Alexandru Drăgulin: Romania’s foreign policy is pragmatic

Vladimir Mitev, Mediapool, 26 May 2026

Summary

Here is a detailed summary of the interview with Alexandru Drăgulin, an expert at the Romanian Diplomatic Institute, regarding the dynamics of Romania’s foreign policy in the context of 2026:

1. The Foreign Policy of the Nicușor Dan Administration: Pragmatism and Balance

Although the first year of President Nicușor Dan’s term was marked by controversy (the cancellation of Europe Day, speeches with sovereignist undertones), Drăgulin believes that Romania will not make a radical change.

• Current stakes: Regional and transatlantic alliances are too well-established to allow for unilateral changes.
• The objective: A policy of balance that maintains integration into the EU (for financial and political reasons) and the strategic military partnership with the US (under the Trump Administration).
• Affinities: Romania is described as the most “pro-Trump” state in the region, historically adopting the American Republican model of governance.

2. The Three Seas Initiative (I3M) and the B9 Group

The expert analyzes two key summits held in Dubrovnik and Bucharest:

• Institutionalization of the I3M: The format is tending to become a regional organization with its own decision-making structures (including a parliamentary dimension and an expanded Business Forum).
• Regional Asymmetry: There is a major strategic gap between the Baltic Sea (maximum relevance) and the Black Sea. Drăgulin notes the absence of a clear U.S. or European strategy for the Black Sea, partly due to the U.S. pivot toward the Asia-Pacific region.
• North-South Axis: Romania is actively promoting transport and energy corridors (gas from the Neptun Deep field, LNG terminals in Greece) to complement the traditional East-West axis.

3. Relations with Neighbors: Hungary and Bulgaria

• Hungary (Péter Magyar): The regime change in Budapest is seen as a “mini-revolution.” Romania views the new Hungarian prime minister’s pragmatism and his proposal to create a “Visegrad Plus” format—which would remove Romania from its historical outsider status—positively.
• Bulgaria: The relationship is defined by a “symmetry of interests.” Although there are pro-Russian undertones in Bulgarian society rooted in cultural background, at the political level Sofia remains aligned with European values. Military cooperation (e.g., Black Sea mine clearance alongside Türkiye) is functioning optimally.
• Infrastructure: The slowdown in projects (the Giurgiu-Ruse Bridge) is viewed in Bucharest more as a technical issue of traffic flow management than a political one.

4. Ukraine: From Competition to Strategic Partnership

Drăgulin emphasizes the need to overcome the “inferiority complex” toward Kyiv.

• Delayed Institutionalization: The strategic partnership was signed only in 2026, after four years of war.
• Military Cooperation: It is urgent to sign agreements for the production of drones and anti-drone systems, a technology in which Ukraine has become highly proficient.
• Debunking myths: The expert criticizes Romanian sovereignist rhetoric, debunking the “besieged fortress” myth and emphasizing that the relationship is a win-win one, including regarding the rights of the Romanian minority.

5. Relations with Poland and Türkiye: Pillars of Security

• The Bucharest-Warsaw Axis: It has evolved from economic cooperation to a deep strategic alliance. Although Poland is more assertive and has greater resources, both states are “co-generators” of the Eastern Flank doctrine.
• Difference in style: Poland is often at odds with Brussels, while Romania prefers the profile of a “disciplined pro-European actor.”
• Türkiye: It remains a vital economic partner, but its ambivalent stance toward Moscow (the desire to share influence in the Black Sea with Russia) creates a divergence from the vision of Romania and Bulgaria.

Note: The analysis suggests that Romania is attempting to transition from the status of a “buffer zone” to that of a relevant Central European actor, integrated into infrastructure networks linking the Baltic, Black, and Aegean Seas.

Interview

Intro

Alexandru Drăgulin is a researcher and political science expert at the Romanian Diplomatic Institute. He provides consulting in areas such as good governance, democracy, and the rule of law in Europe, as well as contemporary politics and the history of Romania and its neighboring countries.

This interview was published in an abridged version on the Bulgarian website Mediapool on May 26, 2026.

Nicușor Dan’s Foreign Policy Line

Mr. Drăgulin, we are speaking at a time when the Romanian government is interim, and we are waiting to see who will lead the executive branch in Bucharest. At this moment, the significance of president Nicușor Dan’s role is growing, as he is expected to lead negotiations between the parties and appoint the new prime minister. However, Nicușor Dan has sent some signals to the public through recent controversies related to Europe Day. Europe Day was, so to speak, canceled—that is, it did not take place. He also made some statements that sounded somewhat sovereignist. If we look at the foreign policy of the Cotroceni Palace, to what extent is Nicușor Dan bringing about a change from the expectations that existed regarding him?

