Vladimir Mitev
Table of contents
Event overview
On May 30, 2026, the Canetti House in Ruse hosted a screening of the film “Why Me?” directed by Tudor Giurgiu. The event was jointly organized by the Elias Canetti International Society, the Bulgarian-Romanian blog “The Bridge of Friendship,” and the Bucharest-based organization “Urban rolls.”
The screening was followed by a discussion between journalist Vladimir Mitev, the audience, and Romanian expert on good governance Codru Vrabie, focusing on judicial reform, the fight against corruption, and the role of the young elites and the secret services in Romania.
Key points from the discussion
1. Realism and historical context of the film “Why Me?”
- The real-life basis: The film reflects the actual structure of the Romanian system in the late 1990s and early 21st century, which elevated young and inexperienced people to high positions. The prototype for the main character is prosecutor Cristian Panait (who committed suicide), and the case involves fuel smuggling by a businessman from Satu Mare who had financed the campaign of then-Prime Minister Adrian Năstase.
- The generational shift: Between 1997 and 1998, Justice Minister Valeriu Stoica carried out a reform to remove personnel linked to the former communist secret police (Securitate) through early retirement. This created a vacuum that was filled by young lawyers (such as Cristian Panait, Victor Ponta, Robert Kazanchuk, and Ovidiu Budușan), whose career paths and personal lives subsequently took radically different turns.
- The “Buduşan” Case: Prosecutor Ovidiu Buduşan uncovered illegal campaign financing for Ion Iliescu and Adrian Năstase from France. Because he bypassed official ministerial channels when requesting evidence, he was sanctioned by Năstase, and the anti-corruption unit was shut down. Years later, Budușan was reinstated by the court, after which he resigned and became a lawyer.
2. Monica Macovei’s Reform and the Independence of Magistrates
- Changing the Status Quo: Codru Vrabie points out that the most important achievement of Justice Minister Monica Macovei (2004–2007) was the affirmation of prosecutors’ independence through words and unequivocal messages.
- Constitutional Equality: Thanks to the 2003 constitutional amendments (originally introduced under Năstase), prosecutors and judges became equal within the Superior Council of Magistracy (SCM). Macovei instilled confidence in prosecutors with the call “Don’t answer the phone”, which gave them the courage to stop carrying out political orders. She also shut down the compromised secret service of the judicial system—SIPA.
3. “The Golden Age” and the Freeze on Anti-Corruption
- Achievements and Criticisms: Romania undergoes a period of intense anti-corruption efforts under the leadership of Laura Kövesi (head of the DNA), culminating in convictions for numerous ministers and the prime minister.
- The Secret Protocols: This success (over 90% conviction rate), however, was accompanied by secret cooperation protocols between the judiciary and the intelligence service (SRI), which were revealed in 2017–2018. Despite political speculation about a “parallel state,” none of these convictions has been overturned by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in Strasbourg.
- Political Response and Decline: Social Democratic Party leader Liviu Dragnea used the rhetoric of the “parallel state” and, through Justice Minister Tudorel Toader, exploited a constitutional loophole. The Constitutional Court ruled that prosecutors are subordinate to the minister, leading to the forced dismissal of Kövesi by President Klaus Iohannis and a subsequent decline in anti-corruption efforts.
4. The Current Situation and the “Leaders in Justice” Program
- The New Freeze: After 2022, the laws were changed, and once again, young, unprepared personnel without permanent status (on temporary assignment) are being placed at the top of the system. The system of temporary secondments lasting 3–5 years in the courts, the prosecutor’s office, and the police makes these personnel vulnerable to political control and influence from the secret services, which sparked civil protests in December 2025.
- The Alternative: As a trainer in the “Leaders in Justice” program of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, Codru Vrabie prepares young lawyers from Romania and Moldova for leadership, management, and teamwork. The goal is to build a “humane justice system” based on values, virtues, and professional cooperation.
5. Comparison between Romania and Bulgaria
- In Romania, prosecutors have the status of magistrates, equal to judges under the Constitution, which gives them a legal basis to resist political pressure and seek redress in Strasbourg or Luxembourg.
- Unlike in Romania, in Bulgaria the collegiums of judges and prosecutors are strictly separated, and Bulgarian prosecutors do not enjoy the same constitutional independence from political authority. Over time, however, the Romanian Supreme Court of Magistrates has also been functionally divided into two sections, bringing it closer to the Bulgarian model.
