Ștefan Popescu: As the rift between Western Europe and the US deepens, Romania will need to discover and forge links with its own region

Vladimir Mitev

Summary

The Bridge of Friendship’s interview with foreign policy analyst Ștefan Popescu analyses the internal political transformations in Romania and global geopolitical realignments, emphasising the need for Bucharest to abandon the illusion of major exclusive partnerships and to reorient its foreign policy towards regional cooperation, including with Bulgaria.

The political crisis in Romania and the limits of leadership

• Societal polarisation: The political crisis in Bucharest reflects an increasingly radicalised society, in which elites and political parties reject compromise and demonise their internal opponents.
• The role of institutions: The state’s institutional architecture is the only factor preventing a complete breakdown, although Romania’s ability to formulate coherent long-term national strategies (in foreign policy, energy or security) is severely impaired.
• Public attitude: Despite political instability, civil society and the business community have developed a long-standing capacity to function and thrive in times of crisis.

The fragmentation of the West and the loss of strategic priority

• The erosion of traditional alignments: Growing tensions between the US and the European Union, alongside the realignment of American priorities (focused on competition with China and the Arctic theatre), place Romania in a zone of strategic uncertainty.
• The limitations of the major European powers: The Black Sea and South-Eastern Europe are no longer an absolute priority for the US, whilst European powers (such as France) have limited resources and multiple military commitments.
• The illusion of the Romanian-Polish axis: The comparison with Poland is a relic of the interwar period; Poland now ranks among the major European powers (the E5 group) and is directing its priorities towards the Baltic region, leaving Romania to seek its own strategic relevance.

Re-evaluating neighbourhood policy: Romanian-Bulgarian relations

• Overcoming stereotypes: Both the elites in Romania and those in Bulgaria continue to perpetuate historical prejudices and identity-based theories, neglecting the shared South-Eastern European cultural matrix.
• The need for connectivity: In the absence of deep-rooted connections (infrastructure, energy, academic cooperation and joint government meetings), both states — faced with demographic decline and a loss of competitiveness — risk becoming the losers in global realignments.
• Regional strategy: The realistic solution for Romania lies in internal consolidation, active diplomacy and the establishment of direct strategic axes with its neighbours: Bulgaria, Hungary, Turkey, Greece and Serbia.

Diplomacy in an era of global change

• Understanding the complexity of neighbouring countries: Analysis of foreign policy must be free from emotion and simplistic labels (such as the rigid characterisation of certain regional leaders as ‘pro-Russian’), whilst taking into account the specific traditions of each state.
• Geographical reality: Regardless of how conflicts unfold, the Russian Federation will remain a prominent actor in the region, and the states of South-Eastern Europe will be obliged to develop post-conflict scenarios and re-establish diplomatic channels to manage common, non-politicised issues.

Interview

Introduction

Ștefan Popescu is a foreign policy analyst and commentator who is highly active in the media. He holds a PhD in the history of contemporary international relations from the University of Paris 1 – Sorbonne. His doctoral thesis on Albania in French foreign policy was awarded the distinction of Summa cum laude and received unanimous praise from the examination board. He also holds a second Master’s degree in geopolitics from the University of Paris 1 – Sorbonne and the École Normale Supérieure in Paris (ENS-Ulm).

Ștefan Popescu served for a short period as Secretary of State at the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. His professional career has been in the field of international relations: he was head of mission at the High Council of La Francophonie (2005–2006), a visiting lecturer and researcher at the Centre for the History of Contemporary International Relations, the Pierre Renouvin Institute at the University of Paris 1 – Sorbonne (2002–2008), a journalist at Radio France Internationale (2007–2012), special adviser on Francophonie to the Romanian Minister for Foreign Affairs (2012), Director-General for External Cooperation at the Romanian Cultural Institute (2012–2013), foreign policy analyst and commentator for several radio and television stations, as well as for national press publications, senior analyst at the Romania Energy Centre (ROEC), adviser to the Minister Delegate for European Affairs (since February 2017).

The political crisis in Romania

Vladimir Mitev:

Mr Popescu, Romania is in the midst of a surprising political crisis. The major parties, sometimes described as pro-European, have a history of working together over the years. However, it now appears that there are issues which have remained unresolved for more than three months. What are the reasons behind this political crisis in Romania?

What are the parties and their leaders waiting for to return to normal functioning?

Ștefan Popescu:

There is a fundamental issue which, I fear, has become structural in Romania – the political parties in Romania… do not come from Mars, nor do they come from the Moon; rather, they come from Romanian society. So it is Romanian society that gives rise to these political forces with this particular character. In recent years, I have observed a very strong radicalisation of the currents and views of the Romanian population, and of the schools of thought permeating Romanian society. Even the Romanian elites are becoming increasingly polarised, and very few voices are calling for compromise or dialogue.

They claim that the existential enemy lies within Romania itself: it is the neighbour next door who thinks differently and who must automatically be manipulated by Russia, or is uneducated, toothless, and so on. , and therefore worthy of utter contempt. This is a very dangerous situation that prevents solutions from being found. Not only the political parties as such, but within the political parties themselves, factions have emerged that are beginning to radicalise in relation to one another, which further complicates the search for a solution. And on top of all this, I believe that this crisis is further compounded by leadership issues stemming from the personality and style of Romania’s President.

Hence the attacks by certain political figures against civil servants, against the secret services, against anything that reminds them that they must act in the interests of the state and the national interest. Under these circumstances, indeed, Romania does resemble a ship adrift — not because it is actually adrift, for the only factor preventing the Romanian state from resembling a ship adrift is, after all, its institutional structure, its institutional architecture. The institutional architecture, for all its problems, for all its failings, for all its lack of professionalism, nevertheless keeps the state on a certain course, which compels, as far as it can — with inherent limitations — the political sphere to relate to the affairs of state, and not merely to the competition for power.