First of all, I don’t think Nicușor Dan is seeking to make a radical change in foreign policy. Rather, he doesn’t want to mark a turning point and is closely following his predecessor’s line. That’s because the stakes in foreign policy are very high. Already, the projects and alliances in which Romania is involved at the regional and transatlantic levels are far too deep-rooted and well-established for Romania to unilaterally make any shifts in its stance toward its allies. In short, I do not believe that Nicușor Dan wants to distance himself from certain European countries or the United States, or from the way European countries perceive NATO’s involvement on the eastern and western flanks or the relationship with Russia. Rather, Nicușor Dan wants to pursue a policy of balance: to maintain good relations with the European Union, to keep Romania integrated into the European Union at its current level and not to take any steps backward—given the country’s very difficult financial situation—but also to maintain the strategic partnership with the United States at the level established years ago. That is, to cooperate, first and foremost, politically and militarily. To cooperate politically in the sense that Romania adheres to the political values of the United States—the market economy, free enterprise, private property, human rights, individual rights, and so on—and to cooperate militarily through the U.S. presence in the country.

Romania, in general and in broad terms, supports American initiatives, provides support as needed, but does not cross any red lines, so as not to upset the balance with Europe. Now I would like to make another point regarding Nicușor Dan’s policy toward Europe. Europe is not a unified bloc when it comes to its stance toward Russia, toward the United States, or the views of European countries on various issues on its agenda, such as energy independence, relations with Russia, and so on. We see that there are certain European countries that wish to maintain a hardline stance toward Russia, such as Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—the Baltic states—and Poland, but there are also certain states that have not explicitly stated an irreconcilable position toward Russia, such as, for example, Germany. Germany has repeatedly stated that it is embarking on a major rearmament process, but it has not expressed hostility toward Russia.

So, regarding Nicușor Dan, I could say that he is pursuing a pragmatic policy. I would also like to comment on a statement in which he himself said that he does not prefer a strictly ideological approach in international politics. This is a good thing, because ideological approaches polarize, place you in a certain camp, and, inevitably, create certain rivals, so to speak.

Apart from relations with European regional blocs, there are already several informal groups of states in Europe. We have the group of the European Union’s founding countries—France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands—but we also have countries that have more recently formed informal blocs, such as the Nordic countries, the Baltic states, and Poland, which take much more decisive stances toward Russian foreign policy and Russia’s concept of the “near abroad.” There is a very hardline approach taken by Poland, the Baltic states, and the Nordic countries, and a somewhat more balanced approach taken by the traditional European powers. 

One more thing regarding Romania’s relationship with the United States: from what I’ve observed, historically speaking, Romania has adopted from the United States, first and foremost, the republican conception of governance and democracy. Of course, there are also certain factions that support Democratic ideas, but American republicanism has dominated the Romanian public sphere, and this is very evident now in the relationship with the Trump Administration. It is clear that MAGA ideas have found fertile ground in Romania. Romania is the most pro-Trump country in Eastern Europe, if not in Central Europe as well, to broaden the scope a bit. This ideological affinity is by no means recent.

The 2026 Three Seas Initiative Summit

Two summits were recently held in Dubrovnik and Bucharest, namely the Three Seas Initiative and the B9 group. What conclusions can you draw from these events, both from a Romanian perspective and in terms of regional politics in Central and Eastern Europe?

Let’s take them one at a time, chronologically. First, the Three Seas Initiative summit, and then the B9. We’ll address them in chronological order and conduct a logical analysis, because certain decisions from the B9 summit stem, in a way, from what was discussed at the Three Seas Initiative.

First of all, the Three Seas Initiative has been consolidated in terms of its structure and format of cooperation, in the sense that, alongside the meeting at the level of heads of state, a parliamentary meeting has also been established. A new level of cooperation has now been introduced, at the parliamentary level. However, in my opinion, this can be a major asset to this format because, as we well know, parliaments are the representative bodies of citizens in all democracies, whether they are parliamentary, presidential, or semi-presidential. This parliamentary meeting in Zagreb in March 2026 provided the Three Seas Initiative with additional political legitimacy and greater democratic representation. In parallel, aside from the parliamentary meeting, the Business Forum associated with the Dubrovnik summit has expanded into an important regional platform for the business community and strategic investments, continuing to benefit from strong political support.

The economic initiatives and business projects within the Three Seas Initiative would not be nearly as successful if they did not benefit from the political support of all the countries involved. Not all infrastructure projects within this framework include all countries. There are projects involving two, three, or four states; it is a collection of projects in a multilateral format. However, all this cumulative cooperation falls under the Three Seas Initiative. The format is moving toward institutionalization; it is moving away from being a mere framework for informal cooperation where transnational economic and infrastructure projects are discussed. It is moving toward becoming a regional cooperation framework with its own decision-making bodies, even if these are not yet highly developed. Thus, the Three Seas Initiative, which is par excellence a Central European initiative, benefits Romania. By participating in this initiative, Romania has, in a sense, regained the status of an outsider it held in the early 1990s, when it was denied entry into the Visegrad Group. This Three Seas Initiative means much more than the Visegrad Group, because it does not include only the Central European countries in that group, but is a much broader format, stretching from the Baltic Sea, through the Adriatic Sea, and reaching the Black Sea.

