Evgeni Krastev: Security in the Balkans is an integral part of European security

Nikolai Krastev, Bulgarian National Television, 10 July 2026

Summary of the #Balkans podcast episode: ‘The NATO Summit in Ankara and security in the Balkans’

Here is a summary of the episode of BNT’s ‘#Balkans’ podcast, presented by Nikolai Krastev and featuring political scientist and journalist Evgeni Krastev as a guest. In this episode, the panellists analyse the outcomes of the NATO summit in Ankara, the Alliance’s resilience and its role in ensuring security in the Black Sea region and the Western Balkans.

Key points of the discussion

1. The outcomes of the NATO summit in Ankara and the Alliance’s unity

• Resilience in the face of crises: Predictions of a breakdown or a serious rift in Euro-Atlantic relations are considered unfounded. NATO has demonstrated internal resilience, harmonising its position and priorities following the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
• The contribution of all member states: All NATO countries contribute to collective defence in accordance with their capabilities — both in terms of physical and material resources, and through science, expertise and intellectual capacity (as exemplified by Bulgaria and the Black Sea region, as well as Iceland, which does not have its own army).
• Turkey’s specific role: Turkey plays a balancing role — it is developing economic relations with Russia whilst, at the same time, providing technical and military support to Ukraine (for example, Bayraktar drones).

2. The development of the ‘European vector’ and support for Ukraine

• NATO’s European pillar: Emphasis is placed on the statements by General Alexus G. Grynkewich regarding the strengthening of the European pillar in the field of defence. Countries outside the Euro-Atlantic area (such as Australia) can only be close partners, but not full members.
• Support for Ukraine: During the meeting, it was agreed to provide 70 billion dollars in aid to Ukraine, as well as to produce US Patriot systems under licence on Ukrainian territory.
• The SAFE programme: Discussions are underway regarding the possibility of Turkey applying for access to the European defence funds (SAFE) through joint projects with neighbouring EU countries (such as Bulgaria), which requires compliance with European and international law.

3. Security and stability in the Balkans

• Western Balkans: NATO is closely monitoring the region. A clear message has been sent to the Serbian public not to allow an excessive link between the so-called ‘Serbian world’ and the ‘Russian world’, in order to maintain stability and economic development.
• KFOR and Bosnia and Herzegovina missions: The optimisation of KFOR troop numbers in Kosovo (a reduction from 4,700 to 3,500 personnel) aims to maintain the same level of effectiveness; however, should the risk profile change, the decision may be reviewed.
• Black Sea Mine Countermeasures Group: The importance of the joint Black Sea group comprising Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey is emphasised; Bulgaria is taking over the rotating chairmanship of this group.

4. The strategic role of Romania and Moldova

• The ‘Mihail Kogălniceanu’ base: The expansion of the Romanian military air base makes it the largest defence facility on NATO’s eastern flank and a key factor for stability in the Black Sea region.
• Relations with Moldova: Romania plays an important supporting role in Moldova’s European integration and security (under President Maia Sandu) against the backdrop of Russian hybrid threats.

Conclusion

The interviewees conclude that security in the Balkans is an integral part of European security. NATO’s presence in the region serves as the main safeguard against destabilising external influences and geopolitical risks.

Nikolay Krastev’s discussion with Evgeni Krastev

Introduction

Evgeni Krastev is a Bulgarian political scientist and journalist. He graduated from St Kliment Ohridski University in Sofia. He holds a master’s degree in international relations and international security and has extensive experience in the fields of political analysis and the media. He works and writes primarily on topics related to geopolitics, security and defence.

Nikolay Krastev, from the #Balkans podcast on Bulgarian National Television, spoke with Evgeni Krastev following the NATO summit held on 8 July 2026 in Ankara, which, according to some observers, is changing the dynamics within the Alliance by strengthening the role of European states. The two analyse the outcomes of this summit and what they mean for the countries of South-Eastern Europe and the Black Sea region.

Nikolay Krastev

The BNT Podcast. Hello, I’m Nikolay Krastev, and this is a clear sign that ‘#Balkans’ is about to begin – the author’s podcast in which we discuss the Balkans, regional relations, and all the regions linked to the Balkans, so that we can better understand what is happening in our region.

This is also the episode with which we’ll bring our first year to a close – or perhaps open the door to the programme’s second year. To mark the occasion, I’ve invited my colleague Evgeni Krastev – a journalist, political scientist and expert in international relations and NATO – here to the ‘#Balcani’ studio to be my guest and yours.

And why NATO? Because the NATO summit in Ankara – the Alliance’s major annual conference and meeting – has just concluded. We will discuss all aspects of what took place in Ankara and the outcomes of this major annual gathering.

So, it’s time to begin. Thank you, Mr Krastev, for being here in our ‘#Balcani’ studio.

Evgeni Krastev

Thank you too for the invitation; I’m delighted to be your guest and that of your viewers.

The NATO Summit in Ankara (8 July 2026)

Nikolay Krastev

Thank you too, as I was keen to discuss this very topic with you – the events and outcomes of the annual NATO summit, which took place in the Turkish capital, Ankara. We can start here: what is Turkey’s role as host of the conference, and does it undoubtedly remain an important member of the Alliance at this time?

