Ștefan Popescu
Summary
Romanian foreign policy analyst Ștefan Popescu has set out, in his YouTube podcast, the foundations of a Romania-centred perspective on the rivalry between Israel and Türkiye, which is becoming increasingly topical.
A new regional rivalry: The Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean are increasingly marked by competition between Israel and Türkiye. Israel relies on quality, technology, air superiority and its strategic alliance with the US, whilst building networks with Greece and Cyprus. Türkiye relies on geography, demographics, its military industry and a direct presence in areas such as Syria, Libya, Northern Cyprus and Somalia.
Syria and the US dilemma: Syria is the most dangerous point of convergence between the two projects. For the US, the situation is delicate, as it has in Israel a leading technological and ideological partner, and in Türkiye an indispensable geographical player in the Black Sea.
The nature of the competition: A direct war is unlikely due to the enormous costs involved. A protracted conflict is on the cards, waged through influence, technology, the economy and networks of proxies on the periphery.
The impact and Romania’s position: Both states are expanding their influence in Romania — Israel through security and the defence industry, Türkiye through the economy and geography. Bucharest must maintain a mature and neutral strategy, cooperating pragmatically with both sides without taking anyone’s side and viewing geopolitics strictly through the prism of Romania’s national interest.
Video
Analysis
Today we shall discuss Romania and the increasingly pronounced rivalry between Israel and Türkiye. There is a fundamental rule in geopolitics and foreign policy: states have no permanent friends, only permanent interests. We know this from Lord Palmerston, Britain’s foreign secretary in the 19th century. And when major regional powers compete for influence, this competition is never confined to their immediate geographical area. Today we are witnessing a transformation of the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean. The classic rivalry between Israel and Iran is beginning to be complemented by another contest: that between Israel and Türkiye.
We are not necessarily talking about a military rivalry, but rather the clash of two different regional projects. On the one hand is Israel, a small state in demographic terms (approximately 10 million inhabitants), but with military, technological and intelligence capabilities disproportionate to its size. Israel cannot compete with Türkiye in terms of scale: it lacks Türkiye’s population (of 90 million), nor does it have the territory or strategic depth of Anatolia. However, it compensates through quality, its defence industry, intelligence services, air superiority, technology and its strategic relationship with the United States.
On the other hand, there is Türkiye, a power with a different geopolitical weight. It has over 90 million inhabitants, a large army, control of the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits, a strategic position between Europe, the Caucasus, the Black Sea and the Middle East, as well as an emerging military-industrial complex of ever-improving quality. Ankara sees itself not merely as a nation state, but as a regional actor seeking strategic autonomy and aspiring to be a centre of power between several worlds.
And this is where the fundamental difference between the two projects lies: Israel projects power through technology, through its alliance with the US (first and foremost) and through quality. Türkiye projects power, first and foremost, through its geography, population, industry, military infrastructure and regional presence.
The competition is not confined to the Middle East, but extends through networks. Israel has built a strategic architecture in the Eastern Mediterranean, together with Greece and the Republic of Cyprus. For Jerusalem, the relationship with Athens and Nicosia is not merely one of energy or diplomacy, but has a clear military and geographical dimension. Greece offers it access and depth in the Mediterranean, whilst Cyprus represents an extremely important forward position for control of the Eastern Mediterranean. European powers such as France and the United Kingdom also feature in this equation, each with their own strategic interests in the region, aligned with those of Greece and Cyprus.
From the Turkish perspective, this architecture may be perceived as an attempt to limit its freedom of movement — the creation of a system of relationships around it that could restrict its access to the Eastern Mediterranean. Türkiye’s response is different. Türkiye is not building the same network as Israel, but is projecting its influence through a direct presence:
- In northern Cyprus, where it maintains troops and has medium-range ballistic missiles;
- In Syria, where it seeks a zone of predominant influence and security;
- In Libya, where it controls half the country;
- In Muslim Africa, specifically in Somalia, where it has established a strategic presence (a 400-hectare base in Mogadishu). Israel’s response to this was the recognition of Somaliland (formerly British Somaliland). For Türkiye, this is the model of a power that is both continental and maritime.
