Viviana Anghel: The crisis among political parties in Romania has opened the door for other actors demanding “accountability”

Vladimir Mitev

Summary

In this Bridge of Friendship  interview, Viviana Anghel, Chairwoman of the “Pro Democracy” Association (APD), provides an analysis of the judicial, political, and social crisis in Romania during the summer of 2026.

Key Takeaways

• Judicial & Institutional Tension: Radicalized public discourse harms the justice system. While citizens have the right to evaluate public services, structural judicial issues–such as underfunding and legislative instability–require structured dialogue between the government, legal professionals, and NGOs, rather than public confrontation.
• Critique of “Reforms”: Measures such as those led by Ilie Bolojan or education spending cuts represent austerity and budget reduction rather than true, qualitative reform. Genuine reform must guarantee equal treatment and social balance rather than creating systemic disparities.
• Crisis of Political Parties: Traditional political parties face a severe decline in trust due to excessive politicization, lack of ideological differentiation, formalistic internal democracy, and patronage. Anti-establishment forces now hold a significant portion of the electorate (~44%).
• Shift to Civic Accountability: As trust in parties wanes, horizontal accountability is shifting toward non-partisan entities–investigative journalism (e.g., Recorder, G4Media), watchdog NGOs, and sectoral regulators. However, civil society can only complement, not replace, formal political representation.
• The Role of Gen Z: Youth political engagement presents both an opportunity and a risk. While Gen Z is digitally savvy and values-driven (demonstrated by electing independent figures like Nicu Ștefănuță), their energy risks being fragmented into digital echo chambers or co-opted by anti-establishment platforms if formal channels for civic participation are not developed.

Interview

Intro

The “Pro Democracy” Association (APD) is a nongovernmental, nonprofit, and nonpartisan organization founded in 1990, with 36 years of experience in the fields of civic participation, good governance, and democratic education. During the years of democratic transition, APD contributed to the reform of electoral legislation (the status of domestic election observer), monitored elections both domestically and abroad, organized the first candidate forums in Romania, and, over time, facilitated dialogue between decision-makers, institutions, and citizens. Significant achievements: in 2013, she chaired the debates at the Constitutional Forum (initiated by Parliament in partnership with APD) on constitutional revision, and the law on the single-member district electoral system, enacted during the 2008–2012 legislative term, stemmed from a draft proposed by APD.

Viviana Angel is the chair of the “Pro Democracy” Association. She is a university professor and works professionally in the fields of public policy, impact studies, and organizational analysis. She has extensive experience in civil society–she has been a member of the association for over 20 years–and has worked both in the central public administration and within the legislative branch.

“The reformist tendency” in Romanian politics

How do you assess the events of Thursday, June 18, 2026, when the judicial system systematically attacked the “reformist movement”?

Unfortunately, the debate on the judiciary has been hijacked by extreme positions that turn complex issues into sensational confrontations, which undermines trust in institutions and erodes public confidence. The justice system cannot function under constant pressure from labeling, superficial judgments, and “verdicts” handed down in the public sphere outside the framework of legal and constitutional guarantees. On the other hand, citizens are the beneficiaries of the justice system as a public service, and they have every right–both individually and through organized groups (NGOs, platforms, movements, etc.)–to evaluate the quality of this public service (which operates through the allocation of public funds). 

It should be noted that positive developments in recent years, such as the abolition of the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism and Romania’s accession to the Schengen Area, were made possible by a legislative framework in the field of justice that was assessed as compatible with European standards on judicial independence and the protection of fundamental rights. These achievements demonstrate that real solutions are achieved through reforms, institutional dialogue, and expert knowledge, rather than through the radicalization of discourse.

Given the technical nature of the field, any dialogue must be structured among government authorities, the legal professions, and nongovernmental organizations. Only through such mechanisms can the system’s chronic problems–insufficient funding, legislative instability, and working conditions–be resolved in a consistent manner, as these issues directly affect the quality of justice and public trust.

To what extent is it accurate to call the tendency of Ilie Bolojan “reformist”? What do its reforms consist of? Isn’t this rather a movement of strict austerity, cutbacks, and budget reductions–but without any qualitative change to the system?

That is correct; it is not a reformist movement in and of itself.

