Romania as a geopolitical hub between Central Europe and the Balkans

Alexandru Drăgulin, 14 October 2026

Executive Summary: Romania as a Geopolitical Hub

Context & Core Thesis:

Russia’s war against Ukraine has tied CEE economic infrastructure directly to military security. While Romania has the location and foundational capabilities to act as a regional geopolitical hub between Central Europe and the Balkans, position alone is insufficient—hub status requires functional cross-border links, execution, and sustained political initiative.

Key Frameworks & Regional Initiatives

• “Balkan Banana” vs. Three Seas Initiative (3SI):
  • Balkan Banana: A concept proposed in the Greek press (Oct 2026) outlining an economic arc from Thessaloniki through Sofia, Ruse–Giurgiu, Bucharest, and Timișoara. It is an informal vision, not an official treaty or government initiative.
  • 3SI: An official EU/transatlantic platform (launched 2015) for North–South energy, transport, and digital connectivity. Romania co-founded its investment fund in 2019; Greece joined in 2023.
• Official Trilateral Platform:
  In Dec 2025, Romania, Bulgaria, and Greece formally created a Black Sea–Aegean corridor platform. The EU Commission announced a joint action plan (Oct 2026) to upgrade the Giurgiu–Ruse rail bridge and plan a second road/rail bridge.
• Greek Alignment:
  Greece’s expansion of the Via Carpathia to Thessaloniki and NATO’s reliance on Alexandroupolis complement 3SI objectives and connect Aegean maritime access to the Danube and Black Sea.

Economic & Infrastructure Priorities for Romania

• Beyond Transit: Infrastructure must anchor localized production, logistics, and intermodal terminals rather than generate mere transit fees.
• The Bulgarian Link: Seamless connection south depends entirely on Bulgarian infrastructure. Land Schengen integration (Jan 2025) reduced border delay, but physical bridge and rail bottlenecks persist.
• Financing: Capitalizing on platforms like the €360M EIF-backed infrastructure initiative (launched Sept 2026, targeting €2B+) requires bankable, technically sound projects.

Energy & Security Convergence

• Vertical Corridor & Neptun Deep: Transgaz-backed gas interconnections and expected offshore gas from Neptun Deep (H1 2027) position Romania as a regional energy supplier, provided pipeline networks and contracts are secured.
• Military Mobility: A July 2024 trilateral agreement with Bulgaria and Greece aims to harmonize transit procedures and reinforce NATO’s eastern flank. Dual-use infrastructure must balance civilian utility with military load requirements.
• Defense Anchors: Romania acts as a military hub hosting French-led NATO battlegroups and multinational headquarters. It leverages diplomatic formats (Bucharest Nine, B9) and joint maritime operations (the MCM Black Sea Task Group with Bulgaria and Türkiye) to project stability toward Moldova, Ukraine, and the Black Sea.

Conclusion

Romania’s emergence as a geopolitical hub is advanced in defense but pending in economic execution. True influence will be determined by practical, delivered results—starting with predictable transport, energy reliability, and upgraded Danube bridge capacity with its neighbors.

Article

Regional cooperation initiatives are becoming increasingly complex as economic infrastructure and security become harder to separate. Russia’s war against Ukraine has reinforced this connection and the need for secure supply routes.[1] A railway can carry both freight and military reinforcements; an energy interconnection can support industry and reduce vulnerability to external pressure. For Romania, the overlap between these functions raises the question of whether the country is beginning to emerge as a geopolitical hub in Central and Eastern Europe. The answer proposed here is conditional: Romania has the foundations and some of the capabilities of such a hub, but regional influence is built through functional connections and political initiative; it does not automatically follow from a country’s position on the map.

Two Different Levels of Cooperation

A comparison between the “Balkan Banana” and the Three Seas Initiative (3SI) first requires a clarification. In an analysis published by The Opinion on 6 October 2026, the “Balkan Banana” denotes a potential economic arc linking Thessaloniki, Sofia, the Ruse–Giurgiu area, Bucharest–Ploiești and Timișoara, with connections to Plovdiv. The author envisages a network of industrial, logistics and technology centers connected to Central Europe. This is a proposal for an economic geography, put forward in the Greek press, that seeks to capitalize on Thessaloniki’s role as a maritime gateway. The article presents neither an intergovernmental agreement nor a joint budget or organization bearing that name. The identifiable intellectual initiative should not automatically be attributed to the Greek government.[2]