And in these circumstances, I view the political crisis in Romania through the intellectual tools at my disposal and, above all, through the prism of my own interests, which are linked to foreign policy. Consequently, I believe that the political crisis in the Romanian state is affecting Romania’s ability to continue to have strategies, sectoral strategies, and to define national objectives in various fields — be it bilateral relations, global relations, neighbourhood policy, the Black Sea, or relations and strategies within the European Union — and from this perspective, it is a worrying situation.

I mentioned, as a positive aspect, the fact that this institutional architecture exists which, for all its flaws — and it too is, of course, criticised against a backdrop of increasingly extreme political competition and the political establishment’s interest in controlling parts of it — is itself a positive element within Romanian society.

Romanian society, on the whole, is a society that has been operating through periods of crisis for generations. At least over the last 36 years, Romania’s development has, of course, been spectacular, but it has not been consistent.

If you look at a graph showing the growth of gross domestic product, it has been very erratic. Consequently, Romanian society and the business community have developed the ability to operate in times of crisis, to rely less on the state, and to find solutions. There are companies that continue to invest; there are companies… and if you travel around Romania’s cities – and not just the cities – you will see that there are building sites everywhere, work is being carried out everywhere, and there are examples of good practice in various economic sectors; there are state-owned companies that continue to pursue strategic projects, despite the difficulties of dealing with the political factor.

But, of course, on the whole, Romania lacks a national strategic direction that transcends political differences. Take the case of the drone in Galați, for example, which crashed onto a block of flats and injured members of a family: despite the fact that this was an issue — we are not discussing the nature of the incident — concerning an event that affected the safety of Romanian citizens, the political parties, instead of sending a message of unity (because Galați is home to voters from all parties—I am convinced of this—and I suspect that all citizens of Galați share concerns regarding their own safety and the undesirable effects of a war that is drawing ever closer to Romania’s borders), they exploited the event for their own political gain, failing to send a message of unity as would have been expected.

The fragmentation of the Western world and Romania’s foreign policy

During Iohannis’s time in office, Romania has, in various respects, succeeded in positioning itself as Western Europe’s regional partner. Many investments from Western Europe have flowed into Romania. Similarly, Romania has framed its foreign policy – for example, with regard to the Republic of Moldova – in collaboration with Germany and France, within the Moldova Support Platform. So, until recently, did Romania have a clear orientation regarding its ally in the world?

The domestic political crisis in Bucharest would not have posed any danger whatsoever if the Western strategic sphere – which we refer to as Euro-Atlantic – had maintained the same coherence. However, the fragmentation of the Western world, the ever-widening differences in outlook between the United States of America and the European Union – and also within the European Union itself, amongst European partners with differing strategies – and – most importantly, even more so than this fragmentation – Romania’s position on the border with the Russian Federation. For a Romania in deep crisis, but with a much more favourable geographical position, situated hundreds of kilometres from the Black Sea, this would not have been a major problem.

At a time when the United States of America is rethinking its deployment in Europe, prioritising among Member States, whilst the European Union’s resources are increasingly limited against a backdrop of competitiveness issues, the outsourcing by the Americans to Europe of the costs of the war in Ukraine, and, of course, the crisis exacerbated by the war in the Middle East (the tensions there are more than just a war; it is a systemic crisis), against this backdrop, naturally, the political crisis in Romania risks causing disproportionate damage.

At the level of the Romanian state as a whole, it is not known at present, or there is a high degree of uncertainty, as to which Western power is assuming leadership of the sphere in which Romania operates. This is because the security and foreign policy of a country such as Romania have been built on alignment — alignment with the power that assumed responsibility for this sphere. That power has been the United States of America and, to a lesser extent, the European Union. At present, I believe that the uncertainty regarding the willingness of these two entities to assume responsibility for this sphere is exacerbating the scale of the political crisis in Bucharest.

The third option – developing relations within the Central and South-Eastern European region

Is there such a phrase in Romania as ‘Buridan’s donkey’?

Of course there is! Absolutely.

A former editor-in-chief of mine, some time ago, when I told him I had two article proposals and was unsure which to put forward – and was just about to tell him so – he’d say: “Give me a third one.” But this is a practical and serious question: if Romania cannot choose between the United States and Western Europe, isn’t the right choice a third option? For example, here’s a suggestion: couldn’t Romania boost its economic and political potential, and so on, through ties within the region?

That is the big issue at stake. Of course, the fable of Buridan’s donkey has a tragic ending, because the donkey, unable to choose between oats and water, ultimately died of hunger and thirst. I don’t think this is a problem unique to Romania. Romania cannot choose on its own. Of course, one could discuss what Romania has failed to do to increase its strategic value.

But I believe that, at this moment of global realignment, even if Romania were to excel beyond measure — realistically speaking, I mean, not that it has managed to develop a chip and semiconductor industry like Taiwan’s, in which case it might have succeeded in attracting Western interest — it is a problem that has less to do with Romania and depends more on major Western interests. However good we might be, we cannot influence global geopolitical shifts.

If we look at the stakes for the United States of America — competition with China, the Middle East, the internal problems of American society relating to reindustrialisation, American societal and even political issues (because the situation there is by no means straightforward either), interest in new strategic theatres emerging on the horizon, such as the Arctic Theatre, which also involves the equation of relations with the Russian Federation — and then the Black Sea and south-eastern Europe, which includes Romania and where life unfolds, are evolving in such a way that it is very difficult to believe that Romania could have done anything more than be a priority of interest.

