Yuliana Metodieva
Summary
Here is a complete and detailed summary of the interview conducted by Iuliana Metodieva on the Marginalia website with Vladimir Mitev regarding the political situation in Romania, organized by key topics:
The Rise of Sovereigntism and Tactical Alliances
Despite the fall of Ilie Bolojan’s cabinet and the Social Democratic Party’s (PSD) tactical vote alongside the far-right AUR, Vladimir Mitev emphasizes that this does not mean the legitimization of the sovereigntists in power. Historically, such votes (such as the USR’s in 2021) are a tool for changing the government, not for forming a coalition. The primary function of parties like AUR at this moment is to mobilize the protest vote rather than to participate in government.
Economic and legal barriers to AUR
According to the journalist, there are two main obstacles to AUR entering the government:
- International pressure and financial markets: Romania is heavily dependent on debt refinancing and foreign direct investment (8.1 billion euros by 2025). A government composed of sovereignists would raise borrowing rates and scare off investors, as AUR advocates for a shift in the balance between international corporations and local “patriotic capital.”
- Lack of governance capacity: The party does not yet have enough experts and staff to administer the state. Furthermore, key figures in the sovereignist camp (such as Calin Georgescu) are the subject of criminal investigations, which acts as a political “brake.”
The Social Divide: The Two Faces of Romania
Mitev outlines the deep division in society as the main driver of sovereignism:
Romania of the big cities and areas with foreign investment: Integrated into the global economy, cosmopolitan, and pro-European.
“Deep Romania”: The periphery, which feels excluded from economic growth. Here, conservative values, the influence of the Church, and a sense of “colonial dependence” on the West dominate. This divide generates nostalgia for the Ceaușescu era even among young people and gives rise to a discourse of “external governance,” in which pro-European elites are perceived as accomplices of foreign interests.
The Role of President Nicușor Dan
President Nicușor Dan is the target of criticism from both camps. He attempts to maintain a balance between pro-American and pro-European stances, which is often interpreted as indecision or betrayal.
- His attempts to strike a balance include participating in forums related to Trump, while simultaneously signing a strategic partnership with Ukraine.
- He is criticized for his lack of clear support for the ousted Prime Minister Bolojan and for a speech on May 9, 2026, which contained Eurosceptic undertones. Mitev points out that Dan is, by nature, a conservative politician who avoids conflict, which, in Romanian political culture, is often punished by voters.
The Future of European Consensus
Although sovereignty is on the rise, it does not necessarily aim for an exit from the EU (Brexit). AUR positions itself within a broader European process of reshaping the Union, drawing inspiration from models in Poland and Italy. Romania remains economically dependent on the West, but the domestic debate over sovereignty and the country’s role in the region (particularly vis-à-vis Ukraine) will continue to shape the political landscape.
Interview
Will PSD and AUR rule together in Romania?
Yuliana Metodieva: Mr. Mitev, following the fall of Ilie Bolojan’s cabinet and the formation of a tactical alliance between the Social Democratic Party (PSD) and the Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR), do you see Romania repeating a broader Eastern European pattern, in which traditional parties are beginning to legitimize the far right through ad-hoc coalitions? Is there a risk that such temporary parliamentary alliances will gradually replace the political center?
Vladimir Mitev: At this moment, representatives of the AUR and the PSD state that they have no intention of governing together. In the past, the Save Romania Union (USR), which today criticizes the PSD for an alleged closeness to AUR, itself voted on the no-confidence motion alongside AUR against Florin Cîțu’s cabinet in September 2021. However, this did not lead to a joint government.
The role of AUR and of sovereignist parties in general is to mobilize discontent and press for a change in the governing formula, but, as a rule, they remain outside the real levers of power. For now, I see no reason for this to change.
On the one hand, there are serious international arguments against including AUR in the government. This would create uncertainty in the financial markets, from which Romania finances itself through debt refinancing. Such a scenario would raise interest rates and send a negative signal to investors.
In 2025, Romania attracted approximately 8.1 billion euros in foreign direct investment. The country needs both public and foreign investment to emerge from the crisis. A government with a sovereignist presence would likely increase investor mistrust, including due to possible attempts to alter the balance between “patriotic capital” and the international corporations that currently dominate the economy.
On the other hand, a number of leading figures in the sovereignist camp who claim a role in government—such as Călin Georgescu or Dan Dungaciu—are the subject of criminal investigations. The very conduct of these trials creates the impression that they also function as a political constraint, hindering their access to power.
The dimensions of the AUR’s challenge
You note that the likelihood of AUR entering the government is, for now, low due to a lack of expertise and the risk of sending a negative signal to international markets.
But does the Romanian elite not underestimate the ability of such parties to institutionalize themselves and transform from protest nationalism into a sustainable conservative alternative, as has happened in other European countries?
