Dimitar Sabev: Bulgaria’s governance failure and strained regional relations doom Northern Bulgaria to backwardness

Vladimir Mitev

Summary

1. The Danube Strategy and Government Inaction

Bulgaria formally holds the presidency of the Danube Strategy in 2026, but there is a lack of clear practical goals and specialized experts. Despite the region’s enormous potential, the government displays passivity, a lack of investment and conceptual capacity, as well as a completely misguided approach to regional development.

2. Causes of the Systematic Decline of Northern Bulgaria

• Lack of state planning: After 1990, the idea of state planning was wrongly discredited. While in Central European countries and Romania the state continued to organize these processes, in Bulgaria, Northern Bulgaria was left to fend for itself.
• Political subjectivism and the “Sofia” factor: Infrastructure and investments are directed primarily toward Southern Bulgaria due to the origins of key politicians. Public and private capital bypasses the North (with few exceptions, such as Gabrovo). Foreign direct investment in Burgas is up to 40 times greater than that in Vidin or Montana.
• A Flawed Agricultural Model: The focus on monocultures (cash crops such as wheat and sunflowers) generates profits for large landowners but fails to create a processing industry or jobs, leading to depopulation.

3. Regional and International Dynamics

• Competition with Romania: Unlike Greece and Turkey, whose economies complement ours, Romania has a similar economic model to ours, and we are more like competitors. Romania attracts more investment due to its significantly larger domestic market.
• “Bypassing the Center”: Due to strategic concerns about Bulgaria’s growing influence (as it is the natural geographic center of the Balkans), efforts to isolate it are evident—for example, through direct Greek investments in Romania’s energy sector.

4. The Connection to the Danube River and the Environment

The central government in Sofia does not view the Danube as part of its region. Dr. Sabev expresses strong environmental concerns regarding proposals for year-round dredging of the river or the construction of a new hydroelectric power plant near Nikopol, for which Bulgaria lacks the industrial capacity to utilize the generated electricity. The regional development plans are simply documents copied from the 1980s with updated terminology.

5. Exhausted Demographic Potential and “Administrative Leprosy”

• Pointless infrastructure without people: If no real measures are taken within the next five years (by 2031–2032), the construction of the delayed highways and tunnels will become pointless, because the human capital in the North will already be completely depleted.
• Bulgarian political leprosy: The reason for the lag is not a lack of support from the EU or Germany, but rather Bulgarian governance, passivity, and the Balkan-style bureaucracy. Change can only come from within—through an intellectual and cultural revival of society.

Interview

Introduction

Dimitar Sabev was born in 1976 in Dobrich. He earned a master’s degree in Business Administration from the University of Economics in Varna and later specialized in the Economics of Sustainable Development in Germany. Since 2006, he has worked as an economic journalist in Sofia—serving as an editor, editor-in-chief, columnist, and investigative journalist for a number of online and print publications. He is the recipient of three national journalism awards. In 2020, he defended his dissertation at the University of National and World Economy on the topic “Marketing, Consumption, and Economic Growth,” which he later published as a book. He is also the author of the books The Humiliated Earth (2010), Salamander (2016), The Mountainous Regions of Bulgaria: Economy and Population (2024), and Coal-Mining Regions After the End of Coal Extraction: Bulgaria’s New Industrial Policy (2026).

Since 2010, Sabev has participated as an economic expert in numerous research projects related to various aspects of the environmental economy and the sustainable development of regions with high biodiversity. Among the organizations and institutions with which he has worked are Greenpeace, SDP “Balkans,” EU “For the Earth,” “BlueLink,” the Bulgarian Biodiversity Foundation, the Greens group in the European Parliament, and many others. He has served as lead author on several international research reports. He has conducted field research on issues of economic development in tropical countries. His interests lie in the field of ecological economics and, more specifically, in “economics”: the intersection of Economics, Nature, and Culture.

Bulgaria holds the presidency of the Danube Strategy in 2026.

Dr. Sabev, the reason for this conversation is that Bulgaria is holding the presidency of the so-called Danube Strategy this year. To what extent, as an economist and as someone living in Sofia and in Bulgaria, do you notice that Bulgaria is holding the presidency of the Danube Strategy?

