Vladimir Mitev:‌ Relations between the Republic of Moldova and Bulgaria are at an all-time high

Mihai Mogîldea, Paralela 47, Radio Moldova, 11 September 2026

Summary

Here is the full and detailed summary of the transcript of the ‘Paralela 47’ programme on Radio Moldova broadcast on 11 September 2026 (hosted by Mihai Mogîldea, with political analyst Mihai Isac and journalist Vladimir Mitev):

Here is a brief summary of the programme:

• Hungary’s blockade and EU enlargement: Hungarian politician Péter Magyar is making the resumption of Ukraine’s accession negotiations conditional upon guarantees for the rights of the Hungarian minority in Transcarpathia. Because Moldova’s path to the EU is linked to that of Ukraine, Chișinău has become a collateral victim, with the last four negotiation clusters currently stalled. Maia Sandu is attempting to identify compromise solutions through direct dialogue with Budapest.
• Recommendations for Chișinău: Analyst Mihai Isac emphasises that Budapest is using the issue of minorities to gain access to European funds and for domestic electoral purposes. In this context, the Republic of Moldova must continue with technical reforms and strengthen its bilateral diplomacy with all EU capitals to avoid dependence on third-party political manoeuvring.
• Moldovan-Bulgarian relations: Minister Mihai Popșoi’s visit to Sofia confirms Bulgaria’s firm support for Moldova’s accession to the EU. Cooperation is expanding in the economic, energy (via the Vertical Gas Corridor) and educational (the University of Ruse’s branch in Taraclia) spheres.
• Prospects for Euroscepticism in Bulgaria: Journalist Vladimir Mitev explains that, although there is Eurosceptic rhetoric in Sofia, Bulgaria will not follow Hungary’s radical model, as it lacks the economic resources required for an isolationist policy.
• The status of the Bulgarian community: To maintain good relations with Sofia, Chișinău has granted the Taraclia district special municipal status as part of the administrative reform, demonstrating adaptable regional diplomacy.

Video with auto-generated subtitles and voiceover in English

Programme

Intro

Presenter:

“Parallel 47. The Republic of Moldova on the world map.”

Mihai Mogîldea

Good evening, dear listeners! Speaking from the Radio Moldova studio, Mihai Mogîldea greets you and invites you to join us for a new episode of the programme ”Parallel 47”, produced in partnership with the Institute for European Policies and Reforms and the Konrad Adenauer Foundation.

Today we’ll be discussing how to overcome Hungary’s deadlock regarding the opening of the final negotiation chapters for Ukraine’s accession to the European Union, as well as the impact this has on the Republic of Moldova. We will also address the significance of Foreign Minister Mihai Popșoi’s official visit to Sofia for Moldovan-Bulgarian relations, and we will discuss the commemoration of the 25th anniversary of the terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001 and their repercussions on the international community. Joining me here in the Radio Moldova studio, as usual, is political analyst Mihai Isac. Mihai, good evening!

Mihai Isac

Good evening! Thank you very much for having me!

Mihai Mogîldea

During today’s programme, we will also be joined by telephone by Antonia Pup, a PhD researcher at the European University Institute, and Vladimir Mitev, a journalist and founder of the Romanian-Bulgarian portal ‘Podul Prieteniei’.

Hungary’s policy on Ukraine’s accession to the EU and the significance of this policy for the Republic of Moldova’s accession to the EU

Mihai, let’s begin with this rather critical speech, if I may say so, by the Hungarian political leader Péter Magyar regarding the opening of accession negotiations for Ukraine’s remaining chapters with the European Union. Recently, the Hungarian politician addressed this issue, stating explicitly that Ukraine must take a few more steps towards ensuring respect for the rights of the Hungarian community in Ukraine before Hungary will lift its veto on the opening of these negotiations.

This issue is also of major importance for the Republic of Moldova, because unless Hungary lifts its veto on Ukraine, we too will be unable to open accession negotiations on the remaining chapters. We recall that in June we secured a positive decision from the European states to open accession negotiations on the first clusters, and at that time there was considerable optimism that we would succeed in July in securing a favourable decision for the remaining clusters as well.

However, this has not happened.

Hungary once again appears to be putting a spanner in the works of this process and, it seems, the Republic of Moldova is trying to find a compromise solution. Just today, President Maia Sandu spoke on the phone with Péter Magyar and, amongst the topics discussed, was our European path.

I would like to begin by clarifying this issue concerning Ukraine. This matter is frequently mentioned in the public sphere, though it is not always clear: what exactly is the issue regarding the Hungarian minority in Ukraine?