What would be the main problem within this initiative? Year after year, the same thing has been observed: for now, there is not the same strategic relevance among the three seas. The Baltic Sea tends to become increasingly relevant geostrategically, economically, and militarily. The Adriatic Sea is also keeping pace, with a certain lead. For now, however, there are no documents that clearly specify the vision and strategy for the Black Sea region. First and foremost, there is no document at the European level dedicated to the Black Sea. I say this because the Three Seas Initiative is, for the most part, under the auspices of the European Union; it has adopted from the European Union the political and economic values it cultivates at the regional level. Furthermore, there is no strategic document regarding the Black Sea from the Initiative’s most important ally outside the Union and outside Europe—namely, the United States of America. Unfortunately, I don’t think we’ll have an American strategy for the Black Sea anytime soon, because the U.S.’s geostrategic priorities have shifted. The U.S. has now shifted its focus to the Asia-Pacific region. This is exactly what the presidential advisor, Mr. Marius Lazurcă, stated recently, some time ago. He said that we must be realistic and accept that Romania is no longer a vital pillar of support for the United States, but we should not interpret this negatively. Simply put, cooperation and partnership continue, but the United States’ priorities have shifted; this is a matter of asymmetric cooperation, in which resources and initiatives belong to the stronger ally. Exactly the same thing is happening in the Black Sea.

The Three Seas Initiative currently lacks a clear format that would give it sufficient international authority, sufficient cohesion, and geostrategic relevance to be capable, on its own, of imposing a long-term strategy and vision for the Black Sea. This is precisely what is at stake in the cooperation. I also observed this year, at the meeting of heads of state and government, that there was much discussion about this gap in geostrategic relevance between the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea, but this is a topic that must also include discussions about the Adriatic Sea. Why not about Croatia’s role? Croatia, as has been clearly seen, is a small country but with a big foreign policy: it has initiatives, it has proposals, it is constantly present on the European agenda, and it wants to be involved in shaping foreign policy issues and approaches regarding Russia or the strategic future of the European Union.

As for Romania, it did not merely play the role of a spectator at this year’s meeting. Romania, on every occasion, had a say, put forward ideas, and reiterated the importance of continuing and completing ongoing projects. This year, Romania proposed placing greater emphasis on the north-south axis, stretching from the Baltic and Nordic countries to southern Greece. This north-south cooperation axis is not necessarily a response to the east-west axis, but rather a complement to it. The states along this north-south axis have already realized that it is necessary to supplement the development of the east-west axis with new transport corridors—for both economic goods and military infrastructure—from the Baltic states to Greece. The reason is very simple: strengthening the defensive flank against threats from Russia and Russian hybrid warfare. Here we are talking about the conventional threats faced by countries bordering Russia; we are talking about transport infrastructure, new industrial centers, highways, railways, and military cooperation.

In addition to the development of transport and regional connectivity along the north-south axis, energy security, of course, remains a priority. There is talk of north-south energy corridors, which remain a priority, and of liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals that are expected to come from Greece, from Alexandroupolis, and so on. From this perspective of energy security, Romania wants to play an even more important role than it does currently, given that gas production in the Black Sea, in the Neptun Deep block, is expected to begin in 2027. With natural gas security secured, Romania believes it can take this role seriously and even become a gas supplier to certain countries.

The 2026 B9 Summit

It was noted that the B9 summit saw low-level representation from the United States, as well as from some countries in the region, such as Hungary and Bulgaria. How is this signal being interpreted in Bucharest?

First of all, generally speaking, regarding high-level attendance at the B9 Summit, overall, this summit was a success in terms of cooperation, given the internal difficulties faced by certain countries. Let me not call them difficulties, but rather domestic political turmoil. Romania has an interim government with limited powers, but, on the other hand, the president is becoming the main actor in this context, and Hungary has not yet installed its new government. Péter Magyar’s new government promises a lot, from what I’ve seen—it promises a lot both domestically and internationally. I have gathered from the future prime minister’s statements that there will be a broad domestic reform and that Hungary’s positions within the EU Council will be clarified, both regarding Ukraine and Russia. In its policy, Hungary is already showing some signs of change. The fact that it accepted and waived its veto right against Ukraine regarding the European support package, in exchange for maintaining the Druzhba gas pipeline, is one example.

As for Bulgaria’s participation, I do not believe this signals a desire on its part to downplay this format of cooperation; rather, Bulgaria has deemed its presence at this level sufficient, given that relations with Romania and its other neighbors are already at a very advanced stage. I believe Bulgaria takes a bilateral approach with each of its neighbors. As for Bulgaria, we have recently held elections; we finally have a parliamentary majority and a government that will enjoy the support of a legislative majority and will finally clarify its foreign policy positions.

It is somewhat similar to the case of Hungary. Both countries are waiting to clarify their domestic policies and institutional arrangements following the elections, and then to return to their previous level of engagement on the international stage prior to these domestic political events. I do not believe this is a negative signal from Hungary and Bulgaria; it is simply a matter of the political context in both countries.

However, Hungary has raised expectations among its neighbors, and they expect it to be somewhat more aligned with the European Union’s policies toward Ukraine and the sanctions against Russia. However, these expectations must also be viewed through the lens of the government’s political vision. It is well known that Prime Minister Péter Magyar is a conservative, and a conservative is not typically open to radical innovations, but will make the changes necessary for the country to remain anchored in its alliances, in NATO, and in the EU. All in all, the B9 was a meeting that, in addition to being a success thanks to the co-organization by Poland and Romania, also brought benefits in terms of strengthening the cooperation format, the biggest benefit being, of course, the inclusion of the Nordic bloc. It is very possible that, in the future, this bloc of Nordic countries will be fully integrated into the B9.

