Paul Hurmuz: The time is coming for Romania and Bulgaria to become more important players in Southeastern Europe

Vladimir Mitev

Paul Hurmuz is a retired Romanian general who is also one of the respected security experts in the Romanian media space. He was Romania’s defense attaché in the UK between 2003 and 2007, and between 2013 and 2016 he was deputy director of the Intelligence Division at NATO Headquarters in Brussels. Between 2016 and 2017, he was the Deputy State Secretary for Defense Policy and Planning at the Romanian Ministry of Defense.

Paul Hurmuz is a member of the New Strategy Strategy, a leading Romanian think tank of experts in international relations and security.

The Bridge of Friendship spoke with Paul Hurmuz about the security dilemmas that could arise for Romania and the region with the return of Donald Trump to the White House, as well as the extent to which the political center of gravity in the EU is shifting eastward. Paul Hurmuz also spoke about defense cooperation in the Black Sea region.

Mr. Hurmuz, we begin our discussion, focused on Central and Southeastern Europe, first with the fact that Donald Trump has won the US presidential election. How do you expect Donald Trump’s second term to influence the balance of power in our region? And what challenges could it create for our countries, especially Romania, in terms of defense and security?

I personally do not expect any dramatic changes in President Trump’s second term. We have to pay attention to what actually happens in this dialogue, in this competition between different parties. People have very strong views and opinions on both sides and from this point of view I think it is important to be as realistic as possible and to look at things with a certain detachment.

After all, beyond certain more or less unusual expressions on the part of President Trump so far, I think that we have to look at what has actually happened. And I think things will be within normal parameters. 

At the same time I expect that the demands on the American side in President Trump’s new term will be much more insistent on the European allies to meet their obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty to allocate at least 2% for defense. Some are even talking about 2.5% and possibly even up to 3% in the next 4-5 years, because beyond the challenges that we have now in the region, we have to recognize that for many years after 1990, European states have allocated quite little for defense with very few exceptions and we need to close this gap.

From what I have heard and read over the last few years in Romania, I have been left with the impression that there is a concern that at some point the US might leave relations with Russia in the region to be managed by ”the Europeans”. And I got the impression that at least part of the Romanian elites, including the international relations and security elites, are worried about such a possible development. How likely is this to happen – i.e. the US to pay more attention and may even redirect forces from Europe to the Indo-Pacific? And on the other hand the EU being in the driving seat in relations with Russia?

I think we have to start from a certain reality here too. 

I thought this was very well expressed in a study last year by the Rand Corporation in the United States. In July 2023 this study was published – Turning Point: How to reverse the erosion of military power and influence of the United States and its allies? The biggest adversaries of the United States and its allies – Russia, China, and others – have developed their military capabilities, and the U.S. military dominance that has been in place for the past 40-50 years has eroded. And this is one of the reasons why not only during President Trump’s time in office, but since President Obama’s time, there has been a lot of talk about this pivot of America towards the Indo-Pacific, with China being identified as the United States’ greatest adversary and competitor. To use a description of an American specialist: Russia is seen by the United States as a hurricane (this one is like a very powerful tornado), while China is seen as climate change, i.e. going slowly but with long-lasting effects.

This is one of the reasons why, as I said, for a long time, ever since President Obama’s time, there has been talk of this shift of emphasis, of the United States’ priority towards the Indo-Pacific, precisely to try to restrict, to limit China’s development, both militarily and in economic and commercial terms.

Obviously, if we look at the reality, we can see that almost 70% of the United States’ naval capabilities are already in the Indo-Pacific, because the Indo-Pacific theater of operations is very different from Europe. From the point of view of the US air forces, they have a very high flexibility, they can be based in the United States, and they can easily redeploy to other areas. And there’s still, basically, the question of theater forces.

For the Indo-Pacific theater of military operations, the American planners realize that what they need there is more Marines, who are capable of carrying out combat actions as needed in that theater of operations. As we saw in World War II, Marines were essential.

We don’t have a theater of operations there in the Indo-Pacific like we have in Europe, which is compact, which is land-based. That’s why I think what our American allies have wanted and want, regardless of who is in the White House, is for the European allies to take on more responsibility. To be able to develop capabilities that will allow us to provide deterrence and defense against Russia if necessary. This in my view does not imply a withdrawal of the United States from Europe, nor do I think it would be feasible, because the strategic interests of the United States in Europe are still very important. And they cannot afford a total disengagement, which would be in my view in contradiction with the fundamental interests of the United States and ultimately the NATO member states.