Mihai Isac

International cooperation is vital for providing more information, and Hungary has provided institutional support for the training of groups of civil servants — including those from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other local and central government bodies — with a view to their involvement in the European integration process and the more effective management of matters relating to these issues. However, when it comes to Kyiv’s relationship with its own minorities, there are issues that have been highlighted previously, including in the context of discussions between Romania and Ukraine. Historically, the Transcarpathian area (the Transcarpathia region), which also encompasses part of historic Maramureș, has been the subject of territorial claims by the Hungarian side. This region, also known as Ruthenia, was ruled by the medieval Kingdom of Hungary and by Poland; it subsequently became part of the Habsburg Empire, then became part of Czechoslovakia — being the area where Romania shared a direct border with that state — was subsequently occupied by the Hungarians during the Second World War, and later returned to the Soviet Union, in accordance with the peace treaties concluded at the end of the Second World War.

A significant Hungarian community lives in that region, and there are also Romanian and Slovak ethnic communities; there is also a population that identifies as Ruthenian/Rusyn. Since the 1990s, this region has always posed a problem for the government in Kyiv, both because of the situation of the Hungarian community and the actions of certain radical pro-Russian groups in the region. The Kingdom of Hungary pursued an active policy of settling ethnic Hungarians in the region during its rule, and today we are, of course, seeing the consequences of this policy, with Budapest demanding that Ukraine respect certain rights.

This is where the dispute between the two sides arises: which rights must be protected, where do these rights end and where do obligations begin. As we know, the Orbán government has always used this mechanism of minority protection as a weapon against other states over the years, including Romania, Slovakia and Serbia. However, according to the Ukrainian Constitution, which has not yet been brought into line with European standards, there is still a great deal to be done in this regard.

Mihai Mogîldea

We are talking about a community of around 60,000–70,000 ethnic Hungarians who currently live in Ukraine, in this region. Among the requests coming from Budapest are those relating to the operation of Hungarian-language schools, the use of the Hungarian language in school administration, the possibility of sitting examinations in Hungarian and, of course, the use of the Hungarian language at a local level. An agreement was reached with Ukraine in June, as you mentioned, which contained a series of commitments undertaken by Ukraine. On the one hand, Ukraine says it has made progress on these commitments. On the other hand, Hungary is not satisfied and does not wish to give Ukraine a vote of confidence regarding the latest round of negotiations. 

How long do you think this situation will last? Beyond these stated positions, what does Hungary really want? Are we once again talking about a strategy of blackmail directed at the European Union, through which it seeks to gain access to European funds or certain privileges in its relationship with the European Union? Or is it rather about the bilateral relationship with Ukraine, in which it is trying to dig its heels in and demonstrate its desire to set the tone for this relationship?

Mihai Isac

We can speak of Hungarian ambitions on both fronts. First and foremost, we are talking about the continuation of the Orbán model in relations with Brussels, a model that is gaining followers in the Balkans as well. We are looking at certain statements and actions by the government in Sofia, and the new prime minister wants much easier access to a range of European financial resources and wants the Hungarian state, in future, to no longer be affected by other opposing positions that Budapest might wish to adopt on various issues, such as migration, nuclear energy or relations with the Russian Federation. Furthermore, for the Hungarian electorate, the situation of ethnic Hungarian minorities outside Hungary’s borders has always been a sensitive issue, exploited for electoral gain by former Prime Minister Orbán. In practice, Hungary has carried out a veritable special operation to issue passports to ethnic Hungarians — and others — in the regions it historically claims, following the Treaty of Trianon, when regions such as Transylvania and Banat became part of Romania and were reunited with the rest of the historical Romanian provinces.

This is how I saw Vojvodina becoming part of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia at the time, but after the 1990s Hungary sought to exploit these sensitivities and carried out, as I was saying, a relentless campaign to issue passports.

The Orbán government implemented a strategy to establish veritable parallel administrative entities in certain regions and, naturally, this entire effort also resulted in the emergence of conflicts, such as the one we are witnessing in the Transcarpathian region. Following the accession of Romania and Hungary to the European Union, the issue of the rights of the Hungarian minority in Romania was clarified.

In addition to this Hungarian community, we must emphasise that there are approximately 500,000 ethnic Romanians living in Ukraine — in historic Maramureș, in the Chernivtsi region of northern Bukovina, in the Herța region, and in southern Bessarabia — and we also have significant communities in Ukraine’s major cities. We also have several hundred thousand ethnic Bulgarians living there, the so-called Bessarabian Bulgarians (we too have a significant community of Bessarabian Bulgarians in the south). We also have Polish and Belarusian communities.

