Vitalie Sprînceană: Moldovan politics should be more than constantly oscillating between the West and the East

Intro

On October 11, 2025, Vladimir Mitev interviewed Moldovan sociologist and activist Vitalie Sprînceană regarding his September 26, 2025, article on the socio-political situation in Moldova. The article looked beyond the standard geopolitical framework to interpret current events and necessary changes for the country.

The audio version of the interview with Vitalie Sprînceană

Vitalie Sprînceană’s groundbreaking text on Moldovan politics, which sparked the current interview

The parliamentary elections in Moldova on September 28: between “déjà vu,” “now or never,” and “more of the same”…

Summary of the interview

This resume summarizes the key points of the provided text discussing the aftermath and assessment of the Moldovan parliamentary elections held two weeks prior to October 11, 2025.

I. Election Outcome and Status Quo

• Result: The pro-European ruling party, PAS (Party of Action and Solidarity), secured a clear and comfortable majority.
• Assessment: The main result is the preservation of the status quo and the maintenance of PAS’s grip on governance for the next four years.
• Mandate: PAS did not campaign on change but explicitly sought a mandate to continue its current course of European integration and existing policies.
• Expectation vs. Reality: The extent of the majority was largely unexpected, though a victory was anticipated.
• Personnel: The ruling team remains largely the same, with few significant changes, leading to the expectation that the same people will not generate new ideas.

II. Geopoliticization and Evasion of Domestic Issues

• Rhetoric: The elections were marked by “hysterical rhetoric” framing the choice as one between “absolute good” (Europe/PAS) and “absolute evil”.
• Geopoliticization: All domestic issues (social, economic, cultural) are interpreted through a geopolitical lens, described as the “geopolitical guillotine.”
• Pro-EU Framing: The economy is presented as dependent on EU integration, which is claimed to resolve problems through vague, unspecified mechanisms.
• Pro-Russian Framing: The opposition attributes economic issues to neglecting the “eastern neighbor” (Russia), arguing that renewed relations would bring cheap gas and market access.
• Evasion: This geopolitical framing serves as a consensus among the political class to sidestep concrete discussions about social and economic policies.

III. Representation, Dirty Money, and Electoral Mobilization

• Voter Mobilization: Many Moldovans were mobilized by fear to make a “moral choice” to “save the country,” rather than a rational one.
• “Dirty Money”: There are significant concerns about illegal and dubious funding entering Moldovan politics, primarily from Russia and associated with figures like Ilan Shor.
• Representation Gap: The suppression of parties linked to “dirty money” creates a problem of political representation for underprivileged groups (ethnic minorities, rural youth, poor people) who feel excluded by mainstream parties.
• Urban-Rural Divide: Over 50% of elected deputies are from Chișinău, leaving much of the country unrepresented.
• State Action: The state’s response to the issue of “dirty money” is deemed insufficient and sometimes abusive or ironic, with investigations often failing to lead to convictions.

IV. Contradiction of Pro-European Authoritarianism

• Decoupling: EU integration has been decoupled from democracy; the country is advancing toward the EU while simultaneously developing a “soft authoritarianism.”
• “Pro-European” Definition: The term is reduced to being approved by Brussels, regardless of adherence to liberal values.
• Authoritarian Methods: The government is using increasingly authoritarian methods, including:
  • Imposing sanctions on Moldovan citizens without proper legal procedure.
  • Shutting down TV stations allegedly associated with Shor without legal due process.
• War Rhetoric: The context of the war in Ukraine is used to justify these measures, framing the situation as “exceptional times” where “democracy is a luxury.”
• Personalization of Power: President Sandu’s image is essential to PAS (“L’Europe, c’est moi”), making the party’s future problematic as she is likely serving her final mandate and the party has no apparent successor or “future generation.”

V. Justice Reform and Minority Issues

• Justice Reform Assessment: The reform is viewed as ambiguous and possibly a failure in achieving true independence.
  • Goal: The practical goal appears to be creating a justice system tolerant of the ruling party and intolerant of the opposition, largely following the ruling party’s direction on major decisions.
  • Vetting: The vetting process for judges and prosecutors has had mixed outcomes, with some questionable individuals passing.
  • Anti-Corruption: Anti-corruption efforts have been selectively applied, with campaigns largely focused on the opposition.
• Minority Attitudes: Ethnic minorities in Southern Moldova (Gagauzians and Bulgarians) often vote against PAS and against the EU accession referendum.
• Misinterpretation: These votes are seen as a rejection of the pro-European politics promoted in Chișinău, which sometimes contains nationalist or quasi-fascist discourses, rather than an inherent rejection of the EU.
• Local Context: The attitude reflects deeply ingrained local histories and fears of nationalism from Chișinău, with Russia paradoxically viewed as a guarantor of minority rights.
• Integration Lack: The Moldovan state is criticized for lacking imagination, patience, and platforms for dialogue, relying instead on infrastructural projects or simply dismissing minority voters as “agents of Putin.”