Discussion’s transcript
General remarks
On 30 May 2026, Tudor Giurgiu’s film “Why Me?” was screened at the “Canetti” House in Ruse, as part of a joint event organized by the International “Elias Canetti” Society, the Bulgarian organization “Urban Rollsl”—based in Bucharest, which organizes film screenings in Romania’s capital—and the Bulgarian-Romanian blog “The Bridge of Friendship.” The screening was followed by a discussion with Romanian good governance expert Codru Vrabie, who answered questions from journalist Vladimir Mitev and the audience regarding Romania’s fight against corruption, judicial reform, and the role of the young elite in the judicial system.
The film Why Me? and real-life developments
Vladimir Mitev:
My first question: what exactly in the film is true and what isn’t… I’m referring to the system, not the personal story. The personal story is a tragedy. We won’t discuss the personal story. But there are systemic issues in the film. For example, the end credits mention the Ministry of Justice’s secret service—SIPA—which was disbanded by Monica Macovei.
There was even—if you will—the fact that Laura Kövesi said a week or two ago about Nicușor Dan: “I wish him a very good night’s sleep.” And the prosecutor general in the film told the young prosecutor the same thing—that he needs to sleep.
So, there are probably many true elements in the film. But, certainly, given that you lived through that period and met with Panait and other people from those same institutions, perhaps you can say to what extent the relationships and conflicts in the film are real, and to what extent they are exaggerated or invented?
Codru Vrabie:
The general structure of a system that promotes very young people to important positions and entrusts them with difficult tasks is true. That is a reality. It was true from 1997–1998 until 2004–2005. And it’s becoming true again starting around 2021–2022.
It may be true that there were such cases at the prosecutor’s office that were ordered. But this, of course, can only truly be confirmed if the ministers themselves—who may have given these instructions—speak out about it.
There is a real-life story—not only regarding the death of this prosecutor, but also the fact that there was a businessman who, however, is not from Oradea, as shown in the film, but in real life is from Satu Mare—also a region near Hungary. And the prosecutor’s name is Lele, not Leca.
This businessman was involved in smuggling gasoline, diesel, and fuel oil between Ukraine, Hungary, and Romania, causing significant losses at the time due to unpaid taxes to the state. Furthermore, this businessman is funding the prime minister’s campaign, whom we saw in the film.
I don’t know if there’s anything else, but many elements fit together and seem to match what is shown in the film. I don’t know if the reasons Panait was pressured are the ones described in the film. In my opinion, we cannot say that Panait committed suicide for the reasons shown in the film.
The movie’s context
Vladimir Mitev:
What was the sociopolitical context in Romania at that time?
Codru Vrabie:
Yes, perhaps it’s important to also describe the context in Romania—in politics, the judiciary, and the security apparatus in the late 1990s, as well as during 2004–2005. Because between 1996 and 2000, reformers were in power. The Minister of Justice at that time (Valeriu Stoica) carried out a major reform among the judiciary. The aim of the reform was to remove from within the system the veteran judges and prosecutors who had ties to the Securitate. The approach taken was to offer them the opportunity to retire early, with only 25 years of service in the judiciary.
Thus, they were allowed to retire with just 25 years of service—that is, earlier than usual. When these individuals were dismissed or removed in 1997–1998, it became necessary to bring young people into the system, but there weren’t very many of them. There are young professionals in the system, but not that many. So, without much experience or seniority, they end up at the top of certain state institutions without having gone through the necessary steps to get there. I believe there are four interesting examples of such people from this period.
One is Cristian Panait. Another is Victor Ponta, who appears in the film under the name Vlad Popa (if we’ve correctly deciphered the director/screenwriter’s artistic license). This is the colleague who shows up at Panait’s office at the end and tells him that an investigation is beginning. The third and fourth are Robert Cazanciuc and Ovidiu Budușan.
Why am I giving these examples? Because their paths are very different. These are examples that unfolded in very different ways.
Panait committed suicide. Ponta and Cazanciuc continued to serve at the time within the General Prosecutor’s Office in Bucharest and then began to move on to other institutions. Ponta aligned himself with the then-prime minister, Năstase. He left the Prosecutor’s Office to join the Social Democratic Party, where Adrian Năstase was president. Years later, he became prime minister—serving from 2012 to 2015. Subsequently, he joined the ranks of the sovereignists.