I received a press release about it, I’ve heard a few things—that is, on an institutional level there are some indications—but as for what exactly will be done and what practical results will be pursued, I have absolutely no idea. And yet I work in the “Regional Economics” section of an institute at the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences.

It has been announced that the vision or goal of Bulgaria’s presidency this year is to overcome regional inequalities.

Yes, that should certainly be the strategy, because from the source to the mouth of the Danube there are extremely large imbalances for which, realistically speaking, there is no objective explanation—they are the result of situational factors. It could be said that along the Danube there are countries that are more divided than united by the river. Things should by no means be left as they are; there is work to be done.

However, knowing the nature of this type of strategic document and, more generally, the strategic planning process in countries with limited capacity—first in terms of investment, and second in terms of conceptual capacity… I’m rather skeptical that anything will change in this regard. At the same time, the opportunities are enormous; they’re right before everyone’s eyes. But clearly, the approach our country has chosen for its regional development is simply wrong.

You are an economist from a prestigious institution. I expect you to be familiar with the key players in your field. Are you aware of any experts in Bulgaria specializing in the Danube Strategy or, more generally, in issues related to the development of the Danube region?

To be honest, I’m more familiar with people from the non-governmental sector who are interested in this issue. But they aren’t focused entirely on it; rather, they deal with the Danube alongside many other things. I know that some people in the region, including those from academic institutions, have high hopes for this initiative. But I don’t know anyone who has labeled themselves a “Danube Strategy specialist” or a specialist in Bulgaria’s European development along the Danube axis. It is telling in this regard that I recently heard a person in a senior academic position from Ruse speak at a conference in precisely this way: “the so-called Danube Strategy.”

The Reasons Why Northern Bulgaria Lags Behind in Development

I invited you for this interview for more than one reason. However, your article on “the poor neighbor from the North”, which uses statistical data to examine the disparities in development between Northern and Southern Bulgaria, played an important role. You yourself were born and raised in the North—in Dobrich—so I assume you have both personal and professional experience that is relevant. How is it that Northern Bulgaria has, for decades, been so different in its development compared to Southern Bulgaria?

This is a very broad question. If it could be answered even within the framework of a one-hour interview—if the answer were simple—that would give the region’s economy a chance to thrive. Northern Bulgaria is indeed in decline—a systemic, structural decline. The only vibrant economic center in Northern Bulgaria is Varna. But Varna, too, is in decline—not only economically, but also socially, culturally, and even demographically. A Varna journalist recently recalled that in years past, the city was expected to reach a population of half a million in the foreseeable future. The reality is that for many years now, the city’s population has been stagnant at around 320,000–330,000 people.

There are many reasons for the decline of the North—if we were to trace them, we would surely go back to the Ottoman period. My explanation is that the “Sofia” factor played a very significant role in Bulgaria after the 1990s, because until 1990, Northern Bulgaria had a stronger economic structure: industrial enterprises were thriving and provided meaningful jobs for people.

This may sound harsh, but the following example clearly illustrates how things unfolded. Why was the Hemus Highway completed up to Pravets, which lies on the route from Sofia to Northern Bulgaria? Well, because the leader at the time was a native of Pravets. Most of Bulgaria’s leaders since 1990, for one reason or another, have been from Southern Bulgaria, with the notable example of Sofia native Boyko Borisov. They simply prioritized what was close to their hearts and minds.

In any case, in Northern Bulgaria we see the failure of national regional policy. For a long time now, the prevailing idea in Bulgaria has been that any kind of planning and organization is practically harmful. You’re probably aware of this—you’ve followed this issue as a journalist— but ever since the late 1990s, structures that claim any form of national organization is harmful have been deliberately funded and promoted in Bulgaria. It was precisely this type of expert who was given a platform in the media—and this continues to this day out of inertia.

A sort of contempt has taken hold toward the profession of the planner—toward the person who strives to organize things with a view toward achieving certain desired national outcomes.

In a way, this was natural—it was the pendulum swinging back after years of an inefficient planned economy—but it produced unpleasant, negative results. In other countries, including those in Central Europe, where the idea of state-led organization was not so radically rejected, the results turned out to be far better. As far as I know, Romania is also better organized than Bulgaria.