Indeed, this has been understood and communicated from within the Romanian state — not by the political leadership, but by the presidential adviser, Ambassador Marius Lazurca, who has spoken publicly on several occasions and stated that Romania remains useful to the United States of America (as seen during the Iranian crisis, through the use of military bases), but no longer constitutes a strategic priority. This is evident.

The question arises as to whether, despite their stated ambitions, the European powers have the resources to project and assume responsibility, from a security perspective (which is a very important matter), for the region in which Romania is situated. Of course, France is the lead NATO nation here, but let us not forget that we must not look merely at the snapshot of the moment: we must consider France’s military resources, which are under strain, the commitments France has undertaken – and there are many of them – and the process, about which very little is said in Romania, of France’s return to Africa.

It began in Chad: Chad resumed military cooperation after having closed its French military bases; the foundations were laid for a new cooperation that signals France’s return to the Sahel region. You have seen the crisis in Ceuta: there is no doubt that, apart from Spain, the country that has been watching it most closely is France, because it is the country most exposed if you look at France’s human geography.

So the problem is that, given that no other power… or there is a high degree of uncertainty regarding the ability of major powers to take on this region, the only solution is internal consolidation and a neighbourhood policy. I see no other option for a country of Romania’s size than, of course, building the capacity to engage in dialogue with various powers. We must return to diplomacy, including with regard to the Russian Federation. I am convinced that strategic reality will, sooner or later, force us out of our comfort zone.

Romania and its region

Furthermore, as I said at the outset, there are also cultural and intercultural aspects. There is intersubjectivity in our region, and I, as a Bulgarian, can say that many aspects of Romanian-Bulgarian relations have remained at the same level for years, even decades, although there is potential for an active dialogue – one that reflects and is constantly learning new things. To what extent does Romania really feel at home in its region, knowing that this theory of a ‘Latin island’ in the ‘Slavic sea’ has long existed? Poland is made up of Slavs, isn’t it? Even if it is a role model.

They are Catholic. There are other Slavic states neighbouring Poland; they are part of the same cultural sphere, so it is not really an island. Hungary does foster this sense of insularity; it has it because its language is entirely distinct. Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia are Slavic neighbours, but they are also part of the same religious and cultural sphere.

I think the following needs to be said: unfortunately – and this is the fault of our elites in all the countries of South-Eastern Europe – we continue to perpetuate certain stereotypes about our neighbours, to cultivate certain labels and to emphasise, more than is necessary, a history which is, admittedly, marked by a great many conflicts. Some of these are recent, and it is certainly true that it takes time and a great deal of courage to put them behind us, if we look at the cases in the former Yugoslavia. I believe that history must not be forgotten, but neither should it be turned into an obstacle.

I believe the public is much more receptive. It is a great pity because we are at a historic moment when the world would be far more receptive to positive messages and constructive approaches. Societies in Romania and Bulgaria… if I were to take Romania as an example, I can say that Romanians do go to Bulgaria. I’m one of those who go: this is the fifth holiday I’ve taken in Bulgaria over the last four years. I’ve ended up going to Bulgaria twice a year, in both winter and summer, and I don’t know if I’d change this destination; I feel very much at home in Bulgaria. This reflects both a willingness on the part of Romanians to engage, and a sense of affinity, as well as the fact that they feel at home in Bulgaria. This creates a foundation that could facilitate cooperation, and it is a shame that it is not being utilised to a greater extent.

It is very strange that, despite this closeness, our elites have very limited social interaction, confined solely to official settings, and unfortunately this is detrimental. We do not feel… at least Romanians do not feel comfortable in the region where they are. I remember that, in the 1990s, Romania sought — and I was told this at school — to show that we are not a South-Eastern European country, we are not a Balkan country, the Balkan Mountains do not run through our territory; we have the Carpathians, even though Romania’s links with the Balkan world are obvious. I was told that we were — and I quote, because it has stayed in my memory — ‘a Central European country neighbouring the Balkans’.

At that time, Romania was distancing itself, seeking to set itself apart — and I understood this — from a conflict zone represented by the former Yugoslavia. But even after joining the European Union, unfortunately there remains this reluctance to engage with our own region, such as the Western Balkans, where there have been no meetings at head-of-state level on Romania’s part for 20 years – for more than two decades. Our foreign ministers and leaders do go… of course, it’s even more prestigious in terms of the photos that can be posted on Facebook or Instagram, because we’re in an age of communication, and it’s one thing to have your photo taken with some leader in Paris or Berlin, and quite another to have your photo taken with the President of Bulgaria, Albania or Serbia. That sort of thing brings you fewer votes, or none at all. But if Macron has the chance to put his hand on your shoulder, or your French counterpart, if you’re the foreign minister, then you can sell that to the public.

And I believe our bilateral relations are also a victim of the way foreign policy is not being conducted, because this kind of cheap publicity is not foreign policy; we must not confuse the two. We are also paying the price for the lack of culture amongst our leaders when it comes to international relations and an understanding of how the world works. I cannot speak about Bulgaria because I am not familiar with it, but I can say this regarding Romanian political leadership: foreign policy is no longer a priority for Romanian political parties. Not in the slightest. There are no longer — save for very few — what we call in Romanian ‘foreign policy specialists’. People specialising in foreign policy are no longer nurtured within the parties. There are no longer specialist departments at party level. They exist only in name, because the institutes that used to function as schools of ideological thought are no longer operational. Both the Social Democratic Party and the National Liberal Party had them, as did the Liberal Democratic Party in its day. So all three major ideological currents of the time were covered: social democracy, liberalism and conservatism.

