Yordan Bozhilov: It is time for a national strategy on the Black Sea

Vladimir Mitev, Mediapool, 4 August 2026

Explanatory note

This text is the full version of the interview with expert Yordan Bozhilov, published by Mediapool on 4 August 2026.

Brief summary of the interview with Yordan Bozhilov

The interview with defence expert Yordan Bozhilov analyses the major challenges facing security in the Black Sea region and relations between Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey, and argues why it is urgent for Bulgaria to adopt a National Strategy for the Black Sea.

• Security developments: Following a period of cooperation in the 1990s, Russian aggression in Georgia (2008) and the full-scale war in Ukraine (2022) have transformed the Black Sea into a zone of serious conflict. No lasting peace is expected in the near future, and a possible ‘freeze’ in the war will leave behind long-term risks (floating mines, threats to trade and tourism).
• The EU and the Black Sea security hub: In 2025, the EU adopted a strategic approach for the region. Within the new security hub, Romania plays a leading role in defending critical infrastructure, whilst Bulgaria plays a leading role in combating hybrid threats and ensuring border security.
• Turkey as a key player: Turkey is the strongest military power in the region, controlling the straits. It pursues a policy of balance – supporting Ukraine, whilst trading with Russia and insisting that issues in the Black Sea be resolved exclusively by the littoral states.
• Bulgaria vs. Romania:
  • Romania is extremely active – it regards Russia as a direct threat, is courting allies (the US, France), is concluding bilateral security agreements and is investing billions in the SAFE programme (Rheinmetall).
  • Bulgaria adopts a hesitant and passive stance, lacks an up-to-date National Security Strategy and is missing opportunities to modernise its military-industrial complex.
• The NATO summit in Ankara (2026): It emphasises the need for European states to take greater responsibility for their own defence and to increase their spending on the defence industry. Whilst Northern Europe is building strong regional alliances, cooperation between Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey remains insufficient to respond to serious threats.

Interview

Introduction

Yordan Bozhilov is the founder and director of the Sofia Security Forum. He has had a long career as a civil servant at the Ministry of Defence between 1992 and 2013, holding various positions, including head of the ‘International Organisations and Arms Control’ department, director of the ‘International Cooperation’ directorate, deputy director of the ‘Security and Defence Policy’ directorate, and head of the defence minister’s political cabinet. He served as deputy defence minister in 2022 and 2026.

Yordan Bozhilov is a lecturer at the University of Sofia and has published works on topics relating to European defence, security in the Black Sea region and other related subjects.

Bulgaria’s stance on the Black Sea region before and after joining NATO

For more than 20 years, Bulgaria and Romania have been members of NATO and, in a sense, it is naturally assumed that part of their added value as members of the Alliance is linked to the Black Sea region. What was Bulgaria’s perspective on issues in the Black Sea region before joining NATO, and how did this change in the first few years following accession?

Yes, we are seeing very significant security developments in the Black Sea region. If we look back to the Cold War period, the Black Sea region formed part of the front line of confrontation between the Warsaw Pact and NATO and was considered one of the main lines of contact between the two blocs, which led to its militarisation with significant forces and resources, both from NATO (represented by Turkey) and the Warsaw Pact. Bulgaria was also heavily militarised — boasting one of the largest armies per capita at the time and a huge defence budget relative to its GDP.

Following the collapse of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact, the security architecture in the Black Sea region changed radically, as Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine and Georgia embarked on a process of democratisation and gradual alignment with Western values and alliances — I am referring to NATO and the EU.

Russia remained, to a certain extent, isolated from these processes, and since 2007, following Putin’s speech at the Munich Security Conference — in which he stated that there was no longer a unipolar world, that the world was becoming multipolar, and that Russia’s interests must be respected — we have witnessed a very serious escalation of the confrontation in the Black Sea region.

Furthermore, in 2008, NATO adopted a declaration stating that Ukraine and Georgia would become members of the Alliance, without providing a roadmap or specifying a timeline, which fuelled further aggressive actions on Russia’s part. This first manifested itself in Russia’s offensive operation against Georgia in August, when Russia occupied part of Georgian territory and destroyed the entire Georgian Black Sea fleet, followed by military actions in eastern Ukraine, supported by Russia. Since 2022, we have been witnessing a full-scale war on Ukrainian territory, with the Black Sea forming part of this military conflict.