The 3SI has a more established political framework. Launched in 2015 at the initiative of Croatia and Poland, it is a platform for cooperation among EU member states on north–south connectivity in transport, energy and digital infrastructure.[3] Greece became its thirteenth participating state at the Bucharest summit in 2023.[4] Its Polish–Croatian origins do not, however, imply a monopoly over the agenda. Romania helped institutionalize its investment dimension: EximBank and the Polish bank BGK jointly established the initiative’s investment fund in 2019.[5]

US support gives the 3SI a transatlantic dimension, while the Dubrovnik Declaration of April 2026 places it within the wider effort to strengthen European resilience and cohesion.[1] This support should not, however, be confused with authorship of the initiative or unified political control. The agenda emerges from negotiations among participants, the priorities of successive presidencies and the availability of financing. Romania, therefore, has room to take the initiative within an established framework, whereas the “Balkan Banana” primarily offers a vision for potential subregional integration.

There is nevertheless an official basis for trilateral cooperation. The memorandum signed by Greece, Bulgaria and Romania in December 2025 established a Black Sea–Aegean Sea corridor platform, under the political coordination of the transport ministers and with European support.[6] On 9 October 2026, the European Commission announced a joint action plan that includes upgrading the Giurgiu–Ruse railway bridge and preparing a new road and railway bridge.[7] The official platform exists in its own right and predates the formulation in the Greek press. The “Banana” may express an economic ambition for this cooperation without retrospectively becoming its official name.

Although they do not use the term “Balkan Banana”, contributions by researchers associated with ELIAMEP place this vision within a longer-standing debate about Greece’s regional role. In 2023, Panagiota Manoli argued that opening the Three Seas Initiative to Greece would add a Mediterranean dimension to cooperation. Connections with Central and South-Eastern Europe would support the development of northern Greece while also serving a security function. The extension of Via Carpathia towards Thessaloniki and the importance of the port of Alexandroupolis to NATO illustrate this convergence between the economy and defense. [8]

Katerina Sokou interprets Greece’s growing regional role through its contribution to South-Eastern European energy security and support for NATO’s eastern flank within the Greek–American partnership. Access to the Aegean through Alexandroupolis thus emerges as a natural complement to the 3SI’s north–south axis. Maria Gavouneli, in turn, highlights the role of Greece and Thessaloniki in regional cooperation through the 3SI and the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor. These two perspectives explain Athens’ interest in turning port and energy infrastructure into a source of regional influence. [9] [10]

The practical requirement for this ambition emerges from the discussion moderated by Elena Lazarou at the 3SI forum in April 2026: national projects need to be connected into interoperable networks by coordinating investment and removing cross-border bottlenecks. For Romania, these contributions suggest an opportunity for complementarity with Greece and Bulgaria: connecting the Aegean axis to the Danube, the Black Sea and the eastern neighborhood through joint projects. This is an interpretation of the convergence between these analyses, rather than an explicit ELIAMEP position on the “Balkan Banana”. [11]

What Romania Stands to Gain

Romania can pursue this complementarity at two levels: within the 3SI, by promoting connections with Central Europe, and in cooperation with Sofia and Athens, by completing cross-border links to the south. The 2026 3SI declaration explicitly includes Rail2Sea and Via Carpathia among the projects relevant to connectivity and mobility for both civilian and military use.[1] Bucharest’s objective is to align these projects with access to the port of Constanța and the country’s economic and security needs.

For Romania, the benefits extend beyond transit revenues. The aim is for infrastructure to attract production, logistics services, research and local suppliers. Better connections between ports and industrial centers can make investment in production more attractive; traffic merely passing through the country does not guarantee this outcome. Promoting the corridor must therefore be accompanied by projects for intermodal terminals, rail access to industrial sites and cooperation among businesses. Competition between ports and cities will not disappear, but it can coexist with complementary services and alternative routes.

Bulgaria is an indispensable partner in this equation. Uninterrupted connections between Romania and the Aegean ports depend on infrastructure and decisions on Bulgarian territory. The removal of checks on persons at internal land borders, effective 1 January 2025, improved conditions for movement.[12] Schengen, however, does not increase a bridge’s capacity or modernize a railway. For communities in Giurgiu and Ruse, geopolitical success must also mean more predictable journeys and access to jobs and services. An agenda devised solely in the capitals would risk overlooking the very places where regional integration is tested every day.