First and foremost, reform must lead to fairness, not to imbalances–such as those in the education sector, which have created a serious risk to the educational system and undermined trust in any good intentions that might accompany this so-called “reformist” movement. Let us note, please, that the Minister of Education (D. David), who carried out the “reform” (= the cuts), has almost completely disappeared from the public eye.  

The constitutional principle of equality of citizens before the law must be applied in all reforms that have a major impact on society.  Education, healthcare, and the justice system are not self-financing, just like other sectors of the public sector, and the responsible management of public funds is essential for the entire public sector–if we want it to be functional and sustainable. Consequently, the government, in its capacity as the administrator of public funds, has the right to manage these expenditures in a fair manner.  For these reasons, the government has a duty to ensure that all sectors and professional categories are treated equally under the law and that the public sector is managed in a sustainable manner, without arbitrary priorities that are perceived as privileges by citizens or by other sectors waiting for “reform” to benefit them. 

Potential outcomes from the political crisis

What will be the consequences for political and social life in Romania if the Romanian state, the “Cotroceni” Palace, and what is considered the status quo–the clientelist and sovereignist tendencies–manage to impose their own government? What would this mean for the NGO sector, for Romania’s position in the EU, and for the country’s financial and economic problems?

At the beginning of the summer, theoretically speaking, the two possible scenarios were early elections versus Nicușor Dan’s (ND) removal from the office of the president. 

But as I said… never say “never”: Băsescu publicly stated that he would not appoint Victor Ponta as prime minister, but when he had exhausted all other options, he had to nominate him for the position. The same applies to Iohannis, who formed a coalition between the PNL and the PSD after accusing the PSD in the summer of 2020 of “fighting in the secret chambers of Parliament to hand Transylvania over to the Hungarians.”  But as fall approaches, concrete and immediate interests will take precedence. These are linked to the survival of the 2024–2028 legislative term and the presidential term.

As for the NGO sector: this will likely lead to greater civic solidarity. It is also possible that new local-national civic movements (“sovereignist”) will emerge or receive greater media coverage. 

Will this conflict between two relatively clearly defined groups–which is now manifesting itself through street protests–lead to a gridlock in the government and a deepening of the economic crisis?

I don’t think so. We see that on some important issues, the parties are in agreement and discuss them in advance at Cotroceni Palace. The only obstacle will be the wage law–which does indeed require more public debate and analysis. This is normal–we’re talking about a reform with significant social and budgetary implications (certain sectors, which are currently paid under special laws, will be included in this single law), adopted through an organic law.

The role of the pro-EU Romanians and the progressive tendency in Romania

If we consider the cancellation of the 2024 presidential election, the repeat election featuring the main candidates Nicușor Dan and George Simion, as well as the events of the past year that have led to deep disappointment with the current president, what conclusions can we draw about the social and political changes in Romania? How did it come to pass that the beautiful, free, and intelligent elites–the urban and educated middle class–failed to realize that they had to choose between two candidates who are sovereignists and supporters of Legionaryism and Trumpism? 

There is nothing new here. The elites and public intellectuals, shaped by Traian Băsescu, were misled by Iohannis as well. The problem is that in Romania, the majority of public intellectuals are on the right (in an ideological and activist sense), even though theory would suggest that under capitalism, intellectuals are on the left. This can be explained in part by the post-communist transition to democracy, which was slow, gradual, and lacked a clearly stated neoliberal direction on the part of the Iliescu regime, which dominated during that period. 

What does the pro-European Romanian voter’s new disillusionment mean for Romanian politics and for the pro-European orientation in Romania? Can we expect these voters to turn to the progressive left (such as “Sens” or “Reper”) or to pro-European Green parties? What does this mean for the activist wing of Romanian NGOs?

There is nothing new under the sun. Since 2016, we have observed a recurring trend of support for anti-establishment political movements: USR (2016, 2020, 2024), AUR (2020, 2024), SOS România (2024), and POT (2024). In 2024, the anti-establishment parliamentary parties and the factions that have split off from them reach their maximum potential and together garner about 44% of the electorate’s votes, tying with the traditional parties, perceived as “establishment,” which together garner about 45% (here we exclude the effect of vote redistribution).

In fact, Romania is facing a deep and prolonged crisis in its party system. Real society exists outside the political parties. These parties now unite only a negligible portion of citizens within their ranks. The “system” parties are experiencing an accelerated decline in public support.

