Romania: military support for the USA and a strategic pact with Ukraine

Lyudmila Zhelezova, BNR, 12 March 2026

Summary

Here is a complete and detailed summary of the conversation between Lyudmila Zhelezova and Vladimir Mitev regarding key geopolitical events in Romania in March 2026. It is about Romania, its military support for the USA and the new strategic pact with Ukraine.

1. Strategic Partnership Between Romania and Ukraine

President Volodymyr Zelensky’s visit to Bucharest marked the signing of a wide-ranging strategic partnership agreement.

• Historical Context: Relations, which have traditionally been difficult, have been steadily improving since 2022.
• Minorities: President Nicușor Dan announced that long-standing disputes regarding the Romanian minority in Ukraine have been resolved, with Romanians there now guaranteed access to education in their native language.
• Military cooperation: The countries are planning the joint production of Ukrainian drones in Romania, with funding from the SAFE program. Additionally, the training of Ukrainian pilots on F-16 aircraft continues at the Fetești center.

2. Deployment of U.S. Equipment and the Role of the U.S.

The Romanian Parliament has approved the U.S. request to deploy additional military equipment and approximately 500 U.S. soldiers (bringing the total number to approximately 1,500). That is how the country provide military support for the USA in its operations in the Middle East against Iran.

• Missions: The equipment will support in-flight refueling and surveillance missions in the Middle East and Iran (as part of Operation Epic Fury).
• Status of the base near Constanța: Modernization of the “Mihail Kogălniceanu” base continues, as it prepares to become the largest NATO base in the region, despite partial troop withdrawals by the Trump administration.
• Political stance: President Nicușor Dan is trying to strike a balance between the interests of Western Europe and those of Washington (Trump), positioning Romania as an “outpost” and an irreplaceable strategic partner.

3. Social and Political Reactions

• Internal Political Tensions: The pro-European government defends the decisions to provide support to the U.S. as being defensive in nature. The opposition, represented by the sovereignist bloc (the AUR party), has, however, declared itself “against” this, insisting on an isolationist policy and expressing doubt regarding the defensive nature of the American equipment.
• Civil society: Divergent sentiments are evident, including protests against the war and in support of Palestine.

4. Economic Impact and Fuel Prices

Military conflicts and geopolitical tensions have led to a significant rise in the cost of living:

• Fuel: The price of diesel has reached approximately 1.70–1.80 euros per liter (over 9 lei). There are fears that prices could reach 2.20 euros.
• Measures: The government is considering packages of measures to “absorb” the price increases, while the opposition proposes reducing the VAT.
• Social context: The rise in prices coincides with a strict austerity regime and high inflation, which creates serious conditions for social tensions.

Romania’s Geopolitical Reality at the Start of 2026 (context by The Bridge of Friendship)

Here is a detailed analysis of five key aspects of Romania’s new geopolitical reality in 2026, based on current events and the administration of President Nicușor Dan:

1. Black Sea energy projects and the Trump administration

In 2026, Romania officially begins extracting the first quantities of natural gas from the Neptun Deep field.

• Energy independence: The Romgaz and OMV Petrom project transforms the country into a net gas exporter for the region (including Moldova and Ukraine).
• The connection to Trump: The new U.S. administration views Romanian gas as a strategic alternative to Russian supplies to Europe. Trump supports American investments in infrastructure but insists on a “business approach”—Romania must guarantee the security of the platforms, while the U.S. provides technological and military support through rotational forces.

2. Comparison: Nicușor Dan vs. the AUR Party

The political scene in Romania is divided into two trends regarding foreign policy, which in some respects are similar and in others differ:

Subject	President Nicușor Dan (centrist)	The AUR Party (George Simion)
USA / Trump	A United States’ “avanpost” Making the Kogălniceanu base available for operations, without imposing any conditions – providing military support for the USA.	Isolationism; “Romania First.”
Ukraine	Full military and strategic support	Skepticism; priority given exclusively to minorities.
EU	A loyal member seeking European funding. Focused on the core of the EU.	Sovereignty. Collaboration with European sovereigntist forces, such as Meloni in Italy and Nawrocki/Kaczyński in Poland.
Military bases	He supports the expansion of the base in Constanța County.	Against the way Romania manages its defense cooperation (“on its knees”)