Regarding Romanian-Hungarian relations, I have observed that, at the bilateral level, the ideological direction or the governments’ policies have not been the primary focus.

These Romanian-Hungarian relations are, first and foremost, pragmatic. The emphasis is on the technical aspects of cross-border cooperation, the Schengen Area, and the strengthening of transport corridors. In other words, the continuation of European integration. The cooperation has worked because, at the diplomatic level, these bureaucratic aspects have been prioritized. I do not foresee, in the future, a revolution, so to speak, in Romanian-Hungarian cooperation. Rather, the two governments will clarify the current state of relations, but it is expected that Hungary will become more involved in regional frameworks. Hungary is also a party to the Three Seas Initiative and the Central European Initiative—an initiative that is less discussed in the public sphere and whose presidency is currently held by Romania. We are observing, rather, how Hungary is trying to maintain its status as a Central European country par excellence, while Romania, in turn, is trying to shed this label of a peripheral country and buffer zone and to align itself more effectively both within the North-South framework and within the strategic Central European region. This is a clear development, relevant both geopolitically and geostrategically, and we must interpret it positively, because, aside from the fact that it clearly represents a break from the Orbán government’s position, we see that this time the initiative came from Hungary and Romania. In the early 1990s, as I mentioned earlier, Romania was in the position of an outsider and asked to be included in the Visegrad Group of Central Europe, but was refused. Now, the very same people who refused it are coming forward with a proposal to reinvigorate the idea of Central Europe. Prime Minister Péter Magyar proposes a reset and the creation of the Visegrad Plus Group. Romania must come up with a response to this proposal.

Péter Magyar’s proposal for a larger Visegrad Group

But what would that mean in concrete terms? What would change—not just in words and labels, but perhaps also in terms of the economy, culture, or geopolitics—if Magyar’s idea were to be realized?

A Central European country must be reevaluated in its relations with the traditional European powers—France, Italy, Spain, and Germany—from a historical perspective. Yes, Romania has had relations and a fruitful history of cooperation with France, for example, but we see that, at present, relations with France seem to have entered a phase of stagnation. Romania is betting on a reassessment of its relations with its neighbors—not only with its immediate neighbors, but also with countries with which it does not share a direct border, yet which are not very far away geographically.

Here I am referring to Central Europe, Greece, and the Western Balkans.

As for Central Europe, Romania has sufficient historical and political grounds to join this Visegrad Plus Group initiative, but most importantly, in major European Union decisions over the past years, Central European countries—and especially those in the Visegrad Group—have not voted as a bloc in the European Council. Each country has voted according to its own short-term interests and its own domestic policy agenda.

Perhaps Péter Magyar is proposing that this bloc of Central European countries achieve greater cohesion than it currently has. He will likely also propose a unified vote in the European Council on certain issues on the strategic agenda. So, I believe that Prime Minister Magyar will not only take a technical approach but will also seek to extend this approach to the political level.

However, I do not believe that Romania’s deeper integration into Central Europe will undo what has been achieved so far in relations with its southern and eastern neighbors. Relations will continue as before. And I would like to add one more thing: integration into Central Europe and the Westernization of Romania have been foreign policy objectives since the beginning of the transition, since the early 1990s, when a camp of pro-European intellectuals immediately formed in the country, which had the intuition to foresee the right path for Romania, namely an orientation toward the West and a calculated distancing from Russia. We are now waiting for a fully-fledged government to be formed in Bucharest and for the Hungarian government to begin its work, and then we will actually see what steps each side will take. Ideally, steps should be taken on both sides. It is important that there be a symmetrical approach from both the Hungarian and Romanian sides. The change of government in Hungary, after 16 years of Orbán’s rule, amounts to a mini-revolution.

And Romania views this change positively, doesn’t it?

Yes. It will depend on the Romanian side how it reacts to the Hungarian initiatives, which, in my view, are welcome.

Romanian-Bulgarian Relations

Okay. And if we look at Romanian-Bulgarian relations, what else might happen in these relations? Should we expect something new, or should we expect things to continue as they have been so far? Relations are going well in areas such as defense and security, but in other areas they seem to be progressing more slowly…

As for Romanian-Bulgarian relations, let’s take a look at the most important aspects one by one: first of all, at the political level, relations have gone very well, to the fullest extent possible, despite the political instability in both countries. Bulgaria, which has had 12 prime ministers in the last five years, has managed to maintain a very clear and consistent foreign policy line toward its neighbors, including Romania.

And Romania, despite internal political tensions—primarily between parties—has managed to separate domestic policy from foreign policy, in the sense that these tensions between parties have not been reflected in its relations with its neighbors. Ideally, we would have a government with ideological coherence, where foreign policy approaches are even more deeply aligned, but for now we are waiting to reach a consensus in Bucharest, and then Romanian-Bulgarian relations will become even stronger than they are today.

