Codru Vrabie: The Romanian justice system needs to be fundamentally changed. However, I fear that we will only see a few cosmetic legislative changes

Vladimir Mitev

Summary of the Interview with Codru Vrabie: Justice Reform in Romania

The interview with Codru Vrabie, an expert in good governance, analyzes the anti-corruption discourse in Romania following the documentary Recorder and the protests.

Vrabie’s reactons to the documentary

• Fearlessness vs. Disciplinary Mechanisms: Vrabie is surprised that some magistrates are still afraid to speak publicly, despite their theoretical independence and irremovability. He believes that the disciplinary mechanisms controlled by the Superior Council of Magistracy (CSM) through the Judicial Inspection are “terribly powerful” and cause fears related to career prospects.
• Comparison with the Năstase Period (2000-2004): There can be no talk of a total regression to that era, as society and institutional mechanisms have changed. The similarity lies in the “collusion, a brotherhood” between politicians seeking impunity and magistrates who submit to political influence for benefits.
• Similarities and differences from 20 years ago:
  • Between 2003 and 2007, magistrates learned what real independence means, leading to stronger anti-corruption efforts.
  • Since the “Dragnea era” (after 2017), politicians have used legislative mechanisms to make it more difficult to uncover the truth in high-level corruption cases.
  • If 20 years ago the political factor decided not to investigate, today the judicial factor (prosecutors and judges) uses “procedural tricks” to prevent investigations against criminal politicians from leading to convictions.

• Supreme Judicial Council: The Council had only three reformist magistrates elected in 2010. The 2016 and 2022 elections consolidated the group of “anti-reformist” magistrates, with a consolidation of power by people such as Ms. Savonea.
• Civil Society (NGOs): Vrabie contradicts the idea that the NGO sector is stronger. He argues that funding has fallen sharply and most influential civic organizations in the reformist sphere have disbanded or been “captured by political interests.” Those who entered politics (e.g., Nicușor Dan, Oana Gheorghiu) did not have a close connection to systemic reforms in the justice system.
• Secret Services: The reintroduction of corruption as a threat in the National Defense Strategy is considered a mistake, but explained by alignment with the policies of the Băsescu-Macovei era. Vrabie criticizes the “heavy-handed” anti-corruption style (Köveși-Morar), which did not bring about systemic changes. He hopes that the future involvement of the services (starting in 2026) will move into the systemic area, providing intelligence on gaps in legislation and decision-making processes, not just on individuals.
• The Change in Corruption and Anti-Corruption: Corruption has shifted from the acquisition of material wealth (“nababs”) to controlling decision-making mechanisms and perverting systems in order to enjoy influence without being disturbed (“post-materialist anti-corruption”).
• Popular Support: Current anti-corruption, being anti-system, fuels both the sovereignist and reformist camps. Sovereignists actually support the mechanism illustrated in Recorder, and a significant part of Parliament (sovereignist parties plus part of the PSD) supports this “octopus.” The reformist anti-corruption movement is a minority (probably 20-25%).
• Nicușor Dan’s reaction: The proposal for a referendum in the judicial system is seen as an “extremely bold but risky gambit” or as a statement “made without thinking.” Vrabie believes that the referendum cannot be legal and that any consultation through the CSM is flawed, and that a consultation outside the law would be challenged.
• Political solution: In order to pass the reforms, the government, led by Ilie Bolojan, needs to take responsibility in Parliament. This requires an agreement within the coalition, including the full support of the PSD, otherwise the reforms will not pass. The next three weeks are decisive.
• Scenarios: The most likely scenario is the PSD leaving the government and a political crisis. The successful scenario would be for the PSD to accept the reform of important aspects of the justice system.