Bulgaria abandoned the idea of state planning and organization. What we see in Northern Bulgaria is a vast region left to develop entirely on its own. Wherever money has been allocated over the years—scarce public funds—it has gone to projects that were already thriving. Funds were not allocated to help something that was struggling, but rather to support something that was already succeeding.

But the very idea of public support for development as a whole was discredited. Moreover, the small amounts that were allocated were generally not aimed at efficiency, but at other—most often political—goals. At one point, Bulgaria hit rock bottom. After that, all public investment in infrastructure—however limited—was directed toward Southern Bulgaria. Private investment, incidentally, was also directed southward—I suspect not without intent, not without a “nudge” from the capital.

Let’s look at the statistics on foreign direct investment by region. The Burgas region is undoubtedly very important—it is Bulgaria’s gateway to the Black Sea—but there, cumulative foreign direct investment as of 2024 amounts to 2.15 billion euros—which is an order of magnitude, i.e., about ten times more than in regions such as Shumen and Lovech. Foreign direct investment in the Burgas region is 3.7 times higher than in the Ruse region. The difference compared to regions such as Montana and Vidin reaches 40 times.

In Southern Bulgaria, where the highways were built, a secondary business infrastructure developed rapidly.

In other words, the economy reacted as expected: by creating production capacity, which led to higher employment and, consequently, some demographic stability. This infrastructure development bypassed Northern Bulgaria, except in a few regions such as Gabrovo—and here we return once again to the personal factor in politics, this is the region of a well-known treasurer of the long-ruling GERB party. With the exception of a few such regions, the rest of Northern Bulgaria were practically punished for not voting for the election winners.

We also cannot overlook the fact that agriculture is traditionally more developed in Northern Bulgaria, yet our agricultural sector has adopted a misguided focus on the production of so-called cash crops (monocultures for quick sale), which generate profits on global markets but are not processed domestically, and this deprives the regional economy of jobs and industrial capacity. Today, Northern Bulgaria is “breaking records” in the production and export of wheat and sunflower seeds, but the price of the farmers’ profits is the depopulation of entire regions.

All these factors—and many more—combine to create widespread deindustrialization, crumbling infrastructure, and a deep sense of sadness. A feeling of unhappiness has taken root in Northern Bulgaria. Naturally, in Northern Bulgaria—for example, in Ruse and Pleven—there are long-standing intellectual circles that want to resist this trend. However, their efforts are based on flawed economic theory, receive no support from the central government, and Northern Bulgaria’s lag behind the rest of the country continues to widen.

The Importance of Bulgaria’s Southern and Northern Neighbors for Regional Development

How does this fit in with the fact that to the south, Bulgaria borders Greece and Turkey—countries with which relations seem more traditional and more developed, and which, at the same time, were economically more advanced than Bulgaria for a long time, while to the north lies Romania, with which there doesn’t seem to be quite as much closeness between the people—between Bulgarians and Romanians—and indeed, the areas bordering Bulgaria are the poorer regions of Romania, not Transylvania? In other words, how does this fact—that Romania lies to the north—affect what you’re talking about?

Yes, the international factor is undoubtedly important, but I think that for there to be any kind of cross-border cooperation that leads to prosperity, there needs to be some kind of complementarity. For example, Bulgaria and Greece complement each other in a way that isn’t particularly beneficial for Bulgaria, but they do complement each other.

Bulgaria exports raw materials to Greece—such as timber and electricity during the winter months. Meanwhile, the Greeks take advantage of lower prices in Bulgaria and come here to buy goods, including labor services.

We buy consumer goods from Turkey, such as textiles, while Turkey invests in our industrial enterprises: the Bulgarian workforce turns out to be, if not cheaper, then at least more reliable and responsible than the available Turkish workforce. And so on—these are just the most general examples. Whereas in relations between Bulgaria and Romania, we do not see complementarity. The countries are similar in nature, and this suggests competition rather than complementarity. For Bulgaria and Romania to interact in a way that adds value, they must have joint projects of mutual interest, which I find difficult to envision happening.

