Mihai Isac: Bulgaria’s role in the Republic of Moldova is much greater than is understood in Sofia

Vladimir Mitev

Intro

Mihai Isac is a graduate of the Faculty of Public Administration at the National School of Political Science and Public Administration, with a degree in Political Science from the Faculty of Political Science at the University of Bucharest. With nearly two decades of experience in the Romanian media, he is currently editor-in-chief of the KARADENIZ PRESS news agency and a regular guest on TVR Moldova’s weekly foreign policy program Impact Global in Chișinău, as well as a regular guest on the program Paralela 47 on the National Radio of the Republic of Moldova. He regularly collaborates with the media in Bulgaria, Turkey, Romania, Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova, Italy, Serbia, and Spain as a political analyst.

Isac interprets PAS’s major electoral success not as a vote for the party per se, but as a strategic vote for the European integration of the Republic of Moldova. In the analyst’s opinion, this result is a direct response by citizens to the process of re-imperialization of the Russian Federation’s foreign policy. The support of President Maia Sandu acted as an electoral driving force, convincing almost three-quarters of the electorate to vote for the pro-European vision, including through tactical voting aimed at stability and the continuation of reforms. Also, the fight against corruption, reconfirmed by the re-arrest of oligarch Vlad Plahotniuc, remains a priority, and the proper handling of this case is crucial to demonstrate the capacity of the Moldovan judicial system.

Romania considers the Republic of Moldova a foreign policy priority, although its support cannot be exclusive, as an effort by the entire EU bloc is necessary. President Nicușor Dan has attempted to personalize the bilateral relationship. At the same time, there is a slight institutional rivalry between Romania and Poland over influence in Moldova. The two countries, together with Bulgaria, should collaborate more closely, overcoming their pride, in order to limit Russian influence. The expert believes that Bulgaria should take on a more active role, especially in southern Moldova, where the Bulgarian community is vulnerable to Russian propaganda.

Bulgaria’s involvement is essential for the Bulgarian community in Bessarabia (Moldova and Ukraine), which is heavily affected by Russia’s hybrid war. The opening of the University of Ruse branch in Taraclia (where teaching will be in Bulgarian and Romanian, not Russian) is seen as an essential step in creating a citadel of Bulgarian culture and reconnecting Russified ethnic groups with their roots. The formation of a Sofia-Bucharest-Ankara triangle of action to support historical communities (Bulgarians, Gagauz) in their efforts to free themselves from the informational influence of the Russian Federation, especially in areas affected by the “Shoristan” political network, is part of the solution.

The entry into Parliament of the Democracy at Home party (led by Vasile Costiuc) with six seats, although it does not promise major legislative achievements, marks the affirmation of a populist/sovereignist current that uses harsh public discourse and relies on media support from AUR (Romania). On the other hand, in the media field, the work of pro-European journalists is now easier in Moldova, although it remains dependent on international grants. This dependence requires a diversification of revenue sources to protect press freedom in the face of geopolitical and political uncertainties, such as the potential interruption of external support.

The explanation for the great success of the Action and Solidarity Party

Mr. Isac, what are the reasons for the unexpected and very good result of PAS compared to other political blocs and parties?

The result achieved by the ruling PAS party is primarily due to the response of Moldovan citizens to the re-imperialization of the Russian Federation’s foreign policy.

The vote for PAS is not necessarily a vote for the party, but a vote for the European integration of the Republic of Moldova. At this moment, if we look at the results, almost three-quarters of the votes of the electorate in the Republic of Moldova went to the vision of European integration. They went both to PAS, which obtained 50% of the votes, and to other parties that support European integration but do not have access to Parliament.

Of course, the support given by President Maia Sandu, who is an electoral driving force for PAS and for the process of European integration, also played an important role. Also, some of these votes represent the useful vote that Moldovan citizens, although they do not necessarily support the PAS party, support the European integration process and have understood that only PAS can ensure stability that will lead to the intensification of the reform process.