Both Russia and Ukraine have carried out large-scale naval operations. Despite Russia’s enormous superiority at sea, Ukraine – which had virtually no Black Sea fleet of its own – has managed not only to destroy a third of the Russian fleet, but also to establish zones of control in the Black Sea, particularly with the help of maritime and aerial drones. Russia’s war against Ukraine has also created other risks of various kinds in the region – floating mines, environmental risks, the jamming and disruption of GPS signals, refugees, the proliferation of weapons and others.

But let me return to your question. You are asking about the development of relations following Bulgaria’s and Romania’s accession to NATO. I must point out that, at that time, the Black Sea region was regarded as a region of peace and cooperation — a region serving as a bridge between continents, states and cultures. A region of vital importance for trade and tourism. In other words, the assessments of all countries were very optimistic. No one envisaged the possibility of a serious confrontation in the future.

Moreover, sub-regional security frameworks are being established in the Black Sea region, based on several key documents. One of these documents is the agreement on BLACKSEAFOR, in which all six Black Sea countries participate and which has both a military and a foreign policy dimension — that is to say, the countries are establishing a framework for cooperation. Another element of the sub-regional security framework is the Agreement on the Establishment of Confidence- and Security-Building Measures, which provides that the states — with a view to reducing tensions and ensuring predictability in the region — shall exchange information, conduct goodwill visits and so on.

Structures have been set up to enable joint action in the event of environmental pollution and so on. At the same time, to address the potential risk of the proliferation of weapons, the Black Sea Centre in Burgas was established,

through which information is exchanged between all six countries at the level of the Ministries of the Interior — regarding vessels that may pose a potential risk to internal security, a potential risk of the proliferation of illegal goods, and so on. Turkey has launched the national operation Black Sea Harmony, which is open to participation by the other Black Sea countries. Other foreign policy initiatives have also emerged.

In other words, in the Black Sea region, during the two decades following the end of the Cold War — up until the start of Russia’s aggression against Georgia in 2008 — there were generally positive trends towards cooperation and risk reduction, which were, in fact, also reflected in the region’s economic and commercial activities. After Bulgaria and Romania joined NATO, they raised the issue within the Alliance of how NATO should maintain a presence in the Black Sea. This was primarily linked to the fact that NATO lacked systems to protect the new member states against potential threats.

Incidentally, it is worth noting that NATO’s action plans for the eastern flank were not adopted until 2022. Thus, for many years, the Black Sea was indeed a region of cooperation, which, unfortunately, is no longer the case. Of course, the question arises: if the security situation has changed radically, what should the response be? Can we return to the universal and comprehensive measures and systems we spoke of earlier, or must we strengthen our own security outside universal frameworks, but above all within the alliances in which we participate? I believe that joint alliances do not work and that Europe – not just our region – faces the need to build a new security architecture.

That is why Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey must seek much clearer cooperation in order to guarantee their own security, as well as seeking cooperation with Ukraine. Unfortunately, Georgia has set out on a path that is taking it away from NATO and the European Union.

And, above all, we must build systems that do not allow Russia to expand its interests in a way that jeopardises the security of our countries. That is a broad outline.

The EU’s interests in the Black Sea region following the accession of Bulgaria and Romania

In 2007, Bulgaria and Romania joined the EU, thereby giving the European Union access to the Black Sea. What has been the European Union’s role and what have been its interests in the Black Sea region since then?

For many years, the European Union did not recognise the Black Sea as an important region. The European Union viewed the Black Sea region primarily through the prism of economic development, trade, the environment and potential enlargement. Formats were established to help countries such as Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia and the countries of the Caucasus prepare for accession when they were ready — provided that both sides expressed a desire to do so.

For many years, the European Union did not prioritise security in the region. This changed in 2025, when the European Union’s strategy for the Black Sea region — or the so-called European Union Strategic Approach — was adopted, comprising three pillars. The first pillar — security and resilience; the second pillar — economic development, economic growth and connectivity; and the third — the environment, preparedness for various situations and other aspects.