Evgeni Krastev

Of course, Turkey is an important member of the Alliance, but all the countries that are part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation are important members. Each has its own role and place, and, in fact, this is precisely what makes the Alliance so monolithic and stable. This is precisely the main factor counteracting all the trends that have emerged in recent years and which continue to exist, according to which the Alliance is supposedly on the brink of a crisis, or there is a danger of disintegration within it, or that certain member states might leave it.

None of this is happening, however. One of the reasons is that every country has the ability, by developing its own defence capabilities, to contribute to collective defence as well. Thus, for example, with regard to the countries in the Black Sea region, which include Turkey and, of course, Bulgaria, NATO’s expectations are precisely that they should ensure – not only in purely physical terms, but also in the form of knowledge and expertise – all aspects important to the security of the Black Sea.

Precisely because we are located here, we possess the necessary capacity and knowledge regarding the specific characteristics of this region. We have the civilian and military expertise required to develop security strategies for this region. This is how Bulgaria is developing its defence capabilities. I would emphasise once again: not only in the physical sense, but also in the intellectual sense of this matter. The issue of defence is increasingly becoming an intellectual challenge. Thus, by developing its capabilities, the country is also contributing to the development of collective security.

There is no country, regardless of its economic capabilities and regardless of the percentage of its gross domestic product that it currently invests in defence capabilities, which does not contribute to collective defence. Because, by developing and meeting its own needs, it contributes to collective defence.

Now, as you well know, but perhaps we should also point out to our viewers: there is one country in the Alliance – Iceland – which has no army. But that does not mean that it – owing to its specific geographical position and a number of particular circumstances – does not nevertheless contribute to collective defence.

Of course, we cannot overlook the fact that this 2026 summit took place in Ankara of all places. It is a symbolic moment, and we will probably discuss this further later on.

Nikolay Krastev

Whilst we are still at the beginning of this discussion: has the Ankara summit turned out to be a symbolic one, as was suggested in all the preliminary analyses and assessments – that it would be a decisive turning point? Was the Ankara summit a turning point, or, on the contrary, are these merely clichés on which the current discussions are based?

Evgeni Krastev

Since the start of the Russian war in Ukraine, this is the fifth high-level meeting to take place within NATO: Madrid, Vilnius, Washington, The Hague last year and now Ankara. The Washington summit was held there precisely because that year marked a NATO anniversary – the NATO Treaty itself was signed in Washington, and that was the reason the summit was held there.

But it is no coincidence that I am listing these five NATO summits – as all the trends that have emerged within NATO, following Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, are developing in an undeniable way. That is to say, these priorities that NATO has set – relating to the support provided to Ukraine, rearmament and modernisation, and the development and enhancement of the defence capabilities of Alliance countries – began as early as the first meeting following the Russian invasion (that was in 2022) and have continued to develop at every meeting since then, including the one that has just concluded in Ankara.

After each meeting, progress has been made, and this process has proved to be a sustainable one. As you have seen, it continues to develop in Ankara; we will see it next year, and the year after, at future NATO summits. So, what I can highlight as the main feature of this meeting is the fact that, in Ankara, NATO has indeed demonstrated resilience. Beyond these clichés that you have mentioned and defined in this way, I would say that this is the main aspect to which attention must be paid and which, in my view, will form the basis of all future analyses concerning NATO’s development, communication between member states within the organisation and, more generally, the future of this military-political bloc. Communication is very important. At present, we have a Secretary-General – Mark Rutte – who is an extremely good communicator.

Nikolay Krastev

This is the political leadership, so to speak, for our viewers, whilst military leadership is traditionally provided by the United States. That is how the roles are divided.

Evgeni Krastev

Yes, military leadership – if we’re referring to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe – has always, until now, been an American general. As for the Military Committee, which is, in fact, the Alliance’s main military body, it is also headed by a general. In this case, it is a European general – an Italian – who heads the Military Committee. Previously, it was a Dutch general, and before him it was Petr Pavel, who is currently the President of the Czech Republic.

Rumours of NATO’s demise are greatly exaggerated

Nikolay Krastev

NATO has not fallen apart, as some claimed and predicted – that this was to be the Alliance’s final summit, that there would be a rift in US-European relations, that is, between the two sides of the Euro-Atlantic bloc. And what has now become clear – that these predictions were wrong?

Evgeni Krastev

I wouldn’t call them predictions. I don’t know what to call them – perhaps it’s a sort of shamanism or something of that sort, because, to make a prediction, you have to base it on certain circumstances and solid facts. There were never any such facts to suggest that, in one way or another, NATO’s very existence was under threat.

In fact, if I may, for viewers who might be more interested in the Alliance’s development, I can recommend the book by Peter Apps – a British author. It covers the history of NATO and is entitled ‘Deterring Armageddon: A Biography of NATO’. That is the title of the book. In it, the author describes in detail the history of the Alliance from its foundation in 1949, covering the provisions of the founding treaty right through to how the organisation subsequently developed institutionally: when the post of Secretary-General was created, who the first Secretary-General was, and how NATO’s military structures subsequently took shape.