Vrabie argues that it is necessary to change “almost the entire system” (macro level), but it is realistic to expect only one or two cosmetic legislative changes. Essential reforms needed include:

1. The mechanism for forming judicial panels: To prevent their repeated change, which leads to delays in trials.
2. The statute of limitations:
   • Remedying the issues raised by the Constitutional Court.
   • Introducing a provision that, once a case has entered the trial phase, the statute of limitations should be suspended.
3. Elections for the SCM:
   • Shortening of terms: The current six-year terms are too long; elections should be held every two years for one-third of the members.
   • Change in the election mechanism: The current system favors conservative/anti-reform candidates, blocking reformers and making the SCM susceptible to “capture.”
4. Support staff: A comprehensive reform must include support staff (clerks, judicial assistants), as the manipulation of the courts would not have been possible without the complicity of some of them.

Refusal of magistrates to accept austerity measures in their domain of activity is considered morally wrong from the perspective of social solidarity, but technically correct. Magistrates have an enormous workload (10-14 hours per day), and the government is asking them to remain in the system longer, with the same overload, but with lower salaries and pensions. The correct solution would be to identify areas with a shortage of magistrates, reduce the workload, and then ask them to work for more years. Vrabie accuses the government of pro-cyclical policies (general cuts) that further polarize society.

Intro

Codru Vrabie is a civic activist, trainer, and consultant on good governance, transparency, accountability, and integrity in the public sector, contributing to several reform measures in the judiciary and public administration. With a bachelor’s degree in legal and political sciences (studying in Romania, Bulgaria, and the United States) and a master’s degree in administrative sciences and European affairs (studying in Romania, the Netherlands, and Spain), Codru has been working for civil society in Romania since 1998. Since 2010, Codru has been working with the Leaders for Justice program, which has been replicated in the Republic of Moldova since 2017.

It is surprising that there are still Romanian magistrates who are afraid to speak publicly about problems in the justice system

Mr. Vrabie, what were your thoughts when you saw Recorder’s documentary? What surprised you or what did not surprise you in it?

First of all, the film confirmed what I knew only anecdotally. That is, I did not have factual evidence of the kind they presented. Therefore, it was not very surprising to me.

What surprised me, perhaps, was the fact that there are still magistrates in Romania who are afraid to come forward and speak publicly about problems in the justice system. This is discouraging, given that in Romania, according to the Constitution, magistrates are independent and irremovable. In other words, theoretically, a magistrate should not be afraid of anything when they have something to say.

But what we see in the Recorder documentary—and what I sensed before seeing the material—is that the disciplinary mechanisms that the SCM controls or masters through the Judicial Inspection are indeed terribly powerful and cause people to fear for their careers.

Has Romanian justice regressed 20 years?

One of the main messages of the documentary was that justice in Romania has returned to where it was perhaps 20 years ago. During Năstase’s government (2000-2004), trials began that led to a situation where, a few years later, magistrates already felt truly independent from the political sphere. This independence led to a period of stronger anti-corruption efforts. But now, if you can compare the situation in the early 2000s with the current one: what is the same and what is different? I guess it can’t be exactly the same, because we’ve already gone through a cycle in which the fight against corruption grew and then stopped.

Obviously, there are some very big differences. I would say that we cannot return to the Stănoiu-Năstase era, because many things have changed both in Romanian society and in the institutional mechanism. What is common is that there is collusion, a brotherhood between politicians who want to enjoy impunity and magistrates who, for various other benefits — usually material — bow down to the political factor.

This kind of collaboration between part of the political class and part of the judiciary resembles what we saw 20 years ago. However, what is different is that between 2003–2004 and 2007, magistrates in Romania really learned what it means to be truly independent from the political factor.

That’s when they started working harder to deliver justice, no matter how high-ranking a politician was, on cases of corruption, tax evasion, money laundering, and all kinds of other serious crimes that usually happen in the world of politics.

Later, starting in 2017, during the “Dragnea era,” the opposite began to happen. Politicians, using the legislative mechanisms and laws they adopted through Parliament or through emergency government ordinances, made it increasingly difficult to uncover the truth about high-level crimes. Then, in one way or another, with the help of magistrates like Savonea — as Recorder shows us — they managed to capture the system so that they, the politicians, could no longer be held accountable.

