Romania’s foreign policy: revolution, reform or continuity?

Marius Ghincea, Contributors, 24 August 2025

Preface

On 25-26 August 2025, the annual meeting of Romanian diplomats took place in Bucharest. Romanian diplomats from around the world gathered to discuss changes in international relations and the vectors of Romanian foreign policy. This article was published on the eve of the meeting and offers an insight into current trends in Romanian foreign policy thinking. The subtitle belongs to the Bridge of Friendship website.

Analysis

Intro

The annual meeting of Romanian diplomats, scheduled for 25-26 August at the Palace of Parliament, is taking place in a complicated domestic and international context. The war in Ukraine continues, and the new US administration’s changes of direction are increasing uncertainty about the direction of transatlantic relations and security in our region. In this climate, Romania’s foreign policy is under increasing internal pressure to be more visible, more active and more relevant. Whereas in the past diplomacy was considered a technocratic field, marginal to the general public, today it has entered the public eye. More and more voices are complaining about Romania’s absence from important meetings or denouncing the excessive politicisation of major foreign policy issues. Thus, foreign policy is no longer a discussion reserved for diplomats and experts. It has become a field of political and ideological confrontation, marked by polarisation and frustration that Romania is not fully exploiting its potential.

The result is a debate that is livelier than ever, but often perceived as chaotic or confusing. The truth is, however, that despite the multiple background noises, through all these positions, criticisms and lamentations, relatively well-defined orientations can be identified, which guide the public debate. So, what this debate needs is a conceptual clarification of the main fault lines that define the lines of disagreement, but also a mapping of the main existing lines of thought, what makes them similar and what differentiates them. Such an intellectual exercise of systematisation and classification provides us with the analytical apparatus to make sense of the apparent chaos in public debate and to understand more clearly the lines of fracture in Romanian society.

In my analysis, I have identified three strands of thought that guide the current public debate on Romanian foreign policy. A revolutionary strand, which argues that the entire Euro-Atlantic tradition on which Romanian foreign policy has been built over the last three decades is wrong and must be abandoned. At the opposite end of the spectrum, a strand of continuity defends the status quo, arguing that predictability and stability are the supreme virtues that foreign policy must protect. Between these two, a reformist strand accepts the criticism regarding the lack of vision and initiative in Romanian foreign policy, but focuses on reforming the means by which Romania promotes its interests, not its strategic orientation. These three strands are currently engaged in a political, intellectual and social competition with long-term implications for Romania’s place in the world.

Revolution, continuity or reform?

The revolutionaries

Firstly, the intellectual strand that most strongly shakes the foundations of post-December foreign policy is the revolutionary one, promoted mainly by the radical right. For its proponents, Romania’s problem is not the flawed execution of its foreign policy, but its very strategic alignment with the Western world and the perpetuation of the ‘strategic trinity’ (integration into the EU, membership of NATO, privileged strategic partnership with the US). In other words, the revolutionary strand sees the main cause of Romanian foreign policy’s shortcomings as the country’s anchoring to the Western world as the sine qua non of our diplomacy.

According to this line of thinking, the strategic alliances to which Romania is a party do not serve the national interest, but undermine the country’s sovereignty and block its potential to have balanced relations with other global powers, such as Russia or China. Membership of the EU and NATO are reframed as constraints that prevent us from reaching our full potential, with Romania becoming a ‘modern colony’, subordinate to decisions taken in Brussels and Washington, with an economy controlled by foreign capital and an external voice reduced to echoing Western interests.