An extremely valuable, detailed and interesting work. But what is more important here, in the context of your question, is the fact that, within NATO, the emergence of crises is not unusual. There have often been crises within NATO and, very often, these have been the result of internal contradictions within the organisation between certain member states.

Nikolay Krastev

Between member states – yes, but have there been similar crises between the United States and the European Union (and the member states of the European Union)?

Evgeni Krastev

There have been. In fact, in 1962, during the Cuban Missile Crisis, the American side was not particularly pleased, from its own point of view, with the passivity of its European allies.

Nikolay Krastev

Exactly what Donald Trump has just said in Ankara.

Evgeni Krastev

Yes, but my point is to make it clear to viewers that even this divergence between the European and American sides of the Alliance is nothing new. However, thanks to good communication… In fact, communication between member states and the Secretary-General’s ability to act as a mediator in these processes are essential to the Alliance’s functioning and vitality. However, let us emphasise that NATO is an organisation made up of sovereign states. And each of these sovereign states has its own specific interests; it is perfectly normal that, often, there is no complete alignment between them.

NATO is not the Warsaw Pact, because each state can state separately: ‘I do not support a particular policy or a particular issue’, whereas in the Warsaw Pact I do not recall anything of the sort ever having existed.

Nikolay Krastev

NATO is definitely not the Warsaw Pact. Over the years, I’ve heard this comparison quite often, and I’ve always found it strange what it’s based on. It’s all a sort of shamanic tale – something like that.

Nikolay Krastev

Propaganda, Mr Krastev.

Evgeny Krastev

Yes, at least that’s how I see it. Because, at the very least, you can compare NATO’s institutional structure with that of the Warsaw Pact, to make it absolutely clear that there can be no connection whatsoever and no comparison between the two organisations (given that the Warsaw Pact has not existed for many years now – since 1991).

Nikolay Krastev

Yes, because there is no such precedent in NATO’s history where NATO troops have occupied other NATO member states, as we saw in the case of the Warsaw Pact – the cases involving Czechoslovakia or, in 1981, Soviet troops alone. This year marks exactly 70 years since the Hungarian Revolution.

Evgeni Krastev

Because the Warsaw Pact was established in 1955, so in 1956 it was perhaps still a little too early…

Nikolay Krastev

Perhaps it was still a little too early, but Soviet troops did enter the country nonetheless.

Evgeni Krastev

Please allow me to clarify more precisely what has been mentioned – that NATO is an organisation of sovereign states. This, by its very nature, rules out such an approach as a possibility, which was characteristic of the Warsaw Pact.

In fact, NATO is, de facto, an international system for guaranteeing national sovereignty. It is extremely important precisely for countries such as Bulgaria. Not that we are such a small country, but, nevertheless, compared with other countries in Europe (not to mention the US), we have more limited economic resources and can allocate a smaller proportion of our GDP to defence.

I would like to point out here that, in the 1970s and ’80s, there was a period when the percentage of gross domestic product allocated to defence reached 8–10 per cent; I believe it even reached 12 per cent at that time. Currently, we stand at 2.3–2.35 per cent – I believe these figures are set out in the approved budget for 2026. So, for those who wish to compare NATO with the Warsaw Pact – there is no basis, I repeat, for such a comparison – they should also take into account these percentages and the expenditure as a proportion of gross domestic product that Bulgaria incurred as a member of the Warsaw Pact, as well as that which it incurs now as a member of NATO and the European Union. And when we take stock and see the results, then we can discuss Bulgaria’s national interest once again.

NATO 3.0

Nikolay Krastev

It is good that experts such as yourself are our guests, so that these figures can be compared and provide a basis for analysis. Even for those who are sceptical. We have an audience beyond Bulgaria’s borders, too, who are following what is happening with Bulgaria and its behaviour within NATO and the European Union. A presence such as yours is, of course, most welcome, as it provides a basis for comparison and analysis.

Has the time come, Mr Krastev, to talk about ‘NATO 3.0’? If ‘NATO 1.0’ was during the Cold War, ‘NATO 2.0’ during the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and, consequently, the Eastern European bloc, and now ‘NATO 3.0’ – almost 36 years after these historic events: can we talk about ‘NATO 3.0’ and what does it represent?

Evgeni Krastev

We can talk about a NATO that is changing. NATO is an organisation capable of transforming itself from within, and this is, also one of the factors (which we have already begun to discuss gradually) that make it sufficiently stable and which lead to disappointment for today’s forecasters – let us call them that, with great reservation – regarding expectations of its disintegration and so on.

NATO has within it institutions and bodies that deal with transformation. We could speak of a possible more visible change within NATO to the extent that we are already in the midst of a process linked to the strengthening of the European dimension within NATO.

Shortly before the meeting in Ankara, General Alexus G. Grynkewich was in Bulgaria – he is the American general who currently commands NATO’s Allied Forces in Europe.

Nikolay Krastev

Let’s clarify this, as we spoke about him earlier.

Evgeni Krastev

Yes, regarding the position we discussed earlier. He sent numerous messages from Sofia – some in a regional context, within Bulgaria (we’ll return to these shortly), and others in a broader context. One of the issues discussed in a broader context was that he spoke about NATO’s European pillar. I prefer to call it a ‘vector’, but it amounts to the same thing.

