Moldova is trying to reclaim Transnistria – through economic leverage and patience

Vladimir Mitev, Mediapool, 26 August 2026

Summary: Moldova’s Reintegration Strategy for Transnistria

After decades of deadlock, Moldova is pursuing the gradual reintegration of its breakaway region of Transnistria through economic, energy, and tax mechanisms rather than military force.

Key Elements of the Strategy:

• Economic & Tax Alignment: Starting in 2024, Transnistrian firms began paying customs duties to Chișinău. VAT and excise taxes take effect in late 2026, with full tax alignment planned by 2030. Revenue will fund a “Convergence Fund” (scaling up to €200M/year) to support local welfare and integration.
• Energy Independence: Transnistria’s reliance on cheap Russian gas via Ukraine collapsed in late 2024.
• Geopolitical & Internal Shift: Nearly 77% of Transnistrian exports go to the EU, creating a rift between pro-Moscow security figures and local business interests (such as the Sheriff group) who need Western trade.
• International Stance: Russia opposes the plan and uses “passportization” to maintain influence, while the EU and Western allies support Chișinău’s approach and demand the full withdrawal of Russian troops.
• The Challenge: Analysts warn Chișinău must balance economic pressure with genuine outreach to avoid alienating the left-bank population.

Analysis

For three decades, nothing much happened in relations between the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic (known as Transnistria for short) – a self-proclaimed state in the eastern part of the Republic of Moldova – and the central authorities in Chișinău. In 1992, following a brief civil war, a ceasefire was reached and Russian troops remained in the region. In an attempt to resolve the Transnistrian issue, negotiations were held in a 5+2 format (Moldova, Transnistria, Russia, Ukraine, the OSCE, with observers from the US and the EU), which resulted in meetings but not in solutions.

With the outbreak of the war in Ukraine in 2022 and the onset of geopolitical changes in the region—which led to the start of negotiations on the Republic of Moldova’s accession to the EU—changes in Moldovan geopolitics began to take shape. The authorities in Chișinău initiated a process of reintegrating Transnistria through tax legislation, gas supplies and a convergence fund. Transnistria no longer has the economic and energy support it once received from Russia. European integration and energy diversification have given Chișinău new levers of influence over Tiraspol. Before 2022, Russia was able to supply Transnistria relatively easily via Ukraine. Now this is much more difficult, and this is precisely one of the fundamental changes in the strategic situation.

This has led to the point where, for the first time since the rejection of the Russian ‘Kozak Memorandum’ (a plan for the federalisation of the country) in 2003, Chisinau has unveiled a comprehensive plan for reintegration. The non-paper ‘Key Approaches to the Process of Gradual Reintegration of the Transnistrian Region’ dated February 2026 was personally delivered to Brussels by the Deputy Prime Minister for Reintegration, Valeriu Chiveri, who met with the European Commissioner for Enlargement, Marta Kos. The plan later formed the basis of the government programme of the new Prime Minister, Vasile Tofan, presented on 20 July 2026. An important element of the plan is that a special “Convergence Fund” is due to come into operation on 1 January 2027.

The reintegration process is already unfolding at the tax level

An interesting fact about 2026: the Transnistrian economy is more dependent on the EU than ever before, whilst politically the region remains loyal to Moscow. According to the Bureau for Reintegration (which is headed by Chiveri himself), the EU accounts for nearly 77 per cent of the region’s exports and provides 41.5 per cent of its imports. The cost of this dependence, however, is painful – according to data from the Friedrich Naumann Foundation, Transnistria’s GDP fell by 18 per cent in 2025, whilst industry contracted by 30 per cent, reaching just 75 per cent of its level from thirty-seven years ago. Wages and pensions in Transnistria are now around half those on the right bank.

Since 2024, Transnistrian companies have been paying customs duties to Chișinău, following nearly a quarter of a century of exemption from this obligation, and are operating under the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area with the EU. From 1 September 2026, VAT and excise duties will be introduced on imports of alcohol, tobacco, cars, jewellery and perfumes from the left bank. For the time being, food, medicines and utility services remain exempt. From 2027, it will be the turn of energy sources and metals, and by 1 January 2030, the region’s tax regime must be fully aligned with the rest of the country. Estimates suggest that the removal of all old tax breaks could bring in up to $195 million to the budget in a single year, whilst the Convergence Fund, starting from a modest €15 million by the end of 2026, is set to grow to €200 million a year by 2030.

Another important aspect of the change lies in the energy sector

The German ‘Marshall Fund’ describes the ongoing process as follows: reintegration is ‘an energy project before it becomes a political project’.

