Bulgarian-Romanian political relations

A Pillar Page

Pillar pages of The Bridge of Friendship

Intro

Until February 2022 and the outbreak of the Russian full-scale invasion in Ukraine, Bulgarian-Romanian political relations were largely frozen and static. This tipping point led to the redefinition of bilateral and regional relations, opening up opportunities for greater political and other forms of engagement between the governments in Sofia and Bucharest. Since the March 2023 Joint Political Declaration for a Strategic Partnership, the two governments have added defence cooperation and the slow-moving Ruse-Giurgiu second bridge project to their agenda, as well as achieving full Schengen accession in January 2025 and establishing infrastructure cooperation in the Romania-Bulgaria-Greece format in December 2025.

Meanwhile, analysts on both sides are increasingly framing the relationship in the context of wider concerns: the declining US commitment to security in the Black Sea region; Romania’s 2025 presidential election, which is being challenged by sovereignist forces; Bulgaria’s recurring political instability (which ended with the rise of Rumen Radev’s party, Progressive Bulgaria, and the formation of a government in April 2026); and strategic interests in Moldova. The overall trajectory described throughout the site’s coverage is one in which formal cooperation is expanding faster than the actual knowledge and trust between the two societies.

Bilateral Cooperation & Diplomacy: Strategic Partnership, Visits & Declarations

Brândușa Predescu: The war in Ukraine has brought us even closer together

Vladimir Mitev, 16 July 2026

In this interview, Romania’s Ambassador to Bulgaria, Brândușa Predescu, argues that Russia’s war on Ukraine has brought the two countries ‘even closer together, both figuratively and literally’, and cites the 2023 Strategic Partnership Declaration as an active framework for cooperation. She highlights concrete progress, including the selection of a contractor for the preliminary design of a third Danube bridge between Ruse and Giurgiu in June 2026, the completion of repairs to the existing Danube (Friendship) Bridge by 1 July 2026, the establishment of a vertical gas corridor to reduce dependence on Russian energy, and collaborative efforts on a Black Sea maritime security hub and drone defence capabilities, partly pursued through NATO’s ‘Bucharest Nine’ format.

Svetoslav Kyosev: The European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation, established in Bucharest, is a response to a real problem

Martina Gancheva, 26 March 2026

Svetoslav Kyosev, vice-president of the Romanian-Bulgarian Bilateral Chamber of Commerce, presented the newly formed ‘East Gate’ European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation (EGTC), which spans Romania, Bulgaria, Moldova and Ukraine, as a legally binding entity rather than an informal network. It is designed to overcome administrative barriers to cross-border cooperation in areas such as transport, investment, energy, digitalisation and public services. He argues that its permanent institutional structure — a general assembly voting on a one-member-one-vote basis, a national college and a secretariat — gives municipalities and institutions durable access to EU funding streams such as Interreg, Horizon Europe and the Connecting Europe Facility. This fills the ‘operational level’ that ad hoc partnerships previously lacked.

Inauguration of the Honorary Consulate of Romania in Ruse

Vladimir Mitev, 18 October 2025

The article reports on the inauguration of Romania’s honorary consulate in Ruse on 17 October 2025. Regional governor Dragomir Draganov described it as the first honorary consulate of an EU country in the city, and lawyer and president of the Bulgarian-Romanian Chamber of Commerce, Viktor Gugushev, was named Honorary Consul for the Ruse, Veliko Tarnovo and Pleven regions. Both Romanian ambassador Brândușa Predescu and Ruse mayor Pencho Milkov framed the appointment as deepening cross-border cultural, business, and educational ties between the two EU and NATO neighbours. Bulgarian ambassador to Romania Radko Vlaykov was also in attendance.

Bulgarian-Romanian relations reveal their potential when there is trust between the participants

Monica Varbanova, 12 October 2024

In this interview with the Bulgarian media outlet Capital, journalist Vladimir Mitev argues that Bulgarian-Romanian bilateral projects are not stalling due to a lack of political declarations, such as the strategic partnership agreement signed by Presidents Radev and Iohannis in 2023, but rather due to a lack of interpersonal and institutional trust. He points to the confusion surrounding the renovation of the Danube bridge in the summer of 2024 and the rumoured ‘disinfection fee’ as evidence of poor communication. He calls for ‘neutral spaces’ for dialogue, as well as more individuals acting as informal bridges between the two societies. This is because he believes that momentum comes mainly from external pressure rather than organic bilateral initiative.

Radu Magdin: The trend in Europe goes eastward

Vladimir Mitev, 10 September 2024

Radu Magdin, a Romanian geopolitical consultant and the CEO of Smartlink Communications, argues that Western Europe has been in a slow-motion crisis since 2008, while Eastern Europe — including Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria, which together form a market of over 70 million people — has become more economically dynamic. He believes that this region should assert itself more forcefully in Brussels, particularly with regard to the completion of Schengen land-border accession, despite Austrian objections. He calls for Bulgaria and Romania to develop business and intellectual networks to build cooperation, rather than relying solely on political elites. He also predicts that Romania’s 2024 elections will not change the country’s Euro-Atlantic orientation, regardless of whether Ciolacu or Ciucă becomes president.

H.E. Radko Vlaykov: Bulgarian-Romanian relations advance successfully in the domains of security and defense

Răzvan Munteanu, 18 June 2024

H.E. Radko Vlaykov, Bulgaria’s ambassador to Romania, describes the present period as ‘probably the best’ in terms of bilateral relations. He cites the joint strategic-partnership declaration of March 2023, frequent military delegations and exercises, and concrete infrastructure steps such as the Ruse-Giurgiu motorway bridge project funded by NATO’s military mobility programme and the ‘Fast Danube’ navigation initiative with the European Commission as evidence of this. He presents the two countries as sharing a NATO responsibility for Black Sea security, including energy security and support for Ukrainian grain transit. However, he also notes the paradox that only two bridges connect the two states along their roughly 400 km shared border.

Iulian Mareș: Romania will try to raise its regional profile and will need partners

Vladimir Mitev, 14 January 2024

Iulian Mares, an independent journalist and president of the Balkan Development Support Association, argues that, as part of its post-communist maturation, Romania’s next president will naturally gravitate towards closer ties with Moldova and Ukraine, while still needing genuine regional partners. He identifies Bulgaria as Romania’s most suitable partner, but criticises Romanian indifference towards neighbouring countries and what he describes as ‘excessive nationalism’ in Bulgaria. He also cites the construction of approximately EUR 1 billion worth of EU-financed border infrastructure with Ukraine as a tangible indication of Romania’s commitment to Kyiv’s eventual EU integration.

The importance of Bulgaria in Romanian foreign policy and of Romania in Bulgarian foreign policy is growing

Vladimir Mitev, 8 December 2023

In an interview with Bulgarian National Radio, journalist Vladimir Mitev argues that the strategic relevance of Bulgaria and Romania to each other is increasing in the wake of the war in Ukraine. However, he notes that Bulgarian perceptions of Romania remain ‘outdated’, overlooking factors such as Romania’s strong ties to Hungary and the roughly 25% support for sovereignist parties there. Mitev points to concrete projects that could strengthen the connection between the two countries, such as improving Danube navigability and building a gas link between Greece, Bulgaria and Moldova. He also suggests that ‘bridges of friendship’, i.e. trusted individuals and civic actors, are needed to close the people-to-people gap that keeps the two nations at arm’s length despite the rhetoric of their governments.

Now online: the study on Romanian foreign policy and Bulgarian-Romanian relations, printed by the Bulgarian Diplomatic Institute

Vladimir Mitev, 12 November 2023

This announces the online publication of a study by the Bulgarian Diplomatic Institute, written by Dr Aneta Mihaylova of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences and the Romanian-speaking journalist Vladimir‌Mitev. The study documents the strong Euro-Atlantic orientation of Romanian foreign policy, as well as its interests in Moldova and Ukraine, and its efforts to diversify energy sources amid delays to Schengen. Vladimir Mitev’s accompanying chapter contextualises this within Romania’s tensions between sovereignty and Europhilia, and possible regional realignments, such as a prospective Polish-Ukrainian axis and the growing influence of China redirecting US attention. He also introduces his ‘bridges of friendship’ and ‘dynamic identity’ concepts as tools for fostering deeper Bulgarian-Romanian strategic understanding.

Sofia and Bucharest work together on new transit routes for Ukrainian grain

Vladimir Mitev, 8 August 2023

In this interview, originally published in Mediapool following a meeting between Denkov and Ciolacu in Bucharest, Romania’s ambassador to Bulgaria, Brândușa Predescu, discusses the joint efforts to establish new transit corridors for Ukrainian grain following Russia’s withdrawal from the Black Sea grain deal in July 2023. She also talks about the progress being made on a third Danube bridge near Giurgiu-Ruse and the FAST DANUBE project, which aims to make the Danube navigable year-round. She also discusses Romania’s resilience to the energy crisis, which is due to its low dependence on Russian supply. She mentions the 33% increase in foreign direct investment in 2022 and the fact that both countries claim to meet all Schengen criteria. Finally, she highlights the surge in Romanian tourism to Bulgaria, with 819,841 visitors in 2022 — a 54.7% increase.

Bulgaria-Romania: bridges, nuclear energy and strategic military partnership

Mihai Isac, 24 July 2023

The article reports on Bulgarian Prime Minister Nikolai Denkov’s visit to Bucharest in July 2023 and details the concrete deliverables of the new bilateral push. These include an agreement to advance a second Danube bridge at Ruse-Giurgiu with EBRD financing of around €5 billion for Bulgarian transport projects, joint support for nuclear power voiced at a meeting of 12 EU countries, and a defence pact between Defence Ministers Angel Tîlvăr and Todor Tagarev to establish a Regional Special Operations Component Command, reinforced by the multinational Poseidon 2023 exercise. Denkov explicitly frames the upgraded Danube crossing as urgent NATO logistics for the eastern flank, made necessary by the war in Ukraine, while both sides reaffirm that they have met the Schengen criteria, despite Austria’s ongoing veto.

