The president of Bulgaria resigned to enter the arena of “dirty” politics. What’s next for our neighboring country?

Vladimir Mitev, The Liberal Community, 26 January 2026

Summary

The document analyzes the political situation in Bulgaria following President Rumen Radev’s resignation on January 19, 2026, to actively enter the political arena.

Key Points of the Analysis:

• Political Vacuum and Crisis: Bulgaria is described as being in a state of “country on autopilot” with an institutional vacuum, operating without an approved budget and with weak institutions (interim Chief Prosecutor, expired Supreme Judicial Council mandate) even while achieving strategic goals like joining the eurozone.
• Radev’s Call for Change: Radev resigned to fight for political causes, framing his move as a quest for a “new social contract” and a radical change against a “facade democracy” where power rests with oligarchic structures.
• Anti-Oligarchy Rhetoric: He criticizes the political collusion between anti-corruption parties (We Continue the Change and Democratic Bulgaria) and leaders like Boyko Borisov and Delyan Peevski, focusing his anti-oligarchic strategy primarily on the figure of Delyan Peevski. The analysis suggests his anti-corruption drive may be a dispute between different factions within the Bulgarian “deep state,” noting his support from business circles in conflict with the former Chief Prosecutor (who was suspected of being close to Peevski).
• Economic and Social Vision: While his former team had modern, social-democratic economists and he engaged in tax reform discussions, his current relations with employers’ organizations are good. The analysis questions whether he would support the economic redistribution necessary for a genuine anti-oligarchic policy that affirms wage labor and disadvantaged groups. His political style is described as patriarchal, preferring a “top-down” approach aimed at restoring statehood through strong central authority (a “father of the nation” figure) rather than democratic empowerment and decentralization.
• Foreign Policy Concerns: Radev’s political ambitions raise foreign policy concerns, with critics fearing his model is akin to Viktor Orbán’s, turning Bulgaria into a “Trojan horse” in the EU. An analysis of his interim cabinet appointments (2022-2023) shows an orientation towards countries bridging the West and East (Austria, Hungary, Turkey). However, his image is complex, as he has supported the investment of German arms giant Rheinmetall and enhanced cooperation with France, and he appointed Kiril Petkov (whose party joined Macron’s Renew Europe group) as interim economy minister. He also signed a strategic partnership with Romania in 2023.
• Brussels’ Perception: Journalist Georgi Gotev argues that comparisons to Orbán are unfounded, as Radev is perceived in Brussels as an anti-corruption leader, and his emergence is seen as an opportunity for political stability in Bulgaria. Gotev suggests Radev is ready for a significant international role, possibly as prime minister.
• The “Bridge” Metaphor: The central metaphor for Bulgarian politics is the “bridge”—a consistent effort to mediate and maintain good relations with all major international partners simultaneously. Radev could be a new, more military-focused version of Boyko Borisov, striving for a centrist position. His success depends on building a dynamic “bridge” to apply the formula of being “more than anyone else in everything” (pro-European, pro-American, and pro-Russian) while championing anti-corruption.
• Conclusion: The confrontation is currently a “theatrical confrontation between political elites,” with real change requiring the empowerment of citizens and decentralization of power. Despite skepticism, Bulgarians are expected to give Radev a chance to prove his actions.

Article

In 2026, Bulgaria entered a paradoxical state of “country on autopilot,” achieving key strategic goals, such as joining the eurozone, in a kind of institutional vacuum. The country is operating without an approved state budget and with a caretaker government, while the key pillars of power are being decapitated or delegitimized. The chief prosecutor has “interim” status and, according to the Supreme Court of Cassation, has no right to exercise his functions from mid-2025. Meanwhile, the Supreme Judicial Council continues to operate with a long-expired mandate. This reality has given rise to an ironic sentiment in society that the state can exist by inertia, without this preventing events such as the opening of new border crossings or the transition from the Bulgarian lev to the euro.