Well, we have spoken about Syria. This is where the two projects converge in the most dangerous way. For Türkiye, Syria represents the issue of border security, the Kurdish question and the possibility of establishing a sphere of influence to the south. For Israel, Syria represents the issue of strategic depth and the prevention of a hostile force emerging close to its borders (or on its borders, to be more precise). Here lies one of the major shifts in the region: Israel is no longer looking solely towards Iran, but is increasingly factoring in Türkiye’s rise.
The American factor also comes into play in this equation. The Americans have a special relationship with Israel — we know this — but they also need Türkiye. Israel is a leading technological and military partner, but more than that, an ideological one. Türkiye is an indispensable geographical player for Washington: a proxy power in the Black Sea, with influence in the Caucasus and capable of playing a role across the wider Muslim world. For the United States, the problem is a difficult one indeed: two important partners are regional rivals.
And this brings us to Romania, because we are speaking from our perspective as Romanians. Romania is not merely an outside observer of this rivalry. It is situated in an important strategic area: the Black Sea, the European Union, NATO’s eastern flank, US bases, and the vicinity of Ukraine. Both Israel and Türkiye are projecting their interests into Romania.
Israel has an advantage in certain segments of the Romanian strategic community: long-standing relations in the field of security, a longer-established visible presence in the defence industry, and the ability to influence certain public discussions on security (and not just on foreign policy). We see many figures in the public sphere who, figuratively speaking, ‘wear their affiliation’ with the Israeli Embassy on their lapels.
Türkiye brings a different kind of asset: the advantage of geography. For Romania, Türkiye is the country that controls the exit from the Black Sea, an important military actor and a key partner in the defence sector. Türkiye is beginning to build its own networks of influence in Romania: the defence industry, businesses, diplomacy, and economic and cultural connections. We have even seen a presence in the public sphere: men and women who did not previously write about foreign policy, but who have rapidly begun to write in a strongly pro-Turkish vein. So, Türkiye is trying to build capital through proximity and a presence here.
What does Romania need to understand? That is, those seeking to mediate between these interests and who think in Romanian terms — those who are not on one side or the other, but who stand with Romania. We must not have to choose between Israel and Türkiye. We must have a mature strategy that enables us to understand the value each country brings to Romanian interests. Yes, Israel can help us through mutually beneficial cooperation in the intelligence and military-industrial sectors. Türkiye can help us in maintaining regional balance and through economic cooperation, including in the military-industrial sector. Romania must, however, be aware that it is itself an area of interest that must not be exploited by one side or the other.
My conclusion is that I do not believe there will be a direct war between Israel and Türkiye. There is rivalry, there is suspicion, there is competition for influence, but an open military conflict — despite the images you see of Turkish military equipment being deployed in Syria — is considered too costly by both sides. It is more likely that we will see what is known in geopolitics as a long-term competition for influence, alliances, technology, the economy and strategic positioning. I do not rule out some conflicts on the periphery (for example in Somalia, through proxies, far from the territory of the two countries).
However, Romania, situated at the crossroads of the Black Sea, Europe and the wider East, must, I believe, learn to read this new map and mediate between the two states’ spheres of influence. Türkiye and Israel are important partners for Romania, but Romania must not take sides.
So, here is a piece of advice I offer you (it is merely advice from my point of view): stop following the vectors of influence of one side or the other. Those who advocate and engage in militant geopolitics in favour of a particular project are simply trying to draw you to the side of a state other than Romania. We must stand by our own interests — namely Romania itself, which so often disappoints us. We must not side with rival states, nor must we be drawn into all manner of disputes.
Türkiye opens up certain prospects for us. I believe, for example, in the need for a Romania–Türkiye geo-economic corridor extending to Hungary and Italy. Similarly, in the case of Israel, there is undoubtedly scope for cooperation, including on Israeli regional projects with Bulgaria, Greece, Cyprus, Israel and even as far afield as India.
I believe we can publicise and mediate between these different interests, without taking sides with one or the other. On the contrary, as a country with a vested interest in preventing an open conflict between the two, I believe Romania must seek to moderate any excesses and send signals, to the best of its ability, both to Ankara and to Jerusalem.
In other words, let us look at the map through the eyes of Bucharest, not through the eyes of other capitals. Goodbye!
Photo: (source: International Context with Ștefan Popescu)
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