Radko Vlaykov: Bulgaria has a worthy place in Romania’s future intentions

Vladimir Mitev, 3 May 2023

In this interview, Bulgaria’s ambassador to Romania, Radko Vlaykov, argues that the March 2023 presidential strategic partnership declaration marks a genuine upgrade in relations, which were previously ‘good but not intense’, to a level that Romania now ranks alongside its ties with the US, France, and Poland. He cites over €8 billion in annual bilateral trade, despite weak transport links. He highlights the planned Ruse-Giurgiu bridge and the ‘Fast Danube’ navigation project as evidence that the two countries now view the river as a connector rather than a divider. He also urges joint Schengen entry to prevent a hard border from forming along the Danube.

Romanian MEP Vlad Botoș: Bulgaria and Romania reached a strategic partnership too late

Nikolay Krastev, 14 April 2023

In this interview, Romanian MEP Vlad-Marius Botoș (Renew Europe) argues that the strategic partnership declaration between Iohannis and Radev in March 2023 came far too late, given that the two countries have been EU members since 2007. He says that he has been pushing for closer coordination since the beginning of his mandate in 2019. Stressing the importance of joint Schengen accession in 2023, he also calls for coordinated eurozone and Black Sea renewable-energy policy. Furthermore, he argues that, given their own accession experience, Romania and Bulgaria are well placed to guide Moldova, Ukraine and the Western Balkans through EU integration.

Joint Political Declaration for a Strategic Partnership between the Republic of Bulgaria and Romania

Vladimir Mitev, 25 March 2023

This is the text of the strategic partnership declaration, signed by the presidents of Bulgaria and Romania in Sofia on 15 March 2023. It commits both states to deeper political and economic dialogue, the Ruse-Giurgiu bridge and FAST DANUBE infrastructure projects, coordinated Schengen and NATO eastern flank efforts, and support for the ‘European perspective’ of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. The declaration also commits the two governments to presenting joint positions within the regional formats of the Black Sea and the Three Seas Initiative, and to condemning Russia’s aggression against Ukraine while pledging support to Ukraine and Moldova.

Yordan Bozhilov: The strategic partnership document with Romania must be followed by real and far-reaching actions

Vladimir Mitev, 15 March 2023

Commenting on the strategic partnership declaration signed during Romanian President Klaus Iohannis’s visit to Sofia, Yordan Bozhilov, President of the Sofia Security Forum and former Bulgarian Deputy Defence Minister, argues that the document will only be meaningful if it is followed by concrete steps in the defence sector, such as joint arms procurement, more joint exercises and daily working-level contact between the two defence ministries. He sees this moment as correcting past failures, citing Bulgaria’s refusal in 2016 to join a NATO Black Sea flotilla initiative backed by Romania. He also warns that mutual stereotypes and distrust will persist unless political willpower is sustained beyond the signing ceremony.

Vessela Tcherneva: It is somewhat strange to make an announcement for a strategic partnership with Romania when there is no regular parliament and government

Vladimir Mitev, 15 March 2023

Vessela Tcherneva, Deputy Director of the European Council on Foreign Relations, reacts skeptically to the Bulgaria-Romania strategic partnership declaration. She questions the point of announcing a long-term commitment when Bulgaria lacks a functioning parliament and government. She argues that the two countries still behave like ‘two islands’ rather than integrated neighbours. She singles out the shortage of Danube bridges (there are only two) as the top infrastructure priority and contends that Bulgaria’s stalled rule of law and anti-corruption reforms leave it ‘indebted’ to Romania with regard to Schengen and at risk of being marginalised within NATO, much as it has been within the EU.

Vessela Tcherneva: Packaging Bulgaria and Romania together is an opportunity, not an inconvenience

Vladimir Mitev, 10 January 2023

Vessela Tcherneva (ECFR) argues that Bulgaria and Romania have wasted three decades of EU-mandated joint treatment by viewing it as an ‘inconvenient’ bureaucratic process rather than a strategic asset. She claims that transforming it into a valuable resource requires reformist elites who are genuinely committed to Europeanisation, not just rhetoric. She calls for the construction of physical Danube bridges, as well as ‘political, economic and social bridges’, and identifies coordination on the response to the Ukrainian refugee crisis and energy policy as immediate, practical entry points for deeper bilateral cooperation.

George Scutaru: Bulgaria’s ambiguity does not prevent Romania from finding more points of collaboration

Vladimir Mitev, 17 December 2022

George Scutaru, the CEO of Romania’s New Strategy Center and a former national security advisor to the Romanian president, acknowledges that Bulgaria has displayed a ‘strategic ambiguity’ towards Russia that is comparable to Turkey’s. However, he argues that this should not prevent cooperation, citing concrete opportunities such as Romanian Black Sea gas (from the Neptun Deep field) being supplied to Bulgaria, the joint protection of overlapping exclusive economic zones by Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey, the dredging of the Danube, and Bulgaria’s involvement in NATO military mobility. He attributes the current shortfall in cooperation mainly to Bulgaria’s domestic political instability, rather than to any fundamental incompatibility between the two countries.

Cristian Ghiță: Our region needs international relations experts in order to make its case

Vladimir Mitev, 4 December 2022

Cristian Ghiță, the editor-in-chief of the Euro-Atlantic Resilience Journal and the communications coordinator at the Euro-Atlantic Resilience Centre in Bucharest (which is affiliated with the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs), argues that Southeastern European states require a larger group of experts in international relations who can communicate the region’s interests to global audiences. He frames ‘resilience’ — in terms of disinformation, energy, and infrastructure — as a shared, cross-border effort. He cites Romania’s supply of electricity to Moldova during an energy crisis as an example of practical regional solidarity and reports that the Euro-Atlantic Resilience Forum attracted almost 70 speakers and over 1,000 participants across 12 panels.

Sergiu Mișcoiu: Bulgarian-Romanian relations are unjustly weak

Vladimir Mitev, 27 August 2022

In this interview, Sergiu Mișcoiu, a professor of European Studies at the University of Cluj-Napoca, argues that despite their shared EU and NATO membership, Bulgarian-Romanian ties remain surprisingly weak. He attributes this partly to a historical Romanian ‘complex of superiority’ towards Bulgaria, and partly to the Danube border still functioning as a psychological barrier. He notes that the majority of the approximately €6.5–7 billion in annual bilateral trade is conducted by multinational corporations rather than local businesses. He suggests that a Bulgarian–Romanian ‘mini-Schengen’, cross-border infrastructure, and civil society/cultural initiatives could help to foster genuine mutual trust.

The Cooperation and Verification Mechanism can encourage Bulgarian-Romanian interaction

Vladimir Mitev, 10 April 2021

This piece summarises an April 2021 podcast interview in which Vladimir Mitev argued that the EU’s Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM), which has monitored judicial reform and anti-corruption progress in Bulgaria and Romania since 2007, could be used as a shared framework to encourage the two countries to collaborate rather than compete. He also contends that, even after the 2020 anti-government protests, Bulgaria lacks a coherent modernisation vision, and suggests that a Bulgarian-Romanian ‘mini-Schengen’ could be a concrete step that Washington-aligned diplomacy under the Biden administration could help to catalyse.

The regional cooperation in Southeastern Europe – nothing, but out of sincerity

Vladimir Mitev, 4 April 2019

Vladimir Mitev provides a critical evaluation of the quadrilateral summit held in March 2019 between Romania, Serbia, Greece and Bulgaria (‘B4’), contending that it yielded ‘beautiful phrases and few, if any, results’. The summit produced only one agreement on cooperation in extraordinary situations and two non-binding memoranda. The much-touted gas pipeline ‘ring’ proposal was left without a timeline or funding. Mitev documents stalled infrastructure projects, including a Bulgarian-Romanian gas interconnector near Ruse that is still lacking a compression station, as well as an undecided site for a third Danube bridge. He contrasts the lack of institutional permanence of the B4 with the durable structures of the Visegrad Group, and quotes a vague, hard-to-parsing speech by Bulgarian Prime Minister Boyko Borisov as being symptomatic of the format’s weakness.

Vladimir Mitev: The media “warming-up” to the Romanian europresidency shows spirit of competition, but we need more cooperation with our neighbours in the region

Vladimir Mitev, 6 January 2019

In this radio interview with Georgi Markov on Bulgarian National Radio, blogger Vladimir Mitev discusses the build-up to Romania’s 2019 EU Council presidency. He contextualises this against the backdrop of domestic tensions between Prime Minister Viorica Dancila and PSD leader Liviu Dragnea, on the one hand, and President Klaus Iohannis, on the other. He also discusses controversial economic measures, such as the ‘greed tax’ on banks, which prompted warnings from Austrian Chancellor Sebastian Kurz about potential investor flight. Mitev argues that both Bulgarian and Western media cover Romania through the lens of a superficial and competitive comparison between neighbouring states, rather than based on genuine knowledge. He also makes the normative case that cooperation, rather than rivalry, should be the guiding value between Romania and its neighbours during the presidency.

Greece, Romania and Bulgaria find a common voice, but still need to accomplish “material” cooperation

Vladimir Mitev, 13 March 2018

The article covers the tenth trilateral meeting of foreign ministers Ekaterina Zaharieva (Bulgaria), Teodor Melescanu (Romania) and Nikos Kotzias (Greece) in Bucharest. It reports that the three states have aligned on EU/NATO enlargement towards the Western Balkans and closer EU ties for Eastern Partnership countries. They have also agreed on the planned ‘Balkan’ gas hub, as well as the Greece-Bulgaria and Romania-Bulgaria gas interconnectors and a vertical gas corridor. The author’s core finding is that, while the trio has achieved rhetorical convergence, no concrete funding or timelines were announced, so implementation has not been achieved. The author contrasts this declaratory, Western-oriented cooperation with the more concrete geopolitical coordination of the Turkey-Iran-Russia bloc.