Robert Cazanciuc moved from the Prosecutor’s Office to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where he maintained ties with the Court of Justice of the European Union. He then joined the Social Democratic Party as well. And now he is a senator. I believe he is currently serving his third or fourth term as a senator for this party. He exhibits a slight tendency toward sovereignty.
Ovidiu Budușan is another case—perhaps even the most interesting one, I would say, if I may comment. Panait was supposed to head the investigations department, while Budușan was supposed to lead the unit for combating organized crime and corruption. Buduşan uncovered illegal funding from France for Ion Iliescu’s election campaign (and possibly Adrian Năstase’s as well). Buduşan reveals that there was illegal funding for the campaigns of Năstase and Iliescu, with the funds coming from individuals in France.
Part of the dossier compiled by Buduşan regarding the illegal funding pertains to bank transactions. Buduşan’s investigation is linked to what is coming from France. This investigation—which in the film simply becomes the “Lele” or “Leca” case—also emerges, in a way, from Buduşan’s probe. And at the beginning of the film, we saw tanker trucks carrying gasoline. These relate to the illegal financing of the election campaign. And this is the connection between Budușan and Panait.
The procedure used by Budușan involves a direct request from the Romanian prosecutor to the French prosecutor to obtain evidence through a “letter rogatory.” The problem is that, in principle, the prosecutor was supposed to go through official channels—via the Minister of Justice, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the relevant ministries in France. Budușan should have followed the standard procedure—contacting the Romanian Minister of Justice, then the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and then the relevant foreign and justice ministries in France. Instead, he sought direct contact with the prosecutor in France.
As a result of this investigation, he was sanctioned. Adrian Năstase found that procedural violations had occurred and disciplined the prosecutors, completely dismantling the organized crime and anti-corruption division. Thus, following Năstase’s reform, Budușan no longer heads any division and is no longer a prosecutor of any kind.
Consequently, new people are entering the judicial system during this period. The idea is to get rid of the Securitate—don’t forget that. The new elites are to replace the old ones. Some of the newcomers achieve good results—such as Budușan. Others are manipulated and enter politics. Still others are so manipulated that they become paranoid and leave the system.
The path Budușan set out on created a rift in the system, which, after more than a decade, led to Năstase ending up in prison, targeted by the Special Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office—an agency he himself had created.
Years later, Budușan won his court cases and, as a result, was reinstated as a prosecutor. After being reinstated, he said “thank you” and resigned. He became a lawyer specializing in criminal law. One of the people he defended was Dinu Patriciu, who also had ties to the fuel deal.
Monica Macovei’s reforms
Vladimir Mitev:
I understand the context of that period. What is Monica Macovei doing to ensure that prosecutors and judges feel independent and can begin this fight against corruption—the one we were following here 10–14 years ago, when we used to say how advanced Romanians were because they were convicting their politicians and sending them to prison? What has Monica Macovei actually changed, what measures has she taken, what has she done to ensure independence among the judiciary?
Codru Vrabie:
Monica Macovei has changed only one thing—words. And I don’t mean that in a pejorative sense. The change was essential. And here I must say that I am by no means a supporter of Monica Macovei. In early 2005, we had a falling out. And it was such a serious falling out that we haven’t spoken to each other in 21 years. But I acknowledge that she brought about a major change—through her words.
I’ll start from the beginning. I’m talking about processes that have been unfolding over many years. In 2003, Adrian Năstase called for a referendum to amend the Constitution. So, once again—something that takes years. In 2003, Adrian Năstase initiated a referendum to amend the Constitution.
One of the articles of the Constitution, amended in 2003, specifically refers to the Superior Council of Magistracy. And what is important to note today is that the text of the Constitution now provides that the Superior Council of Magistracy is composed of judges and prosecutors. This means that, under the Constitution—again, starting in 2003—judges and prosecutors are on an equal footing. Before 2003, this was not the case. Until 2003, the Superior Council of the Judiciary consisted only of judges and politicians. Until 2003, this Superior Council of the Judiciary consisted solely of politicians and judges. Then, prosecutors and judges became equals within this Superior Council of the Judiciary.
The result is that you can no longer take Panait’s case (or Panduru’s case) and assign it to Popa. In 2003, the Constitution was amended. In 2004, elections were held for the new Superior Council of Magistracy. These elections were followed by parliamentary and presidential elections.
