Alexandru Drăgulin, 18 October 2026
Summary
There are three geopolitical scenarios regarding the future of the Republic of Moldova: accession to the EU, unification with Romania, and the reintegration of Transnistria. The path towards the EU influences the other two scenarios. This is explained in an article for ‘Podul Prieteniei’ by Alexandru Drăgușin, an expert at the Romanian Diplomatic Institute.
1. The 2028 accession target versus ‘Plan B’
- The 2028 target: The aim of signing an EU accession treaty by the end of 2028 serves more as a political objective for Chișinău than as a guaranteed deadline set by Brussels.
- Institutional progress: Key negotiating chapters (including the internal market, competitiveness and inclusive growth) were opened by October 2026, confirming steady procedural progress.
- The debate on ‘Plan B’: Although unification with Romania has been proposed by some political figures as a fallback option, should EU integration reach an impasse after 2028, procedural delays do not signify a total failure of the European option.
2. Perspectives on unification with Romania
Political positions on the issue of unification encompass several different perspectives:
- Identity-based unification: Supporters (for example, the National Liberal Party) regard unification as a fundamental objective in its own right and as a direct path to Euro-Atlantic integration.
- Strategic security measure: Some analysts view unification as a potential defensive measure in the event of a serious Russian aggression.
- Pro-European statism: Supported by President Maia Sandu and the ruling PAS party, this perspective prioritises EU accession as an independent and sovereign state. Although Sandu has stated that, personally, she would vote in favour of unification in a referendum, she emphasises that, at present, there is no popular majority in support of this and that EU accession remains the state’s primary official mandate.
3. Reintegration of Transnistria
- Economic integration: Mechanisms such as the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) already allow businesses in Transnistria to trade with the EU, gradually aligning the region’s economy without the need for an immediate political settlement.
- Support and reforms: Programmes such as the EU Mechanism for Reform and Growth (2025–2027) and local initiatives such as the Convergence Fund in Chișinău aim to reduce social and economic disparities between the two banks of the Dniester River.
- The Cyprus precedent: EU law allows a state to accede even if it does not exercise effective control over its entire territory (for example, Protocol No. 10 on Cyprus), which means that Transnistria does not have a right of veto over Moldova’s accession process.
Conclusion
Building a solid European perspective provides Moldova with the resources and framework needed to consolidate its sovereignty and to transform reintegration into an attractive opportunity for residents on both banks of the Dniester. Urgent decisions, such as unification, do not enjoy broad public consensus and would not automatically resolve the security or governance challenges posed by Transnistria.
Article
The prospect of accession to the European Union is shaping two distinct debates on the future of the Republic of Moldova. Unification with Romania is cited by some political actors as a fallback solution should the European path become blocked. The reintegration of Transnistria concerns the restoration of constitutional authority over a territory internationally recognised as part of the Republic of Moldova. In this second case, closer ties with the EU can provide the economic and administrative resources needed to overcome the division. These two themes converge in the same question: how compelling can the European offer become for Moldovan society, including for those living on the left bank of the Dniester?
The thesis of this analysis is that credible accession can consolidate the Republic of Moldova as a European state and create more favourable conditions for its territorial reintegration. Conversely, prolonged uncertainty may fuel the search for alternatives to accession as an independent state, without these alternatives automatically becoming easier to achieve. The relationship between these developments depends on political decisions, domestic reforms and the security environment.
What does the 2028 deadline represent?
The discussion about an emergency unionist solution must begin with a distinction regarding the timeline. In June 2026, Euronews Romania reported, based on an Euractiv interview with Eugen Osmochescu, then Deputy Prime Minister, that unification with Romania could become a ‘Plan B’ if the European path were to stall after 2028. The stated objective was to sign the accession treaty by the end of that year. Signing the treaty and actually acquiring membership are different stages. [1]
The year 2028 must therefore be treated as a political objective for Chișinău, not as a deadline guaranteed by the EU, nor as an expiry date for the European option. A procedural delay is not equivalent to the closure of the prospect of accession. Any assessment of a potential deadlock should take into account its causes: insufficient reforms, disagreements amongst Member States, or a shift in domestic political orientation.