Black Sea Security, Regional Strategy & Great-Power Dynamics

Ștefan Popescu: As the rift between Western Europe and the US deepens, Romania will need to discover and forge links with its own region

Vladimir Mitev, 28 August 2026

In this interview, Romanian foreign-policy analyst and former Secretary of State at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Stefan Popescu, argues that the growing rift between the US and Western Europe, combined with Washington’s declining strategic interest in the Black Sea, leaves Romania in a state of ‘strategic uncertainty’ that it cannot resolve by choosing sides among the great powers. He argues that the only realistic response is internal consolidation alongside a genuine neighbourhood policy, involving partnerships with Bulgaria, Hungary, Turkey, Greece and Serbia, rather than pursuing an unrealistic alignment with Poland. He also criticises Romanian elites for perpetuating stereotypes about their South-East European neighbours, instead of embracing that identity. He also links this external drift to domestic dysfunction, describing Romanian politics as so radicalised that ‘elites and political parties reject compromise and demonise their internal opponents’.

Yordan Bozhilov: It is time for a national strategy on the Black Sea

Vladimir Mitev, 5 August 2026

In this interview, defence expert and Sofia Security Forum founder Yordan Bozhilov argues that Bulgaria urgently needs its own national Black Sea strategy. He contrasts Sofia’s passivity under Prime Minister Rumen Radev’s government with Romania’s proactive defence modernisation, exemplified by Romania’s €5.7 billion contract with Rheinmetall versus Bulgaria’s €3.26 billion deal involving minimal domestic industrial participation. Bozhilov judges the existing trilateral security cooperation between Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey to be ‘insufficient’ in the face of emerging threats such as maritime drones. He also notes that, unlike France, which has already adopted its own regional strategy, Bulgaria has neither an updated national security strategy nor bilateral security agreements with key Western allies.

Mutual interest: military cooperation between Romania and Türkiye is gaining momentum

Vladimir Mitev, 20 July 2026

This article documents the evolution of defence cooperation between Romania and Turkey, moving from a declaratory partnership to concrete industrial integration. Examples include Romania’s commissioning of the Turkish-built corvette ROS Contraamiral August Roman in July 2026 (costing €223 million and built by the state-owned shipyard ASFAT); the €85 million acquisition by the Turkish manufacturer Otokar of Romania’s Automecanica plant, where 1,059 COBRA II armoured vehicles will be assembled; and the founding membership of both countries in the new Defence, Security and Resilience Bank. The analysts Teodor Moga, Ştefan Popescu and Alexandru Balaș are quoted as saying that Romania acts as a ‘structural gateway’, enabling Turkish defence firms to comply with the EU’s SAFE programme local content rules. This is because Greek and Cypriot vetoes would otherwise prevent Ankara from accessing EU defence funds directly. However, they also highlight Turkey’s tolerance of Russia’s ‘shadow fleet’ transiting the Bosphorus as an unresolved issue.

Alexandru Drăgulin: Romania’s foreign policy is pragmatic

Vladimir Mitev, 27 May 2026

In this interview, Alexandru Drăgulin of the Romanian Diplomatic Institute characterises President Nicușor Dan’s foreign policy as pragmatic rather than transformative, balancing EU integration with a military partnership with the US and describing Romania as ‘the most pro-Trump country in Eastern Europe’. He views Hungary’s political shift under Péter Magyar and his proposed ‘Visegrad Plus’ grouping favourably. He criticises Bucharest’s 2026 strategic partnership with Ukraine as being too slow to cooperate on drone technology. He also describes ties with Bulgaria as being sound, despite what he calls the country’s lingering pro-Russian cultural undertones. Furthermore, he argues that US strategic attention has shifted towards the Baltic and Asia-Pacific regions at the expense of the Black Sea region. He also rejects the ‘besieged fortress’ narrative of Romanian sovereignists, insisting that regional cooperation is mutually beneficial rather than a sacrifice.

Ștefan Popescu: Romania needs a neighborhood policy

Ștefan Lică, 29 April 2026

In an interview with journalist Stefan Lică for Adevarul, analyst Stefan Popescu argues that Romania’s failure to develop genuine relationships with its neighbours is indicative of Bucharest’s own lack of strategic direction, rather than instability in Sofia. He states outright: ‘We don’t have a neighbourhood policy, so anything can happen in Bulgaria.’ He criticises Romania for relying on great powers such as the US, France and Germany, while also selling off valuable state energy assets that Western states would otherwise protect. He points to Bulgaria and Hungary as major markets, noting that one million Romanian tourists visited Bulgaria in 2025, and argues in favour of a Visegrad- or Baltic-style regional framework. The piece is set against the backdrop of Bulgaria’s 19 April 2026 parliamentary elections, in which Rumen Radev’s ‘Progressive Bulgaria’ party was leading the polls. However, Popescu insists that the outcome of the Bulgarian election matters less than whether Bucharest finally engages proactively with its neighbours.

Vladimir Mitev: Bulgaria is part of both Western policy towards Ukraine and Western policy towards Russia

Mihai Isac, 26 March 2025

In an interview with Mihai Isac from Karadeniz Press, Vladimir Mitev challenges the perception of Bulgaria as a staunch supporter of Russia, pointing out that approximately 40% of Ukraine’s initial fuel imports during the war came from Bulgaria via the Lukoil refinery in Burgas. Despite this, Sofia has diversified its energy sources by establishing partnerships with Greece through the gas interconnector and with Westinghouse and France in the nuclear sector. Mitev also calls for closer coordination between Bulgaria and Romania on issues in the Western Balkans, including North Macedonia’s unresolved constitutional dispute regarding the recognition of its Bulgarian minority. He suggests that more trust-building between the people should complement the security and energy cooperation between the elites.

The Trump 2.0 times as seen from a Bulgarian-Romanian perspective: while borders and divisions in the West are rising, in the EU’s Southeast the logic of the center is being affirmed

Vladimir Mitev, 7 February 2025

In a recap of a Sofia conference opened by Romanian Ambassador Brânzună Predescu and featuring commentary from ECFR’s Vessela Tcherneva, who warned that ‘the world has changed’ under an unpredictable Trump, and Smartlink Communications’ Radu Magdin, who discussed the value of Bulgarian-Romanian solidarity, Mitev’s keynote argument was that while Trump-era protectionism and border politics were re-fragmenting the West, Bulgaria and Romania were moving in the opposite direction by completing Schengen integration and sustaining ‘bridge’ governments that blended NGO and populist currents rather than polarising along them. Mitev frames this as evidence that the southeastern periphery of the EU is reaffirming, not rejecting, the logic of the European centre.

Paul Hurmuz: The Romanian-British defense cooperation agreement will strengthen NATO’s defense activity in the Black Sea

Vladimir Mitev, 16 November 2024

Retired General Paul Hurmuz, a former Romanian defence attaché to the UK and ex-Deputy Director of NATO’s Intelligence Division who is now affiliated with Romania’s New Strategy Centre, explains that the 13 November 2024 Romanian-British defence agreement builds on a 2023 partnership covering defence logistics, technology and procurement. It also underpins the establishment of a new Regional Maritime Training Centre in Romania for the training of Ukrainian forces. He asserts that British naval expertise, particularly in mine clearance, bolsters NATO’s Black Sea deterrence capabilities within the confines of the Montreux Convention, thereby signalling the UK’s enduring commitment to NATO’s eastern flank.

Paul Hurmuz: The time is coming for Romania and Bulgaria to become more important players in Southeastern Europe

Vladimir Mitev, 16 November 2024

In this interview, retired Romanian General Paul Hurmuz (former NATO Deputy Director of the Intelligence Division) argues that, despite the expected push during the Trump era for European NATO members to increase defence spending, Washington’s strategic focus is shifting towards the Indo-Pacific. This leaves Europeans responsible for more of their own security. He claims that the centre of gravity of the alliance has shifted towards Poland and the Baltic states at the expense of the Black Sea region, and urges Romania and Bulgaria to strengthen their cooperation with each other and with Turkey regarding Black Sea security and gas infrastructure, in order to become more influential regional actors.

Paul Hurmuz: Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey are on the right track on security in the Black Sea

Vladimir Mitev, 21 March 2024

Paul Hurmuz, a retired Romanian general who was formerly Romania’s defence attaché in the UK and deputy director of NATO’s intelligence division, argues that Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey are finally adopting a coherent Black Sea security strategy following their insufficiently vocal response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. He cites a joint demining agreement and a trilateral security report presented at NATO headquarters in November 2023 as examples of concrete progress. He also identifies anti-access/area-denial capability, anti-submarine drone defence and the protection of exclusive economic zones — including new gas finds — as areas where the three states still need to collaborate.

Yordan Bozhilov: The agreement between Turkey, Romania and Bulgaria to fight mines in the Black Sea is quite different from the idea of a NATO flotilla

Vladimir Mitev, 11 January 2024

Yordan Bozhilov, the founder of the Sofia Security Forum and a former Bulgarian deputy defence minister, explains that the trilateral agreement between Turkey, Romania and Bulgaria in January 2024 to clear floating mines in the Black Sea has a narrowly defined, non-hostile mandate — unlike the broader 2016 NATO flotilla proposal, which was blocked by Bulgaria, thereby straining relations with Romania. Mr Bozhilov notes that, under Turkey’s interpretation of the Montreux Convention during wartime, only the three Black Sea NATO states can legally participate in the operation, which he frames as a pragmatic response to over 80 mines threatening shipping and driving up insurance costs, rather than a step towards a larger allied naval presence.

