes to drone incursions. We must understand that these drones are not sent out at random. They are deliberately sent into the airspace of target states, because, if we look at the area where this drone was shot down – a few hundred kilometres from the front line – we realise that these drones are effectively an extension of the process of re-imperialisation of the Russian Federation’s foreign policy.

The fall of the Munteanu cabinet and the formation of the Tofan government in the Republic of Moldova

Romania is not the only country undergoing a transition between a government that has resigned and a new government: the Republic of Moldova is currently at the same stage. It is interesting that there has been little discussion in the Romanian press, or in the region in general, about the reasons for the fall of the Munteanu government, which were linked to corruption scandals and the appointment of associates of the ruling party, PAS, to well-paid posts. So what can we expect from the government led by Mr Tofan, who has been appointed Prime Minister? In what way will it bring something new compared to the Munteanu Government, given that accession to the European Union was, in theory, a priority for Munteanu too? And, last but not least, how will it be ensured that the previous corruption scandals will not be repeated? Can we expect a qualitative change in this regard as well?

No, we certainly cannot expect any change in the short term. There will undoubtedly be further revelations in this regard. We must understand very clearly that the problem of corruption in the Republic of Moldova did not arise with the PAS. It is a systemic problem. We are paying the price for three decades during which practically nothing was done in this regard.

PAS came to power with a strong anti-corruption agenda, and the public certainly had higher expectations. In particular, the involvement of certain members of the President’s extended family has made this case even more high-profile. The Moldatsa case, where a key post was filled by someone without the necessary qualifications, and other similar cases over time have made these issues increasingly sensitive and open to exploitation by pro-Russian propaganda. But we are talking about a genuine public outcry against this situation – a justified outcry. We must understand that we are talking about salaries that defy common sense, not only in the Republic of Moldova but also in European countries.

But in the short term, we cannot expect any major changes. The Munteanu government resigned following a conflict between Prime Minister Munteanu and a number of PAS leaders. It is clear that this fight against corruption is also one of the reasons for his resignation, because there are a number of political figures who seem untouchable, and Prime Minister Munteanu tried to take a series of measures. I am not saying that the vast majority of the PAS party is not fighting corruption, but there are many indications of vested interests – interests of a less than lawful nature – which certain businesspeople with links to PAS or certain senior officials may have.

But at the moment, PAS is paying the price for the fact that, for decades, no measures were taken in this regard. Prime Minister Tofan has already been hit by his first political scandal. The Minister of Agriculture resigned after it emerged that he had concealed part of his political past, having been a member of the Democratic Party, the former party of the oligarch Plahotniuc. Of course, this scandal does not bode well for Prime Minister Tofan. But it will be a while yet before we understand what red lines Mr Tofan has negotiated in this regard and what we can expect.

It is important to realise that, at this stage, Prime Minister Tofan will not be granted a 100-day grace period, as is generally the case, and we must also expect a series of protests against the price rises expected in the coming period. It is extremely important that the Tofan Government attaches particular importance to the fight against corruption; this is both a warning offered as friendly advice and a point repeatedly emphasised by Brussels. The fight against corruption will need to yield results in the coming period, but, of course, it is difficult to discuss this when we have a corrupt justice system and when we see that the reform has not yet produced the desired outcome.

The Europeanisation of the Republic of Moldova

You spend at least a few days every week in Chișinău and, more generally, in the Republic of Moldova. How noticeable is Europeanisation in this country, which is making rapid strides towards the European Union? Yet I suspect that transforming into a European state takes time and requires changes not only in legislation but also within society, in various power dynamics, and perhaps even in the economic structure, and so on. How much progress is being made and to what extent is Europeanisation visible in the Republic of Moldova, and how realistic is it that the country will join the European Union in the coming years?

Efforts are being made towards reform, but the population is also dissatisfied, given the high costs involved. Furthermore, we can say that, from the perspective of the people of the Republic of Moldova, Chișinău is, to a greater or lesser extent, integrated into the European Union, with the vast majority of the population holding passports from EU Member States. And we are not just talking about Romania, but also Bulgaria, Portugal, Italy, Germany, Spain, Greece and Cyprus. There is practically no EU Member State in which there is not a small community of citizens of the Republic of Moldova.

