Lyubomir Kyuchukov: It is strange that, in Europe, we cannot offer European citizens anything better than the ‘Cold War’

Vladimir Mitev

Summary

In this interview, the former Bulgarian diplomat and foreign policy analyst, Lyubomir Kyuchukov, discusses the worsening security crisis in the Black Sea and calls for political dialogue rather than long-term military confrontation.

Escalating tensions in the Black Sea

The Black Sea has become a major flashpoint, as the conflict between Russia and Ukraine has spread into international waters through targeted attacks on commercial shipping and port infrastructure. In addition to the immediate security risks, these disturbances – combined with regional instability – threaten global energy supplies and food security, particularly through their impact on international exports of grain and fertilisers.

The limitations of alternative coalitions and peacekeeping efforts

Kyuchukov criticises unofficial ‘voluntary coalitions’ formed with the aim of deploying peacekeeping forces, arguing that they fragment international institutions such as the UN, the EU and NATO. He identifies two main obstacles to reaching a peace agreement through negotiations:

1. Russia’s demand that Ukraine cede the unoccupied parts of the Donetsk region.
2. Proposals to deploy foreign or NATO troops in Ukraine, which directly contradict the main reason cited by Russia for its involvement in the conflict.

Bulgaria’s position and diplomatic realism

Commenting on domestic proposals for a ‘coalition for peace’, Kyuchukov advocates shifting the focus from military options to political negotiations. He argues that efforts towards dialogue do not isolate Bulgaria, even if neighbouring countries adopt firmer stances. He urges Bulgaria to adopt a proactive strategy – similar to Turkey’s efforts to secure a maritime military moratorium – rather than remaining a passive observer.

A strategic vision for post-war Europe

Kyuchukov warns against turning the Black Sea into a zone of perpetual confrontation or adopting concepts such as ‘NATO 3.0’, whose main objective is to trigger a new Cold War. He emphasises that genuine conflict resolution requires direct negotiations and dialogue, stating that European leaders must provide their citizens with a sustainable, long-term security framework, rather than reverting to permanent division.

Interview

Intro

Lyubomir Kyuchukov is a Bulgarian diplomat and foreign policy analyst. He graduated from the Moscow State Institute of International Relations and later specialised at Georgetown University in Washington. He served as Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs (2005–2009) and as Ambassador to London (2009–2012). He is Director of the Institute for Economics and International Relations.

The importance of the Black Sea region is growing

Mr Kyuchukov, two months ago the NATO summit was held in Ankara, signalling that the Black Sea is becoming an increasingly important region for the Alliance. What makes the Black Sea so important to the West and to the countries in the region at a time when military hostilities are escalating? Shouldn’t strategies for the region be formulated in peacetime rather than in wartime?

It is precisely the escalation of military hostilities in the Black Sea that is the reason for this heightened attention – both at the NATO summit and in the recent discussions within the European Union amongst foreign ministers. This is the most visible and most dangerous escalation both for the countries in the region and for the European Union, because it involves two very worrying elements.

The first is that this is where the war is spilling over beyond the territory of the two warring states (I am referring to Russia and Ukraine). What is happening in the Black Sea is very different from the drones that cross Ukraine’s borders and are shot down or crash on the territory of neighbouring states, because those incidents are accidents. What is happening in the Black Sea consists of deliberate military actions by both sides.

Secondly, and no less importantly: ships belonging to third countries are being attacked in international waters. In practice, this broadens the scope of military operations both geographically and in terms of the parties involved in the conflict. It is therefore no coincidence that this issue is becoming increasingly topical.

Incidentally, it is worth noting a certain asymmetry in the approaches taken by Russia and Ukraine. Russia is primarily attacking ports and their infrastructure, whilst Ukrainian strikes are focused on ships. Of course, neither side limits its attacks to just one area – but this difference in approach is quite evident.

“The Coalition of the Willing” vs. “the Coalition for Peace”

In this context, a leading candidate in the Bulgarian presidential election has proposed a ‘coalition for peace’, which, rhetorically speaking, seems to be in opposition to the ‘coalition of the willing’ to send peacekeeping forces to Ukraine. As if on cue, on the same day when the idea for “coalition of peace” was discussed by the leading presidential candidate in Sofia, rumours appeared that Romania is ready to send 20 soldiers as part of a peacekeeping force to Ukraine. This was later denied by the Romanian authorities, who said that the idea was for these troops to coordinate, not to engage in combat. What do you think of Bulgaria’s recent attempts to adopt this stance in an effort to de-escalate the conflict with Russia? How might it be achieved? Will it be understood by its neighbours?