Southeastern Europe’s affirmation: neither technocracy, nor sovereignism, but people’s agency

Vladimir Mitev, 10 October 2023

In his report on a talk he gave at a Maynooth University conference on EU enlargement, Vladimir Mitev, founder of Cross-Border Talks, argues that Bulgaria and Romania lack an independent regional foreign policy agenda and simply echo EU directives. He claims that the resulting standoff between technocratic elites and sovereignist politicians produces polarisation rather than cooperation. He cites the depopulation of northern Bulgaria (with a 20% population loss between 2011 and 2021) and the ongoing shortage of Danube crossings, despite the promised construction of bridges and ferries, as evidence that grassroots, people-driven engagement, amplified by outlets such as Cross-Border Talks, is required to overcome the gridlock of the elite.

Yordan Bozhilov: Bulgaria has not lost interest in the Three Seas Initiative

Vladimir Mitev, 4 September 2023

Ahead of the Bucharest Three Seas Initiative summit in September 2023, Yordan Bozhilov — founder of the Sofia Security Forum and former Bulgarian deputy defence minister — explains that Bulgaria’s initial wariness of the initiative (perceived by some as a revival of the anti-Russian ‘Intermarium’ concept) has dissipated as its true nature as an economic North-South connectivity project has become clearer. However, chronic underfunding remains an issue, with only a fraction of the required €100 billion having been collected. He argues that Bulgaria and Romania should strengthen their strategic partnership beyond the largely unimplemented cooperation document signed in March, suggesting the creation of a bilateral mini-Schengen and citing the Franco-German model as an example of the kind of elite trust-building that the two countries still lack.

Kyuchukov: The line between being part of conflict and part of war is ever thinner for Europe

Vladimir Mitev, 24 July 2023

In an interview, Lyubomir Kyuchukov — director of the Economic and International Relations Institute in Sofia and a former Bulgarian ambassador — argues that Europe is becoming increasingly involved in the war in Ukraine, even though it remains formally outside of it. He claims that ‘securitisation’ is now dominating EU and NATO policy over political solutions. He dismissed both Russian and Ukrainian peace proposals as ‘conditions for capitulation’, and when asked about the new Bulgaria-Romania strategic partnership, he said it was sound in principle, but had so far remained ‘at the level of good wishes’ without any institutional follow-up. He also comments on Erdogan’s Turkey in the post-election era, describing it as a state that is playing both sides by backing Ukraine while preserving ties with Moscow.

David Bisset: Bulgarians and Romanians realize they need to be something more than great powers’ toys

Vladimir Mitev, 19 June 2023

In this interview, David Bisset, a researcher at Equilibrium (Bulgaria’s largest social services NGO) and originally from Rousse, argues that Bulgarian identity has been stunted by instilled local chauvinism and polarisation from an early age. This forces people to ‘state what they are’ rather than discover who they are. He draws a parallel with how Scottish identity was once reduced to kitsch associated with kilts and bagpipes. He contends that the war in Ukraine has exposed the vulnerability of small states such as Bulgaria and Romania to manipulation by great powers, and predicts a growing public demand for genuine self-determination, rather than these countries continuing to play the role of ‘playthings’ of larger powers in the Eastern Balkans.

Ukraine: an exam too difficult for the Bucharest elite

Armand Goșu, 12 January 2023

Drawing on the analysis of Romanian commentator Armand Goșu and the testimony of Ion Bistreanu, Romania’s former ambassador to Kyiv, the article argues that the country’s political elite failed to convert its geographical assets — namely, the longest EU/NATO border with Ukraine and proximity to the front — into regional leadership following Russia’s invasion in 2022. As a result, Poland assumed that role instead. The article attributes this failure to historical mistrust of Ukraine, the slowness of Bucharest to visit Kyiv (four months after the invasion) and the harsh public criticism of Ukraine’s minority-language law by Romanian officials, even during wartime. This is contrasted with Bistreanu’s recollection that Ukraine had demanded that Romania renounce its 1991 declaration of territorial claims.

Valentin Radomirski: Romania has become the most important and reliable US ally in the Black Sea region

Vladimir Mitev, 8 January 2023

Valentin Radomirski, a former Bulgarian ambassador to Romania and director of the Institute of Economics and International Relations, argues that Romania has deliberately positioned itself as Washington’s leading Black Sea partner. He cites geopolitical analyst George Friedman’s description of Poland and Romania as key US allies in Eastern Europe. He claims that Bulgarian–Romanian cooperation is being relegated to a secondary position because Bucharest is preoccupied with concerns over Hungary and Russia’s influence in Moldova. Furthermore, rising ‘sovereignist’/nationalist sentiment across the region, fuelled by discontent with globalisation, is putting additional strain on the bilateral relationship.

Nicolae Ciuca: Our energy security is highly dependent on the Black Sea

Vladimir Mitev, 4 August 2022

Romanian Prime Minister Nicolae Ciucă argues that Black Sea offshore gas, notably the Neptune Deep project developed with ExxonMobil/Romgaz and expected to come online by 2026–27, is central to Romania’s energy security. He claims that it could stabilise supply for the wider Central and South-East European market and warns that disrupted gas flows to countries such as Bulgaria and Poland would deepen regional insecurity. He also cites the significant increase in Bulgarian-Romanian trade (growing from €1.11 billion in 2006 to almost €7 billion in 2021) and ongoing joint infrastructure projects, such as the construction of a second bridge between Giurgiu and Ruse, as proof that closer cooperation between the two countries and the wider Black Sea region is both necessary and already underway.

What does the dance between the US and Russia in Eastern Europe reveal about Bulgarians and Romanians?

Vladimir Mitev, 3 January 2022

Vladimir Mitev argues that the diplomatic manoeuvring between the US and Russia over Eastern European security in early 2022 (the Geneva talks and the NATO-Russia Council, for example, which evoke echoes of the 1945 Yalta settlement) exposes the fact that Bulgarian-Romanian relations remain passive and stereotype-bound, rather than being treated as an opportunity for closer bilateral coordination. He contrasts the emphasis placed by Romanian Prime Minister Nicolae Ciucă on NATO military readiness with the more ambivalent, Russia-hedging stance adopted by Bulgaria’s government (including Defence Minister Stefan Yanev under Prime Minister Kiril Petkov). He concludes that, despite having internationally credentialed leaders, both nations still view each other through a lens of mutual stereotype rather than engaging with each other substantively.

Maria Grapini: Romania and Bulgaria must increase their economic, cultural and educational exchanges so that they could use the possibilities in EU

Vladimir Mitev, 26 October 2017

In this interview, Romanian MEP Maria Grapini (S&D Group, and former Romanian Minister for SMEs from 2012 to 2014) argues that Romania and Bulgaria have not made the most of their decade of EU membership. She states plainly that “our countries have not made sufficient use of the opportunities over the last 10 years”. She proposes the creation of a Black Sea macroregion modelled on the Baltic Sea Strategy, with the aim of boosting connectivity and economic development. This would be paired with an expansion of cultural and educational exchange, with the intention of shifting public ‘mentality’ towards a better understanding of democracy. She also stresses that engagement with Russia and Turkey should be dependent on their respect for existing EU-signed agreements.

Georgi Pirinski: Romania and Bulgaria can initiate the development of a macroregional strategy for the Black Sea region

Vladimir Mitev, 3 May 2017

Bulgarian MEP and former foreign minister (1995–1996) and National Assembly president (2005–2009) Georgi Pirinski argues that Bulgaria and Romania should use their consecutive EU Council presidencies in 2018–2019 to launch a joint Black Sea macroregional strategy. This would be an EU Council-approved integrated framework requiring no new institutions or spending, but rather better coordination of existing instruments such as Black Sea Synergy and the Eastern Partnership. He cites the Baltic Sea Strategy (2009) as a precedent and suggests that, given its experience of leading the Danube macroregion, Austria’s intervening EU presidency could help advance the idea.

Lyubomir Kyuchukov: Europe must have a strategy for the region of Black Sea, the only European sea which has remained “ownerless”

Vladimir Mitev, 13 April 2017

Lyubomir Kyuchukov, a Bulgarian diplomat who was formerly a deputy foreign minister, ambassador to London (2009–2012) and director of the Institute for Economy and International Relations, argues that Bulgaria should prioritise a Black Sea agenda during its upcoming EU presidency in 2018. He describes the Black Sea as the EU’s only ‘ownerless’ sea, in contrast to the Baltic and Mediterranean, which have dedicated strategies. Citing the war in Ukraine, the annexation of Crimea, frozen post-Soviet conflicts, and a regional arms race as evidence of strategic neglect, he calls for the 2008 Black Sea Synergy to be upgraded with real financial and institutional resources, granting access to structural funds, and for it to be recognised as a full EU macroregion.

EU Accession and Alignment Milestones (Schengen)

Alexandru-Ionuț Drăgulin: Full accession to the Schengen Area can transform Romania, Bulgaria and their region

Vladimir Mitev, 16 January 2025

Alexandru-Ionuț Drăgulin, a researcher at the Romanian Diplomatic Institute, argues that full Schengen membership should be understood as the long-overdue completion of EU free-movement rules, rather than as a political favour. He also claims that it would reinforce the bloc’s eastern security flank against Russian hybrid threats. Citing INSCOP polling, which found that 60% of Romanians believed their country had met the technical criteria for some time, Drăgulin contends that the 13-year delay has fuelled Euroscepticism. He argues that faster transit, tourism growth and infrastructure projects, such as the second Giurgiu-Ruse bridge, should now help to reverse this frustration.

Why does everyone win from the elimination of land border controls in Southeastern Europe?