In other words, for the first time, the European Union — at the proposal of Bulgaria and Romania — has adopted an approach which, first and foremost, encompasses all aspects of interest to the Union, whilst at the same time placing security at the centre of attention. Bulgaria and Romania are regarded as the main driving forces behind the implementation of the strategy. The two countries are actively working to build the so-called ‘Black Sea security hub’, which is designed to address several key issues: the protection of critical infrastructure, combating hybrid threats and border security. Bulgaria and Romania have recently jointly adopted a document setting out the two countries’ commitments to building this hub. The document was submitted to the European Commission and was welcomed, as it does indeed provide a framework that will enable the European Union to play a role in Black Sea security.

I should mention, incidentally, that this hub is not a monolithic entity, but that certain parts of it will be located in Bulgaria and Romania.

Romania will play a leading role in the protection of critical maritime infrastructure, whilst Bulgaria will take the lead in countering hybrid threats and border security. However, in addition to the European Union having its own security strategy for this region, certain states also recognise the importance of the Black Sea region — I am referring to countries such as Germany, France, Italy and others. France has adopted its own national strategy for the Black Sea region. This is very positive, as neither Bulgaria nor Romania can, on their own, build security systems capable of addressing all risks and threats. Bulgaria must, at long last, draw up and adopt its own strategy for the Black Sea and clearly define its interests and the means of defending them.

When we talk about the Black Sea, we must also talk about Turkey’s role, as it is a key ally within NATO, a very important player in the Black Sea region, a candidate for accession to the European Union, and a country with a strong security system and diverse interests. However, Turkey remains, in a sense, on the sidelines of European initiatives. The EU must make efforts to ensure that Turkey is involved in new European initiatives.

Turkey, the Black Sea region and the US

In my interviews and discussions with Romanian experts, the idea regularly emerges that Turkey plays a more complex role in the region – it is part of NATO, but at the same time keeps the door open to economic cooperation with Russia. Even following the NATO summit in Ankara, it appears that we are witnessing a rapprochement between Donald Trump and Recep Erdogan and the countries they lead. This dynamic between them differs from the relations during the first term, which were more strained. How is Turkey’s role in the Black Sea region evolving?

Yes, Turkey is an extremely important player in the Black Sea region for several reasons. Turkey has the strongest military power in the region. Turkey has intelligence and surveillance systems that Bulgaria and Romania do not possess. Turkey controls the straits, which constitute the main route in and out of the Black Sea. The other route in and out is the Danube, if we are referring to waterways. Furthermore, Turkey is a vital hub linking the Near East and, by extension, Asia with Europe.

In other words, Turkey is seeking to position itself as an irreplaceable player in the fields of security, energy, the economy and transport — not only for the region, but also for the EU. Turkey is of particular importance to Europe’s security in terms of combating illegal migration and preventing terrorism.

From this perspective, Turkey is seeking to pursue a highly complex policy to advance its interests in its neighbourhood, as well as within the Muslim world.

We note that Turkey has the ambition to play a much broader role in regional and global security. From this point of view, it is a rather complex actor, as it maintains relations with Russia whilst, at the same time, supporting Ukraine. Turkey blocks the passage of Russian and Ukrainian military vessels through the straits, but also does not allow military vessels from non-NATO countries in the Black Sea region to enter.

For this reason, NATO has been unable to strengthen its naval presence in the Black Sea and, consequently, the defence of its member states. Indeed, Turkey is a rather complex actor, which, in many cases, calls into question the possibility of finding solutions or compromises. One of the serious issues is Turkey’s participation in European initiatives.

Turkey has stated very clearly that the implementation of the European strategic approach to the Black Sea cannot be achieved without its participation, and we have not yet established the terms of that participation. Turkey remains a candidate for accession to the European Union and wishes to play a role in policy-making. Relations between the EU and Turkey are of the utmost importance for the region.

We also note Turkey’s desire to improve its relations with the United States, which could enhance the country’s importance in the wider Black Sea region and far beyond. It is significant that the US has already expressed its willingness to reintegrate Turkey into the F-35 programme.

How this improvement in relations will play out remains to be seen, given that the other key factor for the United States is Israel, and we observe that relations between Israel and Turkey have become strained and have deteriorated considerably in recent years. In any case, I believe that Turkey has sufficient mechanisms at its disposal and a political interest in playing an increasingly important role both in the Middle East and in the Muslim world, as well as in the Black Sea region.