As for relations between Bulgarians and Romanians, I do not entirely agree that there is alienation between us. In my native Dobruja, many people go to Romania to shop or simply to look around. They praise the food sold in Romanian markets and the quality of their roads. It’s widely said that Romania has surpassed Bulgaria in many respects. But in order to achieve joint production and cooperation between Bulgaria and Romania, we need to have something to complement each other with. For example, Bulgaria could provide the ideas, Romania the resources—we could join forces and work together.

However, there is also the fact that there are two barriers on Bulgaria’s path to Europe. Greece and Turkey are not on Bulgaria’s path to Europe. On one side of Bulgaria’s path to Europe stand the Serbs, and on the other—the Romanians. The infrastructure that could connect Bulgaria to Europe—primarily bridges and rail access—is definitely not well developed. In many ways, Romania acts as a lid on Bulgaria.

This is by no means a verbalized strategy, but it is present in our relations because Bulgaria is a strong and very tenacious competitor. We share common Balkan traits, and these include tenacity—when we see an opportunity, we seize it. Bulgaria is an unwelcome competitor. I work with statistics for the entire European Union and am beginning to see the competition between the different countries—this is something that isn’t talked about, but it becomes clearly visible when you delve deeper into the statistics. Within the EU, it’s clear that there’s a division into blocs. Just as Western countries view Eastern ones as unwelcome competitors, so too would Eastern countries themselves be reluctant to hand the top spot to anyone from their own camp.

There is no such thing as good-neighborly altruism among countries around the world, for better or worse. If you start doing something like that, you’ll find yourself in the unenviable position of Mikhail Gorbachev, who is considered the best Soviet leader in the West, but the weakest by the Russians. Because he set out on the path of good neighborliness, the path of goodness, of what we should be as human beings—but apparently we live in a harsher world.

My assertion that the West does not view the rise of the East with a joyful heart is not unfounded. In the West, there is a very strong narrative about deindustrialization—that industry in Europe is in deep and lasting decline. But in reality, since 2007 there has been impressive growth in industrial production in Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria as well. This signifies a shift of the new industrial dynamic toward the East—coupled with deindustrialization in the West, which is causing concern among the powers that be. Many of the EU’s green policies, which certainly have a more negative impact on the East, can be interpreted precisely in this light.

Yes, it’s not pleasant. Yes, this contradicts the European Union’s slogans. Of course, having said that, the European Union is ultimately the big opportunity for Bulgaria and Romania. It’s our wild card, the one we drew when the cards were dealt. But that doesn’t mean everything will be rosy. We must take advantage of this—that is, play like smart players. This is precisely what Bulgaria is failing to do.

And now I return once again to the issue of cross-border cooperation between Romania and Bulgaria. Where there is complementarity, there can be cooperation. Where there are similar large-scale farms and a similar economic structure, we cannot speak of cooperation.

We could only speak of some form of cooperation for economic growth and development if special relations were established between Bulgaria and Romania—relations that definitely do not exist at present. A Bulgaria-Romania bloc— and why not encourage Serbia to join us as well—such a bloc would help us become a hub of economic dynamism throughout the entire EU. However, nothing of the sort exists; at the moment, I see friendship between Serbia and Romania rather than the possibility of a Serbia -Romania-Bulgaria. A lot would have to change for us to embark on such a path.

The Importance of the Greece-Romania-Bulgaria Axis for the Development of Northern Bulgaria

You mentioned the Serbia-Romania-Bulgaria regional cooperation—an initiative that in 2015 was called the Craiova Trio and was under the auspices of then-Romanian Prime Minister Victor Ponta. But in fact, another form of regional cooperation is taking shape to some extent—between Greece, Bulgaria, and Romania—all of which are European Union member states. As you know, last December they signed a memorandum in Brussels committing to build infrastructure corridors among themselves. Work in this regard continues. Since the war in Ukraine, we’ve been observing changes in the region. It seems to me that this is a lasting trend. How do you assess these changes as a factor? Does the fact that Greece is also entering the equation of Bulgarian-Romanian relations—including with geopolitical support from Euro-Atlantic powers — is changing things, and to what extent is it making them different? Because this new trend toward cooperation in Southeast Europe is running up against a certain inertia, a certain tradition, and so on. You say that people in the Balkans are stubborn. To what extent can the Greece-Bulgaria-Romania format have a positive impact on the development of Northern Bulgaria?