Vladimir Mitev, 9 January 2025

Mitev argues that the elimination of Schengen land-border checks on 1 January 2025 will end Bulgaria and Romania’s ‘second-class European’ status. This will cut the truck queues and transport costs that had previously deterred foreign investment, while boosting pro-EU sentiment. He recounts the political battle that took place behind the scenes, including the rejection of an earlier ‘mini-Schengen’ compromise by then-PM Nikolay Denkov, objections by Commissioner Adina Vălean regarding pressure on the Hungarian border, and support from former PM Dacian Cioloș. He also cites NGO figures Codru Vrabie and David Bisset, who frame the change as a victory for citizen empowerment over ‘fortress’-style security thinking.

The elimination of border controls in Southeastern Europe would transform the region

Vladimir Mitev, Malgorzata Kulbaczewska-Figat, 10 April 2024

Mitev argues that removing land border checks between Bulgaria, Romania and Greece would contribute more to regional integration than the ‘Air Schengen’ accession in March 2024, given that approximately 97% of Bulgarian trade with Schengen states is transported by road. He contrasts the idea’s support from grassroots groups such as road hauliers, NGOs and academics with resistance from political elites. He cites the view of former Bulgarian Prime Minister Nikolay Denkov that it would be illegal, the objection of Romanian Commissioner Adina Valean that it would put pressure on Hungary’s borders, and the scepticism of the Ruse Bulgarian-Romanian Chamber of Commerce that it would solve underlying structural problems.

So far the European Commission neither supports nor rejects the idea of a Bulgarian-Romanian mini-Schengen

Vladimir Mitev, 4 April 2024

Mitev reports that the European Commission has not taken a formal position on a Bulgarian-Romanian-Greek ‘mini-Schengen’, and notes that Romanian Commissioner Adina Valean’s public criticism of the idea was made in a personal capacity rather than representing an institutional stance. He discusses the divided political responses — former Prime Minister Nikolay Denkov’s rejection in Sofia versus the mixed signals from Prime Minister Marcel Ciolacu in Bucharest, with the sovereigntist leader George Simion also offering his opinion — while pointing out that the partial Schengen deal brokered by Austria has, paradoxically, tightened rather than loosened the Bulgarian-Romanian land border.

The Bulgarian-Romanian mini-Schengen area as a project for change in Southeastern Europe

Vladimir Mitev, 19 February 2024

Mitev traces the ‘mini-Schengen’ concept — the abolition of border checks along the 631 km Bulgarian–Romanian border — which was first proposed anonymously in a 2011 UNDP-linked commentary and revived after the EU rejected Bulgaria’s and Romania’s full Schengen membership in December 2022. Romanian governance analyst Codru Vrabie is sceptical, arguing that ‘nobody is thinking about it strategically because we do not trust each other’, whereas Bulgarian security expert Vladimir Chukov supports the idea and would extend it to Greece. PM Nikolay Denkov’s rejection of the plan on the grounds of its legal dubiousness is also cited. Mitev argues that even if the scheme stalls legally, its underlying logic could still encourage both countries to think less nationally and more regionally.

Daniel Laurer: Border controls between Greece, Bulgaria and Romania can only be eliminated with European coordination

Vladimir Mitev, 2 February 2024

Daniel Laurer, a Bulgarian MP and co-founder of the ‘We Continue the Change’ party who previously served as innovation minister, argues that the elimination of internal checks between Greece, Bulgaria and Romania would require the approval of interior ministers from across the Schengen area, rather than being taken unilaterally. He contends that Bulgaria’s strengthened external border enforcement against Turkey — with patrols doubled and irregular crossings down sharply — justifies dropping internal passport checks between the three countries. He is framing this initiative partly as a demonstration to Austria that doing so poses no security risk. The target is summer 2024, and cross-party backing is being sought in all three parliaments.

Elimination of border controls between Bulgaria, Romania and Greece is technically complex

Vladimir Mitev, 1 February 2024

Maria Simeonova, head of the Sofia office of the European Council on Foreign Relations, warns that the mini-Schengen proposal is in a legal limbo. This is because Bulgaria and Romania have just promised Austria that they would tighten, rather than loosen, their mutual border controls in exchange for partial Schengen membership. She stresses that compliance with the Treaty on European Union and the Schengen Agreement remains unresolved, and that the European Commission has not yet considered the proposal’s feasibility. She also cautions that political enthusiasm, including that expressed by figures such as Dacian Cioloș, should not distract Sofia and Bucharest from their primary goal of full Schengen accession via land borders.

Austrian insistence on strict control of the Romanian-Bulgarian border is not in the European spirit

Vladimir Mitev, 3 January 2024

This piece summarises a segment from Bulgarian National Radio in which journalist Vladimir Mitev discusses Romania’s busy election calendar for 2024 and the potential impact of a Republican victory in the US on sovereignist sentiment, which was polling at around 25% at the time. Mitev also argues that fake news about Schengen is circulating in Bulgarian and Romanian media. The piece also features an interview with Răzvan Nicolescu, the former Romanian energy minister. He calls the additional conditions imposed by Austria on the December 2023 Schengen agreement ‘totally anti-European’ and discriminatory, as these were never requested of Croatia.

Răzvan Nicolescu: It is a pro-EU act to resist the Austrian abuse against Bulgaria and Romania over their Schengen accession

Vladimir Mitev, 1 January 2024

In this interview, Răzvan Nicolescu — former Romanian energy minister, head of the Clean Energy and Climate Change Association, and current president of the European Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs — argues that the December 2023 Schengen deal is a step forward. However, he believes that it still imposes five additional conditions on Bulgaria and Romania, as well as a demand that Austria reduce its own migration numbers. He describes these terms as discriminatory and estimates that they will cost the two countries 0.8–2% of their GDP annually due to border delays. He presents his NGO’s European Court challenge to the arrangement and its criticism of continued land border controls as a defence of EU treaty principles, rather than the anti-European stance that some accuse it of having.

Council Decision on the full application of the Schengen acquis in the Republic of Bulgaria and Romania

Vladimir Mitev, 1 January 2024

This post republishes the EU Council’s formal decision (document CM 5950/23), which allows Bulgaria and Romania to apply the full Schengen acquis to their air and sea borders from March 2024. It also republishes the joint statement by Austria, Bulgaria and Romania attached to the decision. The statement stipulates that the lifting of land border checks will depend on measures such as tripling the deployment of Frontex on the Bulgaria-Turkey border, increasing the number of guards on the Serbia-Bulgaria border, and fully implementing the Dublin asylum rules. The European Commission has pledged to provide financial support for additional border infrastructure.

Lyubomir Kyuchukov: European context for Schengen enlargement is favourable

Vladimir Mitev, 12 December 2023

Bulgarian foreign-policy analyst Lyubomir Kyuchukov assesses Austrian Interior Minister Gerhard Karner’s proposal to grant Bulgaria and Romania Schengen access limited to air travel in exchange for conditions including hosting Syrian and Afghan refugees and tripling the presence of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) in Bulgaria. He urges Sofia and Bucharest to negotiate jointly rather than accept conditions that go beyond bilateral Schengen matters. The article also compares Romanian Prime Minister Marcel Ciolacu’s acceptance of the compromise with the rejection of any conditions beyond standard EU criteria by Bulgarian Prime Minister Nikolai Denkov and President Rumen Radev. Kyuchukov warns that the current favourable diplomatic window will close in 2024 as Ukraine’s EU accession dominates the agenda.

Dimitar Dimitrov: If all options for Schengen accession are exhausted, the Bulgarian government is left to go for a mini-Schengen with Romania

Vladimir Mitev, 7 November 2023

Dimitar Dimitrov, the executive director of the Bulgarian Chamber of Road Hauliers, argues that, since Bulgaria and Romania meet all the technical Schengen criteria, but are facing what he describes as ‘discriminatory blocking’ from Austria and the Netherlands, the two governments should consider lifting border controls between the two countries unilaterally — creating a ‘mini-Schengen’ — as a fallback option. He puts a concrete cost on the status quo — about €10 per hour per lost truck and an estimated €10 billion in annual losses for Romania — and notes that the European Commission itself is sceptical of a bilateral ‘mini-Schengen’, viewing it as a move that could undercut momentum for full EU accession.

More than 80% of MEPs condemned the Austrian veto against Romania and Bulgaria over Schengen

Vladimir Mitev, 15 July 2023

The article focuses on an interview with Răzvan Nicolescu, a former Romanian energy minister who now heads an NGO that petitioned the European Parliament. On 12 July 2023, a resolution backed by over 80% of MEPs branded Austria’s Schengen veto against Romania and Bulgaria a breach of EU treaties. The resolution also called on the Commission to pursue legal action and assess damages from the 12-year exclusion. Nicolescu argues that Austria’s rationale for migration is not credible, given the lax enforcement of rules elsewhere (he cites Hungary as an example), and says that he is prepared to escalate the situation with public demonstrations in Brussels or Vienna if the veto persists.

Nikolai Milkov: If Bulgaria does not adopt two laws on time, it could be separated from Romania for Schengen

Vladimir Mitev, Martina Gancheva, 14 April 2023

Speaking at the International Crimean Platform summit in Bucharest in April 2023, Bulgarian Foreign Minister Nikolai Milkov warned that Bulgaria’s accession to Schengen alongside Romania hinges on parliament passing two specific laws: one on the accountability of the Attorney General, and one on reforming the anti-corruption body (KPKONPI). He stated that if these laws were adopted in time, both countries could enter Schengen together in autumn 2023. However, another delay would risk Romania proceeding alone and leaving Bulgaria behind.