Indeed, Turkey has always expressed the view and defended the position that what happens in the Black Sea must remain in the Black Sea. In other words, for many years, Turkey has blocked greater NATO involvement in the Black Sea and maintains that the countries of the Black Sea region must build their own so-called ‘regional partnership’ to address security issues in the Black Sea region without any significant role being played by other actors.

Bulgaria’s and Romania’s relations with Turkey

Mutual interest: military cooperation between Romania and Türkiye is gaining momentum

Romania, Türkiye’s gateway to SAFE billions. How Ankara can replicate the Otokar model in the EU and join Europe’s defense efforts

This month, the Romanian media has been reporting extensively on the developing Romanian-Turkish cooperation in the fields of defence and the defence industry, including the possibility of Turkish firms gaining access to funding under the SAFE programme through their subsidiaries based in Romania. In this context, to what extent do Bulgaria and Romania have their own cooperation initiatives with Turkey, and is there perhaps a division of labour between them — in the sense that Romania seems to place, traditionally, a greater emphasis on security in its foreign policy priorities, whilst Bulgaria (judging by reports of new infrastructure projects or cooperation in the energy sector) seems to be pursuing economic interests instead?

I believe there are two lines of thought on this matter. One of them concerns the issues on which all three countries hold similar positions — namely, security-related matters, environmental issues, the problem of floating mines and the protection of critical infrastructure. We note that there is intensified cooperation in these areas.

As regards bilateral military-technical cooperation with Turkey, I would emphasise that Turkey has an extremely well-developed military-industrial complex. For many years, Turkey has been seeking to supply its products to Bulgaria and Romania. Bulgaria has not always been open to such cooperation and appears to have focused more on procuring weapons systems from Western countries — primarily Germany, France or the United States. Indeed, to date, Bulgaria does not have sufficient military cooperation with Turkey in the military-economic sphere, and this is, in my view, an area of cooperation with great potential. Romania is showing greater interest and taking a more proactive approach than we are when it comes to developing trade and production relations with Turkey.

You asked me about SAFE. I do not believe that Turkey will become a full participant in this initiative in the near future. There are political issues relating mainly to relations between Turkey, on the one hand, and Greece and Cyprus, on the other. The major European producers of arms and military equipment also have reservations, given the scale of the Turkish military-industrial complex. But this does not mean that forms of cooperation cannot be found. For example, SAFE allows for the participation of third countries outside the European Union, provided that such participation does not exceed 35 per cent of the total financial output of military projects. In any case, Turkey has an interest in selling its arms to NATO and EU member states, and this was evident at the industry forum that accompanied the NATO summit in Ankara.

I would like to emphasise once again that Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey are developing their trilateral cooperation in a positive direction, insofar as they identify common interests. At this stage, we have a single naval operation, aimed at combating floating mines and protecting critical infrastructure.

Another regional initiative is the construction of a NATO pipeline, which will transport fuel from Turkey and Greece to Bulgaria and Romania. But this is a project whose future remains to be seen. Apart from these aspects, we do not see any serious regional cooperation, and for me this is a problem. Why do I say it is a problem?

We are seeing how NATO is changing. We are seeing that the United States is scaling back its commitment to European defence. This means that the US’s ability to intervene in the defence of affected European states from the very outset of an attack against them is diminishing. The US military is the best trained, the best armed and the quickest to intervene in a crisis. If American influence wanes, how do countries ensure their own security? The answer lies in strengthening regional cooperation.

And here I am referring in particular to the Nordic countries: the Baltic states, Poland, Germany, Finland, Sweden, Denmark and Norway — through a mechanism that will enable them, should one of them come under attack, for the others to deploy very rapidly and provide assistance. They are close to one another, have well-established structures, and their decision-making processes will be swift. Let us now turn a little further south, towards our Black Sea region. There, we do not see such cooperation.

We present naval mine-countermeasures operations as a form of naval cooperation — that we have structures, formations, mechanisms and so on — but this is absolutely insufficient in the event of a more serious crisis in the Black Sea. This is the serious problem.

