Mihai Isac, Karadeniz Press, 5 August 2026
Summary of the Interview
In this interview with Mihai Isac for Karadeniz Press, journalist Vladimir Mitev analyzes the early months of Rumen Radev’s prime ministership following the election victory of his party, Progressive Bulgaria.
- Domestic Governance & Economy: Despite campaigning on anti-corruption and stability, Radev’s administration has largely maintained traditional pro-business practices. To tackle a 5.7% GDP budget deficit, the government introduced fiscal austerity measures—freezing the minimum wage and restricting part-time worker rights—while allocating funds to consolidate local political influence.
- Foreign Policy Dynamics: While Radev mobilized “sovereignist” rhetoric by officially ending direct state military aid to Ukraine, Bulgarian private arms sales continue, EU sanctions remain supported, and key Euro-Atlantic security arrangements (such as US aircraft hosting) persist.
- Relations with North Macedonia: Sofia continues to demand constitutional recognition of Bulgarians in Skopje as part of the broader EU accession framework, even as functional cross-border business and intellectual cooperation continues underneath the public political friction.
- Selective Sovereignism: Mitev assesses Radev’s political stance as pragmatic and transactional rather than a strict ideological shift like Viktor Orbán’s. Ultimately, Bulgaria’s economic and structural dependencies limit its capacity for full geopolitical autonomy.
Interview
Intro
Vladimir Mitev is a Bulgarian journalist and one of the media voices building bridges between Romania and Bulgaria. A speaker of Romanian and Persian, he is editor of Radio Bulgaria’s Romanian-language section and a correspondent for Radio Romania in Bulgaria. He is the founder of the ‘The Bridge of Friendship’ platform, a journalistic project dedicated to Romanian-Bulgarian relations and fostering greater mutual understanding between societies on both sides of the Danube. He graduated in International Relations and Iranian Studies from ‘St Kliment Ohridski’ University in Sofia.
Through articles, interviews and analyses published in the Bulgarian, Romanian and international press, Vladimir Mitev tracks political and social developments in Romania and Bulgaria, regional cooperation, and the dynamics of the Balkans and the Black Sea region, as well as issues relating to Iran and the Middle East. Through his extensive work, Mr Mitev offers an insider’s perspective on the transformations taking place in Bulgaria and on the role that closer Romanian-Bulgarian ties can play in fostering a more connected and influential region at European level.
No major change in the first months of Radev’s prime ministership
Karadeniz Press: Rumen Radev has moved from the office of President to that of Prime Minister, after his party, Progressive Bulgaria, secured around 45 per cent of the vote and a parliamentary majority. He has promised stability, the fight against corruption and the reform of the Supreme Judicial Council. After the first few months in government, are we seeing the start of a real change in the way the Bulgarian state functions, or merely the replacement of the old centres of power with a system much more centred on Rumen Radev?
Vladimir Mitev: For the time being, no major change is apparent in the way the Bulgarian state functions. It seems to me that Radev is not only failing to fight the oligarchy, as he promised, but is doing everything possible to satisfy the country’s big business interests. This was also a popular approach during Borisov’s time.
The 2026 state budget, passed at the end of July, introduces a number of anti-social measures – for example, it cuts the rights of part-time workers and freezes the minimum wage. At the same time, the budget deficit is high – 5.7 per cent of GDP – and a significant proportion of the funds generating this deficit are likely to be used to finance projects and companies that will secure the government’s influence at local level in the run-up to next year’s local elections.
At present, we have a new political force with a majority in parliament, but its governing philosophy and practices do not appear to be new or particularly different from those of the past. Everything is geared towards the business community. Trade unions, marginalised communities and vulnerable people are absent from the rhetoric of those in power. What matters is creating champions – in the economy, in education, and so on. It does not seem as though ordinary people matter, perhaps because they do not possess resources of interest to the authorities, or perhaps because it is difficult and thankless to reach out to people and work with the disadvantaged.
Radev on Ukraine: words vs. deeds
Karadeniz Press: The Radev government has announced that it will no longer send weapons to Ukraine, will not provide financial support, and will not join the ‘Coalition of the Willing’, arguing that the war must be ended through negotiations. At the same time, Sofia maintains that it remains faithful to the joint decisions of the European Union and NATO and continues its economic and energy cooperation with Kyiv. Is this a coherent foreign policy or a strategic ambiguity through which Bulgaria is attempting to remain in the Western camp whilst simultaneously aligning itself with Moscow’s positions?
Vladimir Mitev: It may be a bit of everything. I find it significant that the ‘Progressive Bulgaria’ coalition and its leader, Rumen Radev, won the parliamentary elections in April 2026 by mobilising the sovereignist vote. They need to demonstrate to their voters that they are taking a different approach to foreign policy compared to previous governments.