VI. The Danger of Geopolitical Polarization

• Definition of Polarization: It is not a natural political conflict but a fed conflict that throws social and economic policies into a largely emotional, non-action-oriented geopolitical framework.
• Erosion of Shared Values: The language of “friends and enemies” (West vs. East) is seen as eroding shared commonalities and poses a danger to Moldovan democracy.
• Destructive Impact: This political exploitation, particularly during elections, destroys the efforts of activists and organizations, like the Moldova for Peace initiative, which work to build social cohesion and overcome stereotypes (e.g., between Russians and Ukrainians).

VII. The Weakened and Unrepresented Citizen

• Call for Empowerment: The core argument is that the Moldovan citizen must be strengthened through the “de-hegemony of parties,” which currently hold too much power.
• Exclusion: The political “center” is defined by the President and privileged political class, leaving the ordinary citizen unrepresented and dispossessed.
• Low Democratic Development: The level of local democratic development is very low, with citizens lacking infrastructure (e.g., for local budgeting) and avenues for political participation outside of social media.
• Legislative Transparency: NGOs found that around half of the laws adopted by Parliament were introduced and passed on the same day without public discussion or participation.
• Living Outside the State: A major tragedy is that a large portion of the population, often those working abroad, lives outside the state and the political system, expecting minimal services.
• Individualism: Society suffers from high individualism and a lack of belief in collective action, which is a significant barrier to change.

VIII. The Case Study of Occupy Guguță

• Origin: The movement originated from a confluence of protests in 2018, sparked by the attempt of oligarch Vladimir Plahotniuc to demolish the “Cafeneaua Guguță” and the subsequent cancellation of the Chișinău local elections.
• Goal and Achievement: It became an activist-artist movement that politicized people around issues of corruption, lack of public involvement, and justice sector bias. It succeeded in contributing to the ousting of the oligarch Plahotniuc in June 2019 and protecting the building.
• Dissolution: The movement dissolved itself after Plahotniuc fled, believing their primary goals were achieved and choosing not to immediately transition into a formal political party.
• Legacy: Occupy Guguță served as a “school of political education” (e.g., for working with police, public debate, mobilization), with members later engaging in various civic efforts (pandemic response, refugee crisis).
• Organizational Model: The movement was an example of a political community explicitly trying to reinvent self-organization through horizontality, rotation of roles, and a leaderless structure to confront authoritarianism.

IX. Personal Perspective and Hope

• Personal Motivation: The speaker is driven by a belief in politics as a constant struggle and the understanding that social change takes time, rooted in an anarcho-syndicalist perspective.
• Short-Term Pessimism: The speaker is skeptical about short-term improvements due to a perceived lack of long-term vision or projects for Moldova (e.g., “what Moldova could look like in 2050”).
• Long-Term Optimism: Hope is found in observing younger generations who are seen as more inspired, imaginative, and self-assured than those shaped by the “cynical and tragic transition.”
• Urgent Issues: The country faces serious, undiscussed problems that require “saving,” including significant population decline (losing nearly half the population since Soviet times, according to the 2024 census) and near-nonexistent economic growth.

Assessment of election results and the status quo

Mr. Sprînceană, today is October 11th, 2025. Two weeks ago the Moldovan parliamentary elections took place. These were said to be the most important and strategic elections with the highest stakes, and Moldovans voted correctly: they voted for Europe. PAS, the pro-European ruling party, has a clear majority. I’d like to start the discussion with what happens next. How should we assess the results, and what will happen next now that Moldovans have voted for the “right side”? They voted for Europe. What has changed?

Hi. I don’t know how to start or how to characterize the situation without sounding cynical or detached. On the one hand, we can say that the main result of these elections is the preservation of the status quo. PAS succeeded in maintaining its grip on governance and will govern for the next four years.

This was not entirely expected. It was expected that they would take the majority of votes, but the result is, to a large extent, unexpected. There were some discussions and signals, and of course, polls are not very reliable in Moldova. After the elections, the expectation was that PAS would come close but not achieve this comfortable majority. In the end, they did. There are probably many things going on behind the scenes. They succeeded in mobilizing their electorate and doing other things throughout the country. Yes, they succeeded in maintaining their grip on the government.

I don’t think the situation will change dramatically because this was not a mandate for change. PAS never mentioned change during the campaign. PAS was the party that explicitly said they would maintain the status quo. They said, “We want your mandate to be able to continue doing what we’re doing, continuing the integration, and so on.” In this sense, I don’t expect a lot of things to change. Moreover, it’s the same people. PAS made few changes to their team and electoral lists. Some people were left out, and they brought in some media personalities just to have more recognizable faces, but more or less, the team is the same. Again, I don’t expect the same people to generate new ideas.

That would be a general assessment of the election results. The elections were marked by hysterical rhetoric about their importance. PAS said, “If we vote for other parties, this might be the last election,” because the other parties are “not as committed to democracy as PAS,” implying that the other parties might cancel elections. The choice was framed as one between absolute good and absolute evil. Both the ruling party and the opposition employed this tone. The opposition was also very comfortable in this game. In a way, it was as if the entire political class conspired to sidestep discussions about social issues and focus on politics.

As you mentioned in the opening statement, Moldovans voted “correctly,” according to PAS’s rhetoric: they saved the country. They succeeded in saving the country. However, in my view, this is another instance where people were frightened and mobilized by fear to vote – not for the lesser evil or even to make a rational choice, but to make a moral choice. Meanwhile, it’s obvious to almost everyone that things will not change. Moldovans voted for more of the same.