3. The trilateral format: Romania – Moldova – Ukraine

This new “geopolitical triangle” aims to isolate Russian influence in the Black Sea region:

• Drones: An agreement was signed for the joint production of Ukrainian drones in Romanian factories, with funding from the EU’s SAFE program (200 million euros).
• F-16: The center in Fetești (Romania) is the main hub for training Ukrainian pilots.
• Logistics: The Republic of Moldova serves as a “supply corridor” for humanitarian and energy deliveries from Romania to Ukraine.

4. Romania’s Importance for U.S. Operations in the Middle East

With the approval of Operation Epic Fury (against Iran and its proxies), Romania has become a critical logistics hub:

• Air bridge: The “Mihail Kogălniceanu” Air Base (Constanța) is used to refuel U.S. tanker and transport aircraft flying to the Middle East. Thus it provides necessary military support for the USA.
• Information: Romania hosts early warning and satellite communications systems that monitor missile launches from Iran.
• Strategic pillar: Since traditional allies such as Turkey sometimes restrict access to their bases, Romania remains the most reliable “foothold” for the U.S. on the eastern flank.

5. Romanian-Israeli Cooperation in the Defense Sector

Cooperation with Israel is at its peak, with Romania becoming the first European country equipped with Iron Dome:

• Iron Dome: Bucharest acquired the system to protect critical infrastructure and the border with Ukraine against drones.
• The “Rafael” package (2 billion euros): A historic contract was signed with the Israeli company Rafael for short- and medium-range air defense systems (SPYDER), which replace the old Soviet and American Hawk systems.
• Cybersecurity: Israeli experts are collaborating with the Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI) to counter the hybrid attacks that marred the 2024/2025 elections.

Exchange of words between the foreign ministries of Iran and Romania (context by The Bridge of Friendship)

Tensions between Tehran and Bucharest reached a critical point in March 2026, after Romania officially authorized the United States to use its military bases for operations in the Middle East. Here is the detailed context of the sharp exchange of words and diplomatic maneuvers:

1. Iran’s reaction: accusations of “aggression”

On 16 March 2026, the spokesperson for the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Esmail Baghai, issued an official statement in which he issued direct warnings to Bucharest:

• Participation in the war: Tehran announced that making Romanian bases available to U.S. military forces amounts to “direct participation in the network of military aggression against Iran.”, as in Iran’s view Romania provides military support for the USA.
• Legal and political consequences: Iran emphasized that Romania will bear “international responsibility” under international law and that this will cast a “dark shadow” over bilateral relations.
• Security threat: Iranian media and government officials have suggested that, although Romania is geographically distant, it automatically becomes a “legitimate target for a retaliatory strike” if its resources are used for direct attacks against Iranian territory.

2. Romania’s Response: Firm Diplomatic Defense

Romania’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MAE) and President Nicușor Dan responded promptly, emphasizing the sovereignty and defensive nature of their actions:

• Legal framework: Bucharest reiterated that the U.S. presence is governed by the 2006 Bilateral Access Agreement, which has been public and legitimate for decades.
• “We are not a party to the conflict”: The MFA categorically stated that Romania’s military support for the USA dooesn’t mean participation in combat operations, but is only providing logistical support (KC-135 tanker aircraft and reconnaissance equipment), which is of a “non-kinetic” (non-offensive) nature.
• Accusations against Iran: Romania has launched a diplomatic counteroffensive, condemning Iran’s “completely unjustified attacks” against Persian Gulf states and urging Tehran to cease actions that threaten the global economy and security.

3. Military context: The Mihail Kogălniceanu base

The main point of contention is the base near Constanța. For Iran, this is a “strategic launch platform,” while for Romania it is a guarantor of national security, and an important factor in its military support for the USA.