This mass migration carries an unimaginable social, political and economic cost. The Republic of Bulgaria and Romania can understand this, but the scale is much greater in the Republic of Moldova. From a foreign policy perspective, the Republic of Moldova is doing quite well. The peer-to-peer diplomacy implemented by President Maia Sandu and other senior political figures in Chișinău appears to be achieving the desired success. Maia Sandu seems to be opening more doors than many political leaders in the region, including Prime Minister Radev or President Nicușor Dan.

However, it is difficult to say whether the Tofan Government and President Maia Sandu will manage to stick to the timetable they set for themselves – the very one that helped them win the last election. We must understand that the 2024 and 2025 elections in the Republic of Moldova were not won by Maia Sandu or the PAS, but by Europe, by the dream of living in a democratic country, in a European country, held by the vast majority of the population of the former Soviet republic. I have lived in Chișinău for a very long time and can see the changes. There are changes in mindset, but we still have a great deal of work to do in this regard.

As I was saying, the Republic of Moldova is also becoming quite vulnerable to certain relations between some states. We see the relationship between Budapest and Kyiv and how the Republic of Moldova has been waiting for this crisis to be resolved before officially opening negotiations, from a political point of view. From a technical point of view, the Republic of Moldova is quite advanced and some of the chapters will be closed fairly quickly. The same cannot be said for Ukraine. There is a great deal of talk about decoupling in Chișinău and other European capitals. We have seen how Hungary has blocked the opening of two further chapters. Moldova certainly needs to develop a system of bilateral diplomacy so as to prevent such situations from arising again, where we are at the mercy of crises in other countries. It is important that Moldova’s issues are also known in other European capitals, precisely so that problems caused by political developments in certain states can be addressed as quickly as possible.

Moldova must also have much better relations with Sofia. I had expected that by now there would have been at least one official visit by a senior official from Chișinău to Sofia. We do not know what the Radev Government’s intentions are towards Moldova. We know that there are certain issues that should be discussed, including the situation of the Bulgarian community in Moldova. In the context of the Republic of Moldova’s crucial administrative reform, the Taraclia region will retain its special status; however, at the same time, there is a need to clarify certain intentions and to resume discussions on, amongst other things, economic cooperation. Both Bulgaria and the Republic of Moldova know very little about one another and, unfortunately, the Bulgarian community in the Taraclia region remains a captive of Russian propaganda.

There have been some developments, but time is of the essence and these relations need to be recalibrated, regardless of Prime Minister Radev’s political stance, because the Republic of Moldova cannot afford to turn Sofia into an enemy, and Sofia should gain a better understanding of the Republic of Moldova’s problems. Furthermore, the Republic of Moldova must make every effort to ensure that any strained relations that may arise between Sofia and Kyiv do not affect the Republic of Moldova’s path towards Europe.

The effects of cooperation between Sofia and Chișinău in recent years

Over the past two years, there have been more intensive diplomatic meetings, which have led to a situation where there is now a Bulgarian university with a branch in Taraclia, and there are several initiatives to influence certain Bulgarian media outlets based in the area of southern Moldova with a Bulgarian population. There are many plans, but also some concrete achievements regarding this intensification of relations between the Republic of Bulgaria and Moldova – or, if you prefer, with the region within the Republic of Moldova that is Bulgarian-speaking or has links to the Bulgarian-speaking world. Can we already speak of certain effects of these more intensive interactions within the network of connections that has been established, including at an academic level? Or should we perhaps wait a little longer to see the first effects and transformations which, I believe, were intended – including by the Moldovan state – when it permitted these collaborations?

The involvement of ‘Anghel Kanchev’ University in Ruse in the development of education within the Bulgarian community in southern Moldova is extremely important. Taraclia could also become a base of support for the significant Bulgarian community in Ukraine. More could be done, but, unfortunately, the Bulgarian population in the Republic of Moldova is also in steady decline due to emigration. Some of these people, of course, leave for Bulgaria, others for the Russian Federation, and we need a better understanding of these phenomena in order to implement policies designed to reduce this exodus.

The area clearly needs investment, but I do not expect economic investment to be all that significant, given the small population. To invest in a region, you need a population base that can, of course, provide a labour force and a market. However, certain investments can help the region maintain at least its current level of development and lay the foundations for future growth.