And here I would like to return to the organisation’s 1949 treaty itself, on the basis of which it still operates today. This treaty sets out several concepts that are quite important and which it would be good for as wide an audience as possible to be aware of, as understanding them is, in my view, crucial from the perspective of combating disinformation (which, unfortunately, makes our society one of the most vulnerable, particularly with regard to the North Atlantic Treaty).

This treaty, for example, defines the concept of the North Atlantic area – or, more precisely, the Euro-Atlantic area. In practice, there are clearly defined geographical boundaries, and countries falling within these limits are potentially eligible to become members of the Alliance. Countries lying outside these boundaries would therefore be unable to become members. Australia is a very apt example in this regard. It is a country which clearly aspires to the closest possible partnership with NATO, but cannot achieve more than that at this stage, precisely because it lies outside the Euro-Atlantic area and cannot become a full member of NATO.

Yet Australia complies – particularly since Russia launched the war in Ukraine, when this became very clear – with all NATO standards and policies. Let us recall that, at least in the first and second years, Australia was one of the main suppliers of arms to Ukraine, so that it could defend its territory and sovereignty.

But let us continue with an analysis of the treaty itself, which forms the basis of NATO. With its signing, the American vector within the organisation is, de facto, complete. This includes the United States and Canada – there is no other country in this vector that could potentially join NATO.

In Europe, however, the situation is different. The entire continent forms part of the Euro-Atlantic area and, in fact, from the treaty’s perspective, any country belonging to the European continent can become a member. And here it is already perfectly clear – given the historical context in 1949 – that this is a very lengthy process, for the European dimension within the organisation to take on its full form.

A step in this direction was the fall of the Iron Curtain in Europe, which made it possible for the sovereign countries of Eastern Europe – provided, of course, that they themselves so wished and that the existing NATO member states had no objections – to become members of this organisation. And this took place in several waves, as is well known. The 2004 wave was the largest. Seven countries were admitted to NATO at that time, one of which was Bulgaria.

At present, there are countries in Europe such as Austria, for example, which is a member only of the European Union, or Switzerland, which is not even a member of the European Union. But these are located in Central Europe and, even though they are not members of the Alliance, they are nevertheless under its protection. Because just imagine an enemy operation against Austria or Switzerland – it would have to violate the territory or airspace of countries that are members of the Alliance. And in that case, such an action is inconceivable.

Nikolay Krastev

They are much more closely linked – so to speak – even though they are not members, at many other institutional levels: the exchange of intelligence, financial information (especially in the case of Switzerland), and cyber threats, of course.

Evgeni Krastev

Ever since the Warsaw summit (which I believe took place in 2016), NATO has also assumed responsibility for the cyber domain.

And now, here, the issue of Ukraine is quite interesting – again from the perspective of the Euro-Atlantic area we have been discussing. Ukraine is, without a doubt, geographically situated within this area. And, in this sense, it is entirely understandable why the member states of the European Union are so keenly interested in its situation. This is precisely what explains the point that is often emphasised in public discourse and the media regarding Ukraine’s enormous importance and role for European security. It is for this very reason that we cannot, from a European perspective – from the perspective of the development and gradual shaping of the European vector – equate the war against Ukraine with, for example, the problems and state of war in Iran.

The War in Ukraine and Trump

Nikolay Krastev

Whilst we are on the subject of Ukraine: a very clear message has been sent that Ukraine will receive 70 billion dollars in support of its fight against the Russian invasion, which is now entering its fifth year. This is, however, a fact. Even Donald Trump stated, during his meeting with the Ukrainian president, that he would grant licences for the production of American ‘Patriot’ (Patriot) systems to the Ukrainian side. What message does this send, in your opinion?

Evgeni Krastev

This is a very significant achievement secured by Zelensky and the Ukrainian government during this meeting in Ankara. These were the Ukrainian side’s main requests. In fact, at this moment, Ukraine needs air defence above all else. As far as air defence is concerned, Ukraine is still entirely dependent on donors who are helping it to defend itself. And particularly on the US, precisely because the ‘Patriot’ is probably the most effective air defence system – an American system – and, consequently, the ammunition it needs must also be provided in one way or another by the United States.

Donald Trump put it well here, but we must bear in mind that this matter must also be examined by the Senate. I assume there will be no problems there, simply because the Senate is currently dominated by Republicans, some of whom support Ukraine, even if this is sometimes at odds with Donald Trump’s positions. And now all of them, including the Democrats, share a common stance on this issue. So, the confidence with which Donald Trump gave Zelensky the floor can be explained, in this case, from this perspective.

Nikolay Krastev

There is no better person to speak to on the subject of America than you, because you are someone who knows the American political system and American politics at a professional level and very well indeed. But we’ll talk about that another time.

Evgeni Krastev

The American phenomenon of constitutionalism is an extremely interesting topic.

Turkey, NATO and relations with Ukraine and Russia

Nikolay Krastev

Yes, the ‘checks and balances’ model. We do, however, focus on the Balkans, but when we tackle such topics, we will undoubtedly invite you back.