The Romanian political and media elite, particularly its pro-European segment, is genuinely concerned about the rise of sovereignty movements. One aspect of this is the spread of neo-Legionary discourse, which at times contains anti-Semitic elements. Another aspect is the strong nostalgia for the Ceaușescu era, which, surprisingly, is visible even among young people born after 1989.
There are also political proposals, for example from the “Save Romania” Union, to ban communist symbols and groups that identify with communist or Ceaușist ideology.
When I speak with representatives of the pro-European elites, I often hear that one of the reasons for the rise of sovereignty is that the elites originating from the old nomenclature and the security apparatus were not completely neutralized after 1989, unlike in other countries in the region. An additional factor is the political legitimization of such networks at the global level.
There are, however, also real social reasons: corruption within the two dominant parties—the PSD and the National Liberal Party (PNL)—regional inequalities, and the deep divide between the major cities (the country’s cosmopolitan center) and “deep Romania” (the periphery).
The major cities and the liberal elites associated with them concentrate access to power and resources, while significant groups remain excluded from economic growth based on foreign investment and European funds. These communities often build alternative social structures, at the center of which lie the church, local networks, or state institutions. A more conservative spirit prevails within them, and there is frequent talk of “dignity” and “verticality” in relation to the West, which is perceived as dominant.
This gives rise to a discourse on “colonial dependence,” in which pro-European elites are perceived as complicit with foreign interests. Some of these attitudes are also economic in nature—the feeling that Romanians are turning into a labor force with no real control over the means of production and into tenants in a society where property belongs to forces perceived by sovereignists as foreign.
Nevertheless, I do not believe that pro-European elites underestimate the sovereignist wave. The problem with the latter is that it still lacks sufficient expertise and a clear economic vision. For now, it offers rather symbolic solutions—for example, the romanticization of agriculture (à la Georgescu).
Even with the expansion of the team around George Simion (the AUR leader) to include figures such as Petrișor Peiu or Dan Dungaciu, AUR will only establish itself as a real alternative once it builds a broader base of competent political and administrative cadres.
The role of preident Nicușor Dan
What is President Nicușor Dan’s role at this moment of transition—a technocratic arbiter trying to maintain the pro-Western course, or a figure around whom a new liberal center can coalesce?
In recent months, a large portion of his voters and public supporters have begun to distance themselves from him, claiming that he has betrayed their expectations. The reason lies in a series of his political gestures, which are perceived as ambiguous.
Nicuşor Dan made an effort to attend a forum related to Donald Trump’s initiatives, but failed to attend the commemoration of the anniversary of the start of the war in Ukraine in Kyiv. Subsequently, he signed a strategic partnership with Ukraine, including for the joint production of drones. At the same time, he canceled the official Europe Day celebrations that were to be attended by European Parliament President Roberta Metsola, and on May 9, 2026, he delivered a speech that part of the audience perceived as critical of the EU, including regarding environmental policies.
It appears he is attempting to serve as a bridge between the pro-American and pro-European camps. The problem is that Romanian political culture tends to penalize such a search for balance and prefers clear-cut choices.
There is also criticism that he did not defend Prime Minister Bolojan in his conflict with the Social Democrats, which led to the fall of the cabinet. Disappointed voters even speak of the influence of the “deep state” within his institution.
However, a more moderate assessment is that Dan is trying to act as an arbiter in his capacity as head of state, not as a party leader. This puts him in a difficult position—especially if, in terms of communication, he fails to clearly explain his actions.
He is believed to be appalled by the conflicts that divide society. In 2017, when the family referendum was being discussed— which sought, but failed, to define the family as the marriage between a man and a woman, excluding the possibility of a union between a same-sex couple— Dan adopted a conservative stance and attempted to reach out to conservative members of society, proposing that his party—the “Save Romania” Union—remain neutral. However, the party insisted on adopting a progressive stance on marriage, and Nicușor Dan left the party that he himself had founded.
The pro-European consensus in Romania
Romania has long been perceived as a stable, pro-European country. Is this consensus wavering?
I don’t think what’s happening in Romania comes as a surprise. The European Union itself is changing—sovereignist tendencies are also visible in Western Europe. Even Ukraine, despite the war and its destroyed infrastructure, is becoming an increasingly important geopolitical factor.
In Romania, different social and economic models coexist. One part of society is integrated into the global economy and European networks. Another part is more strongly tied to traditional institutions such as the church and the state and perceives Western Europe as a threat.
There are also differing geopolitical attitudes toward Ukraine—ranging from strong support to fears that, after the war, Romania might be sidelined in the region within NATO and the EU due to Ukraine’s rise. In this context, sovereignty is not necessarily anti-European in the sense of a desire to leave the EU. Rather, it is part of a broader intra-European process of reshaping the union itself. George Simion and AUR get along very well with the sovereignists in Poland and Italy, for example.
Romania remains economically and politically dependent on Western Europe, but at the same time, it is part of the increasingly intense internal debate regarding the future of the EU. It is precisely within this dynamic that the rise of AUR must be understood.
Photo: Nicușor Dan (source: YouTube)
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