Is the post-transition arriving after the Bulgarian protests of late 2025?

By Vladimir Mitev

Summary

The essay, “Is the post-transition arriving after the Bulgarian protests of late 2025?”, is the author’s third attempt to define concepts for change in Bulgaria. It argues that true change, leading to a “post-transition” era, requires a fundamental shift away from the country’s current “in-group” and “tribalist” social structure towards Western-style universalism, individuality, and mutual respect.

Key concepts and arguments:

• Static vs. dynamic identity: The first essay defined change as the dynamization of static identity, which was formed by a “socializing trauma” during the transition. A dynamic identity, built through new experiences beyond national trauma, is necessary for Bulgaria to become an equal part of the EU.
• Dehegemonization: The second essay introduced dehegemonization, the process of “unlearning” lessons from early socialization and trauma that created “broken Bulgarians” and a static identity. This internal dehegemonization is a prerequisite for communicating with others on equal, non-hegemonic terms.
• The Problem of in-groups and tribalism: The current essay argues that Bulgarian society is dominated by in-groups (cliques, “little mafias”) that divide the world into “our people” and “not ours.” This creates a tribalist social structure based on dominance (“might”) rather than universal rights and human value. The endless struggle for hegemony between these groups is a logic of the transition that must be broken.
• True change: Replacing one in-group with another does not change the structure. True change is the emergence of networks that unite different people on an equal footing, fostering individuality and an awareness of those who are different. The greatest enemy is the tendency to surrender freedom to an in-group and a narcissistic leader.
• The bridge as the bulgarian way: The author contends that the most “Bulgarian” thing is to be a bridge—a space that moves energy under conditions of reciprocity and a lack of hegemony, allowing for peaceful coexistence and transformation of contradictory realities.
• Synchronization and post-transition: The true sign of entering the post-transition is synchronization with the region and the EU. Sovereignty as a political idea is a “dead end” that leads to isolation and marginalization. When national media, intellectuals, and the people stop thinking of themselves as exceptional and start seeing themselves as part of the world, the transition will truly be over.
• Bulgarian-Romanian relations are cited as a model: When the affirmation of the Romanian element leads to the affirmation of the Bulgarian element, and vice versa, their aligned interests can be replicated in the region, leading to greater equality in the EU.
• The end of the transition: The post-transition will be recognized by a critical mass of people who are at peace, are bridges themselves, and for whom there is no enemy. Their confidence and self-esteem come from their own qualities and experience, not from reproducing hegemonic interests. The logic of the post-transition is about the ability to transform past experience and heal wounds.

Essay

Essays on change in Bulgaria

This essay is a new, third attempt to define the concepts, practices, and contradictions that could lead to change in Bulgaria.

The first essay was written during the government of Kiril Petkov—two weeks before the start of the war in Ukraine. That first essay defined change in Bulgaria as the dynamization of the static identity from the transition era, which arose as a result of a socializing trauma that made us specific, detached, and incomprehensible to other nations in the region and the EU. This essay demonstrated how attaching a dynamic element to a static identity (for example, the desire to get to know another person or society) can, over time, lead to a new experience beyond the boundaries of national trauma—an experience that gives us the energy to transform static identity into dynamic identity. The moment we succeed in building a dynamic identity, the decades of wandering during the transition will end for us, and we will be able to become an equal part of the region and the EU.

The necessary change in Bulgaria: from static to dynamic identity?

The second essay was written in the spring of 2024, just days after Nikolay Denkov’s government fell from power. This essay complemented the idea of change in Bulgaria by examining it through the prism of dehegemony. We often do not realize how, in our youth, when we lack awareness, we are subject to social and personal forces that we do not understand. As a result, we learn certain lessons about who we are, how to think and act, how to explain the world to ourselves.