For thirty years, Transnistria and Moldova shared a common – and Moscow-subsidised – dependence on gas via the ‘Cuciurgan’ power station: Russia supplied gas on very favourable terms, and the power station provided cheap electricity for the whole country. The scheme collapsed at the end of 2024, when Ukraine refused to resume the transit of Russian gas and Transnistria was left without gas almost instantly. Since then, the region has been lurching from one crisis to the next.

Rather than wait for the next blow, Chisinau decided to take action: the state-owned gas company began buying gas on the European exchange and reselling it to Transnistria. Leader Vadim Krasnoselsky ultimately accepted these supplies – a move that Swedish analyst Jakob Hedenskog described as “a breakthrough in this year’s energy crisis in Moldova, including in the pro-Russian separatist region”.

Behind the changes in the region’s energy sector lies infrastructure built up over many years. Part of this is the emergency synchronisation of the Moldovan electricity grid with the European ENTSO-E in March 2022, completed in less than three weeks instead of the planned one year. Another element is the Iași–Ungheni–Chișinău gas pipeline, capable of meeting up to 75 per cent of the country’s consumption, supplemented by a new Ungheni–Bălți gas pipeline and the regional “Vertical Corridor” linking Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary and Romania. Last but not least are the solar power stations, whose total capacity has increased more than 13-fold in five years and now covers, in some cases, over 70 per cent of electricity consumption – although the country still imports expensive electricity during peak hours.

Thus, the reintegration plan includes the unilateral extension of Moldovan customs duties, VAT and environmental standards to the left bank, and the establishment of a transitional international civilian mission to replace the Russian peacekeeping operation following demilitarisation. The Convergence Fund is intended to guarantee Transnistrians the right to citizenship, amnesty for officials who have not committed any offences, and a promise that social payments will not fall below current levels.

How do the authorities in Tiraspol and Moscow view the reintegration plan?

Officially, the separatists accuse Chisinau of pursuing a “destructive course”, whilst they refer to the Convergence Fund as a “mechanism for the unlawful withdrawal of resources”. Yet behind this rhetoric, some analysts see a rift between two unofficial centres of power: the security forces, closely linked to Moscow, and the ‘Sherif’ business group, whose interests are increasingly oriented towards the West, given that around 80 per cent of Transnistrian exports now pass through Moldova’s trade agreement with the EU.

Even Krasnoselsky himself is sometimes more pragmatic than his officials – he has proposed a joint fight against drug trafficking and pollution of the Dniester and acknowledges cooperation with Chisinau on natural gas issues. Official surveys cited by pro-Tiraspol media show 82.5 per cent support for the so-called Russian peacekeeping forces amongst the local population, whilst a survey cited by CSIS adds that around 45 per cent of Transnistrians themselves now support reintegration – a sign that “economic realities are changing attitudes”, as analysts explain.

Russia rejects Chisinau’s entire approach – Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova accused the Moldovan authorities of obstructing the withdrawal of Russian forces and insists that the “5+2” format remains “without alternative”. But with its leverage exhausted, the Kremlin is reverting to the old tactic – issuing passports. Former Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu warned that over 220,000 Russian citizens in the region are “at risk”, whilst Putin signed a decree facilitating the acquisition of Russian citizenship. The German Marshall Fund interprets this not as a show of strength, but as an attempt to compensate for lost influence.

Western powers

Following the Moldovan parliamentary elections in September 2025, the EU’s stance appears to have hardened. The declaration from the EU–Moldova summit in July 2025 calls for the complete withdrawal of Russian troops from the region, with the bulk of the support being provided by Germany, France and Romania through the Moldova Support Platform, launched in Berlin in 2022. Austria has played a quieter but long-standing mediating role through the OSCE, whilst Hungary long blocked Moldova’s negotiation clusters due to its own stance on Ukraine – a veto that was only lifted after the Hungarian parliamentary elections in April 2026.

The US is proceeding more cautiously – in early 2026, it allocated $36.5 million for Moldovan security, whilst a senior US diplomat visited both Chișinău and Tiraspol. An opinion piece in The National Interest even called on Trump personally to mediate along the lines of the Armenian-Azerbaijani agreement, proposing the status of an ‘autonomous republic’ modelled on Gagauzia.

Will this pressure lead to genuine reintegration – or will it simply leave the left bank poorer and more embittered? The German Marshall Fund warns of a “narrow window” for action: pressure without a political solution may open doors, but if mishandled, it could just as easily entrench the mistrust of the people whom Chisinau hopes one day to govern directly.

Photo: (source: Wikipedia Commons/Bogdan Giușcă, CC BY-SA 3.0)

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