This is where the similarities with the situation two decades ago begin to emerge. Except that 20 years ago, it was the political factor that decided not to investigate certain acts of corruption. Today, it is the judicial factor — prosecutors and judges — that, through all kinds of procedural tricks, ensures that investigations into criminal politicians do not reach the stage of conviction or punishment. These are the major differences between the two eras.

The role of the Supreme Judicial Council

What is the role of the Supreme Judicial Council in these processes of growth and then stagnation of anti-corruption?

I would like to point out something that I consider important. We only saw reformists elected to the Supreme Judicial Council (CSM) in 2010. Since CSM mandates are for six years, the first elections were in 2004. It was only in 2007 that magistrates began to learn what independence from political influence meant, so it was only in the 2010 elections that we saw, for the first time, reformist magistrates elected to the CSM. These were the famous Danileț, Dumbravă, and Neacșu, who, however, failed to push the reformist agenda within the Council, being marginalized by their more conservative colleagues.

Then, starting with the 2016 and 2022 SCM elections, we see that (almost) no reformist magistrates have entered the Council. This has consolidated the group of conservative magistrates—although I think it would be more accurate to call them “anti-reformists.” The Recorder documentary highlights in particular how Ms. Savonea, between 2016 and 2022, consolidated her power in the Supreme Judicial Council, managing to make the new Council elected in 2022 rather friendly or even submissive to her.

These are things that I hope we will see investigated by some truly courageous prosecutors. However, it remains to be seen what President Nicușor Dan will do, because next year, in 2026, he is set to make new appointments to the leadership of the prosecutor’s offices.

The NGO sector

Before asking about Nicușor Dan’s role, I have a few more questions about the context. One thing that is probably different — you can tell me if this is the case — is that the NGO sector now seems much stronger than it was 20 years ago. For example, we see that President Nicușor Dan himself has his origins in the NGO environment; Oana Gheorghiu, Deputy Prime Minister, also comes from the NGO sector. I think more people come from there and gradually reach positions of decision-making in the government or at other levels. How does this political or social power of the NGO sector change the situation with regard to justice?

I disagree with this assessment. Twenty years ago, we had several non-governmental organizations in Romania working in the civic sphere, focusing on good governance and the rule of law.

There were over 10-12 such organizations, all very powerful, with fairly solid funding provided by European funds (at that time PHARE funds, as there were no structural funds yet), funds from USAID, the Soros Foundation, and other sources. Meanwhile, the Soros Foundation funds no longer exist (they withdrew from Romania), USAID withdrew from Romania (after which it was decapitated in early 2025), and European structural funds are delivered through management authorities at the ministerial level. Led by political ministers who do not support NGOs, funding for them is negligible today compared to 20 years ago.

This is also evident in the fact that, of the civic organizations in the area of good governance and the rule of law, essentially only two remain: Funky Citizens and Expert Forum. Pro Democrația is no longer active, APADOR-CH is no longer active, the Legal Resource Center is no longer active, and Transparency International has also been captured by political interests. So the landscape is not at all similar.

You said that President Nicușor Dan comes from civil society. It’s true, he comes from the “Save Bucharest” Association, but he has never had a close connection with the organizations I mentioned earlier. He worked in an extremely narrow niche concerning transparency at the local government level in Bucharest. My opinion is that he did not achieve much there; he had some considerable successes in the courts, but in terms of changing or strengthening administrative mechanisms, he failed to achieve lasting results.

Oana Gheorghiu, also a deputy prime minister, comes from the “Dăruiește Viață” (Give Life) association, which was exclusively involved in the project to build a pediatric oncology hospital. In other words, a type of project that had no connection with advocacy, public policy, or legislation. Don’t forget that most of the influential people in the Romanian non-governmental sector, in the civic and reform areas, left the NGO sector in 2015-2016 to join the newly formed parties: the Save Romania Union and then PLUS. Subsequently, USR PLUS underwent various transformations. It is now one of the mainstream parties, in government for the second time, and no longer seems to be driven by the same reformist ideas as these people were 10 years ago when they were active in civil society.