In this regard, Călin Georgescu, the main recent political exponent of this line of thinking, said in May 2025 that “it is good to be on good terms with all the major powers. Foreign policy means America, China, Russia, Brazil – they are indisputable. It is unimaginable to have rebellious or uncooperative relations. There is only one planet.‘ Similar positions were expressed by people such as Diana Șoșoacă, who stated in August 2024, in a live Facebook broadcast, that ’I am not a slave, neither are my children, and I believe that none of the Romanian citizens are slaves to the United States of America or NATO or any other power,” and that ‘I will never accept that we are slaves and do not have equal rights with other European Union member states, because, at this point, it’s just… who decides? Well, it’s decided based on surface area and population.’ Similar positions have been adopted by foreign policy analysts co-opted by radical right-wing parties, such as Dan Dungaciu, who stated in June 2025 that “Romania’s foreign policy has moved to Brussels. If Romania gives up its right of veto […] then [its] word no longer matters… real foreign policy is dictated by the EU or France‘ or that the current status of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs ’reflects Romania’s submissiveness in diplomatic relations”. Similar positions were expressed by Ion Cristoiu, who promotes the idea that it is not in Romania’s interest to rally behind positions that challenge Russia’s bellicose behaviour, but rather to adopt a pragmatic stance. He criticises the ‘servile’ automatism towards Washington or Brussels in foreign policy decisions, invoking the need for Romania to think about its own strategy, even if this means recognising Russia’s legitimate interests in the region.

The prescription is commensurate with the diagnosis: a break. This school advocates a radical doctrine, which I have called ‘neo-Ceausist’, proposing a return to a multi-vector, non-aligned foreign policy. Specifically, it calls for distancing from the West and diversifying partnerships by moving closer to non-Western powers such as Russia and China. The central idea is that of geopolitical hedging: Romania should not ‘put all its eggs in the Western basket,’ but should cultivate pragmatic relations with all relevant global actors.

The Continuists

Secondly, the state institutions that control foreign policy continue to be dominated by a school of thought that promotes continuity and stability. Its representatives reject almost all criticism of the nature or underperformance of Romanian diplomacy, arguing that Romania’s foreign policy operates at a realistic level that is appropriate to its resources and geopolitical context. For them, Romania has already achieved its major strategic objectives through Euro-Atlantic integration, and the absolute priority now is to consolidate these achievements through consistency and predictability. Any deviation from this course is seen as a risky venture.

The key phrases of this school are ‘continuity and predictability,’ constantly repeated in official speeches or in the writings of analysts who belong to this school of thought. President Klaus Iohannis has been the main promoter of this vision, profiling Romania as a ‘source of stability’ and a reliable ally, firmly attached to Western values. At the level of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, successive ministers, including former minister and current presidential adviser Luminița Odobescu, have reiterated that foreign policy must be marked by consistency.

Continuity advocates believe that expectations for a more assertive foreign policy are unrealistic for a country the size of Romania, ignoring the success of countries such as Estonia or even Finland (population of 5.6 million). In their view, success does not come from initiatives that make us stand out, but from building a reputation as a loyal and predictable partner that honours its commitments. They respond to the critics of the other two camps in an implicit way: they reproach the revolutionaries for ‘risking to kill the patient with their treatment’, undoing the progress of the last three decades, and suggest to the reformists that Romania is already doing everything that is realistically possible, and that stability is more important than innovation at any cost. Thus, their prescription is relatively simple: to maintain the current course, with minor and gradual adjustments, but without changes in strategy.

We see these ideas frequently expressed in public messages, including those of the new president Nicușor Dan, who has retained his predecessor’s foreign policy team, in itself a sign of continuity. For example, Valentin Naumescu, a representative of the continuity camp, stated in June 2025 that “Romania’s foreign policy does not need to be reinvented now. Its traditional principles and pillars continue to be beneficial to our fundamental objectives, the security and development of the country. The strategic orientations and options of our pro-Western foreign policy have proven to be valid,‘ adding that ’there is no need for “revolutions” in foreign and security policy,” but only for the consistent and intelligent application of the existing direction.

The reformists

Thirdly, another line of thinking, situated between the two opposing poles, starts from a diagnosis similar to that of the revolutionaries, namely that Romanian foreign policy is underperforming, but identifies causes that are totally different from theirs. For the reformists, the problem does not lie in our strategic alignment (EU, NATO, US) or in the goals of foreign policy, which remain correct and beneficial, but in the means and mentality with which they are pursued. After achieving the major integration objectives, the representatives of this school of thought argue, our elite put foreign policy on ‘autopilot’. This has resulted in passive, reactive and unambitious diplomacy, which turns Romania into a ‘conscientious student’ who rallies to the decisions of others, but who rarely proposes, leads or shapes the European and regional agenda.