None of this exists any more and, consequently, our leaders, the Romanian elites, no longer relate to,

do not know how to relate to, nor do they understand the particular — I would even say fundamental, critical — value for a country like Romania, given its geopolitical situation, of its neighbouring countries. And here, in particular, I am referring to the relationship with Bulgaria, which, in my view, must be Romania’s closest partner. Alongside Hungary, Romania can only have real strategic value in relation to the countries of south-eastern Europe.

And from what you’re saying now, I understand that this is also a crisis of mindset, of thinking.

Absolutely, a crisis of mindset, of thinking, because both the political crisis you’ve identified and the energy crisis are crises of mindset. The energy crisis illustrates this very well: Bulgaria has developed electricity storage solutions totalling 8.3 gigawatts, whilst Romania has only 1.3, using the very same financial instruments made available by the European Union. So, therefore, the difference lies in the mindset, as the instruments made available to Bulgaria and Romania were the same. No one is stopping Romania from proposing that batteries and electricity storage solutions be classified as critical infrastructure. This has not happened.

As a Bulgarian, I must clarify this. There are some traders or companies that have invested in this venture. I do not believe they are representative of the whole country or the entire population. When it is said that “Bulgarians buy cheap electricity from the Romanians and then sell it back to the Romanians at a high price ”, that’s not correct. The vast majority of Bulgarians have nothing to do with this.

Saying it’s sold at a high price is an oversimplification. It’s an oversimplification that doesn’t criticise Bulgaria. The headlines in the press… Bulgarians, just like Romanians, just like Hungarians, just like the French, have a spot market, which is the market for immediate contracts. And on that market, energy is sold at the spot price. That is how it is sold. It is sold at a high price because, at the spot price, wherever you go in the world, the price of energy is higher. It is one thing to have an older, longer-term contract – in which case you have a fixed price – but the significant quantities sold on the spot market are traded at the spot price. It is a commercial practice that exists all over the world.

These headlines were not intended to criticise Bulgaria, and I do not wish to defend Romania in any way; rather, I wish to show that Romania sells cheaply because it has not built the necessary infrastructure to store the energy it produces from renewable solar sources during the day. Consequently, it is forced to purchase energy at higher prices. This does not apply solely to Bulgaria. There has also been discussion about Ukraine, regarding the purchase of certain quantities of energy from Ukraine, and Ukraine will also sell it at the spot price. It is a commercial practice found all over the world.

The insularity of Romanian identity and the challenges of the present day

When discussing Romania and the region, I note that both synchronism and protocronism regard Romania as an island. It seems to me that the synchronist tendency posits that Romania is a sort of Western Europe planted in a suburban garden, ‘a Latin island in a sea of Slavs’. Protocronism, on the other hand, regards Romania as the centre of the world and the cradle of all civilisations, which also suggests a high degree of exceptionalism.

That is how we would like it to be. We have grown up with a profound inferiority complex in relation to the West. It is true that, beyond the vicissitudes of history, which are objective, and the fact that we experienced that rupture during the Second World War — which upended society and led us into a different system of thought and values —, we then had to adapt to reintegration into the Western world from the position of the poorer relative. So there are certain objective conditions.

But neither have we, as a society and as elites, done everything within our power to draw even closer to the Western world in which we wish to live. We have considered it easier to leave, to abandon Romania, than to create the West here. I’m not saying there haven’t been Romanians — just as there are Bulgarians, I’m sure — who return to the country and put their experience to good use through what they do: whether by setting up a business or investing the money they’ve accumulated in the West. But a great many have preferred to go and lose themselves in the vast Western masses.

If we look… I spent, as you know very well (but I’ll point this out for Bulgarian and Romanian readers), a long time in the West. I was very surprised that, when comparing them with mixed Polish families — Polish-French, Polish-Italian — or even Armenian ones, the children of the couples I met were perfectly bilingual. Among Romanians, the children were perfectly assimilated, even though some had been born in Romania, and the grandparents were learning French or Italian so they could communicate with their grandchildren.

Taking my thoughts further, shouldn’t Romania’s identity be recalibrated slightly, so that its geographical and cultural belonging to its region – Central and South-Eastern Europe – can be appreciated simultaneously?

It should, because I believe that this reconstruction of identity represents a strategic issue in a Europe that is becoming increasingly fragmented, in a Western Europe that will face problems and will no longer be able to serve as a model for us — both in terms of political, demographic and cultural changes, and in terms of security and the economy. I believe we could assess our own worth as objectively as possible.

Confidently, realistically, without idealising things as we did during the communist era, when I believe that even in your country, Bulgaria, you were portrayed as the architects of heroic achievements — because that’s how it was; everything was heroic under communism, wasn’t it? Building a road or a railway line was heroic; our entire history was nothing but heroic. Not in that sense.

But I believe that, unfortunately, a section of the Romanian elite has carved out an opportunistic niche for itself by tearing down Romania’s national history. Of course, what I’ve just said will probably be interpreted in the worst possible light, but what I mean is that there is, on the one hand, real history, with all its details — some of which are less flattering, which may well exist and which undoubtedly have an objective place in academic studies, research, in certain popularisation books aimed at a particular intellectual audience — and quite another is the construction of national identity. This must not, of course, replicate the excesses of the Communist era, nor should it tear everything down entirely, thereby unduly and unjustifiably deepening the historical inferiority complexes we harbour. Think of Maiorescu and his theory of ‘form without substance’: that is to say, we harbour this unease from our more distant past that in Romania we are not like the French, the Germans or other Western Europeans.