Romania’s cooperation with Bulgaria, aside from the infrastructure projects we have—which are absolutely necessary—should be complemented by economic dialogue. More broadly, economic cooperation between the two countries should be further supported by political and cultural cooperation. That is, it would be good to hold Romanian-Bulgarian bilateral meetings more frequently, at a high level, involving prime ministers or even heads of state. At this moment, a discussion between President Nicușor Dan and the new Bulgarian prime minister would be welcome; or a discussion between interim Prime Minister Bolojan and Prime Minister Rumen Radev would be useful, not necessarily to come up with new ideas or to revolutionize the strategic partnership or to express innovative positions, but to consolidate what we already have in the process of implementation.

At the bilateral level, Romania and Bulgaria have a somewhat symmetrical relationship: they are two states with clear positions regarding the international context, regarding what is happening in the eastern neighborhood, and regarding relations with the United States, both Romania and Bulgaria insist on maintaining advanced cooperation with the Trump Administration.

Regarding the new political leadership in Sofia, the Romanian press has suggested that it has a pro-Russian orientation. I do not believe that Bulgaria supports Russian aggression in Ukraine, by any means, but this pro-Russian nuance draws its strength from historical ties. The historical argument in favor of Bulgarian-Russian relations is indisputable: the two countries share a common cultural heritage and have sufficient grounds to maintain diplomatic cooperation even in highly tense contexts. I do not believe that Bulgaria’s cooperation with Russia should be cause for alarm. Bulgaria has repeatedly demonstrated its commitment to European values, the European Union’s foreign policy toward Russia, and has voted in favor of the financial package granted to Ukraine; therefore, we cannot overreact and claim that Bulgaria would end up being pro-Russian.

What connects Romania and Bulgaria in foreign policy, beyond cooperation under the auspices of the European Union, is their relationship with the United States. I would like to emphasize one more thing: Romanian-Bulgarian bilateralism works very well and is supported by certain multilateral frameworks. It is a bilateralism embedded within a broader multilateralism. Romania, Bulgaria, and Türkiye, for example, have this format of military cooperation for demining the Black Sea.

Military cooperation is working very well, given the reluctance of the transatlantic partner and Türkiye to become heavily involved militarily in the Black Sea. The fact that Türkiye has agreed to become militarily involved at least at this level shows that there is support from a regional power. In the Black Sea, Türkiye is currently the main economic actor, but its relations with the European Union are frozen. Meanwhile, Romania and other EU member states have chosen to develop cooperation projects with other Black Sea littoral states, such as Georgia and Ukraine. With Georgia, things changed after the decision to freeze relations with the European Union. But, as I said before, Romanian-Bulgarian bilateral relations are working very well, being supported both economically and politically by the European Union and NATO.

Romanian-Ukrainian Relations

If we look at the relations between Romania and Ukraine, don’t we see a greater complexity than is usually discussed? Romania has recently formed an axis between Bucharest, Chisinau, and Kyiv, but it seems to me that there is also a tendency in Romania—including perhaps among foreign policy elites, or rather among the general public—not to take such strong steps toward Ukraine, to maintain a certain distance, likely viewing Ukraine as a potential competitor for the West’s attention on the eastern flank.

There are, in a way, seeds of a fear in Bucharest that Ukraine could become a competitor for the West’s attention, and things are viewed this way by a segment of the Bucharest elite because the relationship between Bucharest and Kyiv has not intensified sufficiently since the start of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. It was only this year that Romania and Ukraine signed a strategic partnership, and the document of this partnership is very comprehensive; it is 11 pages long and covers cooperation in many areas. But, let’s face it, the war has been going on for four years now. Romania has cooperated with Ukraine on an urgent basis: it has taken in war refugees, provided them with financial assistance, and offered economic support for the transit of Ukrainian grain and its export to Europe; there have been high-level political discussions on countless occasions, but, unfortunately, this cooperation was formalized late. It was only this year that the strategic partnership was institutionalized. Regarding Ukraine and its capacity to be a relevant actor in Europe, political and military analysts have repeatedly emphasized this since the beginning of Russia’s invasion. As the military conflict drags on, Ukraine is becoming increasingly capable. Its military capabilities are strengthening, and we see that Ukraine is not only holding its ground very well against the invasion but also possesses advanced capabilities for shooting down drones. This was precisely the topic discussed at the B9 summit.

President Zelenskyy said that Ukraine has already signed a cooperation agreement with Lithuania in this area—the manufacture of drones—and mentioned that it is set to sign such a document with Romania as well. Let us hope that this cooperation document regarding the manufacture of drones, as well as anti-drone systems, will be signed as soon as possible, because Romania truly needs it;

it is of the utmost urgency for Romania to have adequate military technology to shoot down drones, as Russia frequently tests the airspace of neighboring countries, and in Romania and the Republic of Moldova we have intrusions by Russian drones. Fortunately, these have not caused any casualties, but there is an urgent need to develop and implement an adequate military infrastructure, because it makes no sense to use fighter jets or Patriot or HIMARS systems to shoot down such objects, as the costs are disproportionate. A drone costing a few tens of thousands of dollars ends up being shot down by a missile costing a million dollars, launched by a Patriot system.