Geopoliticization and evasion of domestic issues

In every Moldovan election, there is a dominant interpretation that elections are geopolitical above all else. What about the issues that are not geopolitical in this context? I understand there is a lot of fear-mongering between the different poles in Moldovan politics. But how much are domestic issues – social, economic, cultural, and other issues – part of what is discussed and at stake in Moldovan elections?

Yes, I call this geopoliticalization. It sounds better in Romanian, but I guess it’s a good English approximation too. When I say the elections had a geopolitical nuance or mood, I’m not only referring to the old Marxist critique that important issues are substituted or put aside and not discussed. Something else has been happening over the last four years. Of course, it’s not only been happening over the last four years. It’s an old process: the geopoliticalization of all other aspects.

In my understanding, this means that all issues are interpreted through geopolitical lenses. I call this the “geopolitical guillotine” because all issues have to fit within this framework. For example, cultural, housing, and economic policies are all treated as if they are geopolitical issues.

This is done in different ways. Usually, everything is treated as if it depends on a good relationship with our geopolitical “neighbors.” “The economy is bad, but if we join the EU, everything will improve.” It’s not clear how or through what concrete mechanisms a rapprochement or Moldova’s integration with the EU will improve the economy. But that’s how it’s presented. When we have an issue, such as housing policies, it is explained as follows: “Yes, but the economy will improve. But it’s not improving because Russia is attacking Ukraine and affecting us. Because of this, we should get closer to the EU. Once we join, people will have more money, and these issues will be solved.”

The opposition is painting a similar picture. They say, “Our economic situation is bad because we have neglected our eastern neighbor. Only when we restore good economic relationships with Russia will they give us cheap gas and provide us with access to the Russian market. This will change the economy by providing additional resources, which will lead to growth.” They are doing the same, interpreting all issues as if they depend directly on the relationship with Russia.

I think it’s important to note that the elections were not just an instance where politicians preferred to talk about other things. They also reflect the fact that we don’t discuss the country’s economy in economic and political terms, but rather in geopolitical terms. We don’t discuss the country’s social policies in economic terms; we discuss them in geopolitical terms. Using geopolitical terms to explain everything is the real distortion of these elections and the real geopolitical component.

Political representation, ‘dirty money,’ and electoral contradictions

Another contradiction that appears in Moldova – and that perhaps also existed in Romania when Liviu Dragnea was in power – is the cancellation of parties. They are not allowed to participate in elections due to issues related to funding, such as illegal or dubious funding. There is a certain persecution of parties created by oligarchs like Ilan Shor. Of course, these actions are based on certain legal or democratic arguments, but there are still people who are underprivileged in Moldova and look for ways to express their discontent.

So, I think there is a contradiction here. A democratic society would allow even the poor, who may sell their votes, to participate in politics. On the other hand, the pro-European government tries to limit the influence of this vote, which, as I said, is perhaps somehow dependent on people who are economically or politically dubious. How can this issue be resolved, and can it be resolved better?

The question you’re asking is so complex that, if I knew the answer, I’d probably be chairing a department at a political institute in another country instead of being a journalist and activist. You’re right that there’s huge tension here.

Clearly, dirty money is coming into Moldova. We know the country of origin is Russia, but no one knows the source of the money. Is it Ilan Shor’s money? Or is it Russian state money? Is Ilan Shor an actor trying to enter Moldovan politics for his own agenda? Is he a spokesperson for other interests? Is he being used by Russia? Many things are not clear until the end.

What is clear is that they are spending a lot of money to buy the loyalty of various groups. These groups aren’t only poor people. We don’t have a clear picture of the Shor electorate because it’s an eclectic group. Sometimes they are poor people; sometimes they are ethnic minorities who feel discriminated against. They are also youth from smaller towns and cities who lack economic opportunities. Because of this, Ilan Shor and his lucrative business of organizing protests can provide avenues for them. He also gives them a voice. To a large extent, Usatîi is also trying to give these people a voice.

Beyond the issue of dirty money, there’s really an issue of political representation. More than 50 percent of the deputies who have been elected are from Chișinău and live there, leaving more than half of the country unrepresented, when you look at the groups – who represents agriculturists, who represents small farmers, subsistence farmers, teachers, etc. There is a serious problem beyond the issue of dirty money.

Dirty money is a serious issue, but it is also sometimes abused, creating an ironic and ridiculous situation. The state asks us to believe that these people are bad. The police try to investigate these crimes, but it’s never more than a few YouTube videos. Then, the police say, “We’re investigating it,” but nothing comes of it. Then, these cases go to court, and sometimes the decisions are overturned. Even if this threat is real, the state is not taking enough responsibility or being serious enough. In this way, the extent of this phenomenon is not as large as the police and politicians, especially those from PAS, claim.

Now, let’s move on to another important issue that you can’t do much about. You can stop illegal money flows – and they are trying to do so – but it’s difficult to establish representation where there are no avenues for it and no political forces to represent these groups. There is a huge problem here.