Romanians and the Balkan region

I would ask this question and, at the same time, put forward a hypothesis: why are Romanians cautious about their region? There is a sensitivity — as I understand it, perhaps not among all Romanians, but amongst a significant proportion, a sensitivity built up at the very national level — in relation to Russia. I realise that I may provoke certain negative reactions by raising this subject, especially as I am Bulgarian and am aware of all manner of suspicions, prejudices and sensitivities regarding Bulgarians and Russia. Nevertheless, I believe my intentions are very good.

For example, I have said many times and have been saying for a long time in private conversations that, if you do not adopt such an irrational or vehement attitude (which shows extreme sensitivity towards Russia), you might perhaps be able to contend with Russia more effectively, if your aim is to contend with Russia. In this regard, I hope my intentions will be properly understood. Is the development of this understanding hindered by the fact that the experience from the region cannot be integrated? There is a notion that, if you integrate the experience from the region, it means you are yielding to your enemy – that is, Russia, to the one who is preventing your evolution towards who you are.

That is one explanation, but not the whole story.

Yes, the Romanians have sought… and that is why you know very well that in the early 1990s we knocked on the door of the Visegrad Group, so that we too might be accepted there and not be lumped together with the ‘Balkan’ countries. Even the term ‘Balkan’ has quite a pejorative connotation in the Romanian language: if you tell someone ‘stop being Balkan’, it implies that you are a certain way.

At the same time, there were also reservations towards some Western countries, such as France. When the French criticised the Americans, we were all ultra-pro-American. I want to tell you from my own experience: I was viewed with suspicion because I held a rather Francophile and European outlook in the Romanian public sphere – not so much an American one – so I wasn’t held in such high regard. When the French criticised the United States of America (just look at the press from a few years ago – we don’t need to go very far back), Romanians would automatically side with the American position, without giving it a second thought, like supporters in the stands backing a particular team.

In 2003, during the invasion of Iraq, I recall that Romanians were wholeheartedly behind the US invasion — which, mind you, was an illegal invasion, as it did not go through the UN Security Council. France was treated as a pariah state because it had had the courage, or the interest, to oppose this American operation. And the examples continued, including when Macron gave that famous interview to The Economist in 2019 and said that NATO was brain-dead. History has shown us — in the context of what was happening in Syria and the differences between European states and NATO member states regarding the Eastern Mediterranean — that NATO had entered a crisis phase in which it was no longer functioning as a unified body. But immediately, criticism from our side was directed at Macron.

Consequently, we Romanians insist — and this is the fault of the elites and public figures who shape opinion on foreign affairs — that everyone should relate to our own historical experience. Now, I understand Bulgaria’s position, even though it has a different relationship and historical experience with Russia. That is a fact. Of course, Bulgaria too suffered as a result of its integration into the Communist bloc, behind the Iron Curtain. But, at the same time, if we look at Bulgaria’s independence and certain Russian influences — for example, the architecture of Sofia and so on — there is an aspect that is also positive and cannot be denied. Because just as Romania says there are certain shared cultural traits of which we are proud (French and Italian culture, our connection to the Latin world), so too does Bulgaria legitimately have the right to identify with a vast culture, the Slavic culture, in which Russia also plays an important role.

So, unfortunately, this radicalisation of opinions obscures things that are obvious and a matter of common sense. I believe that everyone’s historical experience must be treated with understanding and respect, not in a childish and immature manner. When I was a child, I too held the same prejudices — they were the prejudices found in Romanian families and in society at that time. It took my own intellectual effort and contact with the French intellectual world, particularly with my lecturers. I took a course and owe a great deal to a brilliant lecturer at the Sorbonne who has since passed away, Professor Bernard Michel, a specialist in Eastern European identities. He was married to a Slovak woman and had a keen understanding of these nations.

At first, the course came as a real shock, because it also highlighted certain not entirely positive aspects of Romanian society, which caused me a great deal of distress. I remember when a Russian professor was invited to the course: initially, I wasn’t even interested in what he had to say; the mere idea that a Russian professor had been invited to Paris scandalised me. Over time, as I matured through reading and my own life experience, I realised what an intellectual trap I had found myself in. It takes a great deal of effort and maturity to put things into perspective and to meet the right people who can guide you towards understanding the depths of human nature.

Romanian-Polish relations

I understand that the effort must come from within – an effort to find one’s place in a changing world, which demands redefinition and perhaps even unlearning certain accumulated experiences. But I believe that understanding is also needed from the outside: there must be an outstretched hand, a bridge or a source of support, or at least someone with whom you can discuss matters beyond rigid positions. Because I, for one, fear that Bulgaria… Just as Romania is very often defined in its literature and education by the notion of ‘form without substance’, I put forward the thesis that Bulgaria is defined by what I call ‘static identity’.

That is to say, of course, Bulgarians’ understanding of themselves and the world is evolving, but it seems to me that it is evolving within relatively rigid limits, and rather slowly. Observing the debates in Romania on identity and society, it strikes me that Romania, in some respects, is more dynamic. Perhaps what I’m saying will surprise you, but that’s how it strikes me: Bulgaria is proceeding at a very slow pace when it comes to this redefinition and to learning from new experiences.

I’ll come back to this, because this is also where the issue of Rumen Radev comes in, which I think is important to discuss. For example, let’s say someone in Bulgaria wants a new experience in their relationship with Romanians, but I see that Romanians immediately look to see who is at the top, and at the top is a person who arouses a great deal of antipathy in certain circles in Romania (perhaps not amongst all Romanians – I realise that society is complex).

But I’d like to ask you something else in the meantime: to what extent, in your experience, do Romanians and Poles share similar experiences, problems or understandings?