Instead of a break, the reformists are calling for a revitalisation of foreign policy within the existing strategic frameworks, while maintaining a pro-Western orientation. The reformists’ solution is a less invasive treatment, but one that requires political will: new ideas, more resources and more courage. This translates into several courses of action. Firstly, a serious investment in the human and financial capital of diplomacy, in order to professionalise the external apparatus. Secondly, a refreshing of the climate of ideas, overcoming the outdated templates and ideas that still constrain foreign policy thinking and have become obsolete in the current context. Thirdly, more political will for more proactive, assertive-constructive and innovative positions.

This perspective is supported by a growing number of experts and diplomats. Former diplomat Dorin Popescu has advocated for a ‘centripetal’ foreign policy that combines loyalty to the EU with innovation and the exploitation of new geopolitical opportunities. Marius Ghincea has been campaigning for years for structural reforms in relation to the means and processes by which foreign policy is defined and implemented. Iulian Fota has stated multiple positions on the need for administrative reform in the MFA. Ștefan Popescu has drawn attention to the need for investment and structural reforms in the way the Ministry of Foreign Affairs operates centrally and in the foreign service. The collective message of the reformists is simple: the direction is right, but we need to change the way we row. It is no longer enough to be present at the table; it is time to bring our own ideas to the table.

Who is right?

	Revolution	Reform	Continuity
Strategic orientation	Multivectorial	Euro-Atlantic, with own initiative	Euro-Atlantic, stable anchor
Intensity of change	Strategic break	Reform of means, maintaining orientation	Gradualism
Origin of the problem	External alignment (trinity)	Means (will, resources, ideas)	No structural problem
Openness Russia/China	High/pragmatic	Minimal/cautious	Minimal/cautious
Policy style	Proactive disruptive	Proactive constructive	Rather reactive/prudent
Multilateralism vs bilateralism	Opportunistic bilateralism	Proactive multilateralism	Conformist multilateralism
Resources for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs	???	Increase in resources	Maintain current level, minor adjustments
Acceptable risk	High	Moderate	Low

My answer to this question is invariably biased. As a representative of the reformist camp, I believe that the revolutionaries are right about the existence of the problem, but they are systematically wrong about the causes of the problem they identify. In the case of the continuists, they are wrong to ignore the existence of problems in Romanian foreign policy and diplomacy, but they are right to advocate for maintaining the continuity of the country’s external orientation.

More specifically, the revolutionary camp correctly identifies a real and tangible problem, namely that Romania is not reaching its potential on the international stage and that its voice is often irrelevant. However, the systematic error they make is in identifying the causes. They confuse our Euro-Atlantic orientation, the main source of Romania’s security and prosperity over the last three decades, with the source of the problems in foreign policy and diplomacy. If they were right, we should see the same phenomenon in other countries in Central and Eastern Europe, but reality shows us that there are countries that perform much better than us (Estonia, Finland, etc.) even though they are part of the same organisations as us, which shows us that the sources are internal and not related to our membership of the EU or NATO. The solution proposed by the revolutionaries, in terms of a strategic break and a multi-vector reorientation, would only undo the hard-won progress and throw Romania into a zone of uncertainty at a crucial moment for the future of security in the region. It is a radical solution to a problem of execution, not of external orientation or membership of the Western world.

At the opposite end of the spectrum, the continuity camp correctly defends the goals and strategic orientation of our foreign policy. Membership of NATO and the EU and the strategic partnership with the US are non-negotiable and must be the unshakeable pillars of national security. Their mistake, however, is one of complacency in precariousness. By denying or minimising the problems of foreign policy performance, the continuists turn ‘predictability’ into an excuse for inaction and ‘stability’ into an argument for stagnation. The world is changing rapidly, and a foreign policy on autopilot is no longer sufficient to promote Romania’s interests. Refusing to acknowledge shortcomings makes any correction impossible.