The climax of this “crisis” was reached on 19 January 2026, when Rumen Radev announced his resignation as President of Bulgaria, leaving the state apparatus without a clear “pilot” at the moment when he decided to actively enter the political arena (he still refuses to announce his own political project, but he has hinted that he wants to fight for certain political causes). This unprecedented move has caused a sharp polarization in public discussions. His supporters describe him as a well-trained patriot and a responsible leader, whose serious facade even hides a sense of humor unknown to the public. In contrast, his critics believe that his actions confirm a habit of abandoning institutional responsibilities—first in the army (to become a presidential candidate) and now as president (to lead his own political project). His foreign policy orientation also remains the subject of attacks, ranging from accusations of “Orbanism” and distancing himself from the EU core to extreme accusations of foreign influence. Thus, while institutions remain weak, the question arises as to whether Radev’s new project can bring new energy to Bulgarian political life and the Bulgarian system and transform the impasse in which Bulgarian politics is stagnating. In this text, I propose some benchmarks and criteria by which this can be assessed.

Rumen Radev’s speech

The storm of political passions that is expected to surround Rumen Radev in 2026 is fueled by his call for radical change, embodied in the concept of a “new social contract.” In his resignation speech, he emphasized that the technical achievement of strategic goals, such as Schengen and the eurozone, has not brought the expected satisfaction, as society is suffering from a profound crisis of confidence. Radev defines the current model as a “facade democracy,” in which real power is concentrated in oligarchic structures that operate outside official institutions and use state instruments as “weapons” against their opponents.

A central point of his criticism is the political collusion between the anti-corruption movement (the We Continue the Change and Democratic Bulgaria parties) and leaders such as Boyko Borisov and Delyan Peevski. According to Radev, the constitutional changes initiated by their joint government have guaranteed the oligarchy permanent access to executive power. He sharpened his tone by stating that the refusal to hold a referendum on joining the euro had led to a definitive rift between the people and the political class. At this turning point, Radev is trying to channel the energy of young Bulgarians, declaring that the period of indifference and “individual salvation” is over.

Thus, positioning himself as a defender of institutions against “corrupt and extremist” forces, he leaves the presidency with a call for epochal change, leaving the political elite and society waiting for his next moves ahead of the early parliamentary elections in the spring.

Radev and the oligarchy

The question of whether Rumen Radev is a genuine fighter against the oligarchy or just more of the same requires a more in-depth analysis of how he defines the political space in Bulgaria. At the heart of his strategy is an attempt to reduce the oligarchic model to a single person, limiting it almost entirely to the figure of Delyan Peevski. By pointing to the leader of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms – A New Beginning as the main source of corruption and parallel influence within the prosecutor’s office and security services, Radev is trying to position himself as the sole moral pillar. However, Radev too comes from the security institutions – the army, which is becoming increasingly important on a global scale in the context of the war in Ukraine and the rise of leaders such as Donald Trump.

Radev is not isolated from the economic elites. He is known to enjoy the support of influential business circles that were in conflict with the prosecutor’s office during the tenure of the previous chief prosecutor, Ivan Geshev, who was suspected of being close to Peevski. This has given rise to a paradoxical alliance: although his anti-corruption rhetoric coincides with the ideas of the urban middle class and parties such as We Continue the Change and Democratic Bulgaria, the motivation behind it seems different. While for the urban right the struggle is for institutional reform, Radev’s trend can probably be described as a dispute between different tendencies within the Bulgarian deep state.

A symbol of this rapprochement between Radev and the anti-corruption trend in Bulgaria is his participation in the discussion “Where is justice headed?”, which took place on 4 February 2025, at the Military Club in Sofia and was organized by the Bulgarian Institute for Legal Initiatives – a major NGO focused on judicial reform and justice. During the discussion, Radev spoke about cases of large-scale abuse through behind-the-scenes influence in the judiciary, known as “The Eight Dwarfs” and “The Notary”, as well as the case of the robbery and bankruptcy of the Central Corporate Bank. These cases have traditionally been used to accuse the so-called status quo in the judicial system, which anti-corruption activists link to Delian Peevski’s behind-the-scenes influence.

When analyzing Radev’s economic vision, it should be noted that once his team included economists who had studied at Western universities, with modern, social-democratic views and good international contacts. During his first term as president, Radev was involved in discussions on tax reform related to fairer taxation. At the same time, his relations with employers’ organizations appear to be quite good. In November 2025, Radev apologized to employers for the 2026 budget, which he did not draft and which was subsequently rejected following protests, in an apparent attempt to show that he was on their side. In December 2025, the outgoing head of state presented his honorary award to the Bulgarian Chamber of Commerce and Industry on the occasion of its anniversary. An anti-oligarchic policy should mean the economic affirmation of wage labor and disadvantaged social groups—and it remains to be seen whether Radev would want a redistribution of economic power, given that he is clearly seeking the support of employers.