I believe Bulgaria could collaborate more closely with the Republic of Moldova in the field of cutting-edge technologies, but here, of course, private initiative is also needed. We cannot expect the Bulgarian state to do everything, nor the Moldovan state to do everything. Perhaps closer cooperation between Romania and Bulgaria in this regard would also be beneficial, but there are differences of opinion and certain bureaucratic rivalries here.

In the Republic of Moldova, Bulgaria enjoys a very positive image, not only in terms of shared historical ties, but also on a human level. A great many citizens of the Republic of Moldova are familiar with Bulgaria through their summer holidays there. It would be a positive step to develop the Republic of Moldova’s image as a tourist destination for Bulgarian citizens. This is an issue that Romania is also trying to address. Romania is far too little known as a tourist destination for the vast majority of Bulgarian citizens. Strengthening the road infrastructure to the Republic of Moldova via Romania will go a long way towards achieving this. We are also seeing investment from Bulgaria in certain sectors.

Furthermore, we must also consider the geopolitics of gas – a subject we have discussed with you before – and the role played by Bulgaria in ensuring the Republic of Moldova’s energy security. We need further discussions on how the Republic of Bulgaria can become involved in the process of reintegrating the Transnistrian region, and perhaps also in resolving specific issues in relations between Chișinău and the Bulgarian community in southern Moldova.

Bulgaria certainly has an interest in supporting the Republic of Moldova. Ensuring the Republic of Moldova’s security brings benefits to the Bulgarian state. The Republic of Moldova is a much easier issue for Sofia to manage than the Ukrainian one, given its smaller population and bilateral issues of much lesser scope. At the same time, however, we can understand why the Republic of Moldova plays a peripheral role in Bulgarian foreign policy. The Moldovan side also bears some of the blame here, as it should have made greater efforts in this regard. Of course, Moldovan diplomats in Sofia are doing their utmost within the limits of their capabilities, but we cannot expect miracles. It would be a positive step if the Moldovan authorities were to be more proactive in initiating discussions with Sofia, including by inviting Prime Minister Radev to Chișinău and Taraclia. We know that Mr Radev is committed to supporting Bulgarians everywhere; we saw this during his terms as president as well. It would therefore be a positive step to extend an invitation to Prime Minister Radev in this regard. I believe that the Republic of Moldova should not be sidelined in Sofia, as this could lead to problems in the European integration process in the future. The Republic of Moldova cannot afford not to have excellent relations with Sofia.

Rumen Radev and Romanian-Bulgarian relations

Let us also conclude with the Romanian-Bulgarian dimension of their relations, including with regard to the Republic of Moldova, but not limited to that. A strategic partnership was signed in 2023 between Romania and Bulgaria, with Rumen Radev himself among the signatories. Similarly, in 2025 a memorandum of understanding was signed between Greece, Romania and Bulgaria, concerning the development of infrastructure corridors between the three countries. And now you have also mentioned the so-called vertical natural gas corridor, which is an initiative supported by Rumen Radev. He was kind enough to invite Nicușor Dan to Sofia immediately after Nicușor Dan was elected president a year ago. But we see that Nicușor Dan’s visit did not take place, and the invitation was not accepted. And it is probably worth asking ourselves how this new dynamic – or, I don’t know, this complexity, if you like – of Bulgarian foreign policy, which is linked to President Radev, about whom there are differing views: some say the change is not that significant, others speak of contradictory opinions or positions, some suggest it is a multi-level policy, and so on… So there are various terms used, but in any case it is clear that Radev perhaps has his own style of conducting foreign policy. So how does the fact that Radev is already a powerful figure in Sofia alter the dynamics of Romanian-Bulgarian relations, both in terms of relations between Bucharest and Sofia and in terms of relations concerning the Republic of Moldova?

Well, Bulgaria plays an important role in the Western Balkans. We see Prime Minister Radev’s attempt to maintain open relations with Belgrade and Ankara. Bulgaria is, of course, playing a diplomatic game, one shaped by its geographical position and historical context. We need to put the way in which Mr Radev is conducting this policy into a much broader context. Prime Minister Radev also has a clear political mandate thanks to the parliamentary majority he enjoys. He needs to deliver results in foreign policy. He has learnt some clear lessons from President Erdoğan, as well as from President Trump and other leaders with a more populist approach, and he knows that foreign policy achievements can be translated into domestic electoral support.