As for cooperation with Kyiv, things need to accelerate, and there needs to be more political will in Bucharest, because it exists in Kyiv. Bucharest must respond with equal intensity to Kyiv’s proposals and to the Ukrainians’ political will to develop cooperation. And it is essential that Romania not view Ukraine as a rival country. If we view Ukraine as a rival for the West’s attention, it means that, unfortunately, we are still stuck in the same inferiority complexes as in the 1990s. It is absolutely necessary for us to break out of this paradigm, to let go of our inferiority complexes and frustrations, and to see our neighbors—in Ukraine, Bulgaria, and the Republic of Moldova—as allies. They are not competitors for the attention of Western countries. And speaking of this competition for the West’s attention, I believe Romania should approach its position a little differently. Traditional European allies—France, Germany, Italy—are, in turn, facing internal problems: extremism, political instability, migration, and others.

Romania should maintain its relations with its traditional Western partners, but at the same time strengthen its relations with its neighbors, first and foremost because, in situations of existential crisis, relations with neighboring countries are an absolute necessity. I hope that in the near future, by the end of the year, regarding cooperation with Kyiv to counter drones, we will see results. Concrete results, meaning a signed document and the implementation of the agreement. In fact, within the strategic partnership, there is an emphasis on this aspect of military cooperation. In the eyes of the Romanian press, Bucharest has been left a bit on the sidelines by Ukrainian initiatives. The fact that Kyiv is coming up with initiatives, while Bucharest merely has to respond—with no symmetry in which Bucharest also puts forward proposals for Kyiv to react to—is a sign that Romania could be much more active.

Regarding what you said about public opinion toward Ukraine: yes, indeed, unfortunately, there is a segment of the population in Romania that does not view Ukraine favorably at all. This is the segment of the sovereignists, who believe that Romania is sacrificing its own resources for other states, specifically for Ukraine. That is not true. This is a cooperation in which there are Romanian interests, in which each state contributes its own logistical resources, making it a win-win situation: I win, you win. It is not a “I lose, you win” situation, as the sovereignists claim. Public information campaigns on this topic regarding Romanian-Ukrainian relations and the need for mutual support between the two countries would be very useful. It would be helpful for these sovereignists to know that not only is Romania helping Ukraine, but Ukraine is also helping Romania; so we are not a country that sacrifices itself for others. We must reduce this misconception as much as possible. It is very important for the government to place greater emphasis on cooperation in order to refute the sovereignists’ arguments. And yes, it can be proven with facts that Ukraine is not an enemy of Romania, not even with regard to the Romanian minority there.

Progress has been made. Ukraine has assured that it will continue to maintain educational institutions for the Romanian population, taking into account demographics and population density. Ukraine has repeatedly assured that all the rights of the Romanian minority will be respected and that its cultural and linguistic heritage will be preserved. Furthermore, Romania has guaranteed that refugees from Ukraine will enjoy all the rights that other immigrants from outside the Union have. I believe that this partnership with Ukraine must be “cleared” of misconceptions early on, because public opinion on foreign policy is vital. There are numerous situations where the government’s foreign policy line does not reflect the majority opinion of the population, but it is democratic to have public legitimacy for this policy. I’ll add one more thing: the government’s foreign policy directions are a very sensitive topic in election campaigns, but at present, a Romanian government that wishes to be pro-European has the support of the population regarding relations with Ukraine. In conclusion, this is not just about beliefs that a certain segment of the Romanian population has held since the era of communist nationalism, but about the conviction that neighboring states wish us harm, that Romania is surrounded by enemies, that we must pursue only our own interests, and view other countries solely as those seeking our territories. Essentially, this is the myth of the besieged fortress and the universal conspiracy. This myth, unfortunately, persists to this day, fueled by disinformation. Those who view Ukraine through the lens of this myth are misinformed and are victims of campaigns carried out by Russia.

Polish-Romanian Relations

How would you characterize Romanian-Polish relations? Isn’t Romania, in some ways, at a crossroads between moving toward Poland and moving toward Türkiye?

First of all, the relationship with Poland has evolved, since the start of the war in Ukraine, from regional cooperation to a strategic alliance. So, relations have strengthened. Up until 2022, Romania and Poland had very close economic cooperation, but from that point on, they moved toward a strategic alliance because the European security environment had deteriorated. It must be said, however, that the foundations for strategic cooperation already existed; the strategic, material, and human resources were available. All that was needed was a geopolitical impetus, a turning point in international relations, for these resources—both Romania’s and Poland’s—to be activated. But this is not just about the year 2022. We can go even further back, to Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014. That was a strong signal sent by Russia at the regional level, but one that Western Europe did not perceive in its true magnitude. However, countries that perceive Russia as a constant threat, such as Poland, understood it correctly. Poland has had a very acute perception since 2014 of Russia’s growing aggressiveness toward its neighbors. And in Bucharest, alarm bells rang as well, because the annexation of Crimea meant Russia’s encroachment on the maritime trade corridors used by Romania and on Romania’s exclusive economic zone.