Furthermore, the state of negotiations has evolved since the ‘Plan B’ statement was made. On 13 October 2026, the EU and the Republic of Moldova opened negotiations on the clusters concerning the internal market and competitiveness and inclusive growth. These are in addition to the clusters on fundamental issues and external relations, which were opened in June and July. There has, therefore, been verifiable institutional progress, even if this alone does not guarantee the conclusion of negotiations within a predetermined timeframe. [2]
Unification with Romania: political currents and the Presidency’s position
The debate on unification spans several political camps and does not entirely coincide with the divide between pro-European and pro-Russian orientations. To understand it, a distinction must be made between a preference for the unification of the two states, the acceptance of unification as a potential security solution, and support for EU accession whilst preserving Moldovan statehood. These are analytical positions that may overlap; they are not factions organised within a stable system of alliances.
One strand is unionism, embraced as a political and identity-based project. For its proponents, reunification is an end in itself, justified by a shared language and culture and by redressing the consequences of historical separation. The programme of the National Liberal Party of the Republic of Moldova explicitly links Euro-Atlantic integration with union with Romania. In this view, unification is not merely a fallback option in the event of a failure to join the EU, but also the preferred route to the European area. [9]
However, supporters of unification differ on the timing and the means. In January 2026, Vasile Costiuc, leader of the party Democracy at Home (Democrația Acasă), announced on TV8 his intention to propose a referendum. Igor Grosu, Speaker of Parliament and leader of PAS, criticised the initiative as ill-timed in the absence of a favourable majority, although he stated that he would personally vote in favour of unification. The dispute shows that a pro-unification preference does not automatically lead to support for an immediate referendum. For the pro-unification opposition, such a move could test the government’s consistency; for the PAS leadership, the risk cited was that the project would be compromised by a failed vote. [10a–10b]
A second strand concerns unification as a response to strategic vulnerability. Alexandru Tănase, former Minister of Justice and former President of the Constitutional Court, presented it in January as a protective measure in the event of a major escalation of the Russian military threat. Eugen Osmochescu’s statement regarding a possible ‘Plan B’ in the event of the European path being blocked forms part of a related debate, but concerns a different trigger. A diplomatic deadlock and an immediate military threat are not equivalent situations and do not justify the assumption of a single contingency plan. [11; 1]
Within pro-European society, a distinct place must be reserved for the statist preference: the Republic of Moldova’s accession to the EU as an independent state, with its own institutions and representation. The label ‘pro-European Moldovanism’ may describe part of this discourse, but it is too broad if it equates Moldovan identity with the denial of Romanian identity and the rejection of unification. A citizen may recognise the Romanian language and historical ties with Romania, may support bilateral cooperation, and yet may prefer to preserve the Moldovan state. Geopolitical orientation, cultural identity and the choice of statehood must be analysed separately.
For pro-European statists, the EU can provide the framework within which independence becomes more secure and more functional. Consequently, non-accession by a certain deadline does not automatically transform this preference into a pro-union one. Analytically speaking, this is where an important limitation of the discourse on ‘Plan B’ lies: commitment to European integration is not a mandate that can be transferred to unification. Nor can votes for the PAS or Maia Sandu be counted en masse as votes for reunification.
This position must be distinguished from pro-Russian anti-unionism. The PSRM reacted in January 2026 to Maia Sandu’s statements by calling for her resignation and an investigation into alleged treason. The accusation comes from the party and does not constitute a legal finding. In this confrontation, the defence of statehood was used against the head of state and the government’s policy direction. The fact that even a pro-European figure may reject reunification does not place them in the same political camp: the same stance on borders may stem from very different external and institutional agendas. [12]
Maia Sandu’s position carries particular weight because it combines the expression of a personal preference in favour of unification with the exercise of a mandate to consolidate the Republic of Moldova and pursue EU accession. In an interview with the British podcast The Rest Is Politics, reported in the press in January 2026, she stated that she would vote in favour of unification in a referendum, whilst also pointing out that the European project enjoys majority support and is the objective pursued by the authorities. At the press conference on 22 January 2026, she reiterated the lack of a pro-unification majority and stated that she had not discussed this issue with European leaders. [13a–13b]
This distinction is confirmed by the institutional agenda: the Presidency’s priorities for 2026 aim to advance accession negotiations, mobilise institutions for reforms and strengthen security and resilience. They do not amount to a programme for preparing for unification. At the Moldova Security Forum on 9 October 2026, Sandu reiterated the argument that the Republic of Moldova would be safer as part of Romania, whilst maintaining the condition of a popular majority and the priority of European integration. Her position cannot be reduced either to a rejection of union or to an announcement that the state is shifting towards a unionist project. [14; 15]
From a political perspective, the President’s statements legitimise the discussion of unification within the context of security, extending beyond traditional unionist circles. At the same time, they may create tension within the pro-European majority: citizens who support accession as a means of strengthening the state may perceive unification as a shift in the project’s ultimate goal. This is an implication of the difference between the two options, not evidence that the pro-European electorate has split to any measurable extent as a result of the statements. The reactions of Costiuc, Grosu and the PSRM, however, show that the presidential message has become a focal point of domestic political competition.