Ion Lixandru: Separation from Bulgaria is not reasonable, because we have so much work to do together

Vladimir Mitev, 12 December 2022

Ion Lixandru, the infrastructure task coordinator for the Romanian Business Leaders organisation, opposes the decoupling of Romania’s and Bulgaria’s Schengen accession, warning that admitting Romania alone would simply relocate border queues to the Bulgarian frontier, thereby disrupting the shared gas, electricity, and Danube transport links which depend on close bilateral coordination. He suggests that a political decision at the level of the European Council could enable the Justice and Home Affairs Council to implement joint accession without a fresh vote. He insists that Romania should remain ‘hand in hand, shoulder to shoulder’ with Bulgaria.

Dimitar Bechev: It is vital for Bulgaria to avoid its marginalisation in the changing EU

Vladimir Mitev, 20 April 2017

Dimitar Bechev, a lecturer at the University of North Carolina and a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, warns that post-Brexit EU integration is centered around the Eurozone. This leaves non-Eurozone states such as Bulgaria at risk of marginalisation in a ‘Europe of different speeds’. He recommends that Bulgaria should move quickly towards adopting the euro and joining the banking union. He is explicitly sceptical of regional alternatives, stating that he sees ‘no real results from the Black Sea Synergy strategy launched by Bulgaria and Romania a decade ago’, and criticising Bulgaria’s upcoming EU presidency for prioritising logistics over the substantive question of eurozone/non-eurozone institutional arrangements.

Historical and Conceptual Foundations of the Relationship

The success we were supposed to forget

Petar Dobrev, 5 September 2026

Dr Petar Dobrev, a historian at Sofia University, revisits the Treaty of Craiova, signed on 7 September 1940. Through diplomacy led by Foreign Minister Ivan Popov and Tsar Boris III, Bulgaria peacefully regained Southern Dobruja — an area of some 7,500 square kilometres, including Dobrich, Silistra, Balchik and Kavarna — with simultaneous backing from Germany, the USSR, Britain and the US. Dr Dobrev argues that this rare bloodless territorial victory was erased from Bulgarian memory in three successive waves: wartime diplomatic caution towards Romania; the discrediting of the monarchy during the socialist era; and later nationalist historiography favouring narratives of loss over diplomatic success. He also notes the human cost that this amnesia obscures: a compulsory population exchange that uprooted roughly 66,000 Bulgarians and 108,000 Romanians.

Petar Dobrev: Dobruja is an interesting multicultural region to study

Vladimir Mitev, 21 September 2025

Petar Dobrev, a senior lecturer in the Faculty of History at Sofia University and at the Institute of History of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, specialising in Dobrujan and Balkan agrarian studies, spoke at the Sofia conference in September 2025, entitled ‘The Craiova Agreement: Diplomacy instead of violence’, which marked 85 years since the 1940 Treaty of Craiova. He argued that Dobruja deserves to be studied as a genuinely multicultural region, rather than being viewed through a nationalist lens. He noted that, while the treaty resolved a territorial dispute by returning over 350,000 inhabitants of Southern Dobruja to Bulgaria, it also produced lasting human trauma through forced population exchange. This topic was under-researched for decades, until nationalist revivals under Ceaușescu and Zhivkov renewed interest in the 1980s.

Daniel Cain: Romanian and Bulgarian historiography are both mature enough to discuss the Dobruja issue together

Vladimir Mitev, 21 September 2025

At the September 2025 Sofia conference on the Treaty of Craiova, Daniel Cain — director of the Institute for Southeast European Studies at the Romanian Academy and head of the Romanian side of the Joint Romanian-Bulgarian History Commission — told attendees that both countries’ historical scholarship had matured enough to allow them to examine the Dobruja question jointly and without national bias. He called the gathering the first such international discussion since 1990. He contrasted the different collective memories of the ‘Quadrilater’: Romanians’ romantic association with Queen Maria, versus the resentment felt by Bulgarians towards Romanian administration. He noted that around 160,000 people were displaced during the 1940 exchange and called for a shared ‘European rhetoric’ that would provide context rather than judgement of the past, through joint academic projects.

The Friendship Bridge – the steel bridge across the Danube in Romanian communist propaganda

Gabriel-Felician Croitoru, 12 July 2023

Romanian historian Gabriel-Felician Croitoru, who originally wrote for the Romanian Navy League’s Marea Noastră magazine, documents how communist Romania used the steel bridge over the Danube, built in 1954 and connecting Giurgiu in Romania and Ruse in Bulgaria, as a propaganda tool from the 1950s to the 1980s. He traces its use in staged visits by Soviet, Albanian, and Cuban delegations to project socialist solidarity; its role as an obligatory destination for school trips; and its symbolic deployment during the 1972 and 1980 Olympic torch relays. He argues that the bridge’s ideological value faded over time, as other propaganda sites multiplied and austerity cuts reduced the number of school trips.

The philosophy of change in Bulgarian-Romanian relations: via bridge of friendship towards dynamic identity

Vladimir Mitev, 1 May 2023

In this conceptual essay, journalist Vladimir Mitev contrasts the ‘static identity’ that is common in South East European societies — characterised by fixed, grievance-based social roles such as being labelled ‘a communist’ for a decades-old publication — with a proposed ‘dynamic identity’ that is formed through cross-cultural contact and personal transformation. Mitev frames the Bulgarian-Romanian ‘bridge of friendship’, and by extension his own Cross-Border Talks journalism, as mechanisms for facilitating interaction between peoples and dissolving these fixed identities. He argues that such grassroots, consciousness-level engagement is more effective in building genuine regional cooperation than state-level diplomacy alone.

Mihai Isac: At the political level, Bulgarian and Romanian elites do not trust each other

Vladimir Mitev, 4 September 2022

Romanian analyst Mihai Isac argues that, despite significant people-to-people contact (with roughly 1.2 million Romanians visiting Bulgaria each year), the political elites in Sofia and Bucharest do not trust each other. He attributes this to incomplete national histories that play down their shared Ottoman-era heritage, and to leaders who engage with Brussels directly rather than with each other, unlike the Visegrad Group model. Isac describes the lack of joint initiatives, such as a shared military brigade modelled on the French-German partnership or shared history textbooks, as a missed opportunity, given the frontline exposure of both countries in the current regional confrontation. He recommends grassroots and journalist exchanges over elite-driven diplomacy.

Vladimir Mitev: Bulgarians and Romanians have a lot to discover and learn about each other

Vladimir Mitev, 16 February 2022

In this interview with UNA News Bulgaria, interviewer Eliz Adem asks Vladimir Mitev, founder of the ‘Bridge of Friendship’ blog, about the lack of information that Bulgarians and Romanians have about each other despite two decades of open borders. Mitev cites lingering stereotypes from the transition period of the 1990s (such as Romanian perceptions of car theft in Bulgaria) and the fact that, although both countries are in the EU and NATO, they still sit outside the Schengen area and have an unresolved border dispute on the Danube dating to 1908. He also highlights asymmetries in mutual perception, such as Bulgarian middle-class envy of Romania’s stronger economy and foreign investment, as well as admiration flowing in the opposite direction. Furthermore, he notes differing foreign-policy postures towards Russia, with Romania adopting a comparatively harder line than Bulgaria’s more ambiguous stance.

Summary of the book “The Bulgarian-Romanian Political Relations (1944 – 1989)”

Vladimir Mitev, 13 November 2021

This is a summary provided by the author of Spaska Shumanova’s book on Bulgarian-Romanian relations under communism. The book argues that, during this period, bilateral ties were mainly driven by the dynamics of the Communist Party leadership and its alignment with the USSR, rather than by genuine bilateral interest. The author describes these ties as being ‘umbilically linked to the personal perceptions of party and state leaders’. It highlights the differences between Todor Zhivkov’s pro-Soviet Bulgaria and Nicolae Ceaușescu’s more independent, nationalist Romania; the disputes over the Danube border and the Somovit-Islaz hydroelectric power plant; the Ruse-Giurgiu ‘Friendship Bridge’, built in 1954, as the main joint achievement; and the tensions in the late 1980s over Ruse’s industrial pollution and the treatment of Bulgarian cultural heritage in Romania.

Daniel Cain: Among all the peoples of their region, Romanians and Bulgarians are the closest ones

Vladimir Mitev, 2 June 2020

Historian Daniel Cain argues that, prior to 1900, Romanians and Bulgarians were bound by a ‘brotherhood’ rooted in their shared struggle against the Ottoman Empire. This is evidenced by the thriving Bulgarian émigré communities, newspapers, and the Bulgarian Academy, all of which were established in Brăila, Romania. However, this closeness fractured after 1900, as a new generation of Bulgarian politicians emerged who were less attached to Romania. The Macedonian question then became a wedge issue. He points to a rapprochement after 2002 when travel restrictions were eased, noting the mutual admiration between the two countries today — Bulgarians admire Romania’s anti-corruption efforts, while Romanians admire Bulgaria’s motorways — and suggests that their Latin-Slavic dynamic and rivalry is evidence of their underlying similarities rather than differences.

A digital booklet about Romanian-Bulgarian relations explores the difficult interaction between both states

Vladimir Mitev, 18 December 2017

This piece announces the release of Vladimir Mitev’s trilingual digital booklet, The Difficult Cooperation: Romania and Bulgaria’s Foreign Policy Exchanges and Infrastructural Projects after a Decade in the EU’, which compiles 11 previous articles from the Bridge of Friendship series. The booklet documents the lack of political will to build cross-border transport links for almost a decade (with improvements only beginning in 2017), and recounts two failed foreign policy initiatives: Romania’s proposed NATO Black Sea naval presence, which was rejected by Bulgaria during President Klaus Iohannis’s visit to Sofia in 2016, and Bulgaria’s proposal in April 2017 for an EU Black Sea macroregion, which was met with a mixed and partly sceptical reception in Romania. Overall, the booklet argues that intergovernmental cooperation has been sluggish, whereas understanding between the two peoples at a grassroots and civic level has fared comparatively better.