But if these lessons lead to a static identity, self-sufficiency, if they cause us to close ourselves off to new experiences, they prevent us from being part of a world that is changing at an ever-increasing pace. These lessons keep us behind the walls of Bulgaria’s socializing trauma. In order to live a normal and happy life, we must develop the ability to unlearn the wrong lessons. And for this to happen, and for us to be able to gain new, transformative experiences, we need to weaken the hegemony of our early socialization and the trauma that has made us broken Bulgarians.

Paradoxical or not, de-hegemony within us also leads to de-hegemony outside, i.e., we begin to communicate with people on an equal footing, as we are all capable of influencing each other. The war in Ukraine has unleashed unprecedented mutual contention between supporters and opponents of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s illegal military intervention in his western neighbor, i.e., mutual domination in Bulgarian society and in the region has increased. This has made it difficult to implement reforms in Bulgaria, partly because of the fragmented nature of the Bulgarian political landscape. Thus, de-hegemonisation at the individual and societal levels has become necessary in order for both individuals and the country to move in a certain direction.

In the second essay, I argue that in order to continue our transformation, we need empowerment through experience beyond Bulgaria’s borders. This can be achieved through a so-called non-hegemonic foreign policy – when we, as citizens, demonstrate our effectiveness by participating in building bridges of friendship, equal relations and development in communication and harmony with the nations with which we are closest in terms of historical experience and social institutions. Thus, instead of reproducing outside Bulgaria the failed experience with which we have been socialized in it, and thus reliving its failure again and again, we will be able to transform this failed experience on the basis of friendly relations with our neighbors.

Life without armour and non-hegemonic foreign policy: a proposal for change in Bulgaria and its region

Now, in this third essay, written two weeks after the fall of the Zhelyazkov cabinet as a result of mass protests demanding a “new way of governance,” I will attempt to outline new concepts that allow for the gradual entry of Bulgarians into the post-transition, as well as their continuing evolution toward classical Western universalism and the capacity for renewal.

In-groups and Bulgaria

Bulgaria is a society of narrow circles of “one’s own people,” circles called in-groups in English. According to the Britannica dictionary, a characteristic of these communities is that they are a small group of people who share a certain interest or activity and do not allow others to join.

The word “clique” is often cited as a synonym for in-group. But in the Bulgarian version, there are likely more synonyms. For example, young people going through secondary or higher education together form tayfi (gangs/crews). Intellectuals have circles of loyalists. And ubiquitous to the social fabric of the country is the “mafia,” which everyone sees in the camp of their competitors—oligarchs, clientelistic networks, police, magistrates, masons, “grant-seekers,” corporations, the NGO sector—but refuses to identify within their own in-group.

Common to these cases is the tendency for members of the in-group to dissolve into it and communicate with the outside world through it. Another characteristic of these communities is that they are often orchestrated by a narcissistic leader who demands loyalty and desires to be liked. Intolerance toward the dominance he exercises over the group leads to the isolation and expulsion of opposition-minded members. If the leader of the in-group is challenged from the outside, he mobilizes his crew, clique, or “little mafia” for hostilities in his name. Of course, a true leader not only demands loyalty but also shares resources with the community and gives it the opportunity to realize itself financially or socially, provided it does not challenge the principles on which his power and the order of the in-group rest.

A defining feature of in-groups is the constant division of the world into “our people” and “not ours” (strangers). The widespread prevalence of this model explains why Bulgaria scores poorly on social capital indicators. Bulgarians are divided, fragmented, lacking in solidarity, and extremely suspicious. Part of their low social capital is due to the fact that, as part of an in-group, it is accepted that they should be interested primarily and exclusively in the other members of their mini-community. If they look or listen to what is happening in other in-groups, it is only to identify whether there is a threat to their own group or to see if they can make money or gain other resources from the interaction.

Tribalist societies vs. heterogeneous networks

Another consequence of viewing the world through the prism of the in-group is the favoritism shown toward its members. Their sins are typically excused or downplayed. At the same time, representatives of a competing in-group are demonized. It is impossible to find or acknowledge anything positive in them. To recognize that a competitor has merits would mean legitimizing them; it is believed that if your opponent is legitimate, you lose your own legitimacy.