As regards Romania, Bulgaria certainly does have certain reservations. I do not believe these reservations are justified at this point; there ought to be a willingness to engage. Well, Prime Minister Radev might even make an old joke, along the lines of: if Prime Minister Radev rings Bucharest, who answers? So this political instability in Romania is having an impact on bilateral relations. At the same time, we are also seeing a certain reluctance, probably caused in part by communication gaps on the part of both countries.

I believe that in the future, at least in the medium term, we will see a resumption of talks, but a high-level visit is more than necessary – either by President Nicușor Dan to Sofia, or by Prime Minister Radev to Bucharest – perhaps even a joint government meeting. But yes, this political crisis in Romania is having an impact on bilateral relations, just as political crises in Bulgaria previously had such an impact. Because, yes, we can now conclude on a humorous note by saying: Prime Minister Radev is phoning Romania. Who is answering at Victoria Palace? Who is the person with whom Prime Minister Radev can speak? So it is clear that we need more stability in Romania too before we can talk about resuming these discussions.

Certain joint Romanian-Bulgarian projects could be implemented in the Republic of Moldova to ensure a more active Europeanisation of the country. This should not place a significant burden on the budgets of the two states, and at the same time, we must understand that relations between the so-called ‘sovereignists’ in Romania and the so-called ‘sovereignists’ in Bulgaria may, in the long term, damage relations between the two states or with the Republic of Moldova. We know that certain parties in Bulgaria, as well as in Romania, have territorial claims in certain areas of the East. This contravenes all international treaties currently in force, and in this regard we must be extremely cautious when addressing certain historical issues.

I believe that what is lacking at present is the political will to more clearly ensure a revitalisation of relations between the two states, Romania and Bulgaria. The three states can cooperate very well on the development of certain tourism, cultural, economic and other projects, but at present we are seeing certain internal political issues which, of course, have a greater impact.

The Bulgarian community in the Republic of Moldova can be saved by clear intervention from Sofia. We do not simply need to invite Bulgarian troupes or groups of singers and dancers from the Republic of Moldova to Sofia to dance, perform and claim that everything is fine, that Bulgarian traditions are being preserved. The Bulgarian community in the current territory of the Republic of Moldova and in southern Bessarabia is the community that played a significant role in the formation of the modern Bulgarian state. Without this historical contribution from the Bessarabian Bulgarians, the modern Bulgarian state would not have existed. And the historical sacrifices of this community seem to have been forgotten by Sofia. We are not just talking about material sacrifices, but about the fact that Bulgaria has a historical debt to the community of Bessarabian Bulgarians. And however much one might try to sweep this debt under the carpet – through scholarships or certain forms of material aid – history shows us that this debt remains unpaid and is growing.

The fact that we offer scholarships to Bulgarian students is all very well, but the fact that they remain in Bulgaria afterwards bodes well only for the Bulgarian state. Policies are needed to encourage their return. The Bulgarian community in the Republic of Moldova and in Ukraine is dwindling and, unfortunately, most likely due in part to Russian pressure, this community could cease to exist within a few decades. The re-imperialisation of the Russian Federation’s foreign policy comes at an enormous cost to the Bulgarian community. In effect, young Bulgarians in the Republic of Moldova are being turned into soldiers of the Russkiy Mir from as early as school. This is not a recent development, but has been going on for decades.

Sofia ought to be far more involved in the region precisely to save its honour, to save its history. And this is not a nationalist argument; it is simply a conclusion I draw from the Romanian state’s interaction with ethnic Romanians east of the Prut, and with ethnic Romanians in the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine. It is time for Bulgaria to reclaim this history. It is time for the modern Bulgarian state to settle its historical debts – debts of honour – which it owes to the Bulgarians of Bessarabia.

Photo: On 10 June 2026, Bulgarian Prime Minister Rumen Radev held talks with his then Moldovan counterpart, Alexandru Munteanu, in Sofia (source: Council of Ministers)

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