Elections, Domestic Political Crises & Key Political Figures

The drone incident near the Bulgarian-Romanian border highlights Romanian hostility towards Rumen Radev’s behaviour and character

B1 TV, 11 August 2026

In this B1 TV panel discussion, hosted by Răzvan Munteanu and featuring military analyst Ion Petrescu, geopolitical expert Vasile Simileanu, and Bulgarian journalist Vladimir Mitev, the fallout from a Ukrainian ‘Maya’-type drone that crashed approximately 100 metres inside Bulgarian territory near Kardam, close to a Trans-Balkan gas pipeline compressor station, is examined. The Romanian panellists criticise the Bulgarian Prime Minister, Rumen Radev, for his public remarks on the incident, calling them ‘cowardice’ and ‘manipulation’ for implicating Romania without evidence. They also criticise Ukraine for not apologising and note that the Romanian President, Nicușor Dan, had ignored an earlier invitation from Radev to visit Sofia. Citing defence expert Yordan Bozhilov, Mitev uses the episode to argue that, unlike Romania and Turkey, Bulgaria still lacks a coherent Black Sea security strategy.

The president of Bulgaria resigned to enter the arena of “dirty” politics. What’s next for our neighboring country?

Vladimir Mitev, 27 January 2026

Vladimir Mitev analyses Rumen Radev’s resignation as Bulgarian president on 19 January 2026 to enter active party politics, framing the move as a challenge to what Radev calls Bulgaria’s ‘facade democracy’, which is dominated by oligarchic power outside of formal institutions and is chiefly identified with Delyan Peevski of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms. The article expresses scepticism about whether this represents genuine reform or a factional fight within Bulgaria’s ‘deep state’, highlighting Radev’s patriarchal, top-down political style. It also cites journalist Gheorghi Gotev’s rebuttal of comparisons between Radev and Viktor Orbán. Ultimately, it concludes that Brussels currently views Radev as a stabilising anti-corruption figure rather than a Trojan horse.

Alexandru Drăgulin: President Nicușor Dan’s priorities will be economic recovery and democratic resilience

Vladimir Mitev, 29 May 2025

Alexandru Drăgulin, a researcher at the Romanian Diplomatic Institute who specialises in governance and the rule of law, argues that following what he describes as Romania’s most serious democratic stress test since the Cold War, President Nicușor Dan must prioritise demonstrating democratic resilience to Western partners and stabilising the economy (reducing deficits and tackling inflation) in order to achieve everything else. Drăgulin outlines Dan’s likely focus on foreign policy, which he says will include territorial security against Russian pressure towards the Danube and the Black Sea, conflict resolution and democracy promotion in the South Caucasus, and Romania’s ambitions to increase its regional influence via the Three Seas Initiative. He also characterises domestic sovereignist movements as exploiting inequality and information gaps rather than offering real solutions.

Romania: Expectations that the new president will boost the renewal of the Romanian political class through the energy of citizens

Vladimir Mitev, 24 May 2025

Drawing on interviews with Sergiu Mișcoiu, a political scientist at Babeș-Bolyai University and supporter of Nicușor Dan, and Andrei Marga, a former foreign minister, the article argues that the winning and losing camps in Romania’s 2025 presidential election both hope that civic mobilisation, as seen in the €53 million campaign to fund a children’s hospital through donations from citizens and companies, can pressure the chronically dysfunctional political class into reform. Mișcoiu frames this significant mobilisation against a potential nationalist victory as ‘a sign of democratic vitality’, and both intellectuals agree that the systemic problems civic energy must now address are administrative incompetence resulting from political patronage, corruption and social dishonesty.

Iulian Mareș: Romania has chosen the European core. Now Southeast Europe must choose where to go

Vladimir Mitev, 20 May 2025

In this interview, Iulian Mareș, president of the Balkan Development Support Association and a county councillor for the National Liberal Party, interprets Nicușor Dan’s presidential victory as a ‘triumph of common sense’, achieved without the support of a formal political party. However, he argues that Dan will still need to govern by collaborating with and reforming the existing parliamentary parties from within, rather than establishing new ones. Mareș attributes the budget deficit primarily to tax evasion and the shadow economy, rather than justifying blanket austerity. He also interprets Dan’s victory as a sign that the rest of Southeast Europe, including Bulgaria, is moving closer to the pro-European core.

What change has Romania chosen?

Vladimir Mitev, 19 May 2025

In his own analysis, Mitev argues that Nicușor Dan’s victory over the sovereignist candidate George Simion represents Romania’s rejection of a Trump-style ‘MAGA’ political model, favouring instead an alignment with Macron’s France and Tusk’s Poland. Despite receiving endorsements from Giorgia Meloni and Andrzej Duda, Simion is portrayed as being unable to present a convincing case for reindustrialisation. In contrast, Dan secured the backing of Bucharest’s IT sector and built on his heritage-protection record to garner support from voters who were put off by what they perceived as Simion’s tyrannical conduct.

Ioana Abăseacă: All that the USR did in the last three years was to approach “those who lost from transition”

Vladimir Mitev, 18 September 2019

In this interview, Ioana Abăseacă — a member of Romania’s Save Romania Union (USR) — responds to criticism that the party only represents ‘winners’ of the transition by arguing that the USR deliberately expanded into rural and small-town constituencies, as well as those in the diaspora, during its first three years. This growth is evident in the party’s increase in votes from 8.9% in the 2016 legislative elections to 22.4% in the 2019 European Parliament vote, with presidential candidate Dan Barna polling in second place. Abăseacă frames this as evidence that the party has reached beyond its original urban, educated base to include voters who were previously excluded from anti-establishment politics. She also defends the party’s internal democratic and disciplinary structures against accusations of elitism.

Danube Bridges & Border Infrastructure

The Danube as a Platform for Cooperation

Smaranda Șchiopu, Vladimir Mitev, 18 July 2026

In this interview, Vyara Mincheva, Bulgaria’s national coordinator for the EU Strategy for the Danube Region (EUSDR), explains how the macro-regional strategy, which covers fourteen countries (five of which are EU candidates), has grown into a more significant tool for aligning cohesion policy across the Danube basin. During Bulgaria’s 2026 presidency, the motto is ‘no region should be left behind’. She notes that the strategy still has no dedicated budget of its own and depends on programmes such as the Interreg Danube Region programme, which has a budget of around €215 million. She also identifies persistent navigation and connectivity problems on the Lower Danube between Bulgaria and Romania as an area where expert-level diagnosis has outpaced actual political commitment from transport ministries.

Dragomir Draganov: Traffic on Friendship Bridge will increase by more than 20% after full Schengen accession

Vladimir Mitev, 28 December 2024

Ruse regional governor Dragomir Draganov explains that a six-month transition period involving risk-based spot checks will replace systematic inspections at the Danube bridge. He forecasts that vehicle traffic will increase by over 20% (from approximately 1,400–1,500 to around 2,000 trucks per day) once full Schengen accession takes effect. He also revealed that the European Commission has earmarked €2.5 billion for a second Ruse-Giurgiu bridge and that a feasibility study is expected by mid-2026. He cited crossing statistics from 2023-2024 which already show an increase of 170,000-180,000 vehicles.

Desecuritisation and citizen empowerment is the future of the Bulgarian-Romanian border

Vladimir Mitev, 22 December 2024

In an article reporting on a panel at the Second Lublin Eastern European Forum, which included Vladimir Mitev, Labinot Hajdari from Kosovo, and Spasimir Domaradzki from Poland, and was moderated by Konrad Pawlowski from the Institute for Central Europe, the 609 km Bulgarian-Romanian Danube border is described as still ‘thick’, despite both countries’ EU and NATO membership. The border is spanned by only two bridges and was last formally settled by treaty in 1908. Mitev argues that the war in Ukraine has paradoxically acted as a catalyst for closer bilateral cooperation and calls for the border to be desecuritised through grassroots, citizen-led cross-border organisations, rather than relying solely on top-down EU integration.

Dragomir Draganov: At the beginning of September 2024 Romania will announce a public tender for the feasibility study for the new Ruse-Giurgiu bridge

Vladimir Mitev, 23 August 2024

Ruse regional governor Dragomir Draganov announces that Romania will open a public tender in early September 2024 for the feasibility study of a new Ruse-Giurgiu bridge, which will determine its location, whether it carries rail traffic, and its number of lanes, with the bridge expected to become operational around 2031-2032. He also refutes rumors of a border ‘disinfection fee’ at the Ruse-Giurgiu checkpoint, confirming crossings remain free, and notes that daily traffic on the existing Friendship Bridge has risen to around 8,000 vehicles at peak.

The third Bulgarian-Romanian bridge across the Danube will be operational in 2035 at the earliest

Lili Granitska, 22 August 2024

The article traces how only two bridges (Ruse-Giurgiu ‘Friendship Bridge’, 1954, and Vidin-Calafat ‘New Europe Bridge’, 2013) span the roughly 400-km Danube border, and argues that a planned third crossing between Ruse and Giurgiu will not be operational before 2035 given the sequence of feasibility studies, tendering and construction still ahead. It recounts the 2022 compromise in which Bulgaria agreed to dredge the Danube in exchange for Romania accepting the Ruse-Giurgiu site, notes EU funding of €7 million for feasibility work, and cites Transport Minister Sorin Grindeanu’s delayed promise of an imminent tender, framing chronic truck queues (up to 48 hours) as the underlying pressure driving the project.

What do we need to know in Bulgaria, Romania and the region about the Danube Bridge repair?

Vladimir Mitev, 6 July 2024

Drawing on details from Ruse governor Dragomir Draganov, the article lays out the practical scope of the July 2024 repair of the Bulgarian span of the Danube (Friendship) Bridge: a 730-day contract to replace six deteriorated panels on the 70-year-old, 1.057-km structure, whose load has grown tenfold since 1954 as trucks rose from 20 to 60 tonnes. It details traffic-management measures during the works (alternating single-lane traffic with signal timing, a 40-tonne weight cap) and lists thirteen proposed mitigation measures, including an online toll system, fast-track lanes for Bulgarian and Romanian drivers, mutual recognition of truck scales, and reactivating a ferry crossing at Mocanașu.