At the moment they are America’s most important allies. And what our American allies would like more would be for the Europeans to align themselves more and better on measures towards China to limit China’s influence in Europe and other parts of the world, to have better coordination between Europe and the United States in this regard.

The interaction is very important, because it’s a very important and mutually supportive interaction between the USA and Europe to deal with these challenges that we have both from Russia and from China.

Donald Trump has promised to end the war in Ukraine. And in this context, going back to my question, to what extent is there a concern in Romania that such a closure – maybe not necessarily with a peace treaty, but through a kind of freezing of the conflict in Ukraine, could lead to a situation where Western Europe again resumes economic relations with Russia? Western Europe in general has had a tradition of good relations with Russia over the last decades.

Personally, I think it is still too early to pronounce on how the conflict in Ukraine will end, despite some signals that have emerged including from Russia, Ukraine and others, that a freeze could be negotiated. A peace treaty is already, in my view, quite a distant prospect. But there is much talk of a freeze.

I don’t think anyone can at this point say very exactly how President Trump in his second term is going to be able to stop this conflict. The biggest concerns, after all, beyond stopping the conflict, are about the extent to which the United States under his leadership will keep the commitments, the obligations that it has made to Ukraine to provide them with combat equipment, munitions, some of which are exclusively made in the United States, such as the missiles for the Patriot systems. There is a very high demand for this type of missiles and other high-performance weapons and ammunition systems, because, as we know, such systems are also needed in other areas, such as in the Middle East, to support Israel in protecting naval, maritime transportation in the Red Sea against attacks by Houthi militias, including to cover certain obligations that the United States has undertaken towards Taiwan.

Western industrial capacity, including that of the United States, has still not recovered after many years of keeping this industry at a fairly low level, because there was no market to sell those categories of technology and armaments. As the conflict in Ukraine, which Russia declared in February 2022, has shown us, consumption is huge. I recently saw a report by an American think-tank in which they were talking about the fact that from August 2022 to September 2024, Russia launched more than 12,000 missiles at targets in Ukraine, which is a huge number. 

Coming back to the question, I think this is the first and most important concern that Ukrainian leaders and European leaders have – whether the support that the United States has given so far to Ukraine in armaments, combat technology and ammunition will continue? And if it will continue, to what extent will it be consistent enough to allow at some point Ukrainian forces to stop the offensive by Russian forces and from there to imagine that some sort of freezing of the conflict, perhaps followed by negotiation, could be reached. But the conditions for moving beyond a freeze are very complex because it is obvious that no Ukrainian leader, and I hope not even the leaders of the NATO countries, could agree to Ukraine ceding the territory that Russia has occupied since 2014.

And to conclude with the challenges posed by a Donald Trump administration in a nutshell, there is growing talk that the European Union will somehow be uncoupled from the United States in this Trump term. Under Iohannis, Romania relied on a united West in its foreign policy. And it seems to me that this is a tradition, in a sense, in contemporary Romanian elites to rely on a united West. But if some rifts appear between the US and Europe on international issues, for example, the attitude towards Russia or Iran or other areas, what will Romania, which seems to me to be based in principle on a united West, do?

The idea that we are dealing with a united West seems to me a very generous description. I don’t think we have ever witnessed, at least in the last 30 years, a constant period when the West was united and only moments when the West was united. Beyond our expressed desires whether in the North Atlantic Alliance (NATO) or in the European Union, they are often mere aspirations, but that in no way, in my view, implies a renunciation by states of the promotion of national interests.

This has been seen in many situations. If we look at the contributions of European states to the NATO mission in Afghanistan, they were very, very different. And some contributions from some European states were quite modest.

There were times when, in fact, these states simply withdrew their troops from Afghanistan before the end of the mission, because they were needed elsewhere, such as in Africa. It is all a negotiation as far as I am concerned. Obviously, there are elements that unite us and that are essential for North Atlantic security, both for the United States and for Europe.

