Alexander Lambov: Bulgaria is highly respected in Taraclia, but this does not influence how Bulgarians in southern Moldova vote

Vladimir Mitev

Intro

Conversation between Vladimir Mitev and Alexander Lambov, PhD student in political science at the University of National and World Economy in Sofia and programmer based in Chisinau.

The interview addressed how the parliamentary elections in Moldova clearly highlight the deep electoral division in the country. In the regions inhabited mainly by Bulgarians and Gagauz  in Bessarabia (Taraclia and Gagauzia), the results were as expected – the pro-European ruling party PAS (Party of Action and Solidarity) received minimal support (less than 10%), while approximately 70-80% of the votes went to the Patriotic Bloc. According to Lambov, the lack of connection between Bulgarians, Gagauz, and PAS can be explained by the fact that PAS is perceived as a right-wing party with nationalist tendencies, which makes it unattractive to ethnic minorities. In addition, from a strictly electoral point of view, PAS strategists do not work intensively in these regions, as they represent a small percentage of Moldova’s total population.

Lambov recalls that the main political attitude of Bulgarians in Bessarabia is skeptical of European integration and oriented toward improving relations with Russia. Unlike PAS supporters, who consider the EU an unconditional alternative, minorities perceive it as “conditionally good” — acceptable only if it directly improves their lives. Research conducted by a doctoral student in political science within focus groups in Taraclia reveals the deep roots of this Euroscepticism: the end of the Soviet period (the 1980s) is perceived as a “lost paradise” because Russian was dominant, facilitating integration. In addition, the community is conservative, expressing strong disapproval of tolerance towards LGBT movements in the EU. Skepticism is also fueled by Moldova’s economic difficulties in recent years, which are mistakenly associated with the European course.

Moldova is counting on Bulgaria to help integrate the Bulgarian community into the European course, as evidenced by the opening of a branch of the University of Ruse in Taraclia. Although relations between the two countries are excellent and Bulgaria enjoys high prestige among Bulgarians in Bessarabia (thanks to educational programs), this prestige does not translate into political votes. Lambov points out that, since teaching at the university will be in Bulgarian and Romanian (without Russian), this will be a problem for local staff who do not speak literary and official Bulgarian. Ultimately, only PAS can bring about a change in the political position of minorities, but satisfying their demands would lead to the loss of support from the majority in Chișinău. According to Lambov, this is an insurmountable political contradiction for those in power in the capital.

The researcher expects that after the elections, European integration will deepen and negotiations with the EU will begin. According to Lambov, the fight against corruption will intensify in domestic politics. PAS will probably take moderate measures to reduce Russia’s influence in the southern regions (e.g., reducing Russian language classes), which could, however, cause conflicts. The political center in Moldova is insignificant (only 8% for the centrist bloc “Alternativa”) because polarization has increased and the centrist position is losing ground in the context of confrontation. Therefore, Lambov predicts that the conflict between the southern regions and the center will not be resolved in the foreseeable future.

Mr. Lambov, we are talking a few days after the parliamentary elections in Moldova. How does the Bulgarian community in Moldova perceive and feel after these elections?

The election results in areas with a Bulgarian majority are not surprising. They are in line with expectations, as the pro-European PAS (Party of Action and Solidarity) has never won more than 10% of the vote in the Taraclia region.

If we assume that Bulgarian voters are saying “no” to PAS policy, the results are not at all encouraging for these voters, as approximately 70-80% of them voted for the Patriotic Bloc, which has a political position diametrically opposed to that of PAS.

Why do Bulgarians and Gagauz in southern Moldova not support PAS?

Why are there no links between PAS and the Bulgarian and Gagauz communities? Will such links emerge from now on, given that the country is clearly moving towards the European Union and it is already clear that there is no alternative to the European course?

I think these links will be very difficult to establish, because PAS itself is quite right-wing politically, with a slight nationalist tendency. At least, that is how it is perceived by voters in the Taraclia and Gagauzia districts.

It is very difficult for a party perceived as right-wing and somewhat nationalist to win the sympathy of voters from ethnic minorities. This is not specific to Bulgarians and Gagauz; a similar phenomenon can be observed in the northern regions inhabited by Ukrainians and Russians, where the Patriotic Bloc is also winning. However, this phenomenon is most concentrated in Taraclia and Gagauzia.

I believe that PAS political strategists have chosen not to work intensively in these problematic regions. From a purely electoral point of view, Gagauzians represent less than 5% of the population, and Bulgarians, according to the latest census, represent only 1.6% of the country’s population. Therefore, it is easier for PAS to gain support in other places where there are more voters and support is easier to obtain, given the party’s political profile.