However, whilst we’re on the subject of Ukraine and the Black Sea – because, after all, Ukraine has an extensive coastline on the Black Sea, regardless of the fact that Crimea has been annexed, and the rest of the territory towards the Sea of Azov, unfortunately, has also been annexed… . But tell me: where does Turkey stand in the dialogue between NATO and Ukraine, as well as between Turkey and Russia? Turkey is making serious efforts to maintain a balance between the two camps – on the one hand, NATO, the European Union and the Western world as a whole, and on the other, Russia. Where does Turkey stand today in this dialogue?

Evgeni Krastev

Turkey has – with a certain degree of reservation, but let us say it nonetheless – a specific status within NATO. And the very reason we define it this way can be found in the 1949 treaty, as Turkey was placed under NATO’s protection right from the organisation’s inception in 1949.

Nikolay Krastev

The first and only country placed under NATO’s protection.

Evgeni Krastev

Turkey became a member of NATO in 1952, alongside Greece – this is no coincidence. If we have time, we can discuss this, especially as it is a topic linked to the issues in the Balkans.

Nikolay Krastev

We’ll have the opportunity shortly. But for now, please wrap up the topic concerning Turkey and the Black Sea-West Partnership.

Evgeni Krastev

Turkey has obligations under the Montreux Convention, signed in 1936 in France. In addition to all this, Turkey also has its own interests – it is the only country, apart from the United States, which has interests outside the Euro-Atlantic area.

It is precisely the fact that Turkey has this rather special status that allows it to do what it has begun to do and, in a sense, continues to do – to maintain economic relations with Russia and defence relations with Ukraine simultaneously.

Nikolay Krastev

It contributes significantly to the production of drones and other types of military equipment supplied to Ukraine.

Evgeni Krastev

Yes, for example, with regard to the ‘Bayraktar’ (Bayraktar) drones, which were first used by Ukraine as early as 2022. A large proportion of these drones (with the exception of the engines) were manufactured in Turkey. On the other hand, Turkey has not suspended civilian flights from Moscow and other Russian cities to its airports.

Nikolay Krastev

Although this is becoming increasingly difficult – as President Zelenskyy himself said, he would not travel to Moscow because the situation is unstable due to Ukrainian drones. But that is just an observation on my part, of course. Right, so are you saying, nevertheless, that Turkey plays a central role in the dialogue, on the one hand, with Moscow, and on the other, with Kyiv?

Evgeni Krastev

Turkey does play such a role. Now, to what extent it is a central one is another matter, but it does play such a role. In a sense, Erdogan tried to act as a mediator…

Nikolay Krastev

… in 2022.

Evgeni Krastev

Yes, meetings took place in Antalya and Istanbul, which came to nothing. In practice, there was no way they could have led to anything, unfortunately. After he probably realised for himself that this role as mediator was unlikely to be very successful, he actually tried to maintain Turkey as an open channel through which there could be some operational communication between Russia and NATO or between Russia and Ukraine.

But, again, if we start from the issue of the vectors – American and European – up to this point this has, in a sense, been advantageous for Turkey, as it remained in the middle.

Nikolay Krastev

Where, then, will Turkey position itself between these two vectors you are talking about – the European one or the American one?

Evgeni Krastev

Well, as the European vector becomes increasingly strong, Turkey will have to align itself with it, because, in fact, it has no other choice. The American vector, as I have already said, has long been defined, and all the processes involved in its formation and consolidation have been completed. The momentum lies in Europe, and Turkey should… . And that is indeed how it appears, from every point of view.

I have observed clear signs here, both before and during the meeting in Ankara, that Turkey is orienting itself towards the European vector. It cannot have its own vector within NATO – if only because it lacks sufficient resources: economic, financial, political and military.

Nikolay Krastev

What do you mean by this? Might Turkey have an interest in European defence programmes?

Evgeni Krastev

The SAFE programme? There are such expectations. It is a somewhat complex process, because, in fact, the SAFE programme is an instrument of the European Union. Turkey might eventually gain access to funding through SAFE, but this requires the agreement of all 27 Member States of the European Union.

You will appreciate that, in order to secure this agreement, Turkey cannot, for example, demand that Sweden send Swedish citizens to Turkey simply because Erdogan considers them to be terrorists. It cannot carry out operations such as ‘Operation Olive Branch’ outside its own territory and in breach of European law, simply because Erdogan claims that this represents some sort of national interest for Turkey.

In this regard, in order to potentially gain access to SAFE and similar instruments, Turkey will have to provide, to a greater extent, guarantees regarding compliance with both international law and certain aspects of European Union law. But, in fact, this is an opportunity for Turkey, because, however well-developed it may currently be from a military-technical perspective compared with almost all the other countries in the Balkans, it could not secure such financial resources on its own to maintain this level of development, as could be ensured through the SAFE instrument. In this regard, if it fails to gain access to SAFE, it will gradually begin to fall behind in terms of its defence capabilities, military technologies and, generally speaking, in all aspects relating to its armed forces.