The question here is not whether it will be understood by its neighbours, but what approach is chosen to bring the war to an end. To begin with, a ‘coalition of the willing’ is an informal structure created to circumvent existing institutions and rules. Such was the case with the first coalition of the willing in Iraq, formed to circumvent, firstly, the UN Security Council, which naturally – given the presence of China and Russia on its membership – did not support the war in Iraq; and secondly, NATO, since this war was not a NATO decision and we know that France opposed it.

The current coalition of the willing is also a means of circumventing institutions. It circumvents the European Union, as there is no unified position there on the question of the possible deployment of troops from European states following the ceasefire in Ukraine. And Bulgaria has a parliamentary resolution opposing such participation. NATO is also being bypassed once again, as the United States does not wish to be part of such an approach. In practice, the creation of such coalitions reflects a lack of unity and creates risks of fragmentation within the relevant international organisations – the UN, the EU and NATO.

That is with regard to the structure. As for the substance of the main proposal – the deployment of troops from EU Member States and other countries as guarantees for Ukraine’s security after the end of the war – this is one of the two problems that make it practically impossible to end the war by reaching an agreement.

The first of these is Russia’s demand that Ukraine voluntarily cede that part of the Donetsk region which has not yet been occupied, which is naturally unacceptable to Ukraine. The second is the demand for troops to be stationed in Ukraine, which in turn is fundamentally unacceptable to Russia. Let us recall that the war began precisely with the primary aim of preventing NATO from entering Ukraine. There is therefore no reason to believe that Russia is prepared to sign an agreement containing such a provision. In practice, this means that either there are multinational forces in Ukraine, including NATO members, but no agreement, or there is an agreement but no such multinational forces.

There is also another point here which has recently been discussed quite actively by all parties involved in the conflict (I say ‘in the conflict’ rather than just ‘in the war’, because we too are part of the conflict – both Bulgaria and the whole of Europe – without being part of the war): I am referring to the phrase ‘lasting peace’. In diplomatic language, this phrase implies the following: following the eventual cessation of hostilities, the first condition is that Ukraine must receive guarantees that Russia will not attack it again. However, there is another element that is discussed less frequently – namely, that if such a peace agreement is reached, Ukraine will undertake not to seek the return of the occupied territories by military means.

Ok, but my question was actually about this idea – which will probably become increasingly clear in the next weeks and months – what exactly does a ‘coalition for peace’ mean, and from your point of view, what might it entail? Is there not a risk that, just as there is a ‘coalition of the willing’ which, in your words, bypasses the EU, so too the ‘coalition of peace’ might turn out not to include the entire European Union or the whole of the West, but rather to bypass the other side, which is maintaining tensions with Russia?

This means shifting the conflict from the military to the political sphere – something that must happen sooner or later, and the later it happens, the greater the casualties will be in the meantime. This is not about countries creating a bloc that forms some sort of new configuration, but rather an approach and a way of seeking a solution to the conflict.

The attitude of Bulgaria’s neighbours towards Bulgaria’s stance on the war in Ukraine and Russia

At present, those in power in Bulgaria seem to be leaning towards the idea of a ‘coalition for peace’, and more generally towards dialogue with all parties, including Russia. What does this look like, and how does it position Bulgaria on the regional map? Is there a risk that some of its neighbours might view this with hostility? And to what extent is this a cause for concern?

For me, the fact that a peaceful and political solution to the conflict is being sought is by no means a cause for concern. A recent study shows that there are at least five groups of countries in Europe which take different stances on the conflict and the ways out of it. The fact that some of Bulgaria’s neighbours fall into the group that is most firmly in support of Ukraine and effectively rules out dialogue does not mean that there are no other views within the Union.

That is the first point.

The second is that there can be no political solution without dialogue. Let us not forget that some of the countries you mentioned spoke out extremely negatively against the attempts by the President of the European Council, António Costa, to establish a channel of communication with the Kremlin, during which he posed a very reasonable question: ‘Do we have to learn from the United States what the Kremlin thinks on these issues?’ In other words, if we in Europe truly wish to play a part in resolving this conflict, we cannot be mere bystanders in its resolution. And we are talking specifically about dialogue by the EU, not alongside the EU. I do not believe that a bilateral dialogue between any Member State and Russia directly would help to stop the war.