I do not foresee, in the near future, a scenario in which Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey would significantly alter their cooperation in the Black Sea, so that it is capable of responding to a greater threat — such as a threat from Russia using military means or these new means, such as maritime drones, for which the most difficult thing is to understand where they are coming from, who is controlling them, what they are aiming to achieve, and so on.

So, from this point of view, to conclude: yes, the three countries — Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey — are developing naval cooperation, but this is insufficient and falls short of the level required to guarantee security in the Black Sea. On the other hand, cooperation in the military-economic sphere also remains at a relatively low level.

How do Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey view the threat to their security posed by Russia?

Alexandru Drăgulin: Romania’s foreign policy is pragmatic

You mention that defence cooperation between the three countries is not particularly extensive. One of the reasons for this is probably that the three countries perceive the threats to their security differently, or at least this main threat, posed by Russia, is perceived differently. I mention this because, at present, we have a government in Sofia led by Rumen Radev, who is accused of having a different understanding of the conflict in Ukraine and proposing a different solution to that of Western Europe.

To what extent is the Radev cabinet continuing the current line on security and defence in the Black Sea region and with regard to Ukraine, and to what extent is it trying something new? What is this new approach, if there is one?

There is no doubt that the three countries have a different assessment of the risk in the Black Sea region. Romania is far more acutely aware that Russia poses a real and imminent threat. That is why Romania is seeking to draw other countries into the effort to guarantee security in the Black Sea region, including France and the United States. You are aware that Romania, by allowing American aircraft, tankers and other assets onto its territory, has raised the issue that America should not withdraw from its territory precisely in its capacity as a guarantor of security.

In Bulgaria, we are seeing a much more hesitant stance when it comes to risk assessments. We do not yet have any clear documents, adopted by the government, which assess the security situation in the Black Sea region. We do not have a Bulgarian national strategy for the Black Sea region, nor do we have an updated national security strategy. In other words, these are things which, in my view, need to be put in place. However, given the government’s initial statements, I believe our position will differ substantially from that of Romania.

Turkey’s position is entirely different. It asserts that Ukraine is the victim of aggression, calls for an end to the war, but, at the same time, leaves the door open to Russia — both for possible future peace negotiations and because Turkey has an interest in trading with Russia, in acting as that very commercial and economic bridge between different regions and in becoming a sort of hub.

So, from this point of view, the countries have different visions and interests, and this does indeed represent a serious obstacle to deeper cooperation. In other words, they are looking for the lowest common denominator. We note that, at this stage, there are not many unifying factors.

Rumen Radev’s vision for the Black Sea region

And what is Rumen Radev’s vision for defence and security in the Black Sea region? To what extent does this represent something new, and to what extent is it a continuation of Bulgarian and European policy to date?

What we observe is that Prime Minister Radev is attempting to formulate policies that represent a continuation of the statements he made both during his time as president and during the election campaign. He has called for an end to military aid to Ukraine. He appeals for peace, without, however, specifying how the negotiating table will be reached in the context of Russia’s ongoing aggression against Ukraine.

We note that the issue of participation in negotiations – namely, the manner, timing and conditions under which to engage in discussions with Russia – is being raised by both Ukraine and various European leaders and EU officials. The question is how the necessary conditions for this can be created. I believe that, at present, there is consensus only on the fact that Europe must be part of the negotiations between Russia and Ukraine. A separate issue is the guarantees that Europe can offer for future peace.

I am of the view that Europe must stand firmly by Ukraine’s side and continue its support both through financial aid and the supply of arms. On the other hand, it must maintain pressure on Russia, and I hope that Bulgaria will be part of the pan-European consensus.

Rumen Radev’s stance towards Romania and Turkey

Paul Hurmuz: The time is coming for Romania and Bulgaria to become more important players in Southeastern Europe

Paul Hurmuz: Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey are on the right track on security in the Black Sea

You mentioned that Turkey seems to be prioritising its economic interests, which are leading it towards an open relationship with Russia. Is there not also a Bulgarian interest in this regard? I recall the situation in 2016, when Romanian President Klaus Iohannis failed to sign an agreement in Sofia to establish a sort of NATO flotilla in the Black Sea region. At the time, Boyko Borisov became known for his statement that he wanted to see sails in the Black Sea region, he wanted to see tourism, he wanted to see economic development – and not the movement of military vessels.