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Vlad Plahotniuc’s role in politics

What role does Vlad Plahotniuc’s return to the country under arrest and the trial against him play in the political life of the Republic of Moldova?

As you well know, Mr. Plahotniuc has also violated the laws of other European countries, such as Bulgaria and Romania, by using false documents. These countries could have requested Vlad Plahotniuc’s extradition, but there is still a degree of confidence in the Republic of Moldova’s ability to administer justice in his case. Also, as you are well aware, during the election campaign in the Republic of Moldova, the series Plaha was broadcast, an attempt to show the role that this oligarch played in the political life of the Republic of Moldova until a few years ago.

The image of Vlad Plahotniuc as a fugitive oligarch, who is a symbol of state corruption, is an image that a large part of the population of the Republic of Moldova has begun to forget. And through these steps, we can say that Vlad Plahotniuc has been put back on the public agenda. His relations with a large part of the political class in Chisinau are well known.

It is likely that he will continue to play a role, at least behind the scenes. And the way in which justice is administered in his case will, of course, demonstrate to the international community whether the Republic of Moldova has the capacity to handle such situations. Part of the votes obtained by PAS, as you rightly asked in your first question, is also due to this desire to fight corruption, and this should be a priority for the government in the coming period.

Mr. Vlad Plahotniuc would have a lot to say, and many heads would roll, both in Chișinău and in Romania, as well as in other countries, if we were to talk about the revelations he could make. But at this point, we are only seeing the beginning of a veritable judicial epic with Mr. Plahotniuc at the forefront.

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Romania’s foreign policy in the Nicușor Dan era

Since this summer, Romania has a new president, Nicușor Dan. What activities and strategic thinking characterize Romania’s foreign policy toward the Republic of Moldova in the Nicușor Dan era?

We cannot isolate a change in Romania’s foreign policy towards the Republic of Moldova. The Republic of Moldova remains a priority in Romania’s foreign policy.

I have noticed that Nicușor Dan has tried to personalize his relationship with the Republic of Moldova. We have seen both official and informal visits by President Nicușor Dan to the Republic of Moldova, where he has met directly with the people. Due to the Georgescu factor and the situation that has affected Romania over the past year, there is a sense of disorientation among the authorities in Bucharest.

But we see that Moldova is slowly returning to the forefront of Romanian foreign policy. Nicușor Dan’s support for the PAS Party was also important, as was the support that Maia Sandu and the PAS Party gave to Nicușor Dan in the second round of the presidential elections.

But at the same time, we must understand that Romania cannot support the Republic of Moldova on its own, especially from a financial point of view.

The entire EU bloc needs to make an effort to enable the Republic of Moldova to implement the necessary reforms and gradually benefit from the advantages of being a member state of the European Union. Unfortunately, we have seen how the internal political struggle in Romania is also affecting the Republic of Moldova. And, along the way, we have also noticed a growing wave of hatred against the citizens of the Republic of Moldova, coming from certain so-called sovereignist circles in Romania.

But we hope that this electoral autumn will come to an end and that the waters will calm down in these circles as well. What we can say for sure is that Romania and the Republic of Moldova remain linked to each other. And if the Republic of Moldova, which has over a million Romanian citizens, fails to complete the process of European integration, it is difficult to see how the Republic of Moldova could end up in a permanent gray area.

The “Democracy at Home” Party and Unionism

For the first time, a unionist party, Democracy at Home, has entered the Moldovan Parliament. What is the significance of this achievement and what should we expect in terms of political action from the Democracy at Home Party in Moldovan politics and with regard to Moldovan-Romanian relations?

First of all, it is difficult to say whether the Democracy at Home Party is really a unionist party. Its leader, Mr. Costiuc, declares himself a unionist and is known for participating in many protests. He is not a new face in Moldovan politics, even if he was more of a marginal force.

At the same time, we see this political leader’s desire to assert himself. I do not expect any major legislative achievements from him. However, there are only six mandates, six deputies in Parliament.

It is during this period that it will be decided whether his mandates will be validated. Mr. Costiuc has an extremely harsh public discourse. I expect to see a series of actions from him in the Moldovan Parliament, including live broadcasts using modern communication technologies, in order to consolidate his power base.