Yes, there are people who sell their votes, which is interesting and ironic. We joke with our friends that we live in a capitalist world where everything is supposed to be sold and bought, but votes aren’t. The state doesn’t care where you live, whether you have a house, or if you’re healthy. You have to pay for many things. A complicated operation can cost tens of thousands of euros. The state doesn’t create infrastructure that allows you to exercise your right to health or a healthy environment, yet it’s very careful that you can’t sell your vote.

There is also the real problem of lack of representation for many groups. Many groups use Shor’s party or Vasile Costiuc’s one, a new political party that entered parliament, as a channel for their voices. I think Shor’s persistence in Moldovan politics is due not only to money, but also to the constant misrepresentation or lack of representation of certain groups that are growing in number.

In a way, I think that was the idea behind the geopolitical consensus proposed by PAS. They realized that, besides geopolitics, which is broadly defined, they could not offer anything that would unite many groups that would otherwise feel unrepresented.

Pro-European attitude coexisting with soft authoritarianism

Another interesting contradiction is that Maia Sandu literally says, “Europe is me,” or “L’Europe, c’est moi,” if I speak French correctly. Theoretically, that means Europe stands for liberal democracy, civic values, and economic development. However, she implements tough measures during elections and in response to the ongoing Russian hybrid war. So, how does this pro-European attitude – which should represent values, not just geopolitics – coexist with a hybrid war against Russia?

Well, I think many of the terms you used in your question are overused and misused in our current political discourse. They are fluid and highly instrumentalized. For example, I don’t truly understand what “pro-European” means in substance. It has become a catchall political concept, and pro-Europe often means pro-European Union, with values becoming secondary.

Then there’s the phenomenon of Macron, Merz, and von der Leyen expressing strong support for Maia Sandu. This means that, in the eyes of European leaders, if they recognize you as pro-European, then you are pro-European, regardless of whether you adhere to or believe in the liberal values typically associated with the term.

In Moldova, I think several things are happening. In a way, the so-called EU integration has been decoupled from democracy. I’ve argued that they are moving in different directions. Moldova is advancing on its European path but is also developing soft authoritarianism. A form of soft authoritarianism is being implemented in the country.

Therefore, I would argue that it’s possible to be both authoritarian and pro-European. In this context, “pro-European” does not imply adherence to, loyalty to, or belief in liberal values. Rather, it simply means being approved by Brussels, which is currently happening. Maia Sandu and her policies are approved by those leading the EU today. At the same time, it is also coherent that she is using increasingly authoritarian methods.

These methods include imposing arbitrary sanctions on Moldovan citizens. Moldova is imposing sanctions on its own citizens without proper legal procedure because they appear on other countries’ sanctions lists. Also, television stations are being shut down because they are supposedly associated with Shor, again without due legal process.

The contradiction is suspended by decoupling the two concepts. While some people may naively believe that Europe means more democracy, in Moldova’s current iteration, Europe sometimes translates into problematic anti-Russian sentiment or Russophobia. Politically, the war in Ukraine has amplified this sentiment, fostering the idea that “we are living in exceptional times, and democracy is a luxury.” I think this is also related to the era of the pandemic, when states began to embrace these exceptional measures.

The rhetoric in Moldova is that “we are almost on the front line, separated from Russia only by the brave Ukrainian army.” We are acting as if we are in a war, which allows us to suspend various freedoms and liberties.

Regarding Maia Sandu identifying with the EU and the notion of “Europe is me,” I don’t want to say this is a characteristic of the Moldovan mentality because I dislike discussions about mentalities. However, it is inherent in modern politics, as everything is personalized in the era of social media. It’s not surprising to see personalities put in front of movements where we discuss people instead of ideas.

However, there is also a simple truth: the entire PAS party essentially exists and survives on Maia Sandu’s image. To a large extent, the phrase “Europe is me” can be translated as “I am PAS, PAS is Europe, and Europe is me.” This connects the destiny of the PAS political party with Maia Sandu. She is the only recognizable figure in the party.

PAS is not a normal political party. It is a traditional party that depends on its leader’s image. No one else in the party enjoys even half the popularity that Maia Sandu does.

There is now a big problem for PAS because Maia Sandu was re-elected last year. If she doesn’t go the “Putin way,” which I very much hope she will not, this will be her last mandate. This poses many problems for PAS. This mandate will present new challenges, the biggest of which is how the party will survive beyond Maia Sandu. Unless there are snap elections, which I don’t envision since PAS can comfortably rule, she will not be president for the next parliamentary elections.

The question is how PAS will succeed in remaining the most popular party and keeping power without Maia Sandu as president. She could probably become prime minister, but it’s a lower position, and it would be a demotion of sorts.

The way you phrased this signals the advantages PAS gained from its political campaign, but it also signals where the major problems will be. If Maia Sandu is not there, I don’t know if the party will be able to develop a leader within the next three or four years. Maia Sandu is a typical Moldovan politician in that she “throws such a shadow that nothing grows.” There is no future generation in the party. It’s a very interesting situation from this point of view.

Assessment of justice reform and its effects

Maia Sandu and PAS are lauded for the judicial reform they have implemented over the past few years. What is your assessment of the judicial reform, its results, and its effects?

I’m not a lawyer or legal expert. My opinion is superficial because I inform myself about the results of the justice reform based on media reports, studies, and media scandals. I wasn’t involved, so I don’t know how it works internally. I have heard mixed reports about it.