So, in Ukraine, this relationship between the central authorities and minorities is affected by certain particularities and, above all, by the way in which Moscow manages to exploit these differences to undermine relations between Kyiv and the parent states, because we also see the issue surrounding the church. Generally speaking, the Ukrainian state is wary of setting a precedent that could subsequently be used by the Russian Federation to weaken the Ukrainian state from a legislative standpoint. Over the years, there have been several plans to grant autonomy to that region, supported, of course, by the Russian Federation. Hungary is attempting, by making use of this numerically rather small minority — we are talking about 60,000–70,000 people, which is practically a third of the Botanica district — to achieve its aims. But it is also a matter of the Hungarian Prime Minister not being able to afford to appear weak in the eyes of the European Union.

Mihai Mogîldea

Let’s return to our own country and how we should approach this issue. So, as I mentioned earlier, we have two out of the six clusters that we have opened to date: Cluster 1 (Fundamental Values), opened on 15 June, and Cluster 6 (External Relations), opened on 14 July.

Broadly speaking, these two clusters relate to fundamental values, justice, the fight against corruption, good governance, home affairs, as well as international trade relations and foreign and security policy. There remain four further very important clusters relating to the economy, the internal market, agriculture and the environment — areas of absolute priority for the negotiation process.

However, as I was saying, this delay is evident. Our timetable was much more ambitious; the statements coming from Chișinău were more ambitious, and the aim was to finalise this process of opening negotiations by cluster by the end of the summer.

This was not achieved due to Hungary’s obstruction. As early as July, there were attempts to finalise this process, and even then Hungary expressed its opposition. Now, at this week’s meeting, the same thing has happened, and we can see that Chișinău is trying to find ways to break the deadlock. I was referring to the discussion held today by President Maia Sandu, during which several issues were addressed: bilateral relations with Hungary, our European path and the security situation in the region. What do you think our strategy and approach should be to ultimately break the deadlock, bearing in mind that we are not directly involved in this issue between Hungary and Ukraine, but the impact is felt here and, it seems, we are once again finding ourselves in the same rather complicated situation we were in last year, until the political context in Hungary allowed for a slightly different approach regarding the enlargement of the European Union?

Mihai Isac

As I was saying, we have seen an interesting strategy adopted by Chișinău in its relations with the government in Budapest. Even though Budapest was launching harsh attacks on Kyiv almost weekly, I have not identified any sign in the public statements of senior Hungarian officials that they would oppose the integration of the Republic of Moldova. At the moment, we may appear to be a collateral victim of this situation. It is important that we continue to implement the technical aspects, so that when the political go-ahead is given to open negotiations on these clusters, we are prepared.

The European Union is currently seeking ways to break the deadlock in the negotiations, including by decoupling the Republic of Moldova from Ukraine. There is opposition within the European Union to this process from certain Member States, including the Baltic states and certain Western countries, and a decision to decouple could be exploited by Russian Federation propaganda to undermine good relations in the region. However, we must be aware that politics also involves tough decisions. It is extremely important that we continue the reform process and do not hide behind the complications in relations between Kyiv and Budapest. But this is also a wake-up call for the Republic of Moldova: our country must step up the process of creating a framework for bilateral diplomacy that will operate at full capacity in the coming years. We cannot have good relations with Brussels alone; we must have good relations with Lisbon, Valletta, Nicosia and Denmark. It is important that the Republic of Moldova’s issues are known to the world, so that we do not become victims of other countries’ domestic political situations in the future.

Moldovan-Bulgarian relations in the context of Moldovan Foreign Minister Mihai Popșoi’s visit to Sofia

Mihai Mogîldea

An important issue concerns our country’s relationship with Bulgaria, given that there is openness in Sofia to deepening ties with the Republic of Moldova; however, at the same time, following the formation of the new government, there are also some voices suggesting that Bulgaria might adopt a more Eurosceptic stance in the coming period and strengthen its bilateral relations with the Russian Federation. There have been indications to this effect; we will see to what extent this is true or not. We are discussing this topic over the phone with journalist Vladimir Mitev, founder of the Romanian-Bulgarian portal ‘Podul Prieteniei’. Mr Mitev, good evening!

Vladimir Mitev

Good evening!

Mihai Mogîldea

Mr Mitev, Foreign Minister Mihai Popșoi was in Sofia this week. He held several meetings with Bulgarian officials, during which they discussed our bilateral relations, including economic and political aspects, the reform of local public administration and the situation regarding Taraclia, as well as the Bulgarian community in the Republic of Moldova. In this context, I would like to ask you how Sofia views the Republic of Moldova’s prospects for accession to the European Union and the areas of interest to Bulgaria in its cooperation with our country?