Nikolay Krastev

However, Mr Krastev, the defence industry is becoming an increasingly important factor both in Turkey and within NATO. Drones, missiles and tanks, manufactured using South Korean technology, are being procured…

Evgeni Krastev

These are being procured, but here we are not just talking about procurement, but also about sources of funding and projects that will benefit from this funding. In principle, within NATO, this has been the approach for decades. High-level cooperation between neighbouring member states of the Alliance is extremely useful – that is, for these countries from different geographical areas of NATO to collaborate with one another and jointly improve their defence capabilities. This will also apply to the use of the SAFE mechanism.

Here too, if Turkey has such intentions, it must, in fact, find such partners. It will be somewhat difficult in the case of Greece. Countries with shared borders must be sought out. Most likely, Turkey will look to Bulgaria in this regard, but let us emphasise once again: in order to find this path, all other EU member states must not object.

Bulgaria’s current role in NATO

Nikolay Krastev

Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey signed a memorandum during the meeting in Ankara. At the same time, Bulgaria is taking over the rotating command of the Black Sea Mine Countermeasures Group. What signal does this send for Bulgaria in the context of NATO’s regional policy on its eastern borders?

Evgeni Krastev

Command of this Black Sea Mine Countermeasures Task Force rotates every six months. These three countries established the task force and, on a rotational basis, take turns in command. It is considered that the countries within a region know it best, have the necessary resources and, in this regard, they are expected to work together to ensure security in the region. This Black Sea mine countermeasures group is a very telling example of this type of approach, which, I would emphasise once again, has been part of NATO’s philosophy for many years and decades.

Nikolay Krastev

We are gradually moving towards the Balkan aspect of this discussion, which is also the main one, but I have presented this broader picture so that our viewers can understand exactly what we are talking about and why the Alliance and the Ankara meeting are important. Does the proposal regarding the oil pipelines in Greece and Turkey, which was put forward during the conference, once again relate to this strategic dimension that the Balkans hold for NATO today?

Evgeni Krastev

When we talk about natural resources, the strategic element is always present. But I have already had the opportunity to mention that the interests of NATO member states do not always coincide. And as regards the transit of natural gas in the Balkans in general, we have precisely such a case. Perhaps we should approach the issue from a competitive perspective rather than one of partnership and alliance.

But that does not mean that, if in certain areas we have a basis for competitive relations, we must consider our alliance relations to be under threat. I would emphasise once again: throughout its entire history, NATO has operated in this way – finding ways to reconcile certain competitive relationships and placing them in the interests of the whole. Because, when I say ‘the whole’, I mean that there is no country (at least in the civilised world) that does not regard peace and security as a national interest.

Nikolay Krastev

Yes, everyone wants peace and prosperity.

Evgeni Krastev

And, in this respect, the current situation is no different. But, as there are tensions – caused mainly by Russia’s protracted war against Ukraine – in some cases these situations seem more intense and acute, giving rise to hypotheses which, as I have already said, have no basis in reality and therefore do not materialise.

Now, as regards Turkey and Greece: let us say that these are countries with traditionally difficult relations between them. There are periods when relations improve, but there are also periods when extremists take control. However, one of NATO’s functions and capabilities is precisely to defuse tensions between allies.

And if we take the specific example of Turkey and Greece, we must note that NATO is doing very well indeed in defusing and reducing tensions in the bilateral relations between these two countries. In fact, NATO provides an institutional framework that offers a basis for holding discussions and finding solutions, even when dealing with rather difficult issues.

In my view, NATO has also provided the necessary framework regarding the 15-year freeze on the contract between ‘Bulgargaz’ and Turkey. It is no coincidence that this happened immediately before, or even at the very start, of this meeting in Ankara. I am not inclined to look for reasons in any specific opportunities that Turkey might gain in Bulgaria. It is rather an expression of a strategic approach on the part of the Turkish state. Since, in order to gain access, for example, to SAFE – and for that access to be sustainable – it would be entirely logical for Turkey to wish to have a greater presence in various sectors through investments in countries with which it could potentially develop joint projects and seek funding via SAFE. And, as I have already said, it is logical to expect that one of these countries might well be Bulgaria.

The Western Balkans and NATO

Nikolay Krastev

Mr Krastev, a few days ago, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Joint Forces, Alexus G. Grynkewich, also spoke about Serbia – he said that Belgrade, too, has an interest in maintaining stability. He even mentioned that NATO has a strategic interest in what is happening in the post-Yugoslav region and in the Western Balkans (as you know, there are two missions in this region).

I would like to discuss briefly the maintenance of stability and the strengthening of the partnership with Serbia. As you know, Bulgaria served as NATO’s point of contact in Belgrade between the Serbian political and military leadership and the Alliance. But is NATO aware of Serbia’s growing proximity to Russia, to China (which is already far greater than that with Russia) or to Iran? Do you think NATO is aware of this?

Evgeni Krastev

I believe the message conveyed by General Alexus G. Grynkewich was by no means coincidental. Through this approach, he demonstrates that, as well as being a high-ranking officer, he is also a rather good diplomat. In fact, this is nothing new – I believe French President Macron has also spoken in this way about Serbia in the past.

What is new is that, for the first time, this message has come from a very high military level, such as that of Alexus G. Grynkewich. It is absolutely clear that NATO is keeping a close eye on the Balkan region. Indeed, Grynkewich put it in no uncertain terms.