On a very general level, it seems that the reform has failed because its purpose was unclear. Branding it as “making justice independent” doesn’t seem to suit them. I believe that most Moldovan political parties would prefer a justice system that is very tolerant of them and very intolerant of the opposition. They would also like a justice sector that takes advice from the ruling party, though I don’t have proof that this involves direct orders.

In this sense, there is confusion or tension within the concept of independent justice. What type of independence? Independence in general? I don’t think they want that. They want a more reliable justice system.

Honestly, I think the result is ambiguous. On the one hand, they succeeded in creating a semi-independent justice system that is still largely dependent. They created a situation in which certain mechanisms were put in place, such as the vetting process, in which judges and prosecutors had their wealth and integrity assessed. While there have been some positive outcomes, there have also been individuals with questionable backgrounds who passed this procedure, casting doubt on the entire process and characterizing it as biased.

They promised to fight corruption and planned to consolidate two anti-corruption institutions: one for petty crime and the other for political corruption. However, the institution fighting big political corruption was weakened and almost decapitated. The chief prosecutor of this institution was removed from office when she began pursuing cases related to the ruling party. This was a clear signal that they want a police force, prosecutor’s office, and judicial system that will obey them.

They didn’t succeed completely, but the system now largely listens to them and follows their orders. For example, you see that all the anti-corruption campaigns are only related to the opposition, as if only the opposition is corrupt.

They still claim they will enact more reforms, including justice reforms, but I don’t understand what their end goal is. I hope they won’t succeed in completely dominating the system. There are signs of small amounts of independence and independent decision-making, but on major decisions, the justice sector is closely aligned with the ruling party. If that was the hidden goal of the reform, then they succeeded. If the goal of the reform was to create a just justice sector, then I think it’s a failure.

EU accession and minority issues (Gagauzians and Bulgarians)

Another contradiction in Moldova is between Chișinău and the central zones of the country and Southern Moldova, where Bulgarians and Gagauzians tend to vote against PAS. We saw that during the referendum on accession to the European Union: Bulgarians and Gagauzians voted against it. Some say they are against the European Union, while others say they wanted to punish Maia Sandu and show their disagreement with her. In other words, how will this EU accession unfold with regard to minorities? We see that the European Union is popular among Romanian-speaking Moldovans. Russian-speaking Moldovans have a different attitude, but there must be a way to integrate them into the European Union. There must also be pro-European politicians who come from their circles.

Yeah, how to put it—the European integration process, besides the technical aspect of adopting new laws and regulations, doesn’t really have content. In Moldova, the content is local, and various political, ethnic, religious, and other groups contribute their own content to the process, associating it with their fears and hopes. In many ways, I would describe it as the localization of the European integration process.

For example, many perceive European integration as getting much closer to Romania. There is a large group of Moldovan unionists who are pro-Romanian and support the EU because it provides opportunities to be closer to Romania. The same is true for other groups. They inject their own content, which sometimes doesn’t reflect the true essence of the process, but rather, reflects fears, incapacities, local realities, local memories, and even memories about things that happened decades ago. The process and its content are both very local.

There is a huge promise that the EU can provide better policies and protection for national minorities than the Moldovan state. Therefore, you would expect national minorities to be interested in joining the EU. However, the Moldovan reality is that the process is mediated through the local context.

I won’t discuss the history of the Gagauz and Bulgarian communities and their attitudes toward Chișinău, but suffice it to say that by the end of the 1980s, with the beginning of Gorbachev’s perestroika, all the conditions were in place. These groups – Moldovans, Gagauz, and Bulgarians – were marginalized in the Soviet Union. For example, there was no Bulgarian newspaper in Taraclia. All the conditions were there for them to build something resembling a European acceptance of diversity. Instead, the movements turned nationalistic, which affected the memory and interpretation of what followed.

Paradoxically, Russia – the country that inherited the Soviet Union, which marginalized the Gagauz and Bulgarians – is now perceived as the guarantor of minority rights against the nationalists in Chișinău.

I think the votes in the referendum show that Gagauzia doesn’t vote against European integration as a process; they vote against the pro-European politics promoted in Chișinău. This is contradictory. Pro-European politics are supposed to be about values and democracy, yet there are authoritarian practices. On the one hand, there are discourses about the EU being the home of many nations. But in Chișinău, including in the PAS party, there are people who emit a nationalist, quasi-fascist, and authoritarian discourse. This discourse negates the right of national minorities to use their language in schools and aims to “Romanianize” everyone. This, in turn, creates other feelings in Comrat and Taraclia.

I think these votes should not be considered an attitude toward Europe but rather a reflection of intertwined local histories. For example, the Gagauz usually vote pro-Russian because they are primarily afraid of the nationalists in Chișinău, whom they associate with the events of 1990 when a huge march of volunteers from Chișinău went to beat the Gagauz and Bulgarians because they wanted autonomy. The country almost had another civil war, which was stopped at the last moment. The scars of this event are still present today.

This local history explains the attitude toward various voting and electoral processes. Maia Sandu’s governance and PAS have not done much to bring the Gagauzians closer because they have been caught up in Russophobic rhetoric. This is understandable, given the regional context, the war, and the fear that, if Ukraine falls, Russia might target Moldova next. However, this Russophobia is also being translated in Gagauzia as further proof that Moldovans are nationalists who, at the first opportunity, will force everyone to learn Romanian and abandon their culture.