From my point of view, over the last 20-something years, Romania has relied on its strategic partnership with the United States, on its membership of NATO and its desire for NATO to be ever stronger and more effective, and on the growing importance of Romania’s potential within the European Union, despite all the challenges we have faced there. But, I repeat, let us not imagine that when states join certain organizations, such as NATO or the European Union, they are in any way giving up their national interests. They exist.

In terms of what people can expect in terms of the relationship between the US and the European Union, it’s a really very interesting topic in the sense that, and this is something that we have to look at very realistically, certain trade measures that President Trump, his administration decided in the term that he had in 2016-2020, were not reversed by President Biden when he took office.

There is, indeed, now a very serious discussion in many circles about the possibility that in President Trump’s new term in office tariffs will be introduced on all imports of products from the European Union. The main reason for introducing these tariffs, 20% is being discussed, is the imbalance between the European Union exports to the American market, which were equated to about €500 billion annually, while American exports to the European Union market are only at €350 billion annually. Why is there such an imbalance?

The reality is that the introduction of tariffs does not necessarily solve this problem. I am not an expert in this area, but as far as I can see, tariffs do not solve problems and they have long-term effects. The first effects are that if the United States introduces tariffs on exports from European Union countries to America, the European Union will have to move to countermeasures, and that will lead to a trade war, which does not help. Another very sensitive issue, and one where the countries of the European Union have quite different positions, is the alignment of the European Union with the countermeasures decided by the United States of America against China.

This is also complicated by the fact that there are countries in the European Union, including Western countries, but not only, Hungary being an example in this respect, which have very good relations with China. Trade relations, industrial cooperation, i.e. there are many Chinese factories that have been built in Hungary, for example. There are Western countries, such as France, Germany, Spain, Italy, France, Germany, Spain, Italy, which want a good relationship with China because they have investments in China and there are important European companies that are on the Chinese market and do not want to miss out on that market because it is a huge market.

The United States also has investments, that is to say, there are American firms that have large investments in China. The fundamental question that many people are asking themselves from this point of view is whether the European Union is going to follow a path of decoupling from China or what is called de-risking.

I believe, and this is just my opinion, that even the United States cannot afford a complete decoupling from China because the very close relations of at least the last 30 years between the United States and China, between Europe and China, cannot be broken overnight. The interconnections are so great that it would practically be an economic disaster in the world if all exchanges and cooperation were to stop at some point.

What can be done, however, and has been done for some years now, is to limit access for Chinese investment in critical infrastructure, in sensitive areas, in high technology. China will do the same. At the time in the previous term President Trump started taking countermeasures against China and China did the same thing in mirror image.

So there is an attempt both in the United States and in Europe to limit Chinese access in critical areas, as I said, in high technology. If you take a look, not very long ago, two months ago, there was a public conference attended by the director of the CIA in America and the director of MI6 in the UK. So the two secret services, American and British.

And it was the first time that the two heads of some of the most powerful intelligence services in the world had appeared in public. This happened on September 7th of this year at a festival organized by the Financial Times in London where they discussed their concerns in the intelligence domain. And at the time, the CIA director said that China’s level of development in all areas, military, economic, financial, diplomatic and so on, is the greatest geopolitical challenge of the 21st century and that since he took over the CIA, he has reorganized the service precisely to meet the challenges. And the CIA has tripled its budget allocated to China as a target in the last three years, now covering about 20 percent of its total budget. And as early as October 2021, the CIA director announced the organization of a mission center dedicated exclusively to China called the ‘China Mission Center’.

And the director of MI6, Britain’s secret intelligence service, was saying in the same public appearance that the tectonic plates of the world are shifting and China’s power and China’s desire to exercise that power is growing. That is why, especially in the United States and Western Europe, but also in other formats involving the US, the UK, Canada, Australia, New Zealand (the ‘Five Eyes’ intelligence format), there is coordination to use all the instruments of the state, including intelligence and security services, to deal with these challenges, to limit China’s access, including through intelligence gathering, especially in the technological field, to these countries.

And to limit their ability to create leverage in these countries to influence high-level political decisions. So things like that, the movements that we see, including in the area that I mentioned, the intelligence services, exist and we have to understand them in that sense. There is very, very great concern about the rise of China, the influence that China is showing, the ambitions that China has.

Both the United States and the Western European countries are very determined to do everything in their power to contain this, to meet this challenge.