This is the logic of the transition, based on hegemony. In societies based on in-groups, the social order is defined by relations of dominance between different small groups, crews, and mafias. In this system, every member and every group feels squeezed by competitors, and all groups exercise reciprocal dominance over one another.

Ultimately, this gives rise to a social structure of tribalism. Instead of the society resting on the universalism characteristic of the classical liberal West—where every individual has basic human rights, autonomy, and potential for agency—it is based on the exclusivist ethos of in-groups. What matters are not rules, rights, or the inherent value of a person, but who has accumulated what “might.” Might is a specific form of power where the possessor can twist arms and force others to do something they do not want to do. He who has might and creates fear is respected. He who does not look dangerous suffers, because the leading logic is strength, not humanity.

Thus, groups that are in a hegemonic position vis-à-vis others can carry out genocide (the State of Israel in Gaza) and violate international law by taking military action without the permission of the UN Security Council (Russia in Ukraine, Turkey in Syrian and Iraqi Kurdistan, Israel in Lebanon, Syria, Qatar, Iran, etc., the US in Iraq, and others), introduce legislation restricting the human rights of social groups that are socially constructed as weak—for example, minorities (examples in this regard are Orbán in Hungary with homophobic legislation; Poland and Bulgaria with their policy of so-called pushing migrants out of the country and other forms of violence against citizens from the Middle East, which sometimes lead to death; Donald Trump’s anti-immigrant policy in the US, the intensification of hostility towards migrants in a number of Western European countries, and the lack of response from the European Commission to human rights violations against migrants in EU member states), etc.

This is how the seemingly harmless ”mafia”/in-group —such a popular social form in the Balkans—contains the seeds of violence and social regression. The replacement of one in-group, which is more retrograde, more connected to the old elites from the time of transition, more tied to Russia or Turkey, with another in-group that is more modern, more connected to the new elites and the educated urban middle class, and more tied to Western Europe, in other words, replacing the in-group of bad businessmen with that of good businessmen, can make the circulation of money in the system more efficient. But it does not change the social structure of society, which continues to be dominated by the endless struggle for hegemony between ours and yours.

The real change in a society based on in-groups will be the emergence of a new social structure—for example, networks that unite many different people on an equal footing, who cannot be socialized through the in-group. In practice, change in Bulgaria will come when we stop thinking in terms of groups and become interchangeable. If we want to be citizens of a Western-style liberal democracy, we must develop sensitivity and awareness both of our own individuality and of that of those who are different from us, of others. This awareness will emerge when we realize that our enemy is not Peevski, Vassilev, Radev, Borisov, or any of the lesser-known leaders of political and economic structures. Our greatest enemy is ourselves and our tendency to sacrifice our inherent freedom by surrendering it to the in-group and a narcissistic leader.

Interrupted development and the social order in Bulgaria

Life is renewal, while the accumulation of might (building upon trauma/stasis) is death. It turns out that the entirety of Bulgarian social life rests upon the sacrifice of Bulgarian citizens, who are first socialized through trauma (an “inability”) upon which Bulgarian hegemony is then built.

This is a dehumanizing process for both the victims and the perpetrators. However, it reveals another important feature: many people in Bulgaria do not develop naturally; they are “incubated.” Like Podsekalnikov from Erdman’s play The Suicide, they are invited to sacrifice themselves in the name of dominant structures (police, army, oligarchic networks, churches). They likely do not fully realize that through their self-sacrifice, they are merely reproducing the well-entrenched interests of Bulgarian society.

Since the “guardian angels” in our society are often fallen angels—pulling their protectees down rather than up—the question is how to raise the level of the “generic Bulgarian” who has been sacrificed. Here, dehegemonization becomes relevant again. To emancipate himself/herself, the sacrificed Bulgarian must direct its energy down an untrodden path.

The middle path as a space for transforming extremes

If he (or she) directs his (or her) scarce remaining energy after the process of socialization and sacrifice toward hating one of the political-economic circles in our country at the expense of another, he will most likely fight against a fallen angel like himself, who directs his energy against the business circles behind the first hero. Both sides will waste their energy in mutual negation.