More delicacy and dialogue are needed, as well as more platforms where the Gagauz and Bulgarian parties are reintegrated into the country and treated as citizens, not guests or agents of someone else. Unfortunately, the Moldovan state doesn’t do enough of this. Most processes aimed at building confidence between various minority groups in Moldova are funded or supported by international donors, suggesting that the Moldovan state is not as interested in this issue.

If you read the Moldovan news, you’ll see claims that large infrastructure projects have been undertaken in Gagauzia, such as the construction of a new highway around Comrat. There’s a kind of “magic thinking” where people believe that the local population should somehow change its attitude toward the EU just because of this road. This doesn’t work that way. I think it reflects the Moldovan state’s lack of imagination in working with minorities and providing them with guarantees of democracy, self-expression, and identity development.

So, I think it reflects internal Moldovan problems rather than the idea that Gagauzians are inherently against European integration. Unfortunately, when the state lacks imagination and patience, it’s easier to claim that Gagauzians are agents of Putin and that Bulgarians are brainwashed to vote for Russia instead of their own interests. However, we know people may not vote in their own best interest because their vote is distorted by a very sophisticated, complex, and sometimes tragic local context.

The parliamentary elections in Moldova on September 28: between “déjà vu,” “now or never,” and “more of the same”…

Strengthening the citizen and overcoming geopolitical polarization

You wrote a prolific article on September 26th 2025 about Moldovan politics. In fact, this article is the reason why I asked you for this interview. You made various criticisms of what we’ve already discussed: the geopolitical polarization and the authoritarian tendencies of the government. Toward the end, you mentioned the need for bridges and said that this continuous polarization and fear-mongering at every election destroys what various activists may be trying to do on the ground.

I want to ask you about that. It seems that your thesis is that the Moldovan citizens – the Moldovan subjects of modernity, if you will – must be empowered, yet this polarization weakens them. You even wrote that elections give too much power to parties. There should be a de-hegemonization of parties in Moldova, which I also interpret as the strengthening of citizens.

How could the citizens be strengthened and these polarizations and differences – center-periphery, minorities-majority, West-East, etc. – be overcome? Are there examples of the successful overcoming of these contradictions and the building of interconnectedness among Moldovans?

Wow, that’s another very sophisticated and complex question that cannot be easily answered. I should make some disclaimers, of course. One is that when I talk about polarization, I don’t mean a lack of conflict or some kind of naive harmony between groups.

I think political conflicts are inherent and shouldn’t be feared. They should be, and they are, part of the legitimate political process. Groups express their interests by confronting them, reaching decisions, and convincing other groups. At least, this is how it should work, and how it works in a liberal democratic understanding of the political process.

So, in this sense, when I speak about polarization, I’m not afraid of conflict. I don’t want a situation where there are no conflicts. There was a Soviet animated movie about a cat named Leopold who always said, “Let’s live in a friendly manner.” It’s not about that; it’s about something deeper. When I say polarization, I’m not referring to just any political conflict. Rather, it’s a political conflict that doesn’t reflect reality but is fed. As I said earlier, everything else – like social policies and discussions about economic policies – is thrown into this kind of geopolitical conflict. This is because there is little action; it’s all emotion. I’m not saying that politics should only be rational, but they are emotional.

Besides the emotional aspect, however, there is nothing about Russian or European integration that calls for action because it’s really like that. This kind of language of friends and enemies erodes anything we share.

In this sense, I think it’s dangerous to Moldovan democracy. As I mentioned in the article, I’m part of a network of organizations and initiatives called Moldova for Peace. We’ve been involved with the refugee effort since the beginning. First, we’re trying to provide food and hygiene supplies, and we’ve been doing so for several years. For at least two years, we’ve also been trying to promote social cohesion. We see how difficult it is to overcome decades of fear-mongering and stereotypes, and how difficult it is for people to get to know each other and overcome their bad experiences with Ukrainians in Kyiv. It’s difficult.

In our organization, for example, Russians and Ukrainians work together. It’s a sensitive process in which we try to build bridges by doing activities together. We have workshops about confronting the traumatic past and moving beyond it. But with the occasion of the elections, you see all these processes basically thrown away because some politicians decided to exploit the feelings we’re trying to help people put aside. We’re trying to find things that unite people, but then there are politicians who say… I remember last year during the presidential elections when some prominent PAS bloggers, in the second round when Stoianoglo, the Gagauz candidate, advanced, were saying things like, “How can we allow a Turk, an Ottoman, to become president of Moldova? We’re a country that has constantly fought the Ottomans.” It’s things like that. They destroy whatever you build slowly. It’s difficult and takes time. Then, because the political sphere has a lot of power and influence and powerful media diffusion mechanisms, you see all these efforts being thrown out just because the ruling party wants to get re-elected. Of course, they want to keep groups pitted against each other. After the elections, though, they say, “We’re now looking for and building social cohesion.” So, this is the reality.