Nikolay Krastev

During his visit to Sofia.

Evgeni Krastev

Yes, precisely during his visit to Sofia, which took place at the invitation of the Chief of Defence, Admiral Emil Eftimov. The message that Grynkewich addressed to Serbia was directed not so much at the political leadership, represented by President Vučić, as at the country’s public opinion itself.

It is absolutely clear that Serbia’s interests are as follows: peace in the Balkans, stability, opportunities for economic development and an improved standard of living. However, in countries where democracy is severely flawed or virtually paralysed, a discrepancy sometimes arises between the national interest and the interests of the ruling elite. When this happens, the country may become embroiled in processes that serve the interests of the ruling class, but which are categorically contrary to the national interests – understood as the interests of society itself and of the Serbian people.

In fact, Grynkewich says the following: “Under no circumstances should you allow an excessive link between the ‘Russian world’ and the so-called ‘Serbian world’, as it is in your interest for the Balkans to be stable. And for the region to remain stable, that is precisely what you must not do.”

Nikolay Krastev

At the same time, however, we note that both the US and NATO appear to wish to reduce the KFOR mission in Kosovo – one of the major missions in our region – from 4,700 (according to previous estimates) to 3,300–3,500 personnel. This measure has been described by the Alliance’s Secretary-General, Mark Rutte, as ‘optimisation’. Do you consider such a decision to be justified? Is it merely a matter of maths and finances, or are there other factors that have contributed to this decision?

Evgeni Krastev

If this is indeed an ‘optimisation’, it should mean that the mission’s efficiency must be maintained. What has so far been achieved by 4,700 people must be able to be achieved to the same extent and with the same quality by 3,500 people (if not actually improving the quality). Since you are asking me whether it is justified: if this is the result – then it is justified. If there are risks associated with the expected outcome, of course, such a decision can always be reviewed and adapted to the actual situation on the ground.

Nikolay Krastev

Do you know why the Alliance’s troop numbers in Kosovo were increased in 2023 – because of the attempted incursion near the Serbian monastery of Banska in northern Kosovo and the attack on the Kosovar police. Does NATO regard such incidents as a possibility in the future on Kosovar territory? Because the idea of dividing Kosovo is still circulating in Belgrade.

Evgeni Krastev

The very fact that Grynkewich clearly stated: ‘We are monitoring the situation and Belgrade’s actions in these regions very closely’, constitutes the answer to this question. Of course it takes them into account. Another question is what the current assessment is, what intelligence data is available and, based on this, what analysis has been carried out, so that it is clear to what extent this risk remains relevant today.

The fact that such a signal was sent to Serbia, as Grynkewich did from Sofia… he has, in effect, expressed expectations that Serbia should comply with and align its policy towards security and stability. The fact that these expectations exist means that such intentions might exist, but the likelihood of them being realised is assessed as very low.

Nikolay Krastev

Well, we also see the NATO mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina – another large-scale mission. Bosnia and Herzegovina, too, suffers chronically from attempts at destabilisation. These manifest themselves at a political and verbal level, but do not, in a sense, rule out a repeat of the Kosovo scenario. To what extent do the Western Balkans and the post-Yugoslav region represent an important area for the Alliance?

Evgeni Krastev

This is an extremely important area for the Alliance, and this is the moment to note that, at present, out of the entire Balkan region, there are only two states (or, as I like to say – two and a half) – Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina – which are not members of the Alliance. And Kosovo, which is also not a member, but the Alliance has a presence there – that is why I say ‘two and a half’.

In fact, it was only after most of the Balkans had joined NATO that the problems relating to stability and security were, to a large extent, overcome. I assume viewers will recall what it was like in the 1990s and what followed, when Kosovo became an autonomous and independent state.

The consensus within NATO – at both the political and military leadership levels, as well as amongst the long-standing member states – is precisely this: for the Balkans to be stable, they must be given support in this direction. Because, by their very nature, they struggle to generate security and stability – historical developments themselves, if we look back, demonstrate this very clearly.

And stability in the Balkans is, in fact, part of Europe’s overall stability. Whether viewed from the perspective of values or direct interests, the security and stability of the Balkan region are essential. For this reason, support in various forms will always be provided.

If there is insecurity or destabilisation in Europe or in the continent’s neighbouring areas, threats can very easily and rapidly spread to the Balkans. I repeat: the fact that this does not happen is due, to a large extent, precisely to the region’s almost complete membership of NATO (and, in the case of many countries, of the EU as well). On the other hand, any instability in the Balkans, provoked from outside by third countries in the event of a war in the vicinity of our region, may, in turn, trigger processes that affect European security as a whole.

This is an extremely undesirable scenario. Therefore, viewed from both perspectives, Balkan security is of the utmost importance – it is an integral part of European security. In this regard, we can fully endorse the words of General Alexus G. Grynkewich, spoken in Sofia: that NATO is closely monitoring the Balkan region, continues to do so, and that the region can count on its full support with regard to security and stability.