The political expectations of Bulgarians: skepticism towards the EU

You mentioned that there is no overlap between the interests of Bulgarians and those defended by PAS. What exactly are Bulgarians looking for in politics? What are their expectations, demands, and interests?

If we consider the results of the referendum on EU accession and the latest elections, the facts show that the political preferences of Bulgarians in Moldova coincide with the position of the Patriotic Bloc. In other words, they prefer better relations with Russia and are more skeptical about European integration and EU accession.

While for most PAS supporters European integration is unconditionally good and the only alternative, Bulgarians in Bessarabia consider it conditionally good. They consider it good only if it makes their lives better and more comfortable. If this does not happen, it does not receive support. These doubts about the personal benefits of European integration are very deep.

Euroscepticism: myths and conservatism

As part of your doctoral research, you conducted a study of focus groups of residents in the Taraclia region on their attitudes towards the EU. What did you find in your research?

The preliminary results of the focus group study indicate several aspects related to Euroscepticism:

1. The Soviet Union as a “lost paradise”: Bulgarians in Bessarabia see European integration as a confrontation between the EU and the USSR. Many of them consider the end of the Soviet period (the 1980s) to be a period of prosperity for the region. This somewhat mythical period contrasts with the current reality. At that time, Russian was the dominant language, which facilitated integration in Moldova in general, as Bulgarian is closer to Russian than to Romanian.
2. Deep conservatism: Interestingly, participants mentioned the EU’s tolerance of LGBT movements and same-sex marriage as a reason for Euroscepticism. This shows that the Bulgarian community in Moldova has a conservative orientation.
3. Economic skepticism: A causal link has emerged between European integration and the deterioration of economic living standards. The last few years have been very difficult for Moldova due to the war in Ukraine—high inflation, zero or very low economic growth. For Eurosceptics, this means that European integration does not lead to economic prosperity.
4. Generational divide: However, there are supporters of European integration, who are concentrated in the younger age groups (up to 30 years old).

We can say that, for many of the inhabitants of these Eurosceptic regions, the Soviet period seems like a lost paradise. Unlike Moldovans, who had a strong desire for sovereignty and independence, Bulgarians and Gagauz, aware that they are a minority, did not welcome the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Attitudes towards populism in southern Moldova

How do these communities view the oligarchic period and populists such as Ilan Shor?

The attitude towards the populist Ilan Shor is paradoxical. We spoke to Shor’s supporters, who say something that sounds cynical: “Everyone steals, and those in Chișinău steal, but at least he (Shor) shares something with us.” That is their attitude towards him.

The role of the University of Ruse in southern Moldova

The University of Ruse already has a branch in Taraclia. It seems that the Moldovan state is counting on Bulgaria to bring the Bulgarian community closer to the EU. What do you expect to happen in this regard with regard to the university and the Bulgarian state?

Interstate relations between Moldova and Bulgaria are extremely good. The university is one of the manifestations of this cooperation and represents a great achievement, as it is the first branch of a foreign university in the entire history of Moldova.

As far as I know, there are also Romanian universities with branches in the Republic of Moldova…

…If I am not mistaken, they operate on slightly different principles, i.e., they are not directly subordinate. I may be wrong, but as far as I know, the branch of the University of Ruse in Taraclia is the first full-fledged branch. For Bulgaria, this is the first branch of a Bulgarian university abroad.

Moldova expects Bulgaria to help it overcome its Euroscepticism. Bulgaria has great authority among Bulgarians in Bessarabia, but this is not directly reflected in the way Moldovans vote in elections.

A number of administrative and educational issues need to be resolved before this university can begin operating. Another point I would like to mention is that, in accordance with the intergovernmental agreement, teaching will be conducted in Bulgarian and Romanian, without Russian. Since school education in Taraclia is mainly conducted in Russian, many Bulgarians speak Bulgarian at a colloquial level but do not have a command of formal academic language. This may make it difficult to find local staff.

The university will therefore have to second its own staff. It is also important to consider the principles according to which employees in the Republic of Moldova and those in Bulgaria will be remunerated, as salary standards in Bulgaria are higher. They are almost double for entry-level positions. It is assumed that staff in Moldova will receive salaries according to Moldovan state standards, which makes working at this university less attractive.

In conclusion, opening a branch of the University of Ruse is a positive thing, but it must be seen through to the end, and at this stage it is difficult to say whether it will be successful. I sincerely hope that it will be successful.