Citizen participation in social change, as called for by the former head of state, would mean opening up to civil movements and creating the conditions for their establishment. Bulgaria has traditionally suffered from a lack of effective social movements – unlike Romania, where there are niche organisations, for example for housing rights or the rights of neurodivergent people. Over the years, Radev has met with dissatisfied citizens—for example, mothers of children with disabilities—and has been involved in initiatives for children without parents. But his political style seems patriarchal.

For example, his interim governments have been composed mostly of male ministers. In addition, he seems to have refrained from making statements in defense of the rights of migrants or other vulnerable minorities. If Radev takes control of the state, including the Ministry of the Interior, on the grounds that he represents a change from the influence of his opponent in these institutions – Delian Peevski – he could change current policies that criminalize any attempt to help migrants, including humanitarian intervention to save their lives. Or he could support the only relatively large social movement in Bulgaria – the feminist one.

Ultimately, Radev’s call to overcome indifference sounds strong, but so far he has been more of a supporter of the traditional “top-down” approach to power in Bulgaria. At this point, his vision is more of an attempt to restore statehood through strong central authority, something like a “father of the nation,” rather than through decentralization and the democratic empowerment of the disadvantaged. Without the economic and social empowerment of citizens, politics will likely continue to be conducted behind the scenes, through the levers of powerful economic structures, and in the best-case scenario, democratization will mean that some dependencies will be replaced by others—that is, there will be a certain rotation of dominant groups in the country’s leadership.

Radev and foreign policy

Although Rumen Radev’s speech announcing his resignation did not contain detailed foreign policy theses, his political ambitions raise concerns in this regard. Media expert Georgi Lozanov noted that although every politician claims to defend national interests, for part of the political spectrum in Bulgaria, these interests often coincide with those of Russia. According to the expert, in the speech that marked Radev’s transition to a new political role, there was not even a hint of the pro-European identity of his future entity.

At the same time, the leader of the anti-corruption party We Continue the Change, Assen Vassilev, insisted that Radev clarify his positions not only on foreign policy, but also on key domestic issues such as the tax system, health, and education. The main question posed by Vasilev was whether Radev is striving to build a strong Bulgaria in a strong Europe or whether his model is that of Orban – Bulgaria as another “Trojan horse” in the European Union, hindering European integration.

An analysis of his appointments to interim cabinets in 2022-2023 shows a foreign policy orientation towards countries that have tried to serve as a bridge to Russia in the context of the military conflict in Ukraine (Austria, Hungary and Turkey) and the growing confrontation between Moscow and Western Europe. If Radev decides to follow the same line in a future government, the current international context could prove favorable for him. On the one hand, Donald Trump is willing to work with Putin to reshape the world order, and on the other hand, influential European leaders such as Emmanuel Macron and Friedrich Merz are already expressing their positions on resuming dialogue with the Kremlin. However, it is unlikely that Radev will form a government with his political group alone, and I assume that if he enters a future government, there will also be a political force open to cooperation with Western Europe.

Bulgarian politics is very noisy, but if something happens in it, if there is understanding and a stable cabinet, the country plays the role of a bridge between everyone. For example, under the leadership of Boiko Borisov (GERB party – member of the European People’s Party) and Delyan Peevski (whose DPS-A New Beginning party defines itself against Soros and in support of Trump), in recent years Bulgaria has pursued European policies towards both Ukraine and Russia (Delyan Peevski even received an award from the Ukrainian ambassador for his contributions to Ukraine).

The question is whether we will see a similar scenario if Rumen Radev joins the government. Although his statements on Ukraine are well known, his image may be more complex. Radev himself points out that he negotiated the investment of German arms giant Rheinmetall in Sopot. In addition, during his term in office, the foundations were laid for enhanced cooperation between Bulgaria and France after the protests in 2020. It is also important to note that he was the one who appointed the future prime minister and former leader of the We Continue the Change party, Kiril Petkov, as interim minister of economy in 2021. Petkov’s party later joined Macron’s Renew Europe group. All this suggests that behind the façade of a sovereignist, there may lie a more complex political actor, whose actions in the future government could combine different vectors of influence – if he so wishes.