Within the 3SI, Romania can use its financial participation to support well-prepared projects and regional partnerships. On 24 September 2026, the European Investment Fund and institutions from six countries, including Romania’s Investment and Development Bank, launched a new infrastructure fund platform, with total commitments of €360 million and the aim of mobilizing at least €2 billion in investment.[13] Commitments and mobilization targets are not money already invested in Romania. The ability to benefit depends on project feasibility, co-financing and delivery. A strategic label can open a discussion, but it cannot replace the necessary documentation and economic viability.

Where Energy and Security Meet in Infrastructure

Energy cooperation shows that regional initiative is shared among governments and operators. The Vertical Corridor links gas transmission networks in South-Eastern Europe and can diversify access to supply sources. In the September 2026 announcement concerning its expansion, Transgaz’s management stated that Romania and the company had promoted the concept since 2016.[14] This is an explicit claim of Romanian initiative, distinct from the Greek origins of the “Banana” metaphor. The corridor’s operation nevertheless depends on cooperation among operators, available capacity, tariffs and actual demand, rather than a single political center.

Romania can combine its transit role with that of a regional producer and supplier. In their announcement of 28 September 2026, OMV Petrom and Romgaz expected the first gas from Neptun Deep to enter the system in the first half of 2027.[15] This prospect can support supply security and relations with neighboring countries, but future production should not be treated as currently available. To turn the resource into lasting influence, Romania needs connections, credible contracts and infrastructure protection. Diversification should also be pursued through electricity, efficiency, and renewable sources, so that a new role in gas trading does not lead to dependence on a single sector.

The direct link to defense emerges in cooperation on military mobility. On 10 July 2024, Romania, Bulgaria and Greece signed a letter of intent for a corridor to facilitate the cross-border movement of forces and equipment. The stated objectives include adapting road and rail routes and reducing bureaucracy, in line with NATO priorities and EU initiatives.[16] This is a mechanism distinct from the 3SI and the economic proposal represented by the “Banana”, even where the infrastructure overlaps. The intended strategic advantage is to reduce the time needed to reinforce the south-eastern flank and provide more supply options.

Infrastructure intended for civilian and military use must be designed for both functions. Bridge load-bearing capacity, terminals, rail interoperability and crossing procedures deliver benefits when addressed together. Concentrating flows at a single point can create vulnerability; alternative routes and repair capabilities increase resilience. At the same time, military compatibility does not justify every economic project. Romania should prioritize investments that meet demonstrable civilian needs and specific defense requirements, rather than promising that every motorway will automatically deliver security.

A Regional Role Supported by Alliances

The security architecture within which these projects operate remains Euro-Atlantic. NATO provides the framework for collective defense, planning and military structures; European cooperation supports infrastructure and resilience. The 3SI is not a military alliance and provides no defense guarantees of its own. Romania already performs specific regional functions: it hosts the allied battlegroup with France as the framework nation, as well as the multinational headquarters in Sibiu and Bucharest, which have responsibilities for the battlegroups in Romania and Bulgaria.[17] These support the idea of a military hub, without in themselves demonstrating the existence of a center of influence across all fields.

In diplomacy, the Bucharest Nine format, established at the initiative of Romania and Poland in 2015, provides a channel for consultations among allies on the eastern flank.[18] Bucharest can use this position to advocate sustained attention to the Black Sea in allied discussions. Cooperation with Greece and Bulgaria adds a southern dimension, while cooperation with Türkiye is essential in the maritime domain. The MCM Black Sea Task Group, established by Romania, Bulgaria and Türkiye and operational since 2024, shows how a specific need—countering the threat from naval mines—can generate practical cooperation. An expansion of its missions was announced in July 2026.[19]

Romania’s relevance therefore stems from its participation in arrangements with different functions and its ability to coordinate them. Partners’ interests do not coincide on every issue, and a credible regional strategy must accept this reality. Bucharest stands to gain by proposing projects that also benefit its neighbors, including the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine. An active role entails providing solutions and bearing costs, such as preparing projects or maintaining logistics capabilities, alongside requesting allied support.

When Geographical Position Becomes a Security Asset

The hypothesis that Romania is a geopolitical hub can be tested against the results. What matters is whether transport times become shorter and more predictable, whether cross-border bottlenecks are removed and whether backup routes emerge. It also matters how much economic value remains in the communities being connected and whether Romania can sustain energy and logistics flows during a crisis. Equally relevant is whether Bucharest’s proposals become joint decisions and projects. The number of summits hosted or memorandums signed is insufficient to measure this capacity.