It is important to understand that Mr. Costiuc is using this populist trend to establish himself on the Moldovan political scene as a representative of sovereignty. I do not expect great achievements when it comes to, say, the unionist movement, of which Mr. Costiuc says he is a part. But I expect his importance to grow as he receives support from the AUR.

According to press investigations, he has benefited from special support operations on social media from the AUR “fauna” on TikTok and other social networks. Mr. Costiuc will certainly remain a force on the political scene in the Republic of Moldova, at least in the short and medium term. It is expected that we will see how the old political class in Chișinău reacts to these changes.

I expect that the party will also be affected by various internal confrontations and disputes, but we will see how things unfold. In any case, Mr. Costiuc has only six seats out of 101, so I don’t expect his impact to be that profound, but I do expect that some of the legislation necessary for the European integration process will be supported by him, as he promised. But it is far too early to talk about the behavior of a party that is not yet a party in the classic sense of the word.

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Moldovan-Polish relations

In September, Iwona Piórko of Poland was appointed European ambassador to Chișinău, which probably suggests the importance of Moldovan-Polish ties. What role will Poland play in Moldova’s accession to the European Union, and to what extent do Poland and Romania have common interests in Bessarabia? Is there competition between them for influence and position in Moldova?

There is a Polish community that has benefited from the support of the Polish state. There is no common Polish-Romanian strategy regarding the Republic of Moldova. We see that Romania is trying to present itself publicly as the main supporter of the Republic of Moldova, which it is.

Poland has greater diplomatic and economic capacity when it comes to the European Union states on the eastern flank, but also on the NATO flank. At this moment, there is room for improvement in relations between the Republic of Moldova and Poland. It depends, of course, on Poland whether it has the capacity to take this step, given its main concerns regarding Ukraine.

I believe that there is a slight institutional rivalry between Poland and Romania when it comes to relations with the Republic of Moldova at the level of certain European institutions, but this is not a situation that could jeopardize support for the Republic of Moldova. At this point, it is clear that Romania and Poland should identify new ways to support the Republic of Moldova together, perhaps even a joint initiative or a joint initiative to support Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova, leaving aside certain particularities of historical relations. It is necessary to overcome certain institutional pride and to relaunch relations between Warsaw and Bucharest. Even if at this moment, let’s say, Bucharest and Warsaw have presidents who in recent months have found themselves on opposite sides of the election campaign… Let’s not forget that George Simion presents himself as a close associate of the new Polish president.

What I can understand is that in Poland, no serious political party or national political leader has pro-Russian views. As you well know, here in Romania, George Simion is considered a political figure close to the interests of the Russian Federation. And Mr. Costiuc’s support can be attributed to the Russian Federation’s desire to create disorder in the Republic of Moldova. Let’s not forget that for the Russian Federation, any form of political crisis in the Republic of Moldova is a good thing. Joint Polish-Romanian efforts, and those of other states, can support the Republic of Moldova. These joint Polish-Romanian or separate efforts should also be considered in the context of the efforts of all European Union member states to support the Republic of Moldova.

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The role of Bulgaria and the University of Ruse in Taraclia

It seems that the Republic of Moldova is relying on the Bulgarian state for stronger support for Bulgarians in southern Moldova in their relationship with the European Union. A step in this direction will be the opening this year of a branch of the University of Ruse in Taraclia, which will teach in Bulgarian and Romanian, but not in Russian. How do you assess the chances of the University of Ruse establishing itself as an educational center for Bulgarians in Moldova and Ukraine and contributing to attracting locals to the European Union?

It is also important for Bulgaria to be aware of the important role it plays in the economic, political, and social life of its citizens, Bulgarians in the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine, especially in the context of developments over the last 30 years. As you well know, there are hundreds of thousands of Bulgarians in the Bessarabia region who have benefited from various forms of support from the Bulgarian state, including scholarships and training internships. Unfortunately, we see that this involvement has not been supported by the economic involvement of major Bulgarian companies. Of course, the same could be said about Romania until a few years ago.