I understand. Now I want to raise another hypothesis. Politico has been writing for a long time that the center of power in the European Union is shifting in a way and it is moving more to the East. Elements of this discourse are, for example, that after the European elections in Germany and France there is a political difficulty or weakness. Just these days we have the announcement that there will be changes in the German government, for example. And, on the other hand, between Germany and France there are very often differences of opinion, if not quarrels, and it is difficult for the European engine to move the European Union forwards in a coordinated way. On the other hand, Poland is often described as a country that is doing things very well, growing economically and investing a lot in defense.

And in this discourse, I think that the fact that Moldova and Ukraine have started accession negotiations with the European Union and, in general, it is also discussed that the region, the eastern part of the European Union, has grown a lot economically in recent years. In fact, it’s seen by some as being the dynamic part that compensates for its underdeveloped state in the last decades. To what extent do you think this theory of the center of power in the European Union moving eastward is true?

I don’t know. At least in the last ten years, after the invasion of Crimea, certain processes were triggered in Europe that eventually led to Brexit, to the exit of the United Kingdom from the European Union which, in my view, has had and will continue to have very important effects on developments in Europe, the departure of Chancellor Angela Merkel from the German leadership and the loss of the elections by the coalition she led changed the landscape very much in Germany as well, but also in Germany’s relationship with France.

That engine in Europe that you mention seems in some ways to be seized up at the moment. It could also be a question of personal relations between the leaders of the two countries, but I think the problems go much deeper. The impact that Russia’s outright outbreak of war against Ukraine in February 2022 has in so many ways affected Europe, including Western Europe, Germany is facing huge economic and social problems.

The destruction of the pipeline that was bringing gas from Russia, gas at a low price and greatly helping Germany’s economic development, has had a major impact. There are now signs that many factories in Germany are closing or relocating, including to the United States, because energy prices are cheaper there than in Europe. 

At the same time, to answer the question about this shift of Europe’s center of gravity towards the East, I think that, in reality, the center of gravity has shifted a little bit to the North-East. In the sense that Poland, especially after February 2022, but also before that date, has embarked on a very intensive program of arming, of increasing its military capabilities to deter possible aggression from Russia. And amid the misunderstandings between France and Germany, Poland is a rising leader in Europe, and is part of different consultation formats. 

I would like to mention, in this regard, again a British initiative, as far back as 2014, to establish what was called and is still called the Joint Expeditionary Force, the Joint Expeditionary Force. It is a UK regional initiative, which at the moment includes 10 states, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Norway, Sweden and the UK. So this force is under the leadership of the UK and it aims to deal with possible challenges in this area, such as the Baltic area and what is called the North Atlantic.

It’s a non-NATO format, so it has a certain flexibility and it doesn’t need the vote of 32 NATO allies to start an operation if it needs to. From my point of view, the fact that the UK has been thinking about such a format since 2014 proves that it has had a strategic vision and that it has understood that it needs to think creatively, to find other formats that will allow it to promote its security interests in the area. 

However, it is interesting at the same time that Poland is not part of this British-led format. Because Poland still relies very much on the special relationship it has with the United States to promote its security interests. Now, from a purely military point of view, it can be said that there is still a certain imbalance between the efforts being made in the north-east, the Baltic Sea, Poland, and with the entry of Finland and Sweden into NATO, this area is even more reinforced than what we see in the Black Sea area. And we have to understand both objectively and subjectively.

From the objective point of view it is obvious that the Black Sea area has remained Russia’s preferred area to act and destabilize Russia’s intervention in 2008 in Georgia, the invasion of Crimea in 2014 and the re-launching of the war against Ukraine in February 2022 including from Russian platforms in the Black Sea proves that it is the preferred area and that the Black Sea is after all the most sensitive, the most exposed area of NATO’s area of responsibility. And we have to admit that this does not seem very visible in the efforts that are being made and in the narrative that is being constructed including in the United States and in Western Europe, the Baltic and Northern Area is, in a way, preferred. At the same time, the Black Sea area is also affected by the instability in the Western Balkans.