A significant portion of citizens no longer satisfy their need for political participation through traditional parties, which they perceive as “clan-like” structures due to excessive politicization that permeates even the second and third tiers of the administration. 

In short, the left- and right-wing electorates of the traditional parties were raised in a spirit of party loyalty and activism (in the sense of political membership), conservative, nationalist, unreflective, and focused on small urban and rural areas; they did not attract members from the ranks of the intellectual elites who could instill the spirit of European values. When they did attract such members, they marginalized them in terms of their influence on the party’s decision-making processes.

The collapse of trust in political authorities is part of a general trend in most democracies, as shown by a 20258 study. The decline in trust in parliament and political parties was exacerbated by the 2008 economic and financial crisis in all democratic regimes worldwide, while trust in law enforcement institutions such as the police saw a significant increase–by an average of 13 percentage points. This paved the way for authoritarianism.

Given the above, as well as the results of the 2024 parliamentary and p residential elections (broken down by age group), the situation among young people suggests the potential for an anti-establishment vote. Since trust in politicians has not yet collapsed among young people, there is simultaneously a tremendous civic and political opportunity. The 2024 Eurobarometer survey shows that young Romanians have other reasons for not voting (13% stated that they had other commitments on Election Day, and 14% said they were not sufficiently informed–among the reasons they cited). 

How do you see the political future of the “reformist movement” in the Trump era and the Dan era?

Since President Nicușor Dan made a point of writing in an op-ed published by newsmax.com that “In Romania, support for Donald Trump remains very high,” I’m inclined to believe that it will depend quite a bit on the Trump era. At this point, the impression ND gives is that he has shed his progressive guise–we don’t know why–perhaps he was forced to do so by circumstances that are less well known. But we should note in this context that ND has not yet published, as promised, the report on canceling the 2024 elections. If he runs in the 2028 elections, ND will be backed by an anti-establishment presidential platform, but it’s hard to believe that without the support of right-wing parties (USR, PNL) he will win a new term.

The 2026 political crisis in Romania

Ten years ago, there was a sense of enthusiasm in Romanian politics that new people were entering politics–a young, educated generation that wasn’t as corrupt as their parents, who, in turn, had perhaps made too many compromises during the transition. In a sense, the film “Bacalaureat” addresses these compromises and the corruption of the parents, but also the hope that young people–the new generation – carry forward. Yet today, 10 years after the 2016 parliamentary elections, in which the USR entered parliament, “reform” seems to be a dirty word for many people in Romania. Yes, there is still the so-called reformist movement, but its opponents and those who have suffered from reforms say that Ilie Bolojan didn’t reform anything and merely cut back and reduced the welfare state. You, too, can see that Romania is in a political crisis–not only in the sense that it cannot form a government, but also because Romanian political parties are in crisis. How did this crisis come about, and how does it manifest itself? Is the crisis at the level of ideas? At the level of leadership? At the level of the parties’ internal workings? Or elsewhere?

I would distinguish four levels at which the criticism is directed, not just one. 

At the level of ideas, traditional parties have, for over a decade, lost the ability to produce programmatic proposals that are distinct in terms of doctrine–the Romanian right and left increasingly resemble one another once they come to power, which erodes their essential function of offering real alternatives in public policy. 

In terms of personnel, the selection mechanism remains one of co-optation based on loyalty to local leaders, rather than meritocracy. Hence the systematic marginalization of members drawn from the intellectual elite, which I have already mentioned. 

At the level of internal party life, conventions and internal elections remain a formality, lacking any real competition of ideas or candidates, which effectively blocks the very mechanism through which a party would organically renew itself. 

And finally, in terms of the relationship with society, the opacity of funding and the excessive politicization of the administration (down to the second and third echelons, as I mentioned) transform parties into patronage-based structures, rather than vehicles for representation. This represents a failure of the institutionalization of political parties–a condition that is, in fact, essential for democratic consolidation.

New actors demand accountability in Romanian politics and society

To what extent will this crisis of the idea of reform, of political subjectivity through parties, and of inspiring visions for a new Romania lead to other forms of social, political, or public action? If the stakes of political power–and the degree of change brought about by politics–decline, does this not open the door to a greater role for the NGO sector, independent media, cooperatives, or nonprofit activities, and so on? What kinds of new forms of deliberate action are we seeing in Romanian society today?