What is Rumen Radev’s stance towards NATO allies in the Black Sea region? As president, immediately after the Romanian presidential elections in May 2025, Radev invited his Romanian counterpart, Nicușor Dan, to visit Sofia, but to date this visit has not taken place…

Yes, it is no coincidence that I said Bulgaria does not yet have a Black Sea strategy that clearly defines what our interests are, how we pursue them and what our relations with our allies are — in contrast to the positions of Romania and Turkey, which are clearly based on long-term policies. Bulgaria’s relations with Romania must, in my view, be a priority. Not just because we are Black Sea countries, not just because we are members of NATO and the European Union, but because, in my view, we share common risks as well as common interests.

From this perspective, I would very much like to see ever closer cooperation. This should take place both in the field of security in the Black Sea region and in the areas of economic relations and joint production. I travel to Romania very often and I notice a desire on the Romanian side for closer cooperation.

But it remains to be seen what the government’s regional priorities will be.

The Radev era and Bulgaria’s new geopolitical weight

Won’t Turkey be the key country in the region for Rumen Radev? Many of his voters were Bulgarian Turks. There are also MPs in the parliamentary group of Progressive Bulgaria, Radev’s party, who are Bulgarian Turks.

That is true, but we do not have a clear position either on what Bulgaria’s stance towards Turkey should be. A few words on Bulgaria’s position regarding Black Sea security and on the year 2016, which you mentioned. In the past, Bulgaria has adopted a rather cautious stance — some might say hesitant — on the one hand, so as not to further exacerbate tensions with Russia, but, at the same time, to ensure a stronger NATO presence. Bulgaria and Romania have been insisting for years that NATO draw up a strategy for the Black Sea, which, incidentally, has been blocked by Turkey because of that policy of regional affiliation I mentioned to you. That is why Turkey launched the ‘Black Sea Harmony’ project — a naval operation intended to replace potential NATO actions in the Black Sea.

Returning to the hesitant stance: yes, indeed, in 2016, Bulgaria held discussions with Romania regarding the creation of this Black Sea fleet. Ukraine had already expressed an interest in joining it. I can say that there were people in Bulgaria who supported Bulgarian participation in the initiative, which was also President Plevneliev’s position.

However, during the meeting held on the occasion of Romanian President Iohannis’s visit, Boyko Borisov categorically refused Bulgaria’s participation in this initiative and made those remarks, saying that he wanted to see boats and sails in the Black Sea, not military vessels. What, in my view, is the issue here, or what are Boyko Borisov’s reasons? Firstly, I believe he genuinely perceived the flotilla as an anti-Russian demonstration. Secondly, however, a few days before this meeting with Johannis, the arbitration ruling had been made public, according to which Bulgaria must pay huge sums to ‘Rosatom’ for the equipment produced for the nuclear power station. The Prime Minister did not want to damage relations between Bulgaria and Russia, as the only way to carry out the project for which this equipment had been manufactured by Russia was with Russia’s involvement. He realised that, if Russia did not take part in the construction, we would be left with equipment worth 600 million euros.

On the other hand, negotiations were already underway at that time for ‘Balkan Stream’, ‘Turk Stream’ or whatever it might be called — something that was supposed to pass through Turkey, through Bulgaria, towards Serbia and other countries in Central Europe. So, he viewed relations with Russia precisely through the prism of these economic projects, which is why, in my opinion, he reacted as he did. These are my reflections, but it is good to understand the reasons. And I will emphasise once again: Bulgaria does not have a clear, articulated and nationally accepted position on the Black Sea.

The 2026 NATO Summit in Ankara

On 8 July 2026, the NATO summit — the so-called NATO 3.0 — took place in Ankara, and this is likely also to have an impact on regional balances and on the Black Sea region. How has the issue of Black Sea cooperation in the field of defence and security developed since the Ankara summit?

The Ankara summit marked the continuation of a process that had already begun – and has been underway for some time. There are, perhaps, three key aspects.