Let’s be honest with ourselves, Bulgaria is an oligarchy. In our country, influential people in politics are almost always the product of some business interests. Even Rumen Radev, who is originally an army general, has reproduced and will continue to reproduce business interests—for example, the modern, green capitalist Kiril Petkov was promoted in politics by Rumen Radev. He also associates with employers, big business, etc. For figures such as Borisov and Peevski, I think it is clear that, in addition to their influence in the interior ministry, businesses also operate through them.

In Romania, things seem to be a little different. There, too, politics is personalized. But the powerful figures behind the scenes in Romania are people from security lobbies. For example, for about 15 years we have been hearing about the war and collaboration within the Romanian services between Florin Coldea, on the one hand – a powerful figure during Laura Kövesi’s anti-corruption campaign, when the support of the secret services was essential for the effectiveness of the Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (DNA) – and, on the other hand, Sebastian Ghiță — a man with interests in the IT sector and a television owner who is hiding from Romanian justice in Serbia after Kövesi’s anti-corruption campaign targeted him. For 10-15 years, the Romanian media has been constantly publishing articles about the current relationship between Coldea and Ghiță. Candidates from major political parties define themselves in relation to one or the other. And so on.

But in Bulgaria, established interests are business interests. Consequently, the Romanian saying “Man lights up the place” becomes “Money lights up the place.” People become members of party groups not because of ideology or class interests, but to find work or earn money. And here, self-sacrifice combined with servility is important. Because Bulgarian society has a severe deficit of authenticity. In our country, many people are interchangeable and, as playwright Petar Denchev says, extremely stereotypical. In our country, there is an uncompromising system of identity grinding, which probably only truly elitist families can resist.

How, then, can the fallen angel raise its level so that it can also raise its blind followers and dependents? 

In my opinion, current political and economic circles reproduce the in-group model, even though they have developed large-scale structures and communities. None of these circles can destroy the others. They are in dynamic equilibrium. Therefore, the solution must first be to not simply reinforce the dominance of these circles. Instead of being encouraged to accumulate new power, they must be encouraged to transform themselves. It is precisely the growth of the fallen angel that can allow him to discover within himself the ability to transform the poles in our politics. But to get there, he must have a sense of the intermediate position between them.

The bridge as the Bulgarian way of being-in-the-world

I contend that in our politics, either everything is “dust in the wind” (caretaker governments) or we have governments that serve as a bridge between all or most international and domestic forces. To grow in an intermediate position is to realize that the most “Bulgarian” thing is to be a bridge. A bridge moves energy between two banks under conditions of reciprocity and a lack of hegemony. The bridge grows with every crossing. Ultimately, it belongs to neither side; it has its own logic.

The most valuable thing about a bridge is its ability to coexist peacefully with different, often contradictory realities. Bulgarians need peace to grow in a way that transforms hegemonic interests. These interests constantly play “divide and rule,” pushing us to hate and “cancel” the other half of our society.

The case involving bTV journalist Maria Tsantsarova (whose dismissal sparked discontent and accusations of censorship from journalists and anti-corruption activists in Bulgaria, while the television station justified its decision by citing violations of journalistic standards and internal media rules) is yet another example of this. At least two camps immediately formed. Each considered itself to be the only one in the right and did not seek dialogue with the other. What is more, each sought to disqualify the opposing camp, to strike it and rejoice in its pain. Thus, our energy was not directed toward building something of our own, but toward preventing the enemy from building something of their own.

Bulgaria will change for the better when everyone can do their own thing and put their energy into their own change, rather than into preventing the change of others. And our society and our fallen angels will regain their strength if they learn not to destroy, dominate, and cancel the enemy, but to transform them. And it is precisely this ability to transform that will bring us closer as a society to Western Europe.