As for the specifics: this issue, particularly regarding the Black Sea, has long since ceased to be merely regional. It has become a global issue because it poses problems for the safety of shipping in the Black Sea and, at the same time, combined with the war in Iran, is leading to a global food crisis, including in the supply of fertilisers. We know that this further complicates energy supplies as well.

Ukraine and Russia together account for over 30 per cent of global grain exports. Russia and the Gulf states account for around 40 per cent of fertiliser exports (primarily urea). In practice, this means – and the UN has sounded the alarm – that there is a risk that, as a result of these two wars, the world could face a very serious food crisis this year (affecting the Middle East and Africa as a whole), and that next year’s harvest could also be jeopardised.

What is more: in addition to all these stakeholders, the United States has repeatedly raised the issue of attacks on port infrastructure in Novorossiysk, where Kazakh oil is loaded and where the two largest US companies are involved as part of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium.

Furthermore: when we speak of freedom of navigation, according to various sources, over 150 merchant ships have been attacked in the Black Sea since the start of the year. This is an extremely serious problem for all Black Sea countries, and it is no coincidence that Turkey, as the country most actively engaged on this issue, is proposing a moratorium on military operations in the Black Sea. What is strange is that Bulgaria, and indeed Romania, have so far confined themselves to the role of observers – all the more so given that, within the European Union, one of the current priorities is to ensure the export of Ukrainian grain.

All this points to the need for Bulgaria to put forward a concrete initiative and to support what Turkey is also trying to achieve. It is only natural that, if we want security in the Black Sea and the wider region, the safety of commercial shipping must be guaranteed. Here we also have the precedent of the 2022 grain deal, which was effectively the only agreement between the warring parties that worked, albeit for a limited period.

Ce înseamnă „coaliția pentru pace” pentru Ucraina?

What would a possible resumption of dialogue with Russia entail for Ukraine? Is it possible for the powers that might resume this dialogue – including Bulgaria, and perhaps other powers in the region and in Western Europe – to satisfy both Ukraine’s wishes and Russia’s wishes? And how will a balance be struck between them?

This is not about satisfying the wishes of both Ukraine and Russia. It is about Ukraine and Russia actually entering into negotiations. I would like to emphasise once again – we are not talking about a bilateral dialogue, but about negotiations in which the EU plays a role. Negotiations are a goal declared by Ukrainian President Zelensky. We, the EU, also constantly declare the need to ‘force Putin to negotiate’. And this creates a very strange situation: we want negotiations, but we do not want dialogue.

The key question here is what sort of Europe and what sort of Black Sea we want in the aftermath of the war. Just over a year ago, the European Union published its strategic approach to the Black Sea. I fear that this strategic approach was precisely lacking in strategy. Because it lacked a vision for the post-war period. The framework within which the overall concept for the region is set boils down to turning the Black Sea into a region of perpetual confrontation and erecting a new Iron Curtain.

More broadly speaking, the same applies to the ‘Europe of the Day After’. A central tenet of the ‘NATO 3.0’ thesis, put forward by the US, is a return to the Cold War era and ‘hard security’ as a guarantee of European security. It would be deeply disappointing if we in Europe were unable to offer European citizens anything better than a return to a new Cold War – one that is, moreover, formulated as an objective.

The lack of a Bulgarian strategy for the Black Sea region

Bulgaria has no defence and security strategy for the Black Sea region, whilst Romania and Turkey do have strategies for this region. To what extent do the views of these three countries carry weight in the drafting of NATO and EU strategic documents for the region?

What should be the fundamental content of such a strategic document for the Black Sea region, when Bulgarians are involved in drafting it and it takes into account Bulgaria or so-called Bulgarian interests, which often have quite different interpretations depending on who formulates them?

The paradox is that a number of non-Black Sea states, including the US, have national strategies for the Black Sea, but Bulgaria does not. Here, too, the concept of ‘national’ is key, as it should exclude short-term party political interests. Bulgaria and Romania were expected to provide added value in shaping pan-European positions on the Black Sea following their accession to the EU – something that did not happen. It must be acknowledged, however, that Romania has a significantly clearer vision and a more active policy on this issue. Passivity in this context means a failure to take important decisions that will have long-term consequences – and which will not necessarily take into account the specific concerns and interests of the countries in the region.

Photo: Lyubormi Kyuchukov (source: Lyubomir Kyuchukov)

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