The first concerns the shape of Europe’s security architecture, given that we are facing a real war and an extremely aggressive Russia. What is the mechanism that will underpin our security within this security architecture? We say: it is NATO. Yes, but at the same time, the United States, which is a key ally within NATO, is scaling back its commitment to Europe’s security. In other words, European countries must take on greater financial commitments, contribute more military personnel to NATO structures, produce more weapons, and so on.

In other words, it is something whose exact form we do not yet know, but, whatever the case may be, the trend is for Europe to play a more significant role within NATO.

The second area addressed in Ankara is the stepping up of military production. Unless we have sufficient military production based on new technologies, we cannot build a defence capable of withstanding a war of the kind currently being waged in Ukraine. At the same time, we must reorganise our armed forces, production and the level of preparedness of both the state and the population. This was also emphasised in Ankara.

The third issue is the support provided to Ukraine. We, as NATO member states, recognise that Ukraine’s security contributes to Europe’s security. From this perspective, Europe must support Ukraine.

These are the three key issues that were discussed at the NATO meeting and on which a joint communiqué was adopted. The positions we adopted in Ankara should be reflected in some way in our policy and in the government’s actions. I understand that a plan has been adopted to increase national defence spending to 5 per cent by 2035, but it remains to be seen how this will translate into specific military projects.

If you were to compare the actions of the Romanian and Bulgarian delegations as participants at the Ankara summit, what strikes you?

What is striking is Romania’s far greater initiative with regard to the Black Sea. In recent years, Romania has invested heavily in its military capabilities and domestic defence production. In Bulgaria, we are particularly lagging behind in terms of developing our defence production base. Unlike us, Romania has managed to attract substantial investment and major companies for the joint production of military equipment on Romanian territory. We do not yet have the capacity to produce new systems in accordance with NATO standards. The project that was supposed to result from the collaboration between Bulgaria and ‘Rheinmetall’ (Rheinmetall) for the production of 155 mm shells has reached an impasse. In fact, this is unlikely to happen, and my concern is that, if Bulgaria fails to modernise its military production and fails to develop the production of new systems — such as drones, robots, systems based on artificial intelligence — we will fall far behind the latest trends and will mainly be buyers of military products from other countries, rather than manufacturers.

Bulgaria and the German company ‘Rheinmetall’s’ investment in its defence industry

Around two months ago, Romania signed a contract with ‘Rheinmetall’ worth 5.7 billion euros under the SAFE programme. What would you like to say at this stage about the negotiations, issues and discussions in Bulgaria that have arisen in connection with the ‘Rheinmetall’ project in that country?

Under the SAFE programme, Romania has requested nearly 17 billion euros, to be spent on military capabilities, on building infrastructure as part of military mobility, and on enhancing internal security and the protection of critical infrastructure. There have been issues there too. I recall that ‘Beretta’ criticised Romania for favouring ‘Rheinmetall’, which, in turn, was charging excessively high prices.

In Bulgaria, the situation is different. We have agreed on a sum of 3.26 billion euros, which will be allocated mainly to the procurement of products from abroad, i.e. with virtually no Bulgarian involvement. The projects include the procurement of missiles, air defence systems and howitzers, as well as the development of drone production capabilities, etc. One of the projects under the SAFE programme was indeed for the construction of a joint factory with ‘Rheinmetall’. Unfortunately, those in Bulgaria who considered how to finance the factory did not take into account the specific features of the SAFE programme.

The SAFE programme does not involve purely loan-based funds, which you receive from the European Commission and use as you see fit. From this perspective, a joint venture between Bulgaria and ‘Rheinmetall’ under the SAFE programme cannot be realised, and no funds have been allocated in Bulgaria’s budget for the construction of such a production facility. Therefore, despite the political desire to establish a joint venture, the financial arrangements are unclear at this stage and, at least this year, I do not believe it can be realised.

Ukraine’s Future in the Black Sea Region

The Black Sea in the Trump era: the Munich 2025 episode

Why the Black Sea countries cooperate less than those from the Baltic Sea

What will be Ukraine’s future role in the Black Sea region, given that it has remarkably established itself as a force in the field of military technology and from a military standpoint?

Yes, the Ukrainian army is probably the most capable army in Europe. Moreover, Ukraine is developing an extremely modern military-industrial complex, which produces the latest weapon systems that will form the basis of future armies. We note that even the US wishes to collaborate with Ukraine on the production of new systems.