On 10 July 2024 the repair of the Danube Bridge at Ruse-Giurgiu will start

Vladimir Mitev, 4 July 2024

Relaying a Prima TV Romania report by correspondent Alex Turcu, the article confirms the Bulgarian-side Danube Bridge repair (BGN 45 million / roughly €23 million, covering six sections totaling 1,100 meters) would begin July 9-10, 2024 and run about two years, with single-lane, traffic-light-controlled crossing during the works. It highlights Romanian mitigation plans, including a new ‘Mocanașu’ truck ferry to run every 30 minutes from mid-July, cited by governor Dragomir Draganov as able to handle 200+ trucks daily, against a baseline of roughly 1,400 trucks and 3,000 cars crossing daily (doubling on weekends).

People-to-People Ties, Media & Civil Society Cooperation

We need more links between Bulgarian and Romanian journalists and media in general

Vladimir Mitev, 29 November 2024

In this interview with Iulia Bahovski of the Romanian outlet byjulia.ro, Vladimir Mitev argues that persistent Bulgarian-Romanian mutual mistrust is partly a media problem, criticizing Romanian coverage of Bulgaria for reducing it to a ‘Russian trauma’ narrative that overlooks distinct Hungarophile and sovereigntist currents unrelated to Russophilia. He calls for joint Bulgarian-Romanian efforts against disinformation and points to Bulgarian fact-checking groups like Factcheck.bg and the Coalition for Media Literacy as models Romanian counterparts could learn from.

Why do we Romanians not cooperate with the Bulgarians? We don’t consider each other relevant enough

Ionela Dobos, 4 June 2024

In this interview, journalist Ionela Dobos questions Vladimir Mitev, author of a study on Romanian-Bulgarian relations for the Bulgarian Diplomatic Institute, who argues that limited cooperation stems not from historical hostility but from mutual perceived irrelevance: since the 1990s both countries’ elites have judged relations across the Danube as low-stakes, each side competed rather than partnered to appear ‘more pro-European’ (notably around Romania’s 2019 EU Council presidency), and neither maintains a cultural institute in the other’s capital. Mitev concludes that ‘popular diplomacy’ — grassroots citizen and media initiatives — holds more promise than elite-level efforts, which remain hampered by inertia and unfamiliarity with joint projects like the stalled mini-Schengen initiative.

Bulgaria-Romania: neighbors who still don’t know each other very well

Benjamin Ribout, 1 June 2024

Interviewing Ruse-based journalist Vladimir Mitev, the article documents concrete gains in the relationship — trade rising from €2.8 billion (2010) to €8.5 billion (2022), 1.2 million Romanian visitors to Bulgaria in 2022, closer infrastructure cooperation under PM Kiril Petkov’s 2021-2022 government, a post-2022 strategic-partnership declaration, and a joint Romanian-Bulgarian-Turkish Black Sea naval force — while arguing the two nations remain distant at the popular level. Mitev attributes this to persistent stereotyping, noting Romanians still sometimes view Bulgarians as ‘potential Russian agents’ and some hold notions of Latin cultural superiority over Slavic culture, and points to the thirteen-year gap between agreement and completion of the Vidin-Calafat bridge as evidence that elites lack experience building joint, consensus-based projects.

Bulgaria and Romania need more people and organisations that are bridges of friendship

Vladimir Mitev, 31 January 2024

In an interview with Emil Stanciu of the Union of Professional Journalists of Romania for TeleMoldova Plus, Vladimir Mitev argues that Bulgarian-Romanian relations are improving at the political and commercial level but still lack mutual knowledge and trust among ordinary citizens, held back by lingering Cold War-era prejudice. He points to his own fact-checking of media claims about a Ruse-Bucharest high-speed rail link (finding transport authorities in both countries had no such discussions underway) as an example of the kind of grassroots, civil-society bridge-building — rather than official diplomacy — that he says is still missing, alongside a project of interviewing ordinary Romanians ahead of the 2024 elections.

Citizens of Ruse and Giurgiu need to establish more people-to-people relations

Vladimir Mitev, 20 January 2024

In an interview with the French-Romanian outlet Regard, Vladimir Mitev contends that administrative cooperation between Ruse and Giurgiu, formalized through the EU’s Danubius Euroregion, has outpaced genuine citizen-to-citizen contact between the two cross-Danube cities. He cites a shared environmental scare — joint protests against a proposed toxic-waste incinerator near the former Verachim chemical plant, rooted in memories of 1980s pollution — as a rare instance of real grassroots solidarity, alongside modest cultural links like the ‘Cu Fata Spre Dunare’ urban project and the Animest film festival, while identifying language and cultural distance as the main barriers to deeper ties.

The Romanian law on smells was presented as exemplary at an ecological protest in Rousse

Vladimir Mitev, 4 October 2020

The article reports on an environmental protest held in Ruse on 24 September 2020 against years of unresolved industrial air pollution. It quotes ecological activist Rostislav Kandilarov as calling on Bulgarian institutions to adopt legislation modelled on Romania’s 2020 law on ‘olfactory discomfort’, which allows citizens to take legal action over smell pollution without first requiring an official determination from the environmental agency. The article presents Romania’s regulatory approach as a tangible cross-border policy that Bulgarian civic groups could adopt to overcome a local political stalemate that has persisted for seven to eight years despite repeated municipal consultations.

Moldova as a Shared Strategic Concern

Mihai Isac: Sofia should be much more involved in the Republic of Moldova

Vladimir Mitev, 31 July 2026

In this interview, Chișinău-based journalist and analyst Mihai Isac argues that Bulgaria should engage more with the Republic of Moldova, particularly by supporting the Bulgarian community in the Taraclia region. He states that Sofia “ought to be far more involved in the region precisely to save its honour, to save its history”. Surveying the wider regional picture, he discusses NATO’s Ankara summit, the limits of the Montreux Convention on a permanent NATO naval presence in the Black Sea, the uneven strategic alignment of Romania and Turkey, the technically strong but politically underdeveloped military cooperation between Romania and Bulgaria, and the political turbulence in both Bucharest and Chișinău. This includes the new Tofan government led by President Maia Sandu facing an immediate corruption scandal. He argues that Moldova’s Bulgarian-speaking minority faces real risks from emigration and Russian propaganda in the absence of direct investment.

Dimitar Keranov: Bulgaria and Romania must expand cooperation in all areas

Vladimir Mitev, 9 January 2026

Dimitar Keranov, a Bulgarian political scientist and the founder of the Varna-based Bulgarian Institute for International Policy, argues that the relationship between Bulgaria and Moldova carries far greater strategic potential than is generally recognised, particularly in light of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which has increased the importance of Moldova to European security. He proposes that Bulgaria and Romania should work together to counter Russian hybrid threats, such as disinformation and election interference. They should also share Bulgaria’s LNG diversification experience via Greece, in order to help wean Moldova off Russian gas. Furthermore, he points to concrete projects, such as the University of Ruse’s Taraclia branch and the Bulgaria-Greece-Romania Black Sea-Aegean infrastructure memorandum, as models for deeper trilateral coordination.

Mihai Isac: Bulgaria’s role in the Republic of Moldova is much greater than is understood in Sofia

Vladimir Mitev, 8 October 2025

Mihai Isac, a Romanian journalist and the editor-in-chief of Karadeniz Press, who regularly comments on Eastern European affairs for TVR Moldova, argues that Sofia underestimates the diplomatic capacity that Bulgaria could deploy in Moldova, particularly with regard to the ethnic Bulgarian community in Bessarabia and southern Moldova. He interprets the PAS party’s recent electoral victory as a largely tactical vote in favour of stability and European integration (driven in part by President Maia Sandu’s endorsement), rather than deep partisan loyalty. He also calls for Romania, Bulgaria and Poland to coordinate with each other, citing the Bulgarian-language branch of the University of Ruse in Taraclia as an example of how to counter Russian cultural influence.

Alexander Lambov: Bulgaria is highly respected in Taraclia, but this does not influence how Bulgarians in southern Moldova vote

Vladimir Mitev, 2 October 2025

Alexander Lambov, a Sofia-based doctoral researcher at the University of National and World Economy who conducted focus group research in Taraclia, reports that the pro-European PAS party won less than 10% of the vote there, while the Patriotic Bloc took around 70–80%. This is despite Bulgarians having a high opinion of Bulgaria itself. He attributes this to the PAS party’s own right-leaning, mildly nationalist positioning, and its strategic neglect of the Taraclia region, which makes up only 1.6% of Moldova’s population. He identifies Soviet-era nostalgia, cultural conservatism on issues such as LGBT rights, and economic anxiety as the reasons behind a ‘conditional’ rather than unconditional Bulgarian view of EU membership.

Bulgaria and Romania should work together to support minorities in Moldova

Vladimir Mitev, 3 September 2022

In a separate interview, Mihai Isac argues that the main challenge for Moldova’s Bulgarian and Gagauz minorities (comprising an estimated 80,000–100,000 ethnic Bulgarians) is the decline in population due to emigration, rather than political disputes or unification issues. He also mentions the community’s Russification during the Soviet era. He suggests that the University of Tiraspol should become a branch campus of a Bulgarian institution, such as Angel Kanchev University in Ruse, mirroring the existing model of Romanian branch campuses in Moldova. He also criticises both Sofia and Bucharest for lacking the political will to pursue this jointly and dismisses fears that Romanian–Moldovan unification would harm Bulgarians, given that the EU and NATO would oppose any unilateral border changes.

Pillar pages of The Bridge of Friendship