Monica Macovei, in her capacity as a government minister, says that prosecutors are independent. They already have equal constitutional status. She tells the prosecutors: “You are now independent, because that is what the Constitution provides.” In 2007, an event took place in Bucharest: the MEDEL (European Magistrates for Democracy and Freedom) Conference, where the conference’s final document confirmed the independence of Romanian prosecutors as magistrates, equal to judges. Prosecutors are magistrates of justice and rights. The document confirms that Romanian prosecutors are equal to judges under the Constitution.
And it was not until 2007 that prosecutors realized they could be independent and that they did not have to answer when someone called them on the phone. These are exactly the words Monica Macovei used when she told prosecutors that they are independent: “You don’t have to answer the phone.” They understood that when politicians call them, they can choose not to answer.
Vladimir Mitev:
In December 2025, protests took place calling for judicial reform. On the frontline of the marches, there was a large banner that read: “Don’t pick up the phone” or “Don’t answer the phone.”
But other things happened before that. I saw one of these things in the film as well, at the end, in the closing credits: Monica Macovei disbands the judiciary’s secret service. Perhaps this is significant.
Codru Vrabie:
Monica Macovei dissolved SIPA, and this had a positive impact. As a result, prosecutors consolidated their independence and no longer faced problems.
During that period, there was a significant phase when Daniel Morar headed the DNA and Codruța Kövesi headed the General Prosecutor’s Office, after which they swapped positions. This was the period when many people within the system—especially prosecutors, but also judges, particularly judges—had the opportunity to prove their worth. Their leadership, in a sense, resulted in the independence of prosecutors.
The rise and fall of Romanian anti-corruption
Vladimir Mitev:
But we’ve now reached what I sometimes call the “golden age” of Romanian anti-corruption. Here in Bulgaria, we used to praise Romania because it had an entire cabinet of ministers—a wide variety of ministers from a wide variety of ministries, even the prime minister—who were going to prison. There were “visible results”—that is, convictions.
Nevertheless, I think it’s fair to say that the Romanian state not only convicted many of the “dinosaurs of the transition,” but it was also the very same state that halted the fight against corruption. This happened during Liviu Dragnea’s administration. At that time, the Constitutional Court ruled that prosecutors are subordinate to the Minister of Justice. This meant that the Minister of Justice could request and obtain Laura Kövesi’s resignation from the president. What do we need to know about this period?
Codru Vrabie:
During the time Laura Kövesi was head of the Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office, there was a secret cooperation protocol between the intelligence services (SRI—Romania’s main intelligence agency) and the judiciary, but we only learned about this agreement publicly in 2017 or 2018. This cooperation agreement was concluded before 2012—that is, before Laura Kövesi became chief prosecutor of the Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office.
There was a great deal of speculation in the press, but especially among politicians, that the success of Romania’s anti-corruption fight was due precisely to these secret protocols with the SRI. At the time, there was extensive coverage in the Romanian media suggesting that the successful anti-corruption campaign (it is worth noting that over 90% of the Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office’s cases resulted in convictions) was, in fact, due to the support of these intelligence services.
However, it is important to emphasize: not a single politician convicted during this period has managed to have their sentence overturned by the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. And this is important, because if there had been anything illegal about these protocols (or, more precisely, about the evidence obtained under these protocols), the Strasbourg Court would have “knocked them off their seats,” as we say here—that is, within five minutes it would have said: “Yes, you’re right, it’s illegal; you shouldn’t be in prison.” Nevertheless, the feeling has remained in the collective consciousness that the Romanian justice system—and especially the prosecution—is in cahoots with the secret police.
Vladimir Mitev:
In other words, the film we just watched suggested that the Romanian judicial system needs to free itself from the influence of the Securitate. But once the judges become independent, do the secret services start operating through the judicial system again?
Codru Vrabie:
I’ll try once more to provide some context for the trials that have been ongoing for years. In 2001, when the film was set, Valeriu Stoica’s reform had been completed, but Rodica Stanoiu had replaced him as Minister of Justice. She is portrayed in the film as a Securitate collaborator, complete with a corresponding code name. The reform had begun back then, but under her leadership at the ministry, it effectively came to a halt.
The argument that the secret services are once again controlling the judicial system resurfaced during the “glory days” of Social Democratic Party leader Liviu Dragnea. According to him, there was a parallel state, made up of secret services, that was directing the judicial system. I don’t know if this was something he truly believed, but it was presented as political rhetoric.