• Emergency measures: Defense Minister Radu Miruță explained that the Iranian statements are mostly “political rhetoric,” but nevertheless, Romania has strengthened its air defense (including with the aforementioned Israeli systems).
• The U.S. as a shield: Bucharest is using Iranian threats to request the Trump administration’s permanent deployment of American troops, arguing that the country is taking on an enormous risk in the name of the strategic partnership.

Analysis of the situation

The paradox is that, while President Nicușor Dan officially states that Romania is an “island of stability” and a “peacemaker,” his actual actions—receiving tanker planes that literally refuel bombers over the Middle East—make the distinction between “logistics” and “participation” very difficult to sustain in the eyes of the international community.

The Global Focus Center head Oana Popescu Zamfir’s position (context by The Bridge of Friendship)

Here is a summary of the main points from Oana Popescu Zamfir’s position, published on Facebook, regarding Iran’s statements directed at Romania:

• Absence of a military threat: The analyst categorically emphasizes that Iran has not threatened Romania with military force or violent actions. Tehran’s reaction is described as “measured and prudent.” The response measures mentioned by the Iranian side are exclusively political and legal in nature (e.g., actions within the UN).
• Criticism of the media: Popescu Zamfir describes as “irresponsible” the behavior of the media and commentators who, in their pursuit of sensationalism and ratings, distort the Iranian spokesperson’s words and unnecessarily amplify tensions.
• Diplomatic language: Tehran’s reminder of the “traditionally friendly relations” between the two countries is interpreted as a diplomatic signal regarding the desire to maintain these ties. Iran’s warnings to countries supporting the U.S. are based on international law, not on aggression.
• Risks for Romania: According to the analyst, Romania is not a priority target for Tehran. The main risks are not direct or legal, but rather global—resulting from instability in the Middle East (e.g., rising oil prices). She notes that Bucharest has always distinguished between the regime in Tehran and the Iranian people.
• Recommendation to remain silent: Popescu Zamfir believes it is not appropriate for Romanian authorities to react to Iranian statements. Since Romania has already clearly expressed its position, entering into an indirect dialogue or exchanging statements with Tehran would be pointless and inappropriate.

Interview

Lyudmila Zhelezova: The U.S. has received permission to deploy additional equipment in Romania, a move that is also set to be voted on in parliament. We’ll learn more about the political and public reactions from Vladimir Mitev, a journalist at the Romanian desk of Radio Bulgaria. Hello!

Vladimir Mitev: Hello!

The Romanian-Ukrainian Strategic Partnership

Lyudmila Zhelezova: And another important event—Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is in Bucharest to sign a major agreement. I suggest we start there.

Vladimir Mitev: Okay. Zelensky’s visit is linked to the signing of a comprehensive strategic partnership agreement. It’s an interesting move, given that relations between Romania and Ukraine have traditionally been more difficult. With the outbreak of war in 2022, however, a process of continuous improvement began. Today’s announcement regarding the partnership actually builds on an earlier version of it, and now it is already a large-scale one.

One of the contentious issues between the two countries has always been the status of the Romanian minority in Ukraine. Currently, President Nicușor Dan states that the issues have been resolved and that Romanians in Ukraine have access to education in their native language. So, the official statements are extremely positive at this time.

Lyudmila Zhelezova: That’s the official line, but as I understand it, there are also plans for a joint drone production?

Vladimir Mitev: Yes, exactly. Recently, a special trilateral framework has been established between Romania, Moldova, and Ukraine. In Romania, Ukrainian F-16 pilots are being trained at the Fetești center.

It is interesting, however, if you’d like to put this into a broader context, by drawing a connection to President Nicușor Dan, who last month made great efforts to attend the Peace Council in Washington. Just a few days later, he did not go to Kyiv, where the anniversary of the start of the war in Ukraine was marked. So, from a certain perspective, if we place Nicușor Dan at the center of our story, we see that, at this moment, he is trying to satisfy various interests in this way.

Until recently, the idea was that Trump is cooler toward Ukraine than Biden, and Western Europe, in general, keeps a certain distance from Trump. Under these circumstances, we’ve seen that Romania is striving to please everyone and maintain good relations with everyone—both with Western Europe and with Trump.