The problems that were triggered by the break-up of Yugoslavia and the wars that broke out there are not resolved. The countries of the Western Balkans are not all integrated into the European Union. This means that, at the same time, the Black Sea area is not as it was in 2019. We do not have the cohesion that the Northerners have and the risks and threats that come from the Western Balkans and we have to recognize that our level of development even though both countries have benefited from EU membership is also failing to reach the level of development that the Northern countries have reached. The problems that we have to solve internally from a political, social, educational and technological point of view are there and it is obvious that, despite certain progress that we have made, we still have a lot of work to do. So, from my point of view, if there is indeed a shift of the center of gravity to the East, unfortunately, this center of gravity is not moving to our area where we are Romania and Bulgaria and it is moving to the North-East.

Where the predominant interest of both countries lies – more to interact with the core of the EU, like, for example, the Weimar triangle, or to move towards these countries in the region or in Europe that are trying to be a kind of bridge to the East, not only to Russia, but to the East in general. There are countries like Austria, Hungary, Turkey that are trying to be a bridge. Probably, if we think about it, we can find such a trend in several countries that are not so much looking for alignment with the West, but kind of being a bridge. So where is the predominant interest of our countries?

I believe that both Romania and Bulgaria must continue on the path they are on in terms of developing an increasingly strong relationship with the United States, but also with Western European countries, in all political, military, economic, financial, technological and economic fields, especially to develop the technological level of the industries we have, including in the field of software development, which is increasingly important for all areas.

However, I believe that this must not in any way conflict with the development of regional cooperation. And here I am referring first and foremost to the fact that Romania and Bulgaria, having the advantage of being members of both NATO and the EU, must find the best ways of cooperating with Turkey. I believe that nothing can be achieved in the Black Sea in terms of defense and security without Turkey. My feeling is that in the United States, too, this is becoming more and more obvious that they understand how important Turkey is from this point of view.

And the first steps that have been taken between the three allied countries, Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey, for which that demining mission is a first step. In May of this year, I took part in a major conference held in Bucharest at the Black Sea & Balkan Security Forum, organized by the New Strategic Center and a panel in which the Director General for International Security of the Turkish Foreign Ministry also participated. The question I put to the Turkish official sounded something like this: “Is it true to consider the MCM initiative, a countermeasure initiative announced by Turkey, Romania and Bulgaria, as a start, and I mentioned then the assessment that I mentioned in our previous interview, the assessment developed by the EDAM Institute in Turkey, the Sofia Security Forum and the New Strategic Center and presented last November at NATO headquarters. That assessment concerned NATO’s role in addressing security threats and challenges in the Black Sea Time for a comprehensive strategic approach for the region and I asked the Turkish official about these proposals that the three institutes from Turkey, Bulgaria and Romania have proposed to develop anti-access area denial capabilities in the three countries in the Black Sea, to develop anti-submarine capabilities of the three NATO allies in the Black Sea, to strengthen cooperation between the three countries to protect the exclusive economic zone where there will be gas exploitation.

From this point of view, when Romania starts exploiting its reserves in the Black Sea in 2027, it will be the largest producer of natural gas in the European Union. It is hard to imagine that Russia will stand idly by as it develops, and then we have to think about how to protect the three countries and our NATO and EU allies. These interests, these gas exploitations, which are sensitive, are critical infrastructure and are not covered by Article 5 of NATO because they are in the exclusive economic zone, so beyond territorial waters, and we need to find other methods, a more creative, more intelligent way of dealing with these challenges, and the Turkish official at the time said yes, of course we can think about the three countries. So to conclude my question, I believe that both Romania and Bulgaria must continue to be relevant, credible and important players in both NATO and the EU, to continue to develop their relations with the United States and with Western countries, but at the same time not to neglect regional cooperation under any circumstances, especially cooperation with Turkey and Greece, obviously because the development of liquefied gas infrastructure in Greece benefits both Bulgaria and Romania. So we must also think about regional development which will enable us to create a certain cohesion in our area as well.

Okay, and the last question is about Bulgaria and Romania again. Before 1989, there was perhaps common sense in our region of Central and South-Eastern Europe, i.e. there was a lot of translation, authors were translated, there were many mixed families and so on, in different contexts. But the question would be more or less like this: why is there not a tendency towards integration or the creation of a regional identity in Central and South-Eastern Europe today? It seems to me that most of the collaboration in the region is taking place in the area of security and defense, but could ordinary people or NGOs or civic institutions in general not also contribute to integration? And to what extent could such integration be useful for the region and its countries?