Greece, Romania, Bulgaria—you are correct to note the emergence of development, but there are many stumbling blocks along the way. First, Bulgaria has a central geographical location, and this gives it a definite advantage. When we talk about regional integration in the Balkans, Bulgaria is inevitably at the center. If a Balkan federation—the one Georgi Rakovski dreamed of—were ever to come into being, its natural geographical capital would be Sofia. And our partners from Serbia, Greece, and Romania know this.

Bulgaria has certainly been historically disadvantaged, and this is also common knowledge. It has been disadvantaged territorially—just as Hungary has been. This makes the other countries in the Balkans suspicious. Not because Bulgaria is doing anything, but because it has the strongest geographical position and has squandered historical opportunities.

The same is happening in the Greece-Bulgaria-Romania vertical corridor. It suffices to note that the Greek public energy company PPC is investing billions in Romania’s energy sector. In the Oltenia region, the energy transition is being strongly supported by investments from PPC. Greece is directly investing in Romania’s energy sector, including in power transmission grids, solar parks, and a large (600 MW) wind farm in the Romanian part of Dobruja. This should suggest to us that the strengthening of ties between Greece and Romania aims to weaken the role of Bulgaria, which is their natural link. We are definitely seeing a “bypassing of the center” in the energy corridor.

I do not wish to dismiss the idea of good-neighborly development along a vertical Balkan axis; however, my career as an economist and journalist has brought me face-to-face with dozens of announcements regarding cross-border infrastructure development. I still remember President Parvanov’s “grand slam,” which, among other things, was supposed to connect the Black Sea and the White Sea with a pipeline…

Still, let’s see what happens. Let’s hope this time is different. But the history of international diplomacy is littered with initiatives and strategies that get off the ground and then fizzle out. Personally, I think that in the Balkans, the approach cannot be top-down. When you decide something from the top, thousands of small stumbling blocks suddenly pop up. Even if you implement it with billions, people may simply boycott it and refuse to use it.

To sum up, the connection between Greece, Bulgaria, and Romania makes Bulgaria particularly strong, and that is undesirable. A connection between Greece and Romania, with Serbia acting as an intermediary, would be more realistic than one involving Bulgaria. No one wants a strong Bulgaria.

Greek-Bulgarian Economic Ties

I won’t dispute many of your claims, with which I don’t entirely agree. I’ll just point out one thing. According to reports, Greek investments in Bulgaria amount to 3 billion euros, and there are 18,000 Greek companies operating there, while Greek investments in Romania amount to 4 billion euros, and there are 2,000 Greek companies operating there. Romania is a larger market. It doesn’t seem to me that Greece has any anti-Bulgarian or pro-Romanian bias. And I can even return to the topic of regional development.

Don’t you think that there is already something like a common economy between Northern Greece and Southern Bulgaria?

There’s a lot of Bulgarian investment in real estate in Northern Greece, as well as in trade, and there are Greek companies in Bulgaria—in Sandanski, Plovdiv, and so on. Don’t you think that regional cooperation is already taking place between Bulgaria and Greece and could serve as inspiration for someone who wants to do the same with Romania?

You’re absolutely right that there are many Greek investments in Bulgaria. Many of them are in the field of finance and financial intermediation. We know how extensive the expansion of the Greek banking system in Bulgaria was before the debt crisis. A significant portion of those investments is still here.

Greece’s large-scale investment in Bulgaria largely confirms my thesis that development occurs where there is a difference. Where there is complementarity. Where there is a price differential. The price differential between Bulgaria and Greece was significant until recently, and this led, first, to investments aimed at “capitalizing on” Bulgaria’s lower production costs and, second, to access to markets that are less developed than those in Greece.

Bulgaria is certainly closer to Greece. Bulgaria is an Orthodox country, and that alone attracts Greek tourists; I see many Greek tourists in Plovdiv. Our cultural proximity is undeniable. When I say that no one likes a strong Bulgaria, I’m not referring to ideas from the early 20th century—about military confrontation—but rather to strategic economic confrontation, which is, how shall I put it, friendly fire. Like a nudge from a friend—just as at a scientific conference, it’s most likely that one of your good friends will challenge your findings, because he’s the one who knows best what you were thinking and what you’re trying to achieve.