I would argue that it makes sense for Romanians to draw closer to Poland. For example, whilst the US was a very important point of reference during the post-communist transition, and then Trump won the elections (both in his first and second terms, strongly aligned with the MAGA movement), the Poles felt a sense of disappointment, at least to some extent. Of course, at the state level there are still figures who wish to cooperate with the US, but the Poles have this perception — which the Romanians may share — that something bad is coming from the East; and if your Western ally is cooperating with this East that you are wary of, that requires a redefinition of your policy. Here lies a layer of geopolitical arguments suggesting that Romania and Poland might have common interests.

But I also note that Romania’s image in Poland is improving, especially after Morawiecki visited Bucharest in 2023 and that strategic partnership was signed. Then Żabka arrived in Romania, and the famous Luca chain from Bucharest also appeared in Poland. I understand that Romania seems interesting to Poles, both for tourism and in the sense that Romanians give the impression of having certain ambitions that are more clearly defined – as a people and as elites – than other nations in the region. The Poles seem to appreciate these things. How do you view this Romanian-Polish relationship? Could it be that Romania, faced with the ‘donkey’s dilemma’, is heading in the right direction, drawing closer to Poland?

Yes, I’m laughing because, indeed, about two or three years ago I gave a presentation to the regional board of a French multinational in the large-scale retail sector, which operates in Poland, and in Romania. A Polish man who had driven there told me he was absolutely convinced that Romania was Poland’s future competitor, and he was surprised to find factories and a developed business environment in Romanian cities, with small and medium-sized enterprises that did not exist in certain Polish cities.

Where does the Romanian perception of Poland stem from? It is an old idea, dating back to the interwar period. Romanian historiography has remained heavily influenced by the alliances of the interwar period: the Little Entente, the Balkan Entente (which our Bulgarian friends regard as negative, particularly the Balkan Entente of 1934 and the Little Entente of 1921) and the Romanian–Polish Treaty of 1926.

Why are we influenced by them? Because they were regarded as alliances aimed at preserving the status quo, maintaining Greater Romania, and were directed against revisionist countries.

I would like to clarify for our Bulgarian colleagues: any country wishing to alter the status quo is revisionist, in a positive or negative sense, but my professors in Paris used to tell me that geopolitics is a subjective science. I respect everyone’s perspective and try to put myself in the other person’s shoes: if I had been born in Bulgaria, I too would have been a revisionist during the interwar period. But the major revisionist countries were not just Hungary and Bulgaria, but the Soviet Union.

Romanian communism perpetuated this view. I was the beneficiary of an education system which, in primary and secondary school, relied on the textbooks from the communist era. As you are well aware, communist Romania also emphasised this narrative, through figures in historiography such as Eliza Campus, Ion Calafeteanu and Cristian Popișteanu, who wrote professionally and scientifically about the alliances that constituted the so- the so-called ‘cordon sanitaire’.

After 1990, against the backdrop of the aspiration to join NATO, Romania frequently compared itself to Poland in the public sphere, stating: ‘We deserve to join NATO because, from a military point of view, there are only two countries in Eastern Europe that matter: Poland and Romania. The rest do not matter’. It was said that, together with Poland, we were the largest former communist states aspiring to European and Euro-Atlantic integration.

This habit of comparison has persisted, even though Romania — objectively speaking and despite the progress made — has lost a great deal of momentum compared to Poland. Poland has surpassed one trillion dollars in nominal GDP, whilst Romania stands at around 400 billion. Romania’s demographics have suffered a much sharper decline: Poland has kept its population relatively stable, unlike Romania’s demographic decline. Romania’s population is now less than half that of Poland. Poland is a much more influential player in European affairs and has established itself as a major regional power, something Romania lacks.

The relationship with Poland remains an important and strategic partnership, but I believe Romania’s vision is misguided — and I know I am in a minority here. I believe that, despite Poland’s interest in Romania, Poland harbours no illusions about Romania’s place in the balance of power on the eastern flank. Poland has no interest in joining forces with Romania to form a tandem, as it considers that Romania, Hungary and Bulgaria belong to a different category. Poland wishes to be the West’s point of reference.

It is already recognised by the Western world as a major European power — consider the E5 group, which brings together the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Germany and Poland. Poland is the only truly strategic pivot in Eastern Europe. It is therefore an illusion on Romania’s part to harbour hopes based on the echoes of the Romanian-Polish alliance between the two world wars.

Romania must develop partnerships with Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey. It is along this axis that it can realise its potential, rather than with Poland, which has different ambitions and no primary interest in the Black Sea. At the B9 summit in Bucharest in early May, Poland’s intention to shift this organisation (originally conceived as a Romanian-Polish partnership) towards the Baltic region, where Poland has priority interests, was clearly evident. There are calls in the Nordic countries invited to join the Polish initiative (Norway, Sweden) to transform the B9 into a B14, including Northern Europe and the Baltic States.

Unfortunately, Romania did not have the foresight to invite Greece or Turkey to tip the balance towards south-eastern Europe. Nor did Bulgaria help us much, sending only one ambassador (either the ambassador in Bucharest or the one at NATO) to represent it at the B9 summit. This was telling, despite the political crisis that was also unfolding in Sofia at the time.

I’d like to add something else, Vladimir, regarding what you were saying about President Rumen Radev’s position. We are used to aligning ourselves with the leading powers in the Western world: we look at what the Americans are doing, what the French are saying, what the Germans and Brussels think, and then we adjust our position accordingly. We do not understand independent positions or those with new nuances. This simply isn’t part of the mindset in Bucharest, nor that of the commentators. Foreign policy commentators and the Romanian press tend to oversimplify matters. It’s very easy to say that Rumen Radev — who held all the necessary NATO clearances, having been a fighter pilot — is pro-Russian, that is, to oversimplify the fact that he has held certain positions regarding Ukraine which do not align with Brussels’ line.