The University of Taraclia escaped the process of amalgamation of Moldovan universities and became, thanks to the opportunity to become a branch of Angel Kanchev University in Ruse, a center that has been given the chance to be part of a European education system. In this region, as in other areas in the south of the Republic of Moldova, we can clearly speak of a deep economic, institutional, and systemic crisis due to massive migration and the lack of clear policies by the Moldovan state over the last 30 years.

We see how the region is affected by poverty, although, of course, there are some signs of improvement. The illegal military invasion launched by the Russian Federation against Ukraine has had a battering ram effect on the Bulgarian community in Ukraine. We see thousands of ethnic Bulgarians from Ukraine fighting in the Ukrainian army. We also see how the Bessarabian Bulgarian community living in the Russian Federation, both from the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine, is being used as a propaganda weapon by the Russian Federation. We see the same thing when we talk about the Bulgarian communities in the regions under Russian military occupation in Ukraine, such as Crimea.

So, Bulgaria’s role is much greater than is understood, as far as I can tell, in Sofia. And we are talking about the need for the Bulgarian state to get involved in the historical, ethnic, cultural, and economic reconstruction of the communities in southern Bessarabia. Taraclia could become a major cultural center for the Bessarabian Bulgarian communities throughout Ukraine, whether we are talking about those in the Odessa area or in other cities and areas of Ukraine.

The legislation in the Republic of Moldova is quite permissive when it comes to the use of minority languages, whether Bulgarian or Gagauz. And the role that this university can play is that of a vanguard and citadel of Bulgarian culture and education, as was played by the Bulgarian High School in Bolgrad in the mid-19th century. The high school in Bolgrad, a city known as the capital of the Bessarabian Bulgarians in Ukraine, educated a large part of the first elites of the modern Bulgarian state, which gained autonomy after 1878 and later independence.

The University of Taraclia can also become an example of how the Bulgarian state can manage relations with other Bulgarian communities that are not located immediately near the border. It can also be a means by which ethnic Bulgarians who have been Russified and denationalized over time can reconnect with their Bulgarian roots through the programs offered at this branch in Taraclia.

The Bulgarian state can also train specialists not only for the Bulgarian economy, but also for the local economy. Of course, it would also be a good idea to set up other education systems, and here I am referring to technological or dual education or other forms of education that would support the process of returning home for members of the Bulgarian community from other regions of the Republic of Moldova, from the European Union or, even better, from the Russian Federation.

The exact number of ethnic Bulgarians currently living in the Russian Federation is unknown. We know that the Russian Federation is implementing a policy of denationalization of the communities living on its territory. Also, against the backdrop of the Russian war against Ukraine, we cannot know the exact number of ethnic Bulgarians in Ukraine. But the University of Taraclia can support them, regardless of how things develop. And the Bulgarian state needs to try to obtain facilities from the Republic of Moldova when it comes to students who will come from Ukraine or elsewhere.

Let me give you an example: in the Republic of Moldova, we have several thousand citizens from Southeast Asian countries or the Indian subcontinent who are studying in the Republic of Moldova, providing an important source of income for the national budget, but also for the budgets of these universities, such as the University of Medicine. If the University of Taraclia can gradually implement a series of programs that expand the educational offer for such citizens from outside the EU, it could be a good sign. But, of course, the primary role must be to serve the Bulgarian community in Bessarabia, both in the Republic of Moldova and in Ukraine.

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Romanian-Bulgarian relations and their impact on the Republic of Moldova

After the start of the war in Ukraine in 2022, Bulgaria and Romania rediscovered their political relations, signing a Strategic Partnership declaration in 2023. How is this rapprochement between Romania and Bulgaria felt at the state level in the Republic of Moldova?

First of all, I am a little skeptical when it comes to how Romania manages its strategic relations. If we look at the South Caucasus, Romania has signed strategic partnership agreements with the Republic of Georgia and Azerbaijan, but this is not reflected in its foreign policy itself.

