A two-speed Europe. Romania on the periphery

Ștefan Popescu, Gândul, 30 January 2026

Summary

The article, “A two-speed Europe. Romania on the periphery,” argues that the European Union is entering a phase of “functional differentiation” driven by factors like the conflict in Ukraine, the recalibration of U.S. strategic interests, and budgetary constraints.

Key points include:

• Two-Speed Europe: Statements by the German Finance Minister confirm a deliberate strategy for a “two-speed Europe,” with Germany and France leading an initiative to create a “hard core” of the six strongest European economies (France, Poland, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain).
• Objective of the “Hard Core”: This consolidated core aims to establish a privileged economic space offering superior financial conditions, a more predictable regulatory framework, and reduced bureaucracy to companies, contrasting with the structural inertia of the EU-27.
• Geographical Concentration: The new power bloc focuses on the northern and Mediterranean axes, with less attention paid to the eastern flank, causing peripheral regions like the Black Sea basin to risk reduced political and strategic engagement.
• Russia and the U.S. Limes: The initiative coincides with a renewed willingness by major European powers to resume pragmatic dialogue with Moscow, influenced by an observed “new phase of cooperation between Washington and Russia.” The article suggests the weakening of the American security umbrella (NATO) is accelerating the retreat of the complementary European integration framework.
• Romania’s Position: Romania is placed outside this “hard core,” in a structural peripheral position. Its leadership is criticized for a “worrying lack of ideas” as it oscillates between economic alignment with Germany (e.g., supporting the Mercosur agreement) and security/diplomatic alignment with France (e.g., position on the American Peace Council initiative).
• Consequences of Fragmentation: The EU-27 faces “controlled fragmentation,” where formal cohesion masks differentiation in resource access. Convergence policy will be replaced by selective financial mechanisms like SAFE, and states outside the core risk being in an “intermediate zone” with “differentiated membership,” anchored in European interests but lacking the same density of political and strategic engagement as the core.

Analysis

One of the structural effects of the conflict in Ukraine—amplified by the recalibration of American strategic interests in Europe, the budgetary constraints of the main contributors to the EU budget, and the imperative of rearmament and domestic economic recovery—is becoming increasingly clear.

We are witnessing the European Union entering a phase of functional differentiation, which is historically predictable but rarely assumed so explicitly. The recent statements by German Finance Minister Lars Klingbeil – “the time has come for a two-speed Europe” – are not just a circumstantial position, but the expression of a deliberate strategy.

The idea, initially formulated in a media event in Berlin organized by the publication Die Welt, was quickly translated into a concrete diplomatic initiative: a letter addressed to France, Poland, Italy, the Netherlands, and Spain, intended to lay the foundations for a mechanism of deepened cooperation between the main economies of the Union.

The objective of this consolidated core is clear: to create a privileged economic space capable of offering European companies—especially start-ups and high value-added industrial projects—superior financial conditions, a more predictable regulatory framework, and reduced bureaucracy, in contrast to the structural inertia of the EU-27.

This attempt to institutionalize a “hard core” also reflects the anticipation of an inevitable dilution of the Community project against the backdrop of enlargement to the Western Balkans. Even if the right of veto is eliminated, the complexity of the decision-making process will increase and strategic cohesion will be more difficult to maintain.

The geography of this new power bloc indicates a concentration of interests on the northern and Mediterranean axes, with less attention paid to the eastern flank of the Union. As a result, peripheral regions – such as the Black Sea basin – risk a reduction in direct political and strategic engagement.

Recent diplomatic signals from Paris, Rome, and Berlin suggest a renewed willingness on the part of the major European powers to resume pragmatic dialogue with Moscow. This orientation cannot be separated from the new phase of cooperation between Washington and Russia, which European capitals are observing and internalizing, even if they do not explicitly state it.

The German initiative, shared by France, to form a select group of the six strongest European economies not only redefines the economic architecture of the Union, but also draws a new strategic limes for the continent. This internal frontier of European power is inextricably linked to the rescaling of American engagement.

Recent history shows that the American and European limes have been complementary: NATO functioned as a geopolitical antechamber to European integration, first providing the security umbrella, then the framework for economic integration and massive investment flows. The weakening of the first umbrella is now accelerating the retreat of the second.

In this context, Romania is clearly outside the hard core, in a peripheral position that is becoming structural again. The leadership in Bucharest is facing a difficult strategic equation that official discourse avoids.

In an attempt to avoid marginalization and preserve its diplomatic visibility, Romania oscillates between Paris and Berlin, trying to respond to often divergent expectations. With regard to France, the signals are manifested in the areas of security and diplomacy—visible in Romania’s position on the American Peace Council initiative, a postponement justified by invoking the UN Charter, copied and pasted from the French Foreign Ministry’s communiqué.

With regard to Germany, the logic of our alignment is predominantly economic, and support for the signing of the agreement with Mercosur is in line with this. This dual orientation reflects a worrying lack of ideas and an inability to adapt, which is a sign of decision-makers who are outdated in every respect.

For Romania, if it stands by passively—and given the deterioration of its foreign policy over the last eight to nine months, there is little hope—this reconfiguration will not result in brutal marginalization, but rather a more subtle one with structural effects.

The EU-27 seems to be entering a phase of controlled fragmentation. Formal cohesion will mask an increasingly marked differentiation in access to resources, and convergence policy will be gradually replaced by selective financial mechanisms.

For the periphery, structural funds will be increasingly replaced by instruments such as SAFE, designed not so much to stimulate endogenous development as to direct demand towards the industrial capacities of the hard core.

The most significant consequence, however, is strategic. States outside the hard core risk being placed in an intermediate zone: neither part of the decision-making core, nor completely outsourced from its sphere of interest.

This is a zone that is predominantly anchored in European interests, but without benefiting from the same density of political and strategic engagement as the consolidated core. A new meaning of European belonging: not equality of status, but differentiated membership.

Photo: (source: Pixabay, CC0)

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