Any hegemony, even if pursued in the name of enlightened ideals, gives rise to resistance and reaction. We must move towards the center of the EU not just with part of our society, but with our entire population. And this requires giving up hegemony. We need to give up the gene of competition and war, which stigmatizes entire social strata and groups. We must be aware of the nature of the forces at work in our society, as well as in our region and in the EU. Instead of simply being their object, we must be able to transform them. It may seem daunting, but we will only become true Europeans when we develop the capacity to transform not only ourselves, but also Western Europe itself – the core of the EU. The high level of conflict in our society shows that dialogue does not work very well in it, and instead of resolving contradictions with empathy, they are “resolved” with force.

Post-transition becomes a reality when we connect non-hegemonically with the region and the EU

In my previous essay, I discussed the need for synchronisation with the region and with Europe as a whole. This is not an end in itself and is not due to some imaginary subordination of mine to Ursula von der Leyen or Soros. It is due to the fact that sovereignty is a dead end for Bulgarians, even though many of us profess it. It is easy for many Bulgarians to spit on the European Commission, American Democrats, and Soros because these fellow countrymen live under the illusion that by taking up the banner of proud sovereignists à la Orbán, they will not have to change and learn new things in their old age.

In fact, if people prefer to remain isolated and blame others for their failures, the increasingly powerful capitalist forces in the world will bypass them and make them increasingly marginal. Furthermore, a process of integration and synchronization is underway in our region. If people prefer to be an island and claim that they are surrounded by enemies, they will eventually discover that they have missed the trains integrating Bulgaria into the only part of the world that has something to offer it. The country will thus become something of a reserve where people complain but are unable to renew themselves. For these and other reasons, it is important to have internalized denial, directed not only outward but also inward—toward ourselves.

In 2020, I experienced the protests of the time as having an unconscious object of desire called post-transition. That is, on some level, they believed that the previous reforms, protests, and changes had only partially Europeanized us and that the legacy of the past, of the traumatic transition of the mafia and the old elites pulling the strings, continues to hinder Bulgaria’s development. 

Posttransition is the subconscious object of Bulgarian protests’ desire

The protests of 2025 bear similarities to those of 2020, vaguely hinting at a desire for a different kind of politics. The large presence of young people at these protests may be linked to a long-standing demand for meritocracy, i.e., fair competition in society. On the other hand, although many protesters declared themselves strongly opposed to Peevski without articulating what exactly the “Peevski model” means, the protests can be seen as directed against the entire political class. The protest song of the sovereignist tendency of the protest, for example, is anti-We Continue the Change-Democratic Bulgaria and Eurosceptic. In other words, to some extent, everyone is on the streets, and it is somewhat misleading that anti-corruption formations We Continue the Change-Democratic Bulgaria is directing the protests in only one direction. There are many directions of discontent.

But for me, synchronization with the region and the EU will be the real sign that our society has entered a new stage of development. Even our pro-Western and pro-European academic and other elites are nationally centered. The parties in parliament largely rely on Bulgarian exceptionalism and reproduce it.

The transition may be over, but it seems as if we are suspended in time and space and are slowly coming down to earth, so that we can enter the post-transition period. When the national media, leading intellectuals, and the people themselves begin to think of themselves as part of the world, rather than something exceptional and self-sufficient, then the transition, and with it our exceptionalism, will truly be in the past, and we will enter a new phase.

Bulgarian-Romanian relations

My experience with synchronization is mainly in Bulgarian-Romanian relations. And here I see an interesting phenomenon. Bulgarians and Romanians communicate along different geopolitical axes, and the conclusions drawn from communication, experiences, and emotions are different in function of the geopolitical frames, in which interaction takes place.

For example, when this happens along Russian lines, Bulgarians display their bottomless nationalism and almost consider Romanians to be some kind of Macedonians who are hiding their Bulgarian roots. Romanians, in turn, like to see Bulgarians as little Russians. So nothing particularly significant happens along these lines, except that Bulgarian and Romanian mafiosi may not like each other, but they do interact.