Vladimir Mitev

From what I have observed and what has been discussed in recent years, Sofia is a firm supporter of the Republic of Moldova’s accession to the EU. For example, we saw this summer that the Foreign Minister in Sofia proposed an exchange of experience and support regarding accession and reforms – in other words, for Bulgaria to share its experience of accession.

Furthermore, I can see that Bulgaria has interests in several areas concerning the Republic of Moldova. Of course, from a geopolitical perspective, I believe it clearly supports EU accession. I see economic interests in several sectors, for example in the energy sector. We can see that, recently, a Bulgarian company has been supplying natural gas to the Moldovan market.

I also see that Bulgaria, through this route known as the Vertical Corridor, is set to play a more significant role in the south-to-north supply of natural gas – that is, from these liquefied natural gas terminals in Greece to Moldova and Ukraine.

It was even mentioned this week, during Mr Popșoi’s visit to Sofia, that it is time to see more Bulgarian investment in Moldova. I, for one, know that one of the Moldovan banks has Bulgarian capital, so we can imagine that, alongside political relations — which seem to me to be very good — we can also expect a strengthening of economic ties.

Furthermore, Bulgaria has close ties with the community in southern Moldova, where ethnic Bulgarians live. There has been talk in recent years — including as far back as the Zhelyazkov government — that this collaboration linked to the University of Ruse, which has opened a branch in Taraclia, is supported by both sides, in the sense that it is hoped the Europeanisation so desired by the Moldovan state and the citizens of Moldova will somehow come about through the education provided by this university.

So, if I may summarise the informal discussions and based on what is being reported in the media, I can say that it is not only Moldovans who are pleased to be welcomed in Sofia; it seems to me that in Bulgaria, too, the fact that there is an open door to the Republic of Moldova in many respects, across various projects and prospects, is appreciated.

Radev and his sovereignty

Mihai Mogîldea

The Prime Minister-designate, who was chosen following the parliamentary elections, has often taken a different stance in relation to the European Union and the North Atlantic Alliance; he has at times not shied away from expressing his opposition to the views put forward by the two organisations and has frequently been labelled as more Eurosceptic, if we may put it that way. I would like to ask you how you view these concerns today – namely, that Bulgaria might follow the path taken by Hungary under Viktor Orbán and, over time, become a closer ally of the Russian Federation? At the same time, what is the risk of more Eurosceptic views emerging within the Bulgarian government – views which could affect us too, given that we are in the process of joining the European Union?

Vladimir Mitev

If I had to be very brief, the answer would be that Bulgaria will do what it is permitted to do, and membership of the European Union and Euro-Atlantic structures imposes certain limits on Bulgaria too. I believe Bulgaria will not go beyond what its resources allow, and in this context, I can elaborate on my answer a little.

When the elections took place in April 2026, both in Hungary and in Bulgaria, I spoke with Ștefano Bottoni, a Hungarian analyst who is well-known in Romania and across the Romanian-speaking world in general.

I also spoke with Sergiu Mișcoiu, one of Romania’s leading analysts, asking whether we could expect a ‘new Orbán’ to emerge in the region. Both said it was impossible, and the logic was simple: the resources available to Hungary or to Orbán personally are not available to anyone else in the region.

Of course, it is a fact that certain positions taken by Radev are causing concern, and pro-European elites and intellectuals in Bulgaria are challenging certain actions with increasing depth and severity. But, at the same time, if we look at actions rather than just words, we can see that support for Ukraine — for example, arms deliveries — continues via private traders. We can see that Bulgaria is not blocking or vetoing any European Union decisions regarding Ukraine. For the time being, it seems to me that Radev is rather increasing the rhetorical ambiguity, which is probably acceptable in some respects in the current era, when the international context itself is not permanently fixed on opposition. On the other hand, it seems to me that Bulgaria is still doing what it needs to do. Personally, I am still banking on the fact that Bulgaria will not make such abrupt moves. There may be talk, but Bulgaria has strategic interests regarding North Macedonia and I do not believe it will allow itself, as a state, to open up other fronts – for example, by alienating other allies or partners in the region.

So it seems to me that Bulgaria has certain resources, but what Hungary was doing and the resources Hungary had cannot, in my view, be compared with what Bulgaria has. Hungary has major Chinese and American investments. In Bulgaria, we are only now seeing a delegation visit China; it seems to me that the economic momentum in this regard is only just beginning to improve slightly. For the time being, it seems to me that we are still a long way from a situation where Bulgaria has an economic dynamic that would allow it to be so independent of Western Europe.