So you can expect the most serious opposition precisely from those closest to you—but they remain your closest allies. Let’s take Romania as an example again. We are too similar to Romania to be able to develop in a complementary way. Development is fostered by difference. Romania, however, has one major advantage that Bulgaria lacks, and that is its larger market. When a company—including a foreign company—manufactures for a market of 16–18 million people, that’s one thing. When it manufactures for a market of 6 million people, that’s another. For 6 million people in Bulgaria, it simply isn’t worth building production facilities. Romania is advantaged by its sheer size; it has greater economic pull. It attracts investment and development, whereas Bulgaria lacks this advantage of scale and must specialize. Bulgaria is currently trying to specialize.

Bulgaria is a small market for Romanian companies. Moreover, the Bulgarian market is a fiercely competitive one. I do not expect major investments by Romanian companies in Bulgaria. Rather, Bulgarian investments in Romania would likely be larger. Bulgarian companies have long been trying to break into the larger Romanian market.

In any case, when we’re talking specifically about Northern Bulgaria and Southern Romania, I find it particularly telling that I myself was born 35 km from the border between Bulgaria and Romania. In my 50 years of life, I have never once set foot in Romania. There were no school programs to take me from Dobrich to Constanța. There was no conference to take me from Varna—or now from Sofia—to Bucharest or Brașov.

There is the Danube, which flows between us. It divides us. For people from border towns like Ruse or Silistra, it’s much more natural to have strong ties and hopes for shared development. But a city further inland like Dobrich has a different orientation. I’m someone who enjoys traveling. But no—I’ve been to five continents, yet I’ve never been to Romania, just 35 km from where I was born. And that speaks volumes about the state of our cooperation and interaction.

The Danube and Sofia

There is also a view that Bulgaria—or more precisely, Sofia, where decisions are made in our country—does not feel that the Danube is its own because it does not flow past it. Over the years, Bulgaria has complained that Romania does not show enough enthusiasm for building bridges across the Danube. Romania, in turn, has complained that Bulgaria does not dredge the Danube to keep it navigable year-round. For decades, there has been a discussion about building a joint dam in the Nikopol area. But these and many other initiatives related to the Danube and the shared border remain at the level of intentions without being put into concrete action.

Personally, I agree with the observation that Bulgaria does not view the Danube as its own. However, regarding dredging and the power plant, I have very serious reservations of an environmental nature. In the world we live in—a world facing an environmental crisis and on the brink of ecological collapse—we cannot afford development that comes at the expense of nature.

As for the dredging of the Danube, I know of several environmental NGOs that would walk all the way from Bulgaria to Brussels to oppose such a project. I think we Bulgarians are a bit more mindful of the environment than our northern neighbors.

And regarding the new power plant on the Danube: the electricity it will generate must serve a purpose. In conversations with colleagues more experienced than I am, they quote Romanian scientists as saying: “Why do you Bulgarians need a new power plant in Nikopol? Look, we need electricity—we manufacture Dacia cars, we have industry. What are you going to do with that electricity?” Producing something for the sake of production itself, without regard for its practicality or benefit to development—I am against that.

As far as I can tell, the abandonment of the Danube project is a consequence of what I mentioned at the beginning: the general neglect of Northern Bulgaria and the general abandonment of the idea of regional planning.

In this regard, there are documents called Integrated Territorial Strategies for Regional Development. Each of Bulgaria’s six regions has such a plan; they are relatively new, dating from 2022. In Northern Bulgaria, there are still three regions at the so-called NUTS-2 level: Northwest, North-Central, and Northeast. Starting next year, there will be only one region.

But these documents contain so many wishful statements! I get the feeling that the plans and concepts in them haven’t been updated since the late 1980s. Back then, geography and territorial science in general had reached a good level—but since then, for 40 years now, the ideas and plans have been copied over and over again. Where it used to say “socialist development,” it now says “European integration” and “territorial cohesion” —but that’s basically the difference between the new and old documents.