At the same time, as far as foreign policy is concerned, it will be interesting to see whether there is a major shift or rather just a slightly different nuance of the same approach. Bulgaria continues to support the EU’s anti-Russian sanctions. It has endorsed the final declaration of the South-East Europe–Ukraine summit in Kyiv. And even before officially announcing that it was suspending military aid to Ukraine, Bulgaria was not sending military aid from its own military reserves – it simply did not declare this publicly. At the same time, deliveries of Bulgarian arms to Ukraine via private traders continue without any problems. Not even the withdrawal from the coalition of those willing to get involved in Ukraine strikes me as all that radical, given the decision by the Bulgarian Parliament during Rosen Jeliazkov’s time as Prime Minister not to send soldiers to Ukraine as part of the peacekeeping forces. When, during acting Prime Minister Andrey Gyurov’s visit to Kyiv, Bulgaria signed a security cooperation agreement with Ukraine, Radev claimed to be opposed to it. But now that he holds the parliamentary majority and heads the government, he states that the agreement with Ukraine will not be cancelled.
So Radev is probably doing something in the Trump style – increasing the unpredictability, uncertainty and ambiguity of his actions, or at least of his words. This seems logical for someone praised by Newsmax CEO Chris Ruddy as “a new leader for Europe: positive, strong, pro-NATO, pro-America, pro-Trump, pro-Israel”. The next moment, however, we realise that perhaps he is, first and foremost, a European politician. Any efforts on his part, hypothetical or real, to pursue a specific line of foreign policy will come up against a series of constraints characteristic of a country such as Bulgaria, linked to its integration into Western and Western European networks, and its lack of resources and of intellectual, moral and creative capacity, as well as infrastructure, etc. for strong sovereignty, and so on.
The Bulgarian-Macedonian dispute
Karadeniz Press: Rumen Radev has maintained a hard line towards North Macedonia, insisting on the inclusion of Bulgarians in the Skopje Constitution and accusing the Macedonian leadership of tolerating hate speech and exploiting history. How far can Bulgaria go in defending the rights of the Bulgarian community without this dispute becoming a permanent obstacle to North Macedonia’s European integration? And what might be a realistic compromise that Sofia and Skopje could accept?
Vladimir Mitev: Bulgaria maintains that it is not a party to the issue of amendments to the Macedonian Constitution and the inclusion of Bulgarians as a constituent people in the Republic of North Macedonia, as a necessary condition for the Skopje government to begin EU accession negotiations. These demands addressed to the authorities in North Macedonia come from the EU as a whole, following Sofia and Skopje’s acceptance in 2022 of the so-called French proposal to break the deadlock over the start of North Macedonia’s EU accession negotiations.
At present, I observe that Bulgarians and Macedonians are waging a sort of hybrid or cold war in the online sphere, including through the media. What is less widely recognised, however, is that there is also a relationship of cooperation and even trust between Bulgarians and Macedonians. There are intellectuals in both countries who have relationships based on trust. Businesspeople from one country are developing businesses in the other. As far as I understand, even the relatives of the Macedonian Prime Minister Mitskoski – the Macedonian leader who refuses to introduce constitutional amendments and is considered to have an anti-Bulgarian stance – have business interests in Bulgaria. In other words, relations between Bulgarians and Macedonians, alongside the visible level of conflict, I hope also have an underlying dimension that could allow them to develop positively.
What matters to me is not so much the noise that Bulgarians and Macedonians make online when they argue, but rather what Macedonian citizens and the Macedonian political elite truly want. Many of the countries that have joined the EU have made serious compromises regarding their national interests.
For example, Bulgaria had to shut down four nuclear reactors that were operating perfectly normally. However, the countries that joined, including Bulgaria, considered that, in the long term, their interests would be better protected by joining the EU than by remaining outside it.
I believe the situation in North Macedonia is similar. Once North Macedonia manages to pass all the tests and join the EU, the struggle for the viability of its state and its identity will have been won. However, in order to begin EU accession negotiations, the country must reform its constitution to include Bulgarians, alongside several other peoples, as constituent peoples. Macedonian citizens and elites clearly find it difficult to recognise Bulgarians as having equal rights to those of any other constituent people. However, such a measure can also be viewed in a different light, including by the Macedonians themselves – as an acknowledgement of the fact that Macedonians and Bulgarians are today distinct peoples, a point which they themselves maintain so emphatically.
Radev on the Black Sea region
Karadeniz Press: Radev states that Bulgaria must become a major stabilising force in the Black Sea region, advocates increasing defence spending to meet NATO’s target of 5 per cent of GDP, and supports the development, alongside Romania, of a maritime security centre. But how can Bulgaria strengthen security in the Black Sea whilst at the same time withdrawing its military support for Ukraine, the state that is directly confronting the Russian fleet and forces in the region? Is there not a contradiction here between the rhetoric about defending the eastern flank and the actual policy towards Kyiv?
Vladimir Mitev: An interview I conducted with the Bulgarian defence expert, Yordan Bozhilov, is due to be published, in which I ask him about Radev’s vision for the Black Sea region. Bozhilov says it is not yet clear which direction Radev will take. And Bozhilov’s answers are very measured and balanced. He gives Radev the chance to define his regional policy.