It is not stated directly, but it is implied that Moldova is counting on Bulgaria to help combat the Euroscepticism of Bulgarians in Bessarabia. I believe that the desired result is achievable, but it will be very difficult and there is no guarantee that it will be achieved. Bulgaria has great authority among Bulgarians in Bessarabia, but not necessarily when it comes to voting in elections.

Bulgaria is loved because it carries out projects and supports Decree 103, under which students from Bessarabia study at Bulgarian universities. These are serious issues that support Bulgaria’s position in the region, but it is still difficult to act politically and change people’s political positions. Practice shows that even if the Bulgarian authorities were to do something in this direction, the most serious change must come from the PAS. However, satisfying the political demands of Bulgarians could lead to the PAS losing voters in Chișinău. This creates an insurmountable contradiction. And we see a situation where the way Bulgarians in Taraclia vote does not change.

The influence of improved Romanian-Bulgarian political relations on relations between Bulgarians and Moldovans in the Republic of Moldova

Recently, since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, but especially since 2023, Bulgarian-Romanian relations have improved at the political level. A strategic partnership declaration has been adopted. How is this improvement felt in Moldova? Is it felt at all levels – among elites who speak Bulgarian, Romanian or have ties to Bulgaria and Romania? Do these groups of people cooperate more?

According to my observations, the improvement in Bulgarian-Romanian relations is not felt among Bulgarians in Bessarabia.

However, I believe that it is perceived positively by the Romanian-speaking elites in Chișinău. Since these elites are oriented towards Romania, good relations between Romania and Bulgaria naturally facilitate the building of bridges between Moldova and Bulgaria. This is based on the principle: “The friend of my friend is also my friend.”

However, among Bulgarians in Bessarabia, this news may not reach them at all or may not be significant.

Polarization and the future of Moldova

Is there a political center in Moldova, and will the country become truly European when such a center emerges?

There are parties in Moldova that position themselves as centrist, but after the war in Ukraine, polarization has increased. In these elections, the centrist force—the Alternative Bloc—won only about 8% of the vote. This shows that the center is not missing, but it does not have significant political importance.

We see how the Patriotic Bloc says what the Bulgarians in Bessarabia want to hear, winning 80% of the region, while receiving much less in the central regions of Moldova. And the central regions of Moldova have many more voters. Thus, the centrist position in a polarized country is a losing one. It is of no interest to either the left or the right of the political spectrum. We have a situation where, in practice, support for PAS comes from right-wing groups in society.

What will happen next, now that the pro-European party continues to govern?

I believe that measures will be taken to deepen European integration and negotiations with the EU will begin on various chapters. This result is a very important achievement for PAS. Just a year ago, there was a referendum on European integration, which was on the verge of failure. Now, the political balance is in PAS’s favor, and I believe they will take advantage of this to push Moldova further along the path toward the European Union.

In terms of domestic policy, I believe that efforts to combat electoral corruption, which does indeed exist, will be intensified. As for the regions of Gagauzia and the district of Teraclia, perhaps some attention will be paid to these regions.

We will see to what extent sympathy for the European Union will grow and how events will unfold there. I believe that PAS will take steps to reduce Russia’s influence in the region. Perhaps it will make gentle attempts to reduce the use of Russian here by reducing the number of Russian language classes in schools and universities. This could be a source of conflict. It remains to be seen whether it will be a serious source of conflict.

But I believe that this contradiction between the southern regions, such as Gagauzia and Taraclia, and the center of the country will not disappear easily. It will exist for a considerable period of time. It will not be overcome in the foreseeable future.

Photo: Alexander Lambov (source: Alexander Lambov)

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About Author

Vladimir Mitev

Vladimir Mitev is a Bulgarian Romanian-speaking journalist. He has interacted with many Bulgarian and Romanian media outlets, including Bulgarian National Radio, Mediapool, all major Bulgarian television stations, Darik Radio, and more (Bulgaria); Radio Romania, The Liberal Community 1848, all the major Romanian television stations; DoR; Libertatea; PressHub; and others (Romania); The Analysis, Acorn Radio (USA); Open Democracy (UK); voxEurop (France); the Observatory for the Balkans and the Caucasus; The Other News (Italy); The Institute for Central Europe (Poland); Argument (Czechia); Merce (Hungary); Bilten (Croatia); and Agora (the Republic of Moldova).
He promotes the idea of non-hegemonic, mutually empowering interactions in Central and Southeastern Europe that could contribute to the formation of a dynamic regional identity and connect citizens to the global community.

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