Today, as far as Romanian-Polish relations are concerned, Bucharest and Warsaw effectively function as major pillars supporting NATO’s eastern flank—in fact, its central-eastern flank—and represent two geopolitical centers of major interest: Poland, in northeastern Europe, alongside the Baltic and Nordic countries, and Romania, in the Black Sea region, alongside Bulgaria, Türkiye, and Greece. There is a very strong strategic convergence between Romania and Poland regarding the perception of the Russian threat, relations with the United States, the internal strengthening of NATO, military and financial support for Ukraine, energy security, and regional infrastructure. We are referring here to transnational infrastructure, to the transport corridors that enter Romania and then proceed to Poland. In recent years, a true Bucharest-Warsaw axis has formed within NATO and the European Union. And regarding this cooperation with Poland, I would point to the recently concluded B9 summit. The B9 format is a catalyst for the entire cooperation, with Romania and Poland as the founding countries.

Thus, the B9 is the main political instrument for collaboration, founded in 2015 by the two states, and has since become the primary coordination forum for the states on NATO’s eastern flank—the eastern flank encompassing both the central-northern and southern parts. Therefore, through the B9 format, Romania and Poland seek to articulate their common regional agenda and influence NATO’s strategic agenda, at least at the level of Eastern and Central-Southeastern Europe. In particular, the B9 aims to support Ukraine and counter the aggression of the Russian Federation.

Second, through this cooperation format, Romania and Poland are seeking to maintain U.S. attention and engagement on the eastern flank. We see that this intention is all the more necessary as the Trump Administration frequently raises the issue of withdrawing some troops from Europe. Last but not least, both Poland and Romania are attempting, through the B9 format, to prevent the marginalization of Central and Eastern Europe in favor of Western European priorities. Through this format, Eastern and Central Europe tend to become not necessarily a separate center of power, but a region of development complementary to the West.

Thus, in practice, Romania and Poland are co-architects of the current doctrine regarding NATO’s eastern flank, a doctrine that has evolved over the past few years, especially following the Russian invasion of 2022.

We have identified, however, some subtle differences between Bucharest and Warsaw. It is a visibly asymmetrical cooperation. Poland has more robust economic, political, and military resources than Romania. Poland has a stronger voice in Europe at the political level, but its internal developments have also differed from Romania’s since 1990. This does not mean that Romania is merely a follower, but Poland is the country that usually takes the initiative first. A noticeable difference is that, at the strategic level, Poland displays a much more pronounced militancy. Warsaw promotes a much tougher policy toward Russia, unequivocally condemning Russian aggression. Poland is investing heavily in armaments and, at the same time, aspires to the status of a regional military power. Romania also condemns Russian aggression, but is somewhat more cautious: it relies more on diplomacy, and Bucharest is more attentive to the consensus within the European Union and NATO.

Generally, Romania monitors the direction of discussions within NATO and then expresses its position in line with the majority view. Second, another notable difference between Romania and Poland is their relationship with the European Union. In recent history, Poland has, as we know, experienced very tense periods in its relationship with Brussels, especially during the era of the PiS (Law and Justice Party) government.

I would like to add here that, nevertheless, Poland had sufficient internal democracy to overcome that era, now returning to good relations with the European Commission. Throughout this time,

Romania has systematically avoided direct conflicts with European institutions, constantly negotiating its position. One example is the PNRR funds, for which Romania is negotiating its position but avoiding a confrontational approach with Brussels. In its relationship with the EU, Romania prefers to maintain the profile of a disciplined pro-European actor, without straying from conformity or taking highly visible opposing stances. Romania rarely invokes its veto right in the European Council.

This sometimes leads to Bucharest being perceived as more moderate and predictable, and predictability is, for the most part, an advantage, a positive aspect. On another note, there is a difference in the Romanian and Polish approaches to the strategy for the Black Sea versus the Baltic Sea. Poland prioritizes the Baltic Sea and its border with Belarus, as well as its border with the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad. The existence of this exclave, in Poland’s immediate vicinity, represents a constant imperative for Warsaw, forcing it to maintain a state of permanent military readiness. On the other hand, Romania is seeking to elevate the strategic importance of the Black Sea, as seen at both summits—the Three Seas Initiative and the B9 summit. After 2022, however, a trend toward strategic integration emerged, in the sense that Romania and Poland are insisting on reducing the differences in significance between the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea. We thus have an axis stretching from the Baltic Sea (Poland) to the Black Sea (Romania). In their relations with the United States, both Romania and Poland are currently among the most pro-American European states. Both host U.S. military infrastructure, both support an increasingly intense U.S. military presence, and both prefer NATO over excessive European strategic autonomy. Romania and Poland have been quite reluctant regarding the French proposal on strategic autonomy.

At present, relations are developing positively, with economic ties complemented by political and strategic convergence, but Romania could likely place greater emphasis on certain areas, such as the defense industry. This is precisely where Romania is currently focusing its efforts through the SAFE rearmament program. Poland is already very advanced in this regard, particularly in the military defense industry, but Romania is also sending clear signals that it does not wish to stand still. Thus, we have economic and political convergence, as well as a Romanian-Polish geostrategic synergy. This synergy is, of course, supported by the B9 format, but also by the fact that both countries fully support NATO doctrine and the allocation of a higher percentage of GDP to defense spending.