These are the reasons why I believe that civil society in Romania is currently in a much weaker position, even though it seems to have some people at the top of the power structure. The real political power lies in Parliament. The representatives of the former civil society or of the reformist movement in Parliament are terribly few and do not have the political influence necessary to change the legislation. And the crisis we are now seeing in the justice system stems precisely from the fact that, at the legislative level, changes have been made “with dedication” for the anti-reformist politicians.

Secret services

I understand that civil society can mean many things and we need to think more complexly about its presence in political life. But I want to ask you something else in this category: when we talk about the secret services, these too can theoretically mean many things. We remember that in the “golden age” of anti-corruption, with Laura Codruța Köveși at the helm, the Romanian secret services were the element that gave power to the DNA’s campaign against politicians. Now it is interesting that in the national defense strategy adopted in November, corruption is again defined as a threat to national security, as it was during Băsescu’s time. It seems that the services are expected to play a supporting role in the fight against corruption once again.

What do you expect to be the same regarding the role of the secret services in this process that seems to be taking shape now? Will they again be heavily involved in the work of the judiciary and anti-corruption, or will it be different?

Here, I would be interested in looking at two different aspects of the issue. The first is strictly related to the involvement of the services at the operational-procedural level, and the second is one of substance: what exactly the intelligence services are looking at.

If we take them one at a time, in my opinion, the re-inclusion of corruption in the National Defense Strategy as a vulnerability, danger, or risk—regardless of the exact definition there—is a mistake. However, it is an error that can be explained by the fact that Nicușor Dan, viewed from a distance, is to some extent a continuator of the policies of the Băsescu-Macovei era (2004-2008), when there was a very strong focus on this anti-corruption direction.

We have not yet discussed the fact that this style of anti-corruption “with a club,” with the desire to cut off heads, although it was spectacular and produced immediate results, could not and did not bring about systemic change. It only targeted a few prominent, visible figures, who were sent to prison. Precisely because this happened, the political system surrounding those powerful people subsequently sought to “correct” the system in its favor. On the other hand, the Băsescu-Macovei reformist camp did not produce sustainable systemic changes that would close opportunities for corruption and make abuse of power unacceptable or even improbable. That is why those cooperation protocols between the SRI and the prosecutors’ offices, which were abusive in themselves, were necessary. This is why I also criticized Ms. Laura Codruța Köveși: I considered it wrong to work in the justice system with materials from the secret services. Let us not forget that there are now decisions of the Constitutional Court (adopted in the last 10 years or so) that prohibit the interference of the services in the act of justice.

Therefore, I believe that the way the services are involved starting this year, in 2026, will be different. In the past, during the Köveși-Morar tandem, it seems that the services provided information obtained from telephone or environmental wiretaps: “Look, Minister X met with businessman Y, we believe it is corruption, investigate.” Now, I believe that the involvement of the services needs to move into the systemic area.

This is the second point I wanted to emphasize. Intelligence (human intelligence and analysis) is needed to uncover loopholes in legislation and decision-making processes; loopholes in the way illegitimate interest groups and politicians interact. I believe that in the next stage, the services must bring this systemic intelligence to the attention of decision-makers and show where there are vulnerabilities that can subsequently be confirmed by specific criminal investigations by prosecutors. The main goal must be legislative intervention to close those loopholes, making it impossible to repeat such practices.

I would add an important element: legislation on the Register of Interests was recently adopted. If all lobbying companies and non-governmental organizations record their meetings with politicians there, and ministers, secretaries of state, and parliamentarians do the same, we will begin to have a much clearer picture of the systems of influence in Romanian politics. From there, the intelligence services will be able to generate serious and complex analyses of phenomena, not just individuals.

There is a saying that “great, enlightened minds discuss ideas and concepts, while small, narrow minds discuss people.” During the heyday of Romanian anti-corruption, we had to deal with services that dealt with people — coincidentally, Voiculescu, Patriciu, or the Micula brothers, a bunch of scoundrels. But starting in 2026, under the new strategy, the services need to have a “big mind” and discuss systems, ideas, and concepts.

Corruption has changed. So has anti-corruption.