Europe is also very actively pursuing future collaboration with Ukraine. I would say that Ukraine will be a key player in the Black Sea. We note that Russian military vessels have been withdrawn from ports in Crimea, as Ukrainian maritime and aerial drones, as well as missiles, have begun to strike them with great ease. We also note, however, that Ukraine is striking vessels from the ‘ghost fleet’ that are transporting Russian oil. In any case, Ukraine will be a very important factor in the future security architecture of the Black Sea. How relations between Ukraine and Bulgaria will develop — this is indeed a very serious matter, given Bulgaria’s stance on supporting the country and the path to achieving peace.

From the perspective of the military conflict’s evolution, unfortunately I do not see a lasting peace being achieved in the near future that would regulate relations between Ukraine and Russia. Rather, the trend is towards a form of ‘freezing’ the conflict, but this too poses a risk, because if the fundamental issues between the two warring parties are not resolved, any ‘freeze’ on the conflict could very quickly be ‘thawed’, potentially leading to further hostilities or a new confrontation. On the other hand, we cannot resolve an issue such as floating mines and the clearance of the Black Sea of existing sea mines until peace is achieved. In other words, if we merely have a freeze on hostilities, these mines will continue to pose a long-term risk. From this perspective, as far as I am concerned, the Black Sea region will remain a conflict zone for many, many years to come. Of course, all this has negative consequences for transport, tourism and relations between states, but these are the realities.

Poland and the Black Sea region

I believe you also have a good understanding of Poland’s role in the field of defence and security, including Poland’s interest in our region. What is important to Poland when it comes to defence and security in the Black Sea region?

Poland is extremely active not only in its intentions and actions to build a very strong army. Poland’s defence budget already accounts for almost 5 per cent of its gross domestic product. It is very actively procuring weaponry and developing a military-industrial base on its territory, as it considers the risks posed by Russia to be very high. But Poland is also trying to rally the countries of Central and Eastern Europe around it.

Poland is the initiator and an active participant in a number of regional initiatives — the ‘Three Seas’ initiative, the ‘B-9’ initiative — but Poland is also involved in a trilateral format with Romania and Turkey concerning Black Sea security. You see, I am not mentioning Bulgaria, as it has remained outside this framework since 2017–2018. So, from this perspective, Poland is an important regional actor. Furthermore, Poland wields significant influence within NATO and the European Union, including on issues relating to Black Sea security.

Bulgaria and security agreements with its allies

Paul Hurmuz: The Romanian-British defense cooperation agreement will strengthen NATO’s defense activity in the Black Sea

Since 2022, many countries in the region have concluded security agreements with Western European states. For example Romania concluded such an agreement with the United Kingdom in 2024. Poland initially concluded an agreement with France, but has recently also concluded one with the United Kingdom. Whilst a network of such security agreements is being built up in our region, it appears that Bulgaria has not signed a similar agreement with any Western European country. How can this be explained? Is the country safer without such agreements?

I would attribute this rather to the problems we have faced in our domestic politics — frequent changes of government, and Bulgaria’s largely unclear stance on security in the region. As I said, we do not have an up-to-date national security strategy.

From this perspective, we do not know how to assess risks and threats, how to neutralise these risks and threats, what we do at national level and what we do at regional level, or how to engage our allies, NATO and the European Union. These, then, are issues that we must clarify going forward. My firm position is that Bulgaria must absolutely strengthen its regional role and cooperation. The signing of the 10-year agreement between Bulgaria and Ukraine on cooperation in various fields, including the military and security sectors, is a very positive development. I would also like to see further initiatives at bilateral and regional level. It is in Bulgaria’s interest to see a stronger presence of NATO and the European Union in the region, but this depends on Bulgaria and the other countries in the Black Sea region.

More interviews with Yordan Bozhilov

Yordan Bozhilov: The strategic partnership document with Romania must be followed by real and far-reaching actions

Yordan Bozhilov: Bulgaria has not lost interest in the Three Seas initiative

Yordan Bozhilov: The agreement between Turkey, Romania and Bulgaria to fight mines in the Black Sea is quite different from the idea of a NATO flotilla

Photo: Yordan Bozhilov (source: Sofia Security Forum)

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