There does not seem to be any dispute over identity along German and French lines. On the contrary, there is trust between Bulgarians and Romanians integrated into German or French structures, and they legitimize each other, as is generally the case in the EU. The problem here is different—foreign dynamics in Bulgarian-Romanian relations have traditionally been stronger than purely Bulgarian-Romanian ones. We need not only foreign corporations or cross-border NGO networks, but also Bulgarians and Romanians as individuals to become more actively involved in bilateral and regional relations. Without such internal dynamics, these relations will remain too dependent on the international situation. It is precisely the Bulgarian-Romanian element in the relations that must be the leading one.

The two nations must discover how the affirmation of the Romanian element leads to the affirmation of the Bulgarian element, and vice versa—more Bulgaria means more Romania. Here again, the logic of tribalism and exceptionalism is a potential obstacle. For decades after 1990, the two countries were more in competition. It was only after the start of the war in Ukraine that they thawed their relations and realized that they could do bolder things together.

If Bulgarian and Romanian interests learn to align, this practice could be replicated with other countries in the region. This would mean that Bulgaria and Romania would become more equal members of the EU.

Dehegemonization means normal life and peace

I have already spoken about the discontinuity in Bulgarian development. I also said that dehegemonization is the way to correct this discontinuity. Dehegemonization is necessary to stop the emotional manipulation that occurs literally every week in one case or another. Topics constantly arise on which the hegemonic elements in Bulgarian society practice “divide and rule,” directing people’s energy and discontent against a convenient and often false enemy. 

We are constantly in a state of mobilization, in which we must be on guard so that nothing fatal happens. This emotional terror over us must stop so that we can experience normally what the interruption in our experience prevents us from experiencing in order to be whole.

Now, when two people meet after a long pause or when new acquaintances meet, there is always a lingering doubt – which lobby does this person belong to? Are they with Radev, Vasilev, Borisov, Peevski, or Slavi? 

In a normal and healthy society, it should not matter who sympathises with whom in politics and who they vote for. Romanians like to talk about politics and freely share what they think about their politicians. Bulgarians, however, are cautious and avoid political conversations with people they do not fully trust. This is a sign that Bulgarians are more fragile and vulnerable than Romanians. But it is also a sign that Bulgarians do not allow themselves to be weak and vulnerable.

Dehegemonization would allow Bulgarians to be weak, to experience their weakness, in order to become more resilient afterwards. At the moment, people in Bulgaria are building fortresses en masse. After much scrambling, they reach a small hill above the plain. And instead of thinking about how to get from the hill to the mountain, they dig in on the hill and do not allow equal relations with outsiders. Anyone who is not one of their own is a potential threat. This is a result of the hegemony and insecurity of many Bulgarians.

Dehegemonization, linked to synchronization with the region and the world, which has allowed Bulgarians to be less dependent on hegemonic interests in society, would affirm their emotional freedom and give them more choices.

Instead of a conclusion

At present, too many people are carried away and manipulated by hegemonic interests in the system to fight the “enemy.” We will recognize the post-transition by the emergence of a critical mass of people at peace, people who are bridges or cross bridges and for whom there is no enemy. 

The surest way for the post-transition to come is for a critical mass of Bulgarian citizens to enter it as a way of life and a way of thinking. We will recognize these people by the fact that they live and grow in peace, by their security, confidence, and self-esteem, which come from their own qualities and experience, and not from the fact that they reproduce hegemonic interests in society. If the logic of the transition was one of accumulating power based on static identity and mutual, destructive domination, the logic of the post-transition will be linked to the ability to transform past experience and heal wounds.

These are Bulgarians who are aware of their role in the world—related to the transformation of the poles in society, the de-hegemonizatiom of social relations, and the dynamization of the static identity that marked the Bulgarian transition. For these Bulgarians, there is no enemy outside. The enemy is our propensity to give power to in-groups and empower narcissistic leaders. The change continues. 

Photo: “When pa…” is the anthem of the Bulgarian protests of late 2025 (source: The Bridge of Friendship; Pexels, CC0)

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