An important element in the comparison between the “golden age” of 20 years ago and the present is the Romanian people’s opposition to corruption. I remember the case of that Romanian who threw himself off the balcony of the Parliament in protest against corruption. There have been many occasions when citizens have demanded anti-corruption measures, and politicians have delivered them because there was a popular desire to see the guilty go to prison.

How do you see this comparison today? On the one hand, we see the anti-corruption protests that erupted after the Recorder film; so, the feeling of support for justice reform exists. On the other hand, it seems to me that there is a very large group—which we could call sovereignist, composed in part of the PSD electorate—that tends to side with the non-reformist or conservative tendency represented by Ms. Savonea. To what extent can we still say that the anti-corruption spirit among the people is as strong now? Hasn’t it weakened or shifted towards conservatism in recent years?

My opinion is that, just as the “recipe” or substance of corruption in Romania has changed, so has the substance of anti-corruption. What do I mean, exactly?

Twenty years ago, during the Năstase era, corrupt politicians intended to grab as many material resources as possible: money, goods, houses, cars, in order to raise their own standard of living and become very rich, true “nabobs.” That’s how they imagined it should be. Gradually, we saw that during the 2010s and then, very visibly, during the Dragnea era, corruption began to shift towards controlling decision-making mechanisms, towards perverting decision-making systems and processes. Corrupt politicians want to control these levers so that they can enjoy resources, wealth, and influence without being disturbed by state institutions.

It is a subtle difference, a form of “emancipation,” because there has been a shift from the desire to obtain concrete wealth to the desire to hold decision-making power and influence. As a result, anti-corruption has also changed. In the beginning, it was strongly driven by a sense of injustice: “Look at how much this man has accumulated, how he mocks us by flaunting his unjustified wealth!”. In an era when people blame the system, this anti-corruption attitude, which is by definition anti-system, feeds both the sovereignist and reformist camps in equal measure.

It is a form of “post-materialist” anti-corruption, just as corruption has become post-materialist. Except that when we look at sovereignist politicians, we see that they are, in fact, supporters of the mechanism illustrated in the documentary Recorder. In other words, we find ourselves in a situation where a significant part of the Romanian Parliament—the sovereignist parties plus part of the PSD—supports this “octopus” allegedly run by Ms. Savonea and other people around her.

This means that, from the point of view of the post-materialist fight against corruption, it is weaker than the materialist fight against corruption was 10 or 20 years ago. That is why I said earlier that, if reform is needed, the intelligence services — the intelligence part — must deal with this systemic, post-materialist component. Otherwise, it will not be possible to achieve sustainable reform solutions.

It is interesting because I had the feeling that Romania was entering a period of deep stagnation, in which nothing was happening. And yet, the last two years have shown us a profound change in society, with an acute need for systemic reforms, starting this year, in 2026. Instead of stagnation, we are seeing a very interesting effervescence. It remains to be seen whether we have politicians who can live up to expectations — and I am not necessarily referring to the expectations of the population, but to those of analysts like myself.

It remains to be seen whether we have leaders like Nicușor Dan, Ilie Bolojan, or others who can truly respond to this “astral moment,” in which Romanian society needs new, creative, innovative, and, certainly, systemic solutions. We can no longer proceed on a case-by-case basis, “patching things up” here and there.

The reaction of the political and judicial systems to the documentary Recorder

Let us now look at the reaction of the political and judicial systems to the film Recorder and the challenge that these protests represent. We see that President Nicușor Dan has proposed a referendum within the judicial system—an idea seen as “strange” by some analysts, including those at Expert Forum. On the other hand, the Judicial Inspection has launched investigations to verify the claims made in the documentary, and Marius Voineag (head of the DNA) has presented documents to show that he acts similarly to Laura Codruța Köveși when requesting additional information from his subordinates regarding cases and that he cannot be attacked. How do you view these reactions?

Fortunately, some voices have been raised within the judiciary to support what the Recorder investigation has revealed. These voices represent the reformist segment or group within the judiciary, somewhere around a quarter of the total number of judges and prosecutors. It is natural that there are relatively few people who come forward and speak out because, as we discussed earlier, the system seems to be terribly oppressive.