How do we overcome it? I don’t think you’re right that the center of Moldovan politics is basically soft authoritarianism – I’m being polite – but rather, the center is the president and the political class exerting power, and privileged groups getting access to power. A lot of people are unrepresented and dispossessed. The ordinary Moldovan citizen doesn’t have many political avenues to express his opinion or participate, except on social media. The level of local democratic development is really very low. People are not invited to discuss, nor is there infrastructure for their participation in local budgeting at the village level, for example.

Further on, this exclusion is amplified to the extent that NGOs monitoring transparency and participation in the decision-making process found that around half of the laws adopted by parliament were introduced on the day they were adopted without discussion or public participation. In this supposedly pro-European and democratic system, the average Moldovan citizen doesn’t have much power to influence things or participate, and his voice isn’t heard. As a consequence, you have all these issues we’re discussing, such as misrepresentation and various social media personalities capturing these voices and pretending to be representatives. There is no easy solution for overcoming these divisions or building bridges. I think what is needed is a consensus among politicians. But I don’t want to sound naive. I’ve laid out the problems, and now I’m waiting for the politicians who caused the problems to realize they’re problematic and change. We also need to change the way politics is done. This is why, at Platform, we’re trying to promote a discussion of social policies and avoid geopolitics. We need this change and, of course, many other things happening at the grassroots level.

However, things are not happening. As I mentioned in the article, the biggest problem is that the country needs to be saved. I was joking about this, saying, “Let’s save the country,” but the country is in a precarious, dangerous, and problematic situation. The country really needs some urgent measures. For example, the population is declining. The last census, in 2024, showed that we are two million fewer than in Soviet times. In 30 years, we’ve lost nearly half our population. There is migration, but there is also an aging population, which is a real problem that needs to be solved. So, yeah, let’s think about saving the country. Let’s consider the fact that economic growth is almost nonexistent. Let’s think about that. In this sense, the country needs to be saved, but not in this way. We need to have these discussions, but they’re not happening.

To go back a bit, I said that the biggest tragedy of this country is that most of its population lives outside the state. This is why I’m saying that we need more than politicians paying attention to social cohesion. We need to reinvent the country because of how its economy works. It’s based on remittances, trade, and people working abroad and sending money. These people are excluded. They live outside the country and outside the state. They basically live outside the political system. Their interaction with the state is minimal and rare, happening only a few times during their lives for things like schooling and healthcare. Otherwise, they live totally outside the state and don’t expect anything from it.

As a result, I think the other problem that will probably haunt us in the decades to come is that nobody believes in the potential or success of collective action. We’re very individualistic, and everything is thought of in terms of individual success or failure. This is also a barrier to establishing whatever you want to do, and it’s something you need to overcome. Of course, if the government and the country’s ruling class were more interested in creating social cohesion and a more powerful citizenry, they would make efforts to do so. There would be solutions, such as citizen assemblies that really try to involve people at the local level in the decision-making process. But this isn’t happening, and I don’t think it will. In Moldova, you have various small groups at the grassroots level – both NGOs and outside NGOs – trying to do this. Then there’s a large group of people who are totally uninterested and live outside the state. The state is kind of using these fears. The state is ruled by a political class that is not interested in building anything with a long-term perspective. So, yeah, I think that’s a dramatic and catastrophic description of the situation. This is my reading of the situation. However, the discussions we’re having to improve the situation do not reflect this at all. They are going in a completely different direction.

The case study of Occupy Guguță

Okay, let’s end this interesting discussion by returning to the recent past. Some time ago, there were anti-oligarch protests in Chișinău, and a social movement called Occupy Guguță (after a café in the center of Chișinău) appeared. You were involved in this movement, which was associated with Platzforma, if I recall correctly. Could you tell us how the movement started, what it accomplished, and what happened to it?

Yes, I should mention first that the movement was not associated with Platzforma. Platzforma was just a media outlet providing a platform. Otherwise, we were just participants alongside many other groups, initiatives, and activists.

I was basically part of the build-up to this movement because it was centered around a cafeteria called “Cafeneaua Guguță” in Romanian. It’s a former Soviet cafeteria in Chișinău’s Central Park. I started getting involved with this case in 2014. There was a long process in which the most powerful person in the country at the time, Vladimir Plahotniuc, wanted to demolish the building and build a huge hotel. In my view, he privatized the building illegally. This was the first project he wanted to undertake in the Central Park of Chișinău.

A group of activists started to monitor the case. We wrote and asked for public debates and consultations. Another thing was happening in parallel: a court case was also following the case and writing about it. Around 2018, several factors came together. We’re still busy fighting for the fate of this building, but in 2018, there were local elections in Chișinău, and Andrei Năstase won. However, the oligarch Vlad Plahotniuc did not want to recognize the results of the Chișinău elections for various reasons, so he canceled them. This brought many people into the streets.

There was a confluence of various protests, and then the court made a decision about Cafeneaua Guguță that was very negative. It basically allowed the oligarch, Plahotniuc, to demolish the building and do whatever he wanted. There was a feeling that all of these events were connected. He canceled the election results in Chișinău because he wanted to build in the central park. There was discontent, and various groups started gathering in front of the cafeteria.