Thus, the reformist path is the only correct option. It shares the revolutionaries’ position in admitting that there is a problem and the continuists’ wisdom in maintaining a pro-Western and pro-European orientation. The solution is not to demolish the house, but to renovate and modernise it. The problem is not what we are pursuing (integration, security, prosperity within the Western world), but how we are doing it. We need to revitalise diplomacy within the existing strategic framework: more initiative, more intellectual input, adequate financial resources and a firm political will for a more assertive and relevant foreign policy, one that contributes constructively to solving common problems. It is not the direction of the boat that is wrong, but the pace and force with which we row.

Who will win?

Victory in this competition of ideas is not predetermined and will be decided on two distinct fronts: the battle for institutional control and the test of performance in the face of geopolitical shocks.

In the short and medium term, the continuity camp has an overwhelming advantage in terms of institutional control. It forms the ‘operating system’ of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Presidential Administration and other state structures with external responsibilities. The diplomats and officials in these institutions are, for the most part, trained in the spirit of predictability and prudent alignment. For them, continuity is not simply an option, but the very essence of the culture of the institutions to which they belong. The fact that the new president has retained his predecessor’s foreign policy team consolidates this institutional stronghold.

The revolutionary strand has no chance of penetrating this system by conventional means, at least at the top. There is only one way for it to capture the institutions: a major electoral victory that would allow it to appoint political leaders at the top of the state (President, Prime Minister, Foreign Minister) willing to purge and radically restructure the diplomatic apparatus. Until then, they remain an external pressure force, eroding public confidence in the system, but not controlling its levers.

The reformist faction is in the most difficult position. It is often a ‘loyal opposition’ from within or close to the system, but without decision-making power. Their victory cannot come through a rupture, but through a slow process of persuasion and consensus-building among the political and administrative elites. They must convince the ‘fortress’ of continuity that changing means and processes is not only desirable but absolutely necessary.

At the same time, the difficult international context acts as a relentless endurance test for each approach. The continuity faction, although solid on paper, is proving increasingly ineffective. Reactive diplomacy, which waits for others to make decisions and is content with the role of a ‘diligent student,’ is inadequate in a world that demands initiative. Romania’s passivity in key regional issues and its absence from relevant decision-making formats are not signs of stability, but symptoms of declining relevance. In the long term, this lack of performance will erode the very legitimacy of the continuity strand in society, which will no longer be able to justify maintaining the current course.

The revolutionary strand would fail the reality test spectacularly and catastrophically. At a time when Romania’s security depends directly on the strength of NATO’s Article 5 and the support of its Western partners, a policy of ‘distancing’ or hedging towards Russia and China would be an act of national suicide. The reality of the border conflict is the strongest argument against the neo-Ceausist fantasies of those in the AUR or around Călin Georgescu. Any attempt to implement such an agenda would isolate Romania and expose it directly to Russian subversion.

The reformist line is, in theory, the only one suited to the current challenges. Its representatives understand that the only way to strengthen the transatlantic relationship and enhance Romania’s security is to become a more active, involved and valuable ally. An assertive and constructive foreign policy, which comes up with ideas and builds coalitions within the EU and NATO, is exactly what Romania needs to navigate the turbulent waters of current geopolitics. However, it is also the weakest and most institutionally vulnerable.

Long-term victory will most likely belong to the faction that manages to convince others that it has the solution to the real challenges. At this moment, the real battle is between the comfortable inertia of the continuists and the urgent need for adaptation supported by the reformists. The reformists’ success in influencing and transforming the institutional fortress from within is the only way to achieve a victory that will not derail Romania’s external orientation, before the frustration generated by stagnation opens the gates to a victory for the revolutionaries.

Photo: Romanian foreign ministry (source: Facebook)

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