What is important is to see whether these people manage to rise above the condition discussed earlier—of analyzing specific cases, person by person—and offer systemic solutions. From what I have seen in the summary on the Presidential Administration’s website, no solid systemic solutions seem to have emerged yet; the beginning is a little timid. It remains to be seen whether more substantial proposals will emerge at the level of the Presidency and the working group formed within the Government.

Strictly speaking, as far as President Nicușor Dan and his solution with the referendum are concerned, I am afraid that we are once again seeing a partially populist inclination, reminiscent of Băsescu-Macovei. I do not believe that a referendum within the judiciary can be legal; this is the first issue. Secondly, if consultation with the judiciary is desired, it is mandatory that this be done through the mechanisms of the SCM. And we currently suspect that the SCM mechanism has already been captured. Therefore, we could not trust the results of such a consultation if it were carried out through the SCM. If another way is found, “outside” the existing laws, for a consultation at the level of the Presidency, the result will be rightly contested by the anti-reformist voices in the judiciary.

I would say that Nicușor Dan, through his statement on the referendum, either made an extremely bold but risky bet, or “spoke without thinking” and now finds himself in a catch-22 situation, from which he has no way out except to postpone the issue sine die. There is another aspect: the way he expressed himself regarding the results of this consultation, stating that, under certain conditions, the SCM should leave “urgently.” It reminded me of 2019, when former President Iohannis put to a referendum the idea that measures should no longer be adopted by emergency ordinances in the judiciary. The Romanian people rejected the idea of “emergency” action in the justice system at that time, so I believe that President Nicușor Dan has once again been carried away.

A reasonable solution would be for the results of the consultations at Cotroceni to be made available to the government working group. Subsequently, the results should be passed through Parliament, but with one amendment: if the usual parliamentary procedure is followed, it is very likely that the reform will remain “orphaned.” I believe that Prime Minister Bolojan, together with the government and the four-party coalition, will need to take responsibility before Parliament for the reforms in the justice system.

I don’t see any other political solution. At the moment, if we put the solution in the hands of the majority formed by the sovereignists and part of the PSD, they control 51-52% of Parliament, so the reforms will not pass. To resolve this dilemma, an agreement is needed within the coalition so that the PSD, in its entirety, supports the assumption of responsibility. Then, the anti-reformist pole would no longer have a chance of success.

I asked you earlier about the reaction to the protests…

The protests themselves are a consequence of the film; I would put the film and the protests together. They are parts of the same phenomenon, and this phenomenon comes from the post-materialist anti-corruption movement — anti-system, but reformist. This area is currently a minority among the Romanian population, representing probably no more than 20-25%. This is also the percentage of judges and prosecutors within the judicial system who have already written to the president, responding to the appeal made about ten days ago.

That’s pretty much how things stand at the moment. Nicușor Dan’s rhetoric is very close to that of this 20-25% group, both in society and in the judiciary, but I don’t see how he could win on his own. Therefore, Nicușor Dan needs to work very closely with Ilie Bolojan on this issue in order to convince the PSD and part of the PNL to remain in government and support the Executive. Subsequently, the Government should take responsibility before Parliament.

We will most likely see these developments in the next three months. There are only two possible scenarios. The most likely scenario is that the PSD will leave the government, which would plunge us into a terrible crisis. The less likely scenario, but one that would be truly successful, is one in which the PSD agrees to reform important aspects of the justice system. This would mean repealing the legislation that the PSD itself has proposed over the last ten years and finding other solutions for the material desires of some party members.

And I want to be clear: I do not want it to be understood that the PSD is necessarily the source of all evil and, therefore, must necessarily become the “scapegoat.” There is also an important group within the PNL that thinks the same way, a relevant segment of the UDMR with the same vision, and, I fear, even within the USR there is not 100% support for the reformist agenda.

I believe that the next three weeks are crucial in terms of seeing how Nicușor Dan positions himself—until around mid-January. He will need to come up with very strong messages at the first meeting of the CSM at the beginning of the year. Then we will see what results come out of the consultations with the magistrates, given that he has announced another round or two of meetings. He will probably have to recalibrate his statements about that referendum and the “emergency” departure of the CSM members. At the same time, it will be necessary to reopen the dialogue with Ilie Bolojan on this issue, but also with Sorin Grindeanu, whose position is very important.