Meanwhile, there were other protests in Chișinău by politicians and political parties, but we also held our own protest related to the building. It became a platform for many issues. We became a political movement because it was clear to everyone that it was not only about the building, but also about many other issues. It’s about how the justice sector works for the rich and powerful, not the public. It’s about corruption and citizens not being asked or involved in the decision-making process.

We started doing various things. It was basically an activist-artist movement. We tried to make this movement a platform for the politicization of people, political education, and political action, such as solidarity.

We survived and functioned for more than a year, until 2019. After we had elections in February 2019, three big parties emerged: the Democratic Party of oligarch Plahotniuc, the Socialist Party, and the ACUM bloc (Maia Sandu’s PAS and the former candidate for the canceled local elections). After an action by the Russian, EU, and American ambassadors in June 2019, which we call the “revolution of the ambassadors,” Plahotniuc was removed and fled the country. He has since returned in chains and is in prison, but yeah, he fled the country just before the elections.

The Socialists and the pro-Europeans then started to govern together. We said that, basically, as a movement, we had achieved our goals. We succeeded in kicking out the oligarch. Of course, it wasn’t our doing, but we said that we contributed as well. The cafeteria case was solved, and the movement dissolved itself.

There was a feeling that we were at a threshold. The main factor that had driven us together, the oligarch, was gone. So, we had official, democratic governance instead of governance by bandits. At the same time, a lot of thought was put into what we should do next. Should we continue with the same protests, trying to be creative, with artists protesting things for the next few years? Or should we take a step further and build a political movement or a party? The results of these internal debates were that we were not ready to commit to forming a party. We decided that dissolving ourselves was the best solution.

Now, Occupy Guguță is just a Facebook page with occasional updates. Occupy Guguță was a school for political and civic education. Many people who participated in that movement later participated in mobilizations around the pandemic. We tried to build a voluntary civic movement to help people who needed special attention and care, but I forgot what it was called. At one point, people from Occupy Guguță helped homeless people in Chișinău. Then, when the war started, mostly the same people from Occupy Guguță were involved in the refugee crisis.

This experience taught us many things, such as how to work with the police and how to build public discourse, participate in public debates, mobilize people, and run various campaigns. It was a school of political education, and it is a dear memory to us. It doesn’t exist anymore. Maybe it’s for the best. No one from the movement mentions it on their CV to get jobs. Some people from the movement went into politics.

The legacy of the movement is mostly ambiguous now because, on the one hand, we succeeded in protecting this building, which is still standing. The big hotel that the oligarch wanted to build was never constructed. On the other hand, we wanted to make this building accessible to the public, but we didn’t succeed in forcing the state or local authorities to buy the building and use it as a civic hub, a school, or something else that would benefit the public.

In this sense, it’s ambiguous. But, as I said, it was a very significant and meaningful moment in my experience, as well as in the experiences of many others. It was probably the first political community that acted and lived explicitly politically. We tried to reinvent everything, including the ways in which we self-organized. We’re very much into horizontality and employ things from participatory economics. We understand that the division of roles within the collective should be such that there are no prestige jobs or functions, and that the same people shouldn’t hold them. We rotate them. We’re trying to make everyone recognizable and leaderless to confront issues such as sexism and authoritarianism. It was a very nice, small situation of exception that I experienced with other people.

Personal perspective and hope

Okay, we spoke for more than an hour about the weakened Moldovan citizen and a number of social difficulties. I want to end with a question for you about the country. Where do you find the personal energy and hope to continue your work and the things we discussed? Where is the hope for Moldova?

Well, I just love what I do. My political trajectory, education, and allegiance have taught me a lot. I’m an anarcho-syndicalist. This has brought me to the realization that politics is a constant struggle. You could call it class struggle, but it’s a constant struggle. I can’t expect things to just happen by themselves. That’s the one thing.

As a trained sociologist, I understand that social change takes time. I think this is also very important. My experience with Occupy Guguță and other movements has also shown me how difficult it is to build durable, sustainable movements. It’s probably easy to form groups around media personalities, but these are not political parties.

I realized that in a context like Moldova’s, where very few people believe in collective action, achieving something as simple as working together is sometimes an accomplishment. Nobody teaches us how to do that in this hyper-individualized society. I always say that we need a different kind of political education in schools and everywhere because we’re basically taught to compete with each other but not to work together or cooperate. If you consider this, you’ll see that things require patience and deliberate effort with the understanding that they will take time.

My hope, my power, and my energy come from knowing that change won’t happen overnight. I’ve seen too many instances of overnight change, and I’m afraid of it. I know that durable change is difficult to build.

As for Moldova, I don’t have much hope that things will be better, because I don’t see any projects oriented towards that. I don’t see any discussion about what Moldova could look like in 2050 or 2100—50 or 70 years from now—or even just the exercise of speculating about it. In this sense, I’m skeptical.

But then I look around and see many other people. I see younger people. Maybe I’m too cynical because of our complicated, cynical, and tragic transition. Because of this, I’ve seen countries collapse in my lifetime, and I’ve seen people change their convictions overnight. This has also influenced me. Maybe I’m not the best candidate for utopian projects, but I see younger generations that are more inspired, imaginative, and self-assured. I have some hope. I always say that I’m optimistic in the long term but pessimistic in the short term. So, yeah, I think I’ll end here.

Photo: Vitalie Sprînceană (sursă: Facebook)

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