When it comes to Bulgaria, the economic and political situation is forcing the political elites in Bucharest and Sofia to work much better together. There has been some progress, but I think there is room for much improvement. We often see that relations between the two countries, the natural process of rapprochement between two European Union member states, are driven more by civil society, the media, and businesspeople than necessarily at the political level.

Any form of support for the Republic of Moldova at the level of the European Parliament should automatically involve Bulgaria. This is due to the historical and ethnic ties between part of the population of the Republic of Moldova and Bulgaria, but also for strategic reasons for Bulgaria. At present, the Bulgarian state has unused administrative and diplomatic capacities to support the Republic of Moldova.

Romania should, of course, appeal to Bulgarian MEPs for support, depending on the interests of the Bulgarian state, and to Bulgarian companies for support when it comes to economic development. Joint Bulgarian-Romanian investments in the southern region of the Republic of Moldova would also be a good move and send a strong signal.

It would also be a good sign, returning to our previous question, for the Taraclia branch of Angel Kanchev University to have joint projects with universities in Romania. As you well know, there is also the cross-border faculty of the University of Galați. Most likely, and also very effective from a financial point of view, would be the launch of joint Romanian-Bulgarian programs in support of higher education in the Republic of Moldova. There could be a series of pilot projects.

At the same time, we see that, even if Romania does not expect or directly request greater involvement of the Republic of Bulgaria in Moldova, we nevertheless see that Romanian involvement on the part of the European Union in the Taraclia region is not enough. Sofia’s involvement is also needed, and we are not talking here only from a cultural or ethnic point of view, but also from the point of view of an image of unity in the face of the hybrid war waged by the Russian Federation within this community.

Let us not forget that the city of Taraclia is, unfortunately, also caught up in this parallel “Shoristan” network. As far as I know, the mayor of Taraclia is banned from Romania. Of course, he can go to Bulgaria on the basis of his Bulgarian citizenship, but Mr. Lupov is known for his actions against Romania, for which he has been sanctioned, as has Ion Ceban, the mayor of Chișinău. Also, some of the Șor activists in the southern region are ethnic Bulgarians. So it is clear that intervention by the Bulgarian state is also needed to improve the image of the European Union in the region, to support the normalization of life in the region, and to no longer allow the Bulgarian ethnic community in the southern region to be used as a geopolitical battering ram against the authorities in Chișinău.

Of course, Bulgaria could also play a role in decriminalizing the Gagauz region, because there is a big problem there, as you well know. Of course, alongside Turkey. The close relations that exist between Sofia and Ankara, between Romania and Sofia, and between Romania and Ankara, could form a triangle of action that would attempt to limit the influence of the Russian Federation in the region. It is extremely important that such important historical communities, such as the Bessarabian Bulgarians and the Gagauz, benefit from the support of European states in their efforts to free themselves from the informational yoke of the Russian Federation.

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The media and the road to the EU

You carry out a lot of media projects and activities. How does Moldova’s gradual rapprochement with the European Union affect your journalistic and media entrepreneurship activities?

First of all, it is much easier now to work as a journalist in the Republic of Moldova. In certain areas, of course, there are certain peculiarities, such as the Gagauz region, where pro-European media are criticized and harassed. I think Mr. Sirkeli’s example speaks volumes (Mihail Sirkeli is a Gagauz journalist who criticises his community’s stance on Russia – note of the translator). Improvements are needed in the field of legislation, but at this point we can say that it is easier.

Investments in the Republic of Moldova from European Union countries are expected to increase, both as a community bloc and bilaterally. But at the same time, it remains a field in which it is difficult to operate without economic support. Much of the media in the Republic of Moldova relies on international grants or support from certain countries, which, of course, leads to situations that jeopardize their activities. Such was the case in January 2025 when, for example, Donald Trump decided to cut off US support. Of course, this is a unilateral decision by the US government, a decision made by elected officials, by the US electorate, and it highlights the need to diversify sources of income for the media in the Republic of Moldova.

Photo: Mihai Isac (source: YouTube)

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