Defense cooperation in the Black Sea region

You mentioned that U.S. interest in the region seems to be waning. What is happening with NATO cooperation and, more generally, with Black Sea cooperation among coastal countries such as Bulgaria, Romania, and Türkiye? How is this idea evolving? For example, there is discussion about establishing a naval center, but perhaps there were even more discussions. Historically speaking, ideas for a Black Sea macro-region and so on have also been floated. Where do we stand today, in this Trump II era, with defense and security cooperation in the Black Sea?

As I said earlier, Romania and Bulgaria are pushing for a military security strategy in the Black Sea, as they have a different perception than Türkiye regarding Russia’s aggressive actions. Romania and Bulgaria feel the Russian threat in the Black Sea much more acutely, whereas Türkiye has developed an ambivalent relationship with Moscow. This is the point of divergence between Romania and Bulgaria, on the one hand, and Türkiye, on the other: their stance toward Russia. 

If the three states had a more harmonized stance and a more radical perception of Russian aggression in Ukraine and in the Black Sea, then cooperation would advance beyond current limits—that is, beyond this partnership for demining the Black Sea. But, as we see, Türkiye has a somewhat more unilateral approach: it does not go beyond the limits imposed by NATO, participates in the Alliance’s defensive flank, but does not place too much emphasis on the collective regional military component. 

Türkiye prefers a more pragmatic approach from an economic standpoint, emphasizing trade relations, but these economic relations also involve Russia within the BSEC (Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation). This poses a problem, as Russia’s inclusion in trade relations contravenes the European Union’s sanctions regime against that country. But if we look at them separately, what are the relations between Romania, Bulgaria, and Türkiye? They have very good relations, at least on the economic front. The Romanian-Turkish relationship is going very well, with a very large trade surplus on the Turkish side. Türkiye is investing heavily in Romania, while Romania is not as present in Türkiye. We see that there are projects with Turkish companies—for example, Otokar—or Turkish companies involved in developing Romania’s transportation infrastructure, such as highway construction. 

However, I do not believe Türkiye’s approach toward Russia will change anytime soon. Türkiye is signaling that it would rather share influence in the Black Sea with Russia; not to exclude Russia from the Black Sea, but to share the space with it, without, however, stepping out of NATO policy. When it comes to NATO’s defensive stance toward Russia and the perception of threats from Moscow, Türkiye aligns with NATO’s position. There is an ambivalent relationship between Erdogan and Putin in this area. Of course, Türkiye controls the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits and has a clear strategic advantage in the Black Sea, turning it into a hub of selective access.

The goal of Romania being part of a European strategy regarding the Black Sea dates back to before Nicușor Dan’s term. Immediately, from the moment the establishment of this regional hub was brought up, the most prominent voices in Romanian politics have stated that Romania must host this hub, as this would enhance the country’s strategic relevance. It is a very good idea for Romania to host this center, but it must be accompanied by effective involvement in the implementation of the security strategy that will be developed at the European level. We must not remain merely at a symbolic level, content with the fact that Romania is hosting this center. We must participate actively and effectively in the Black Sea strategy, because if we remain only at a symbolic level, we will not have real geostrategic relevance nor the maximum benefits.

The Black Sea and Aegean Sea Macro-Region

There are ideas to create a Black Sea and Aegean Sea macro-region. Have these ideas reached decision-makers in Romania? There is a Danube macro-region; is there sufficient interest in the region for a Black Sea and Aegean Sea macro-region as well?

It should be a welcome proposal, but a major obstacle is the lack of geostrategic convergence with Türkiye, as I mentioned earlier. It would be great to achieve such a project for a Black Sea–Aegean Sea macro-region, which would obviously include Greece as well, wouldn’t it?

Yes.

But if we include Greece, we must also take into account the differences in geostrategic vision between Athens and Ankara. These differences are very significant, and the rivalry between Greece and Türkiye is already historic.

But it seems there has been an improvement in relations recently between Athens and Ankara facilitated by the U.S., hasn’t there? Erdogan has had some meetings with top Greek decision-makers.

If a third party intervenes to mediate relations between the other two, then, obviously, the outlook becomes entirely different, especially when the mediator is the United States.

Of course, the U.S. could resort not only to persuasion but even to coercion if its own national interests are at stake. America can effectively intervene in mediating Greek-Turkish relations.

Infrastructure Projects Between Romania and Bulgaria

I’ll conclude with a more specific topic. In Bulgaria, this issue keeps coming up: why aren’t the procedures or activities related to the new Giurgiu-Ruse bridge making much progress, or why are they moving so slowly? Or why aren’t the Ruse–Giurgiu or Turtucaia–Oltenița ferries starting up? There is a perception from the Bulgarian perspective that infrastructure projects are moving slowly. How is this viewed from the Romanian perspective?

I haven’t seen any negative comments in Romania regarding these initiatives. Rather, it is said that the work is proceeding at this pace precisely to avoid negatively impacting the normal flow of traffic and to avoid further disrupting traffic beyond its current state. This is a technical rather than a political issue. I do not believe there is a need for high-level political intervention to demand that the pace of work on the bridge be accelerated. On a case-by-case basis, matters need to be managed in the area of customs cooperation and traffic flow, so to speak. This is an area of cooperation at the micro level here.

Photo: Alexandru Drăgulin (source: Alexandru Drăgulin)

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