It is also interesting that it was Rumen Radev who, together with his Romanian counterpart Klaus Iohannis, signed the strategic partnership declaration between the two countries in Sofia in March 2023. This was a direct consequence of the geopolitical changes in the region after the start of the large-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine and led to more intensive Euro-Atlantic cooperation between Bulgaria and Romania in the areas of security, defense, and infrastructure development. Immediately after Nicușor Dan was elected president of Romania, Rumen Radev invited him to visit Sofia, which probably demonstrates his continued interest in Romanian-Bulgarian relations.

Journalist Georgi Gotev on Brussels’ attitude towards Radev

According to French- and Romanian-speaking journalist Gheorghi Gotev, who worked for Euractiv for a long time and is currently developing the media site Eualive, comparisons between Rumen Radev and Viktor Orbán are unfounded, as the two are perceived completely differently in Brussels. While Orbán is a symbol of corruption, “Radev positions himself as a leader in the fight against corruption.”

Gotev points out that the frequent elections in Bulgaria are due to the weakness of the parties and short-lived coalitions. In this context, the emergence of a new political project is seen as an opportunity for stability.

Regarding the war in Ukraine, the journalist defends Bulgaria’s moderate position. He distinguishes Bulgaria’s position from the extreme positions of the Baltic states and Poland, due to historical specifics, but believes that this difference is acceptable. He considers it normal for Radev to be part of a group of leaders, such as Macron and Meloni, who call for dialogue with Moscow. Gotev emphasizes that European institutions should serve member states, not the other way around.

Gotev predicts that Radev is ready for a significant international role and possible participation in EU summits as prime minister. He highlights his language skills and character, noting that “Radev will not be a ‘yes man,’ unlike his predecessor Borisov, whom he describes as unsuited to this environment.

What can we expect?

The central metaphor through which the dynamics of Bulgarian politics in recent years can be understood is that of a “bridge.” Since Boiko Borisov’s last government, all configurations of government have represented a form of mediation, seeking to maintain good relations with all the major powers and all international partners simultaneously in a dynamic context. This “Bulgarian bridge” is redefined according to the changing global context—from Borisov’s balance between Trump, Merkel, Orbán, Putin, and Erdoğan, through Kiril Petkov’s diverse coalition, to Galab Donev’s approach, which followed Austria, Hungary, and Turkey’s external line of bridging the West and East in the context of the war in Ukraine. Even in the case of Denkov’s cabinet, we saw an attempt to reconcile opposing vectors, such as those of Macron and Erdogan.

Despite its dynamism, this bridge has a stable structural feature: it is deeply national-centric. Bulgarian society, media, and politicians continue to think within the boundaries of the nation-state, seeing Bulgaria as the center of the world. This spirit explains Bulgarians’ lack of enthusiasm for integration projects such as the eurozone. However, any sovereignist who comes to power is obliged to act within the objective context of Bulgaria’s membership of NATO, the EU, the eurozone, and Schengen. In this sense, Radev could prove to be a new version of Boyko Borisov — “a general in the army, not the police” — who strives to adopt a centrist position.

If Radev really has the ambition to be a lasting political phenomenon and not just to use the protest vote once, he will probably have to apply the formula that liberal political scientist Ivan Krastev attributes to Borisov: to be “more than anyone else in everything” — more pro-European, more pro-American, and more pro-Russian at the same time, adding to this a prevailing commitment to the fight against corruption and stronger patriotism. Although Radev is a phenomenon made possible by the global context and the “Trump phenomenon,” his success depends on how dynamic the bridge he is trying to build will be, so that his bridge is not replaced by a more suitable one. At this point, however, skepticism or criticism of Rumen Radev’s new role remains justified because, after 35 years of ups and downs of various “saviors,” Bulgarians are cautious about a new mobilization against the status quo.

Instead of real change, we are currently witnessing a theatrical confrontation between political elites, reminiscent of Vince McMahon’s American wrestling federation. Serious accusations of national betrayal are being made, but the economic interests behind political opponents remain intact. The fury is directed toward symbolic violence—depriving political opponents of their official cars and offices—blows that do not really hurt. However, real transformation does not consist in replacing one group of politicians and businesspeople with another, but in empowering citizens and decentralizing power. Although Radev’s rhetoric does not currently focus on this modern spirit of self-organization, and despite the skepticism outlined above, Bulgarians will likely give him a chance, within certain limits. After that, his actions will define him. “Hope dies last.”

Photo: Rumen Radev resigns (source: YouTube)

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