As regards Ukraine, Radev has already expressed a desire for cooperation in the energy sector – for example, regarding natural gas supplies or the construction of new nuclear reactors in Bulgaria to supply electricity to Ukraine. Radev and Zelensky are currently meeting and, naturally, have much to discuss, as was evident at the NATO summit in Ankara.
As for Radev’s regional policy, it seems to me that Bulgarian-Turkish relations will be particularly important to him. Quite a few Bulgarian Turks voted for him. He also has Bulgarian Turkish MPs. It has been announced that far-reaching agreements in the energy and infrastructure sectors are the subject of discussions between Sofia and Ankara.
Radev and the American war against Iran
Karadeniz Press: Despite his international reputation as a politician favouring closer relations with Russia, Rumen Radev has supported the stationing of US refuelling aircraft at the Bezmer base and has stated that the United States is Bulgaria’s main security ally. Does this decision mean that, beyond the rhetoric regarding Russia and Ukraine, Radev will remain a pragmatic leader loyal to NATO? Where, in fact, do the limits of his Euro-Atlantic orientation lie?
Vladimir Mitev: Radev demonstrated a certain degree of self-confidence when he made the extension of the US refuelling aircraft’s presence at Sofia Airport beyond 30 June 2026 conditional on the abolition of US visas for Bulgarian citizens. The aircraft temporarily left Sofia at that time. However, just a few weeks later, the Bulgarian government received a new request for the refuelling aircraft to be stationed there in the context of the war in Iran… (And hastily the request was approved by parliament – note of the translator)
I do not believe this is a matter of any limitations on Radev’s Euro-Atlantic orientation. Radev studied at a military academy in the US. As the saying goes, he is ‘educated in the US’. Rather, Radev is coming up against the limits of his own ability – and that of his own state – to play an independent and sovereign role. Perhaps this makes him a more tragic figure than we realise. Or perhaps it turns him into a more cynical version of a sovereignist. Because his sovereignism is selective. And this will probably become increasingly clear to his voters as well.
Radev and the EU’s rules: the limits of sovereignism
Karadeniz Press: Radev won the election on promises of lower prices, stability and severing the links between politics and the oligarchy. However, his government must tackle a budget deficit estimated at 5.7 per cent of GDP, meet Brussels’ demands to reduce imbalances, and continue the reforms necessary to access European funds. Can Radev meet the social expectations that brought him to power without coming into conflict with the European Union’s fiscal rules? And will Bulgaria remain firmly anchored at the heart of the EU, or will it move closer to the sovereignist model promoted by Viktor Orbán and Robert Fico?
Vladimir Mitev: It seems to me that, in our region, the only country situated at the heart of the EU is Poland. Bulgaria has joined the eurozone, but it seems to me that it continues to have a peripheral or provincial society. If you read the Bulgarian press or live in Bulgaria, you would probably get the impression that Bulgarians are the centre of the world and that everything is done by Bulgarians, for Bulgarians and amongst Bulgarians. But a small step outside Bulgaria, for example into Romania, shows just how limited Bulgarian influence is beyond its own borders.
In this context, it probably becomes clear why Bulgarians periodically elect politicians who pursue a political line lacking any ambition to align with the region and integrate into the core of the EU; a line centred on ‘national interests’, which shuns lasting alliances, with the exception of one with a ‘big brother’, which varies depending on the era.
In Borisov’s day, this ‘big brother’ was probably Germany. Then, under the anti-corruption parties’ government, Bulgaria moved into the French sphere of influence within the EU. Now it appears that Bulgaria is banking on American infrastructure and energy projects for the South-East European region, whilst rearming in cooperation with Germany and France and collaborating once again with Turkey in the fields of infrastructure and energy.
I myself asked Hungarian and Romanian political analysts, after Maghyar defeated Orbán in Hungary, whether they expected a new Orbán to emerge in the region. They all said that Orbán was a unique phenomenon and could not be replicated, not least because no one else possesses Hungary’s political and geopolitical resources.
Analysts at the European Council on Foreign Relations in Sofia write that “Rather than aligning with the broadly pro-European consensus and anti-American sentiments in Bulgarian society, Radev is attempting to balance competing security frameworks (the American and the European – my note), without sufficiently considering European security interests”. Indeed, Radev is banking on the sovereignist trend within Bulgarian society and is not accepted by other influential social groups. Yet it strikes me that Bulgaria is something of a special case and even when it mirrors regional and global trends linked to a shift towards sovereignism, it does so in a somewhat exceptionalist manner. I believe that Bulgaria lacks the economic resources necessary to develop a truly deep-rooted and powerful form of sovereignty. Radev may wish to be a version of Orbán, Fico, Trump or someone else. But, as I have already said, he will increasingly come up against his own limitations, the limits of his political movement’s capabilities and those of his country.
More on Rumen Radev’s foreign policy
Photo: Rumen Radev (source: YouTube)
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