Romania, the Black Sea region and NATO

Nikolay Krastev

I would prefer not to bring this discussion to a close, but time is an unforgiving factor, Mr Krastev. My final question for you is to discuss briefly Romania’s role in the Black Sea region. We note that this role is becoming increasingly consolidated. Romania is expanding its air base on the Black Sea coast – ‘Mihail Kogălniceanu’. You’ve had the opportunity to visit it; you’ve had the opportunity to go to Romania. Is Romania becoming a key element of strategic security in the Black Sea region – perhaps even more important than Bulgaria?

Evgeni Krastev

I haven’t visited that particular base, but I have been to Romania. As regards security in the Balkans as a whole, Romania certainly has its role to play. We cannot isolate it in a separate context. In my view, the issue must be addressed here first within the Balkan context, and then within the pan-European one.

Nikolay Krastev

This will be the Air Force’s largest base, with 10,000 personnel, on the Alliance’s eastern flank – situated not just anywhere, but specifically in the Black Sea region.

Evgeni Krastev

Like Bulgaria, Romania also forms part of two regions simultaneously – the Balkans and the Black Sea region. In this sense, the establishment of this base and its location there can only be viewed in one way: as a factor of stability both in the Balkans and with regard to the Black Sea region.

However, when we talk about this base, I believe it is of greater importance for the Black Sea region and for ensuring the security of the Black Sea itself, of the countries in the region and, of course, for the eastern flank.

And this is a long-term issue. Regardless of when Russia’s war against Ukraine ends and regardless of how it ends, the security challenges in the Black Sea will not disappear. What is more, they may even worsen after this period, as it is unclear what developments will take place within Russia itself following a possible end to the war.

Moreover, afterwards, in any case, it will be the turn of diplomacy to resolve the issues arising from the military actions. As far as Russia is concerned, when we speak of diplomatic instruments, they must be backed by force – generally speaking, by a readiness to act, with the necessary infrastructure and equipment. Because, unfortunately, as reality has shown us over the past four and a half years, when it comes to Russia, this is the only approach that works.

And here I wish to emphasise strongly: I am not talking about an aggressive approach. On the contrary – I am talking about dialogue and diplomacy, but for all of this to be taken seriously by Russia, it must be backed by force.

Nikolay Krastev

Romania is, of course, also very important for Moldova, which aspires to become a member of the European Union and the Alliance. Following Russia’s aggressive actions in Ukraine, the issue of Moldova is undoubtedly coming to the fore. In this podcast, we discussed the rapprochement between Romania and Moldova (whether unification will take place is an entirely different matter), but NATO is a very important bridge for Moldova’s security. How do you view Romania’s role in this regard? Although it is not a country with direct access to the Black Sea, Moldova is linked to security in the Black Sea region.

Evgeni Krastev

Romania’s role with regard to Moldova… Unfortunately, these are the sort of relations we would have done well to have with North Macedonia. The situation between Romania and Moldova is developing very positively compared to that with the Republic of Macedonia.

The Moldovan state, led by President Maia Sandu, has fared quite well in recent years in terms of safeguarding its national interests, organising elections (thwarting attempts at external interference in them) and pursuing a course of integration, primarily into the European Union, and subsequently – probably – into NATO as well. In the parliamentary elections a few months ago, in all regions of the country where voting took place, it was precisely this development path set out by President Maia Sandu that was supported.

Nikolay Krastev

I had the opportunity to visit Moldova and saw a fairly large German contingent assisting the Moldovan armed forces with demining operations and ensuring security and stability in this part of the Black Sea coastal region.

Evgeni Krastev

The role of Germany, the role of the leading NATO countries and of the Alliance as a whole in promoting peace, stability and security are essential to the state of the European continent and its development as a strategic space. Where necessary, support is provided so that risks can be mitigated in a timely manner.

NATO has developed a comprehensive programme since 2014, following Russia’s aggression against Crimea. It was then that multinational battlegroups, such as the one in Bulgaria, were established. Five – and subsequently, I believe, six – NATO countries, which possess greater economic and military resources, form the basis of this programme. In our case, one such country is Italy – it holds the leadership role within the multinational battlegroup. In addition, there is a Bulgarian contingent, as well as further contingents from other countries. Each member state can deploy its own military personnel to one or other of these battlegroups.

Initially, such groups were established in Poland and the Baltic states, and the model was subsequently expanded. This demonstrates the degree of purely military integration within NATO and its potential for development, as well as the Alliance’s readiness to respond rapidly to potential threats, as each of these battle groups can be rapidly transformed into a brigade, should the need arise.

Nikolay Krastev

Yes, we hope it won’t come to that, but we must be prepared for any scenario. Thank you, Mr Krastev, for being our guest! That was Evgeni Krastev.

You can revisit the conversation with him in the episode, as you’ve heard a detailed and extremely interesting analysis not only of NATO’s history, but also of the Alliance’s conduct in Eastern Europe and on the eastern flank of the Balkans.

You’re welcome to share your views in the comments section on NATO and Balkan policy, as well as the meeting in Ankara. You can ‘like’ this episode, which will help it to be shared on YouTube, viewed by more people and draw the attention of a wider audience to the developments in our region.

That’s all for today, dear viewers. Thank you, and stay tuned to ‘#Balcani’!

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Photo: Evgeni Krastev (source: YouTube)

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