Therefore, the next three weeks are decisive, and in the following two months we will see the actual action at the legislative level.

What reforms are needed in the Romanian justice system?

You mentioned that you are expecting certain reforms in the justice sector. What could this reform actually entail? What could be changed by law or ordinance?

Nothing can be changed by emergency ordinance, because we have the 2019 referendum, from the period of President Iohannis. Changes can only be made by law and, as I said earlier, I believe that such laws cannot pass through Parliament through the usual procedure, but require the Government to take responsibility.

What I think needs to be changed, first of all, is the mechanism for setting up court panels, so that they can no longer be changed three or four times in a row in order to delay the trial.

Secondly, I believe that intervention is needed in the statute of limitations regime in two directions. First: to remedy what the Constitutional Court pointed out three or four years ago, issues that Parliament has unfortunately left unaddressed. Second: a new provision should be introduced whereby, once a case has entered the trial phase, the statute of limitations is suspended. Thus, even if there are changes in the composition of the panel, this would no longer mean that the case is delayed until the statute of limitations expires, as it would already be suspended.

Reforms concerning the Supreme Judicial Council

You mentioned that certain rules concerning the functioning of the Supreme Judicial Council need to be changed…

A third extremely important point concerns the elections for the Supreme Judicial Council. Here, too, I see two essential aspects. The first concerns the length of terms of office. Currently, Supreme Judicial Council members are elected “en bloc” for a six-year term. These six-year periods — as we discussed regarding the 2004, 2010, 2016, and 2022 cycles — are far too long, and the Supreme Judicial Council becomes unable to respond to the needs of the justice system. Even if its members are acting in good faith and want to respond to what is happening in the system, the institution remains “stuck” for the entire six years.

As I have argued since 2004, elections for the Supreme Judicial Council should be held every two years for one-third of its members. This is a model similar to that of the Constitutional Court, where the term of office is nine years, so that renewal takes place every three years for one-third of the members. In the case of the Supreme Judicial Council, with a six-year term, renewal would take place every two years, also for one-third of the members. This would bring the Council much closer to the body of magistrates and enable it to respond much more quickly to internal concerns and reform needs.

The second aspect related to elections concerns the specific mechanism by which magistrates appoint their representatives. I would like to remind you that, in 20 years and four successive rounds of elections, we have seen only three reformist magistrates elected to the Supreme Judicial Council—all three in 2010. None of them managed to maintain their reformist position within the judiciary after being elected to the Supreme Judicial Council. This indicates that the election system favors conservative candidates, or rather, anti-reformist ones. The current system almost blocks reformists from entering the SCM, which means that the institution can never reform itself from within and is susceptible to capture. That is why I believe we need to carefully analyze and change the way Supreme Judicial Council members are elected.

Beyond these three major topics, each with its own sub-points, I would add one more element which, from my observations, is not discussed at all. The judicial system—at the level of courts, tribunals, courts of appeal, or public prosecutors’ offices—does not function with judges and prosecutors alone. It also functions with clerks, assistant magistrates, and other support staff.

I firmly believe that genuine reform of the justice system cannot be achieved without consulting these people as well. It is vital to include them in the dialogue, because I believe that the manipulation of the courts could not have been achieved without the complicity of some clerks or judicial assistants. If we ignore this direction, we will not achieve a complete reform, but only a partial one. Therefore, I would add to the reform package a detailed section on the career, professional development, and guarantees of independence for auxiliary staff, judicial assistants, clerks, and assistant magistrates.

Realistic change in the justice system

You have already said a lot, and I think you may have already answered, but please let’s do a kind of recap. We are seeing a clash between the reformist tendency and the status quo tendency in the justice system. People associated with the “stabilocracy” of Iohannis’s term are now under attack in the film Recorder. There is a desire for a “changing of the guard.” What do you think is realistic to change?