Romania’s Support for the U.S. War in the Middle East

Lyudmila Zhelezova: And what are the reactions following the news about the request to deploy U.S. equipment in Romania, and what is happening with the largest NATO base in Europe, located near Constanța?

Vladimir Mitev: Yes, first about this base—if I’m not mistaken, its modernization has been underway for two years now. When it was first announced, it was stated (and this remains a statement) that it would be the largest NATO base in the region. One peculiarity, however, is that in the meantime, Trump came to power and announced the partial withdrawal of American troops.

Currently, as far as I know, there are only 1,000 American soldiers in Romania. What is happening with the new agreement is that approximately 500 American soldiers will be sent back to Romania.

They will provide support, for example, to aircraft that will perform in-flight refueling of other aircraft on alert, or their activities will be related to surveillance missions in the region surrounding Iran and the Middle East.

When asked about reactions—first and foremost, it is noted that the government emphasizes that the presence of these aircraft and, in general, of military equipment stationed in Romania, serves a defensive military role. The aircraft will not carry ammunition, etc. They stress that, according to their interpretation, this does not constitute involvement in the military conflict. On the other hand, there are differing attitudes among Romanians. Some have supported Palestine—protests to this effect have taken place in Romania, and there have also been protests against wars in general. Thus, we observe divergent reactions and attitudes, similar to those in Bulgarian society.

It may be interesting to note that, from a political standpoint, something slightly different is observed in Romania. The position of the current government (let us recall that it is composed of four parties, considered pro-European in one form or another) is predictable, as these parties are traditionally representatives of this European and pro-European trend. The opposition has so far been accused of being “Trumpist.” This refers mainly to the AUR party—a nationalist or sovereignist party.

It is interesting, however, that this party currently appears to support the other side of Trump—not the one involved in military conflicts, but the isolationist one. Thus, although the AUR party is pro-Trump, it has announced that it will not support the current decision to back the U.S. In general, the entire bloc of sovereignist parties in the Romanian parliament has expressed, in one form or another, its disagreement with the decision. You mentioned that the decision depends on parliament—it has approved it.

On the other hand, the arguments of the parties supporting the decision, as well as those of leaders and experts, are that Romania felt somewhat abandoned for a long time when Trump announced the withdrawal of his troops. There was concern that there would be no one left to defend Romania adequately. That is why the logic that Romania is once again strategically important is now accepted. There are interpretations suggesting that the countries of Southeast Europe—Romania, Greece, Bulgaria, and Italy—are becoming a sort of outpost for the U.S., especially at a time when we see that allies in the Middle East feel they cannot be defended adequately.

Measures Against Rising Fuel Prices

Lyudmila Zhelezova: You mentioned public reactions. How is this situation affecting fuel prices, and what measures is the government taking?

Vladimir Mitev: Yes, fuel prices are indeed rising. As far as I know, a liter of diesel currently costs about 1.70 euros. There are fears that the price could reach 2.20 euros. I’m converting from lei to euros so our listeners can better understand the price levels. The government is determined to fight to ensure the price does not reach a two-digit figure in lei, meaning it should not exceed 2 euros per liter.

Measures to this end will likely be clarified soon. There are various ideas; the government is proposing packages of measures to help “absorb” this price increase. There are other proposals as well—for example, the opposition is proposing a reduction in the VAT on fuel. But this is, obviously, an emergency situation and poses a major problem for the government.

Even without this, Romanians have been complaining over the past year or two because prices have risen significantly. And as you know, Romania is currently under a strict austerity regime. That is, people’s incomes in certain sectors are falling, as their benefits or supplementary income are being cut. On the other hand, inflation, which is already present, is “eating away” at incomes, so there are grounds for tensions in this area as well.

Lyudmila Zhelezova: Returning to the news—Romania and Ukraine have signed a declaration, or at least a memorandum of understanding on a strategic partnership, and intend to jointly produce defense materials and cooperate in the energy sector. Thank you very much. You heard the details from journalist Vladimir Mitev of Radio Bulgaria’s Romanian service.

Photo: Nicușor Dan (source: YouTube)

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