Yes, I too notice a certain hostility from some people I consider friends. The moment Rumen Radev comes up in conversation, this hostility surfaces…

I want to say one thing, Vladimir, which I really do ask you to bear in mind: a foreign policy analyst or commentator must not resort to labelling. Secondly, it is essential to take into account the complexity of each country’s traditions. Thirdly, nerves and emotions have no place when we’re analysing foreign policy. We must view the world objectively and always put ourselves in the other person’s shoes. If you don’t put yourself in the other person’s shoes, you won’t understand a thing about international relations.

Bulgaria and Russia, Bulgaria and the West, Bulgaria and Romania

Right. I’d also like to say something that I hope will be accessible to the Romanian public.

Bulgaria is a member of NATO, the European Union, the eurozone and, soon, the OECD. So Bulgaria is part of the West. If there had been a stronger affiliation with the Soviet Union in the 1970s, I can see that as early as the 1980s, when the whole region began to move towards the events of ’89–’91, Bulgaria had already taken its own steps: relations with West Germany were established as early as the 1980s, and there was economic openness.

Moreover, Bulgaria has never been solely pro-Russia. During its democratic period, Bulgaria has always had a Russophobic streak as well. I think this is often overlooked, and I frequently find myself having to explain it, as if the entire Bulgarian people were completely on Russia’s side, as if we were all Russian agents here and did not belong to the West, and as if our attitude towards Russia were nothing more than simple obedience. It seems to me that Romanians still cling to an outdated image of Bulgarians from the past – one that is no longer relevant, and probably never actually existed, not just now but in the past either.

There are many oversimplified images from the past, to be honest.

Even the situation regarding the fact that the modern Bulgarian state was created after the Russo-Turkish War, in which the Romanians were also involved and played a very important role… Anyone interested in history can see that, in just a few years, Bulgaria evolved to a point where, by 1886, it was very close to war with Russia.

It joined the anti-Russian alliance.

And at that time there were discussions about Bulgaria and Romania uniting under the Romanian king.

Yes, there were discussions with Hungary too, but after 1918, not just with Bulgaria.

This brings me to a related topic that still weighs heavily on my mind, and I hope you’ll mind if I bring it up.

Romanians could be far more curious about Bulgarians; they could apply a richer imagination when thinking about them. I fear that Bulgaria is always viewed through a very narrow and unattractive lens. But I’ll add this too: the Bulgarians themselves do not help matters, through what I call a ‘static identity’ – that is, the difficulty Bulgarians face in renewing their experience, or the state’s and society’s obsession with order, hierarchy and hegemony in social relations. It strikes me that, until recently, Bulgaria was evolving very slowly. And this is entirely true of Romanian-Bulgarian relations, which, at a grassroots level, seem to me to be progressing too slowly and contain a strong element of static experience, at least as far as the older generations are concerned.

The Bulgarians, in the way they organise their forces within society, are channelling their energy elsewhere and less towards Romania. It is a psychological and relational issue between Romanians and Bulgarians, because there is no bridge or infrastructure to offer a new experience and help us move beyond this static approach.

I cannot presume to speak about Bulgarians; I am Romanian and I do not look at what my neighbour is doing, but at what I am doing.

From my point of view, the first visits by the leadership in Bucharest should not be to Paris or Berlin, but to Sofia, Budapest, Athens, Belgrade and Ankara. Turkey represents the deep forces of history, the ancient empire to which we relate. That is where I would make the first visits.

I was saying that the level of social interaction is very low and limited solely to official settings. I’d love to see the foreign ministers having a coffee in a park or at a café in the centre of Sofia or Bucharest. I would like to see the President of Bulgaria as the guest of honour of the President of Romania at the ‘George Enescu’ Festival. I would like to see joint sessions between the academies of the two countries.

It is unacceptable — and here the blame lies with both Bulgaria and Romania — that there are not joint government meetings between Romania and Bulgaria at least once a year. It is unthinkable not to hold joint government meetings with one’s neighbours. Romania lacks a neighbourhood policy and lacks people who understand a state’s foreign policy. Had there been such signs, the clouds of misunderstanding would have dissipated and energy would have been channelled down to the grassroots of society.

There is none of that natural ease of interaction that you see amongst politicians in the West — the rapport that exists between Poles, French, Germans, Spaniards or Italians. Here, politicians are stiff, reading out statements and posing for official photographs, without any real openness. There was the crisis in the Middle East, which had an impact on our neighbouring countries: the first telephone call or meeting to exchange views (on how we should approach Iran, especially given that the US is using infrastructure in our countries as a means of projection) should have taken place between Romanian and Bulgarian officials. I have seen no sign of this.

And one more thing, dear Vladimir: we are countries situated in the vicinity of conflicts, and the closer you are, the greater the shockwaves. We are countries experiencing demographic decline, an ageing population, and we risk disappearing from the stage of history. The only way to limit the loss of competitiveness is through connectivity. If we do not connect and act in small, fragmented ways, we will be the big losers of global realignments.

Civic infrastructure in South-East Europe

I’d like to ask you about what I call civic or non-state infrastructure and its importance for Romanian-Bulgarian relations. My website is part of such an infrastructure, as is a recently established club for Romanian speakers in Ruse. How do you view this factor, and to what extent are you interested in getting involved in building such a civic infrastructure (media, culture, etc.)?

It is fundamental.

It is important to bear in mind the uniqueness of your initiative. Romania no longer has a press correspondent in Sofia — neither Radio Romania nor Romanian Television does. In these circumstances, a platform for dialogue such as the one you have built is all the more necessary.