I don’t know how long people have been talking about bike routes along the Danube (in fact, just recently, in Berlin, two Canadian tourists asked me if there were any decent bike paths along the Bulgarian bank of the river). I don’t know how long people have been talking about improving the highway network. I don’t know how long people have been talking about the same things that need to be done—and yet they still aren’t getting done. The only thing left for me to do is to truly believe in the party factor:

Northern Bulgaria is generally more left-leaning, and apparently the ruling right-wing parties are penalizing the northern regions and municipalities. It sounds like a conspiracy theory, but do you have any other explanation?

Of course, much of the infrastructure neglect in Northern Bulgaria is a consequence of the general neglect of Bulgaria, including on an ideological level. Unless something changes in the way thinking is done at the central level in Bulgaria, I expect that, year after year, the same old strategies and plans will be recycled over and over again, while the population continues to decline—and at some point, Bulgaria’s demographic decline alone will render all these endlessly delayed infrastructure projects meaningless.

Development projects only make sense as long as there are still people. Already, in some northern regions of Bulgaria, the state is the largest employer through schools, health services, and the police. There is no longer any private business there—it has died out because there are no people to serve. I’ve already said that it makes sense to work and produce when the market is large. Here, we’re way behind in taking action, and at some point, it no longer makes sense to do so.

The sad thing is that in both Bulgaria and Romania, the Danube regions have potential; they have their own opportunities. But they’ve been systematically denied that small infrastructure boost that makes all the difference. Today, at least south of the Danube, there are desolate, abandoned, peripheral regions.

In 2025, there were protests in Ruse calling for the construction of the Ruse–Veliko Tarnovo highway, which is expected to connect to the future new bridge over the Danube at Ruse–Giurgiu (source: Ivan Belchev)

Public Pressure and the Development of Northern Bulgaria

The issue of peripheral and underdeveloped regions is important. I can again cite the example of our northern neighbors. There, too, there are underdeveloped regions, such as the Moldavia region of Romania. Literally until last year, there wasn’t even a highway leading to the entrance of that region. Construction is now proceeding at a rapid pace from Bucharest, so there will soon be a highway, but for years this region was neglected. The region has been losing population for decades. Only Iași, the capital, saw its population grow. There is significant emigration from the Romanian region of Moldova to Italy and elsewhere.

Interestingly, people in Moldova organized themselves into nongovernmental organizations that became advocacy groups. They held protests, created websites, communicated with one another, and made demands of politicians to develop their infrastructure and the region as a whole.

This led to a situation where even political parties began to incorporate people from these movements for the development of Moldova, because these movements clearly had influence at some level and had reached a critical mass.

I recall that last year, in May, there were protests in Ruse that blocked the Danube Bridge. Perhaps these went unnoticed in Sofia. But one of their demands was to build the Veliko Tarnovo–Ruse highway. These protests did not evolve into a sustained organization, with press releases, expert analysis, or lasting public influence.

Could this be one of the reasons for the lack of development in Northern Bulgaria—the absence of civil society, of lobbies, and of public pressure? That is my first question. The other concerns the relationship between Sofia and Northern Bulgaria, and between Sofia and the provinces. How can these relationships be further shaped in a way that takes the interests of the periphery into account? These are two questions that, in my view, are interconnected.

There are indeed many examples where local discontent sparks a response and brings about change. In Bulgaria, typical examples—and I think this is also the case in Romania—are the protests against certain investments in the extraction of mineral resources. When people unite and resist locally, they make a difference. But I’m not aware of any particularly successful protests in Bulgaria regarding infrastructure development. I know that people gather and block roads—for example, in the Pleven region and elsewhere in Northern Bulgaria—simply demanding that the road network be improved, that is, that the potholes be patched up. But the results, unfortunately, are as follows: a politician comes along, says, “We’ll do it!”; maybe something gets started, and then the work fizzles out. There’s a great deal of inefficiency and a great deal of apathy.

There are no people in the government who put their heart into their work. And that’s because if you put your heart and soul into it, you’ll be targeted and “taken down.” The Balkan-style bureaucracy rewards those who keep their heads down and punishes those who want to bring about change. Yes, regional protests do lead to change, but it’s very difficult. You have to have the media on your side.