He is the most emblematic figure from the 2016–2018 period who supports the thesis that there is a parallel state that is not elected through elections. It runs parallel to the official one and simply exists. And he mobilizes support by claiming that he is fighting against it. This is why he set out to remove Kövesi. Because, according to his statement—whether we like it or not—Kövesi was the “representative” of the parallel state—that is how he describes Laura Kövesi, as a representative of this parallel state.
Dragnea is using Tudorel Toader, who was the Minister of Justice at the time. And Tudorel Toader managed, through the Constitutional Court, to bring back into discussion a provision of the Constitution that existed even before 2003. During the 2003 amendment, this article was not properly removed. He took advantage of some “junk” that had been left in the Constitution, swept under the rug, and lo and behold, this junk turned out to be useful to him. Here’s the kind of debris that has come to light.
Since the Constitution states that prosecutors operate under a certain form of supervision or control by the Minister of Justice, a ruling by the Constitutional Court was issued stating that they are subordinate to the minister and that the minister may intervene in the work of the prosecutor’s office. Consequently, he can even request Laura Kövesi’s dismissal, and he did request her dismissal from Klaus Iohannis. Klaus Iohannis was forced to sign. He had no right to an opinion. He simply received an order that Laura Kövesi must be dismissed…
The recent times and the judiciary
Vladimir Mitev:
Thus, following the rise of the Romanian anti-corruption movement, we arrive at its decline or stagnation, which continues through 2022, and then the resurgence is weak, with the politicians targeted by it now holding much lower positions than before.
Codru Vrabie:
After Laura Kövesi’s dismissal, the process of amending the laws governing the judicial system begins anew. As a result, after 2022, young people and new staff members return—people who are not prepared for top-level positions.
During Iohannis’s term, there is a return to the situation that existed before Macovei’s reforms. Thus, after Iohannis leaves office, there will be a demand for reform from Romanian society and, perhaps, from a segment of the judicial system.
The reason is that a significant portion of the positions and posts within the judicial system are held by individuals in delegated roles—that is, they are on secondment or have temporary status, not permanent appointments. They are young. They lack experience, and there is dissatisfaction in this regard, as no results are visible in the judicial system.
Vladimir Mitev:
This is a situation reminiscent of the one we started with—the one described in the film “Why Me?”—when fresh blood entered the institutions..
Codru Vrabie:
And here we return to the film, because in the first instance, when people like Budușan, Ponta, Cazanciuc, and Panait were appointed—they were appointed again. Even in the film, Panait asks his boss what’s happening with his secondment—is it being extended? In other words, we’re returning once again to the protests of December 2025. This is an echo of those assignments. In other words, right now in Romania—among both judges and prosecutors, and according to the Recorder documentary from a few days ago, we understand that this is also the case within the police force—this system of assignments has been in place for at least 3–4, if not 5, years. And this leads to a situation where those at the top of the judiciary, the prosecution service, and the police depend on politicians, for whom these assignments serve as an easy tool to control them.
The Leaders for Justice programme
Vladimir Mitev:
Here, I would like to note that Codru Vrabie is a trainer in the “Konrad Adenauer” Foundation’s “Leaders in Justice” program, which trains young legal professionals in Romania and the Republic of Moldova. In 2019, I watched the documentary “People of Justice”, which featured interviews with young lawyers from this program. It was from this film that I recalled the name of a prosecutor whose name had appeared in the media in connection with the Recorder documentary on the capture of the judiciary and the calls for judicial reform at the end of 2025. What can you say about the young legal professionals—graduates of the “Leaders in Justice” program—who have been part of the system for several years? What kind of change are they bringing about?
Codru Vrabie:
The prosecutor in this example was, for a time, the leader of a professional association—an association of prosecutors. She worked at the National Anticorruption Directorate (DNA) and was heavily attacked on television, in propaganda, and in politics. She handled the Teldrum case, for which Liviu Dragnea is still on trial. She was the prosecutor in that case. That is why she seems such a prominent figure. She drafted one of the indictments against Dragnea.
Vladimir Mitev:
Let me rephrase the question—what do you teach young lawyers in your role as a trainer? Or what distinguishes their work from that of previous generations in the judicial system?
Codru Vrabie:
I don’t teach them strictly legal matters. I teach them how to work together with their colleagues. I teach them about leadership and management.