To this question I have to come back to what I described a little earlier – the complexity of the area we live in, the complexity of the area for Romania and Bulgaria. The fact that we have so many risks and threats both from the Black Sea area and from the Western Balkans. This is also determined by, how shall I say, historical reality. The fact that the Balkans, the historically extended Balkans, were for a long time considered the powder keg of Europe, some 100 or so years ago. Precisely because we live in such a diverse, complex area. From a religious point of view, from an ethnic point of view and from the point of view of economic and social development, I believe that the time has come for countries like Romania and Bulgaria to be relevant players in the region, including in the Western Balkans. In the cooperation they have with the countries of the Black Sea Basin, Ukraine, Georgia and the Republic of Moldova. In other words, we should not constantly wait for other actors from outside our region to come and solve our problems. We also need to be more active. 

I believe that intellectually this activity exists. I was recently, a month ago, at the Zagreb Security Forum. This is the second year I have been there. And I can see a certain effervescence, a desire to discuss, to find solutions, to benefit from Western expertise, but also from expertise in the region.

Just yesterday, I took part in a discussion organized by an institute in France to discuss and comment on likely developments after the presidential elections in the United States. There were experts from Romania, North Macedonia, Hungary. I believe that there is, intellectually, the desire and the ability to discuss more about the problems we have and the solutions we should apply. The problem, from my point of view, is that I do not see a transfer of these debates, of these concerns at regional level to the political, economic and social decision-making level and to the other level of the population, in general, public opinion, which is much more interested and more involved.

Because, probably partly through our own fault, in the last 30 years, solutions have always been expected from the West, not locally. And I think the time has come for countries like Romania and Bulgaria to become more important players in the region. Because we have the capacity to do so. At the same time, as I mentioned in our previous interview. I believe that on all levels we must insist on stronger cooperation between Romania and Bulgaria. On the political, economic, financial and civil society, military and so on. All of these areas are important because, in this way, I believe that we can also combat the actions which Russia is taking in the region, one of whose objectives is to inspire mistrust between us, to inspire, how shall I say, negative feelings, unhealthy competition and divergent objectives. I believe that together we need to find the solution to combat and to be less susceptible to the influence of Russia and other actors who do not want our good. And I know that there are concerns in Romania and Bulgaria in this respect to combat disinformation and other things.

Why are institutions not emerging to promote a sense of regional belonging? Or a regional subjectivity, if I may say so? Why is there not even a regional political thinking or subjectivity in our region? And do you think it should appear?

I don’t know, I don’t think I have a concrete answer to this question. Because, as I said, things are very, very complex. And at the same time, we have to recognize that our accession and our integration meant, for a certain period of time, a certain renunciation of the things that characterize us, Romania and Bulgaria, in the area where we are, in order to share the general values, European or Western European. We are now realizing, after so many years of integration, both in NATO and in the European Union, that national values are nevertheless important, without being exacerbated into a poor-quality nationalism. That national values, national history, cannot be thrown in the dustbin to embrace other things and other histories, as some have wanted. Because I believe that nations, peoples, are still important for the development of humanity and, from this point of view, I would dare to say that the elections that we have seen in the United States, with all the pain that they have caused some people, have been a maximum demonstration of the exercise of democracy and the will of the people. We may not like it, but that is the reality – peoples, nations, are and will remain for a very, very long time and those who imagine that we can do without them, in my view, are fundamentally mistaken. 

If Romania and Bulgaria will succeed in creating this regional identity, it is difficult for me to foresee it, but, as I have mentioned, and I believe that this should be the objective of the two countries, Romania and Bulgaria must strive to be as relevant as possible in the region, in Europe, in the two organizations NATO and the EU. Their voice must be heard and listened to and their interests must be heard and respected. I am sorry to end on this negative note, but the fact that a European Union country blocked Romania and Bulgaria’s full access to the Schengen area was a very wrong signal and it was a signal which probably pleased the authorities in Moscow very much. And the fact that the other major countries in the European Union did not find the strength to assert themselves and reverse this decision is, in my view, a weakness on the part of those EU countries, but also a weakness on our part, Romania and Bulgaria, which should have been firm and not allowed their interests to be affected to such an extent for the sake of simple electoral calculations in the country in question which opposed it.

Photo: (source: Wikipedia Commons, CC BY-SA 4.0)

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