So far, I haven’t seen a similar movement in Varna—this large city—to complete the Hemus Highway. It’s starting to seem to me that the people of Varna are fine with things as they are—cut off from Sofia, cut off from the rest of the country, left to their own devices.

And so we arrive at the point of neo-feudalization.

With this crumbling infrastructure in Northern Bulgaria, feudal dependence is almost easier to maintain. This is in the realm of dark humor. But a great economist, Gunnar Myrdal, actually said something similar: people who are mired in poverty do not protest for a better life. It is the people who have already reached a certain standard of living who protest—either seeking improvement or wanting to preserve what is being taken from them. But those who have fallen into despair and destitution can no longer protest. They are disheartened, disarmed.

I think, for example, that the Northwest is not in such a situation. Strange as it may seem, the Northwest has retained pockets of regional resistance. However, even they have now given up waiting for infrastructure improvements and are trying to organize themselves with whatever means they have at hand. Ever since I studied the geography of Bulgaria for my college entrance exam, I’ve been hearing how this road from Vidin through Pleven to Sofia will be completed and how wonderful everything will be once tunnels are built under the Petrohan Pass and under Shipka.

The Pyramid of Cheops was built faster than the Hemus Highway. I don’t want to sound defeatist, but is there even any point to all these infrastructure projects anymore? What will they bring to life when human potential has already been exhausted? We need to be blunt: if things don’t change within the next five years at most—by 2031–2032—we need to rethink the idea of national infrastructure development. We’d be better off becoming a nature reserve. There are no people left, no economic activity—why build roads and tunnels? This is with regard to local resistance.

The Role of Germany and the EU in the Development of Northern Bulgaria

One last attempt at optimism on my part. 🙂 You know that Bulgaria is part of the great Western integration networks—NATO, the EU, the Eurozone, the Schengen Area, soon the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and perhaps I’m missing many other important networks. We also know that the Danube Strategy—to return to the topic we started with—is a European macro-regional strategy. The Danube is highly developed in its upper reaches—that is, where Germany and Austria are located.

In other words, perhaps at the European level, our partners—and Germany, which is such an important and traditional partner for Bulgaria—should be committed to developing the entire European Union, including its periphery, including Northern Bulgaria, including the Danube region along the lower course of the river, and so on.

What do you see happening in this regard? Perhaps you are even more involved in various research projects or attend conferences in EU countries. Do we have to overcome our own challenges on our own—certainly drawing on the resources provided by the European Union—or can we expect a nudge from outside—as, for example, we could say that the two bridges between Bulgaria and Romania were built with outside impetus: one by the USSR near Ruse, the other by Austria near Vidin? In other words, sometimes, when the strategic interests of important external factors prevail, things happen—even if we’re stubborn and unable to find common ground. How do you view all these issues—the external factor and the European factor, above all?

Personally, I don’t believe in the argument that anything can improve in our Balkan countries as a result of Germany’s wishes. To the extent that there has been any prodding, we’ve been getting prodded for quite some time. And I’d say that many of our international partners in Western Europe can’t explain the passivity of the Bulgarian side—I can speak for Bulgaria—given that it has all the necessary prerequisites. They prod us, and we respond with a passivity that’s hard to explain. It’s as if Bulgarians can’t bring themselves to believe that they are already part of a society where success goes to those who are smart and hardworking. Rather, the expectation is that for things to happen, someone else must still give us permission.

The problem lies in Bulgarian governance—in the leprosy of Bulgarian politics, I would say. In my view, development, to the extent that it can occur, will not be expressed solely in an increase in wealth, but in a general intellectual and cultural elevation—an elevation of the sense of dignity—the realization that you are valuable, that you’re not second-rate, but a human being who is the bearer of ancient history and the best of civilization. Personally, I think that something like this can come only from us, only from within.

The people currently living in Bulgaria remind me, to some extent, of an iceberg. What is on top is not always the best or most representative of the nation. Perhaps what is needed is a great surge of still water, raging waters, a powerful upheaval, so that what is on top right now can sink to the bottom, where it belongs, and bright minds can rise to the surface.

Photo: Dimitar Sabev (source: YouTube)

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