The idea is for colleagues to work well, to leave work without feeling overwhelmed or exhausted, and to return the next day with a smile on their faces and a desire to work. And from a professional standpoint, they’ve managed to perform at such a high level. A prosecutor can’t work alone. They must work as part of a team with police officers. They must collaborate effectively with others. For example, a prosecutor needs to work well with police officers to carry out this work.
We also have graduates from the Republic of Moldova. One of the prosecutors—let’s call him Radu—told the story of how he managed to secure a conviction against a criminal. The man went to prison and served his sentence (I think it was six months). Then he came back and knocked on the door: “Good afternoon, Mr. Prosecutor. Thank you for sentencing me to spend six months here, because I did something wrong. The time I spent in prison taught me valuable lessons. And if I hadn’t been sent here, I probably would have killed someone.”
Because that is what human justice stands for. And to ensure things don’t go back to the way they were, we have the chance, step by step, to achieve human justice all the way to the highest levels of the system—whether through delegation or not. The system will become more humane.
The public asks: Q&A session
Vladimir Mitev:
(to the audience) Do you have any questions?
Kliment Zanov:
I have just one comment: I organized a screening of this film in Bucharest, attended by the prosecutor and the actor playing the lead role. During the discussion, I asked a question about the role of the secret services in the judicial system, and everyone was stunned. Then, the prosecutor admitted how difficult it is to make the system work. And the moderator of the discussion said that the country simply functions this way—through them.
We are struck by the fact that the discussion about this film, now south of the Danube, broadly addresses the influence of the secret services on the judicial system, whereas the discussion about it, when it took place to the north, focused mainly on the film itself and on the personal story.
Vladimir Mitev:
In my opinion, Romanians do not shy away from talking about their society’s security tendencies. In the media—for example, on platforms like “Recorder” or in other independent publications—there is a great deal of discussion about the secret services. There are also films about the influence of these institutions.
Codru Vrabie:
I have no qualms about speaking on this subject. The intelligence services exploit any vulnerability in people who are too young and unprepared, placed in positions too high for their capabilities. They understand perfectly well that the way people are selected determines everything—this is how they ensure their control over the system and take advantage of any convenient opportunity.
I can say that in the “Leaders in Justice” program, we take the opposite approach to selection. We look for people’s virtues. They gather for our course on Thursday afternoons, without knowing one another. And by Sunday afternoon, when they leave, they feel like lifelong friends, because they’ve realized that they’re united by the same values and qualities. And this is precisely due to the selection process.
So, there is a selection process based on weaknesses and one based on virtues.
Ivanka Șișova:
Can you compare the Bulgarian judicial system with the Romanian one?
Codru Vrabie:
I have three answers. The shortest answer is: “No.” Just one word. The slightly longer answer is: “I don’t know.” “I don’t know” is the longer answer. I also have an even longer one. I have an opinion. That is the third answer.
The system in Romania is unique in the EU. In the sense that in Romania, prosecutors and judges are equal. Whereas in Bulgaria, you have a separate college of judges and a college of prosecutors. The same is true in Moldova. In France and Italy, there are also investigating judges—things are a bit more complex there.
What was achieved and partially promoted by Dragnea between 2018 and 2022 was the division of Romania’s Superior Council of Magistracy, so that it no longer operates entirely jointly for judges and prosecutors. It now operates divided into two sections: the judges’ section and the prosecutors’ section. This is, in fact, similar to what you have in Bulgaria—the judges’ college and the prosecutors’ college. Romania’s Superior Council of Magistracy has been divided. The similarity between Romania and Bulgaria is that, gradually, these bodies have been separated in our country as well.
The difference, however, is that in Romania, prosecutors are magistrates under the Romanian Constitution. If a Bulgarian prosecutor wants to stand up to Bulgarian politicians, they will run into problems. In contrast, a Romanian prosecutor can attempt to do so on the basis of the Constitution. The Romanian prosecutor will have the Constitution’s backing, and even if they have to wait for years, they have a good chance of winning their cases in Strasbourg and Luxembourg. But the Bulgarian prosecutor has no chance of reaching Strasbourg or Luxembourg.
Vladimir Mitev:
This will be an opportunity to discuss serious issues more seriously. I hope you are satisfied. We will also consider other events of this kind. For now, have a pleasant evening!
Photo: Codru Vrabie (left) and Vladimir Mitev during the discussion in Ruse (source: Kliment Zanov)
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