So, of course, theoretically, the situation could deteriorate, as you say, but it seems to me that there is still some way to go before that happens. I am also counting on the fact that Bulgarian leaders are thinking through their actions and will not take decisions that would jeopardise their prospects for the future.

Mihai Mogîldea

Mr Mitev, thank you very much for this first-hand information from Sofia, and we look forward to welcoming you back here at Radio Moldova.

Vladimir Mitev

Thank you too.

The significance of Moldovan-Bulgarian relations (Mihai Isac’s perspective)

Mihai Mogîldea

Dear friends, we are continuing our discussions in the Radio Moldova studio. Mihai, so Bulgaria is a country we must pay attention to today, especially given the precedent of North Macedonia — a country whose accession process remains blocked to this day due to constitutional amendments demanded by Bulgaria. There is a fairly significant Bulgarian community in North Macedonia, and Sofia’s demand for the recognition of the Bulgarian minority in the Constitution is blocking North Macedonia’s accession to the European Union.

We, it seems, have so far played this card of bilateral relations with Bulgaria rather skilfully and have managed to accommodate, in practical terms, these requests from Bulgaria regarding Taraclia (we recall the status of the university operating there). Today, Bulgaria is paying particular attention to the status of Taraclia in the context of local government reform, and we know that, as already announced by our government, Taraclia will have the status of a municipality, which differs from that of the other districts in our country.

I would like to ask you how you view the current state of affairs in these bilateral relations with Bulgaria and, to some extent repeating the question asked earlier, whether there is a risk that Bulgaria might drift towards a more Eurosceptic stance and, at some point, impose certain conditions on Chișinău, which could complicate our path to accession to the European Union?

Mihai Isac

There is a saying, found in various forms in all the world’s languages: ‘never say never’. We cannot presume to know what actions the government in Sofia will take in a year or two’s time. We know that, at present, Bulgaria is not among the states that would oppose the Republic of Moldova’s European integration.

It is true that Bulgaria is extremely important for the Republic of Moldova, being its fifth or sixth largest trading partner within the European Union. Bulgaria is a country well known to many of our listeners as a holiday destination. At the same time, Bulgaria offers tens and hundreds of scholarships every year to ethnic Bulgarians (and others) from the Republic of Moldova. We have significant communities in Plovdiv and Sofia; I know them personally because I also studied in this Balkan country.

Mihai Mogîldea

But there are also many Bulgarian citizens here, in our country, who hold dual citizenship.

Mihai Isac 

Absolutely!

Before Romanian legislation became more lenient regarding the process of regaining Romanian citizenship, the option of Bulgarian citizenship represented, for many of our citizens, a route to the West. There are currently no very clear statistics regarding the number of Bulgarian citizens on the territory of the Republic of Moldova, but this figure certainly exceeds the number of those who declared themselves to be of Bulgarian ethnicity in the last census.

There are very good historical ties. Let us not forget that the army which liberated Bulgaria during the War of Independence (the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878) set out from Chișinău. The first modern-era secondary school teaching in Bulgarian was established in Bolgrad, when this territory belonged to the Romanian Principality of Moldova.

We have a great many historical ties and, of course, we also need to develop our trade relations. This is a sore point for us: the Republic of Moldova ought to be much more active on the Bulgarian market.

However, Minister Popșoi’s visit and President Maia Sandu’s discussions with regional leaders demonstrate the Republic of Moldova’s ability to pursue, when the will is there, intelligent diplomacy. It is extremely important that the Republic of Moldova does not become a victim of internal political conflicts in Denmark, France or other European states. We know what passions Ukraine’s accession process has stirred up in the Netherlands — there was even a referendum a few years ago, in which the majority of the Dutch electorate opposed Ukraine’s European integration. It is precisely these lessons that Chișinău must learn. Moldova’s problems need to be understood, as I was saying, in Lisbon, in Nicosia and in Paris. We must not look at a map solely in terms of a country’s economic, political, military or demographic significance. Just as we go with an open heart to the Baltic states — Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia — so too must we go to other European countries. Especially as Bulgaria is a necessary ally, particularly given that there is increasing discussion about linking the Republic of Moldova with the Western Balkans.

Photograph: Bulgarian Foreign Minister Velislava Petrova-Chamova (right) and her Moldovan counterpart, Mihai Popșoi (left) (source: YouTube)

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