I’d like to get involved. Having received my university education in France, I realise that, at a time when Europe is fragmenting, our neighbourhood represents a fundamental strategic asset. That is the first reason. The second is personal: after looking towards the West, I began to reassess the region to which I belong and the neighbouring countries. I’ve been going to Bulgaria on holiday for four years now because I love it: I love the places, the people, the food, and the socialising.

I am in love with the Balkans. I had the chance to meet a great Romanian Slavist, the late Professor Nicolae Ciachir of the University of Bucharest, who was very attached to Bulgaria and was awarded the Order of Saints Cyril and Methodius by the Bulgarian state. I have developed a deep appreciation for the Balkans. Although it has had a negative image throughout history — as Churchill put it, ‘they produce more history than they can consume’ — it is a region with enormous potential. And above all, it is our home, which we love, where we live our lives, and which we must protect.

For Germany or the US, Bulgaria is a dot on the map, but for Romania it must be a key partner. We cannot change the past; we have had conflicts, but we must focus on our shared civilisation. Whether Romania has a Latin cultural heritage and Bulgaria a Slavic one, we are very close and form part of the same South-Eastern European civilisation. We must abandon the harmful labels we apply to one another.

Having studied international relations in France, to what extent do the theory and the authorities in the field see any significance in these matters? I have been running this website for over 10 years and have been trying to communicate about Romanian issues in Bulgaria and Bulgarian issues in Romania. The problem is that Romanians are not prepared to sacrifice fundamental interests for what the Bulgarians want, whilst the Bulgarians are unwilling to compromise with the Romanians. But the challenge remains, especially since the start of the war in Ukraine: we cannot remain so fragmented and self-absorbed. The issue is one of increasing regional potential.

How could it be otherwise? Potential is a key concept. Increasing potential is achieved through closer ties and interconnection at all levels (economic, infrastructure, intellectual debate), because we are too small on our own. We have no other choice if we wish to remain relevant in this global reorganisation.

The scaling back of the American presence will fundamentally influence the coherence of the European project. The European project was founded on the American security commitment. Any reduction in this commitment affects the very DNA of the European project. Let us not forget that both Bulgaria and Romania first joined NATO before being accepted into the European Union. There is an organic link.

The Evolution of the EU

Towards the end of our discussion, I’ll ask a question with which we probably should have begun. Given the trends in the West – in Europe and the US – do you expect the rift between North America and Western Europe to continue to widen? To what extent will the essence of the European Union change from an economic and geopolitical perspective?

Economically and strategically, the Americans tend to delegate responsibilities. In the Black Sea region, to whom do they delegate responsibilities? To Turkey. Turkey is the delegated power (we shall see how this plays out against the backdrop of the contradictions between Turkey and Israel). In the Western Mediterranean, the delegated power is Morocco, which has the status of a key non-NATO ally of the US, hence the recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara.

We note that Europe’s neighbouring regions are delegated to non-European powers. We then see the American hierarchy on the continent: Poland in relation to south-eastern Europe. Furthermore, a certain self-interest is emerging on the part of European states, summed up by German Chancellor Merz’s remark: ‘If you do not want to stake your future on Europe, then at least stake it on Germany.’ This remark clearly highlights the risks of fragmentation. The donor countries (France, Germany) will be less receptive to the cohesion policy that we still need, because they have their own economic problems.

Serbia, Bulgaria, Turkey — our neighbouring countries. Romania must work with them. Strategically, we are closest to Bulgaria, but above all to Hungary, with whom we share:‌ geography and a community of 1.2 million people. Unfortunately, Hungary aligns itself more closely with the Visegrád Group and the Polish-Austrian axis, with a Central European orientation. Furthermore, Hungary is in a more strategically comfortable position, whilst we are in the contact zone with potential conflicts (Turkey–Israel, Turkey–Greece, Iran) . If we look at the map, there are no more than 1,800 km in a straight line between Tabriz, Varna and Burgas — a plane can cover that distance in an hour.

Romania’s and the region’s relations with Russia

All the countries you mentioned – Hungary, Serbia, Bulgaria, Turkey – for better or worse have, in recent years, served as a bridge to the East. What role will Russia play in this emerging world?

Russia will remain a presence in our region, whether we like it or not. Nothing prevents us from reflecting on the post-conflict Black Sea region. In Romania, there is not enough scenario-based thinking. Leaving aside each country’s relationship with Russia, there are common, non-politicised issues: economic projects, industrial alliances, and infrastructure links. Between Romania and Bulgaria we have only two bridges, one of which was built by the Communists in the 1950s — we have a huge amount of work to do together.

But Russia does not represent a social model that can inspire…

Nobody has said that, by any means. We, along with the Bulgarians and Romanians, are much closer to one another and to the West as a societal model than to Russia. Russia has always been in a unique position due to its geography, traditions and status as an empire — we are not talking about a country the size of ours, but one of continental dimensions.

At a societal level, we have a great deal in common with the Bulgarians, Serbs and Albanians. We live in these imperfect democracies — but where is there such a thing as a perfect democracy today? We see abuses in the US, and in France, and in Germany. Political systems are evolving everywhere. The fact that historical providence has placed us side by side must compel us to understand one another, because mistrust and reserve will do us no good at all.

Photo: Ștefan Popescu (sursă: Ștefan Popescu, Gândul)

Subscribe to the channel of the blog “The Bridge of Friendship” in YouTube, where a number of video and audio interviews are published! The blog can also be followed in Facebook and Twitter. Its Telegram channel is here. And here is its Substack account.

About Author