I believe we are already witnessing a transition, not just a future possibility. As political parties lose their ability to aggregate social demands, the function of horizontal “accountability” is shifting in part toward non-partisan actors: investigative journalism (Recorder, PressOne, G4Media), civic mobilization platforms (Declic), monitoring organizations (including APD, with nearly 36 years of activity in holding political parties accountable and educating the public about democracy), and more active sectoral regulators. Civil society has long since taken on the role of a “school of democracy” and has provided a counterbalance in a context where formal institutions have weakened. It is also important to note here that the educational system is in crisis due to so many failed experiments instead of coherent public strategies and policies grounded in a long-term strategic vision.  It is important to note, however, that these forms can only serve as a complement to political representation, not a substitute. They can hold institutions accountable and prompt institutional responses, but they cannot, on their own, produce electoral legitimacy or governance. The risk, if this shift in power becomes permanent without party reform, is a democracy that functions “on the sidelines”–through civic pressure and the press, rather than through representation–which is fragile in the long term. It must be stated clearly that civil society is not the cause of democracy, but merely contributes to its consolidation. 

Isn’t the crisis of political parties or political trends in Romania a sign of success for Romanian society? I’m seeing more and more independent media outlets conducting investigations that lead to the intervention of the prosecutor’s office and the cleansing of society through public outcry and institutional intervention. We’re also seeing proactive regulators in the fields of finance and competition. Institutions also intervene when hate speech emerges in society. To what extent can we say that Romanian society is entering a more mature phase in which Romanian state institutions, civil society, and European legislation are leading to the renewal of society and the raising of democratic and free-market standards?

The answer is ambivalent, and I think it’s worth stating it exactly that way, rather than categorically. On the one hand, yes: the proliferation of investigative journalism leading to prosecutorial action, proactive stances, and the institutional response to hate speech and disinformation–all of these are signs of what the literature calls “societal accountability,” a mechanism that complements classic electoral “accountability” and serves as an indicator of democratic maturation. Ultimately, we can reconceptualize modern, civic democracy as a set of equivalent partial regimes corresponding to each sector: institutional, political, civil society, etc.

On the other hand, a crisis of political parties without renewal does not automatically lead to maturation. It may just as well open, as I mentioned, “a path to authoritarianism,” especially when trust shifts preferentially toward institutions of force rather than representative ones. The difference between these two paths (maturation vs. erosion) hinges on whether the elites and the masses come to view democratic rules as “the only game in town,” or whether a significant portion of the electorate remains willing to abandon them in favor of anti-system alternatives, as indicated by the 44% figure I mentioned earlier.

The youngest Romanians (Gen Z) and their role in politics

How do you view the role in politics of the youngest generation–those who are now under 30? This generation voted Nicu Ștefănuță into the European Parliament as an independent. It seems to share very similar views with its peers in the U.S. and Western Europe, being pro-LGBT, pro-Palestine, tech-savvy, adept at political satire, and so on. To what extent is this generation capable of successfully playing a role that the generation of young people from 10 years ago may not have been able to fulfill–that of renewing society and demonstrating a new kind of politics and public life?

Here, I would be cautiously optimistic. Structurally, the current generation (Gen Z) resembles that of ten years ago in terms of initial enthusiasm, but it has real advantages: it is more closely aligned in values with its peers in Western Europe and the U.S., more tech-savvy, and capable of gaining representation on its own–as demonstrated by the case of Ștefănuță–independent of the traditional party system. The challenge is whether this generation can transform its digital and value-based presence into a sustainable political infrastructure–not just media visibility–because, as I said, young people’s trust in politicians hasn’t yet “collapsed,” which is a real civic opportunity, but also a narrow window of opportunity. The risk is twofold: either fragmentation into digital bubbles lacking the capacity for institutional cohesion, or the co-opting of this energy by anti-establishment movements (AUR, for its part, has a following among young people, as does USR, another anti-establishment party that has since been co-opted into the system through its participation in government). From the perspective of democratic consolidation, the challenge is precisely the one we’ve been highlighting: if no real alternatives for civic and political engagement emerge–beyond TikTok, YouTube, Facebook, and Instagram–we risk this generation’s energy remaining unchanneled until 2028.

Photo: Vivana Anghel (source: Facebook/Viviana Anghel)

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