A realistic priority would be a joint agenda with Bulgaria and Greece focused on a few cross-border links, with publicly identified responsibilities, financing and deadlines. Romania could promote eligible components through European instruments and mechanisms associated with the 3SI, aligning them with military mobility requirements. In parallel, links to Constanța, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine should ensure continuity between the southern projects and Romania’s role as a security provider in the Black Sea region. Domestic coordination among transport, energy, defense and local authorities is a prerequisite for such a foreign policy.

Romania is thus moving towards becoming a geopolitical hub, but the process is uneven and remains conditional. Its military functions are already visible; economic integration and the ability to shape the regional agenda need further strengthening. The 3SI offers a platform for negotiation and investment, while the “Balkan Banana” idea encourages the development of a more closely connected regional economy. Their value to Romania will depend on its ability to turn cooperation with its neighbors into lasting results. For Bucharest, the test of regional influence begins at the bridges across the Danube, too.

Sources

[1] Three Seas Initiative. Dubrovnik Declaration: The Three Seas in Its Second Decade: Powering Europe’s Strategic North–South Axis. Dubrovnik, 28–29 April 2026.

[2] Ουγγρίνης, Φάνης. “Βαλκανική «Μπανάνα»: Οικονομικό τόξο με πύλη τη Θεσσαλονίκη”. The Opinion, 6 October 2026.

[3] Croatian Parliament. Parliamentary Summit of the Three Seas Initiative: Advancing the Three Seas Initiative: Vision, Responsibility, Partnership. Media advisory. Zagreb, 24 March 2026.

[4] President of the Republic of Poland. “The 8th Summit and Business Forum of the Three Seas Initiative in Bucharest”. 6 September 2023.

[5] EximBank. “Fondul de Investiții al Inițiativei celor Trei Mări, vehicul de investiții pentru finanțarea proiectelor de infrastructură”. 28 November 2019.

[6] European Commission, Representation in Romania. “România, Grecia și Bulgaria își consolidează cooperarea în domeniul infrastructurii de transport”. 4 December 2025.

[7] European Commission, Directorate-General for Mobility and Transport. “Bulgaria, Greece and Romania Step Up Delivery of Strategic Transport Links”. 9 October 2026.

[8] Manoli, Panagiota. “Turning the 3SI into a 4SI: A View from Athens”. In Anticipating the 2023 Three Seas Initiative Bucharest Summit: Advancing the Common Agenda, edited by Ana-Maria Andreea Anghelescu and Iulian Oneașcă, 43–44. Working Paper 46. Bucharest: European Institute of Romania, 2023.

[9] Sokou, Katerina. Greece-US Relations: Capitalizing on a Generational High. ELIAMEP, 26 September 2023.

[10] ELIAMEP. “The Role of Greece in the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC)”. Summary of an interview with Maria Gavouneli on ERT3, 13 September 2024.

[11] ELIAMEP. “Dr Elena Lazarou, Director General of ELIAMEP, at the Three Seas Business Forum 2026 in Croatia”. Event report, 30 April 2026.

[12] Council of the European Union. “Schengen: Council Decides to Lift Land Border Controls with Bulgaria and Romania”. 12 December 2024.

[13] European Investment Fund. “EIF Joins Forces with Six EU Countries to Spur at Least €2 Billion for Infrastructure between Baltic, Adriatic and Black Seas”. 24 September 2026.

[14] Transgaz. “Signing of the MoU on the Expansion of the Vertical Corridor”. Press release published via the Bucharest Stock Exchange, 4 September 2026.

[15] OMV Petrom. “Neptun Deep avansează către prima producție de gaze, preconizată pentru prima jumătate a anului 2027”. 28 September 2026.

[16] Romanian Ministry of National Defense. “Letter of Intent Signed Romania, Bulgaria and Greece for the Creation of a Military Mobility Corridor”. 11 July 2024.

[17] NATO. “Strengthening NATO’s Eastern Flank”. Accessed 14 October 2026.

[18] Szymański, Piotr, and Jacek Tarociński. Security Cooperation Formats in the Baltic Sea Region: Recommendations for the Council of the Baltic Sea States. OSW, 29 May 2026.

[19] Romanian Ministry of National Defense. “România, Bulgaria și Turcia extind misiunile grupului MCM Black Sea”. 8 July 2026.

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