What I think needs to be changed is almost the entire system. When we talk about the statute of limitations, trial panels, elections to the Supreme Judicial Council, and auxiliary staff, it means that we, from the point of view of decision-making processes within the justice system, are changing almost fundamentally the way things are done. This is the real need. This is the macro level, at the level of ideas, concepts, and systems, where I said earlier that the secret services would need to bring in high-level “intelligence.”

However, what I think is realistic is rather just one or two cosmetic changes at the legislative level. It is possible that, due to public pressure, Ms. Savonea will resign from the judiciary—she will probably retire, given that she has the necessary age and seniority. However, Ms. Savonea’s departure from the judiciary will probably mean that she will become a lawyer and turn into a kind of Laura Vicol; that is, we would be jumping out of the frying pan into the fire.

So, what I think is realistic is rather a cosmetic change to the current system, without any substantial reform. I say this because I look at the way the political forces are arranged in Parliament. Otherwise, if President Nicușor Dan really has the negotiating skills he boasts about and the vision of a mathematician who knows how to think seven moves ahead, as in chess, he may have a chance to achieve substantial reform, as I mentioned earlier.

But I doubt it, because we live in Romania and we have the politicians we have. There is no point in hiding behind our fingers and hoping for fantastic things; they are not always the most visionary leaders. If we weigh up what is necessary with what is realistic, I fear we will be disappointed again. Will this mean political crisis? I think so. Will it mean street movements and protests? I think so. But if you ask me whether these things—political crisis and protests—will ultimately lead to a better outcome in Romanian politics, I’m afraid the answer is no.

The reaction of magistrates to the government’s efforts to introduce austerity measures for them

The government has asked the justice system to accept certain limitations on retirement privileges, but the system refuses. How do you view this refusal?

This position is not morally correct towards the rest of society, which is going through a period of austerity. I don’t think I need to explain why it is not correct from the perspective of social solidarity. But let me explain a little why it is correct from a technical point of view.

The Romanian government, through the Ministry of Justice and the Supreme Judicial Council, has never been concerned with the proper regulation of the work of magistrates. Romanian magistrates are few in number compared to the needs of the system and therefore have an enormous workload. They generally work between 10 and 14 hours a day, but they do so for 25 years, after which they retire. At present, what the government is asking magistrates to do is to remain in the system for more than 25 years, under the same conditions of overwork, but with lower pay and a lower pension. From a technical point of view, this is not fair.

What would be fair would be for the government to identify the areas where more magistrates are needed, to reduce the workload per magistrate, and then it could justifiably ask them to work more years for less pay. However, the government claims that it does not have the funds to invest in this direction. In other words, yes, reform can be carried out with these people, but only if it is presented correctly from a technical point of view. If this is not done — that is, increasing the number of magistrates and reducing the workload in order to make career extensions and pay cuts acceptable — then magistrates will strongly oppose any reduction in salaries and pensions.

There is a strong opinion that magistrates in Romania are a privileged social group and do not want to show solidarity with the rest of society when it comes to austerity. It is good that you have also introduced a perspective that looks at their positions with some understanding. Romania is in an area where governance issues are very complex…

Exactly. The position of magistrates, viewed through the prism of morality and social solidarity, is not correct. However, if you look at it from a technical perspective — taking into account the volume and conditions of work — their position is very correct and, again, understandable. But to see this, we need to look at things from a different perspective.

And the Romanian government is once again in a situation where it wants to solve problems using pro-cyclical policies, instead of using counter-cyclical policies. That is, now, precisely because of austerity, it would have been the right time to invest more money in the infrastructure for justice, in personnel and working conditions, in order to achieve sustainable long-term results over the next 2-5 years.

Unfortunately, the government is intervening with these pro-cyclical policies: “let’s cut everyone’s funding.” The result is that it is pushing both magistrates and society toward radical positions. This is causing even greater polarization in society, precisely because of the use of these pro-cyclical policies.

Photo: Anti-corruption protests in Romania called on politicians to stop making phone calls to exert pressure on representatives of the judiciary (source: YouTube)

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