The Presidency must therefore manage the balance between openness to a unionist option and maintaining a broader social coalition in favour of accession. Clarity of the mandate is crucial: citizens must be able to support the European project without being implicitly expected to accept the disappearance of the Moldovan state. Any potential unification project would require its own democratic agreement and arrangements negotiated with Romania, in coordination with European partners. Romania’s EU membership and the German analogy do not predetermine these conditions.
This diversity explains why unification remains a contested possibility, whilst the reintegration of Transnistria is an objective for which the authorities are already implementing policies. A credible European perspective can bring together citizens with different identity-based and state-related preferences. Turning the year 2028 into a unionist ultimatum would risk narrowing this base of support before the alternative has secured its own mandate.
European instruments and the reintegration of Transnistria
In the Transnistrian issue, European integration can gradually alter the costs of separation and the benefits of participating in a common economic and administrative area. There is already a concrete precedent: the rules of the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area between the EU and the Republic of Moldova were extended to the Transnistrian region from 1 January 2016. Economic access to Europe can, therefore, proceed even in the absence of a political settlement. [3]
Experience also highlights the limitations of this mechanism. Economic actors can benefit from trade with Europe without the de facto administration renouncing its separation. To contribute to reintegration, economic benefits must be linked to the convergence of rules and to the expansion of the capacity of constitutional institutions to provide services and protect rights.
European funding can support this transformation. The Reform and Growth Facility for the period 2025–2027 provides for approximately 1.9 billion euros, predominantly in the form of loans, with disbursements contingent upon the implementation of agreed reforms. This is a programme for the Republic of Moldova, not a budget earmarked for the reintegration of Transnistria. Targeting interventions to bring the two banks closer together would require eligible projects, financial oversight and appropriate implementation conditions. [4]
One important area is energy. Reducing the right bank’s vulnerability to Russian supplies and to electricity produced in the Transnistrian region can strengthen Chișinău’s freedom of decision-making. At the same time, the European offer of 60 million euros for the population on the left bank of the Dniester is conditional on measures relating to human rights and fundamental freedoms and excludes support for energy-intensive activities. The offer illustrates a mechanism for incentivising change; it should not be confused with a sum that has already been transferred. [5]
These conditions must be accompanied by a social package that is clear to residents. Access to healthcare, the recognition of qualifications and support for business adaptation could make closer ties with Chișinău more attractive. These are policy areas that deserve to be developed through projects and negotiations, rather than results already achieved simply by opening accession chapters.
The Convergence Fund offers an example of an internal initiative that could be coordinated with external support. The Moldovan authorities link the harmonisation of tax regimes to funding aimed at reducing the disparities between the two banks of the Dniester. At the end of September, the Government announced the collection of duties on certain goods and the provision for allocations to the fund in the 2027 budget. In October, the drafting of its operational framework was still undergoing consultation. Consequently, it should be presented as a mechanism under development, not as a European programme that is already operational. [6]
The challenge is to transform fiscal convergence into a credible exchange between contributions and benefits. If the population perceives only additional costs, the de facto administration may exploit this discontent. If the new obligations are accompanied by accessible services and transparent investments, the Chisinau authorities can gain legitimacy in everyday life.
Reintegration and accession can proceed in parallel
Economic resources alone do not solve the problem of Russian troops, separatist security structures and guarantees for a sustainable settlement. On 5 October 2026, Kaja Kallas emphasised the importance of socio-economic reintegration efforts and reiterated that Transnistria would not become an obstacle to the Republic of Moldova’s European path. The political message is important, but does not in itself constitute a legal framework for accession. [7]
The Cyprus precedent shows that European law can accommodate the accession of a state that does not exercise effective control over its entire territory. Protocol No. 10 suspended the application of the acquis in areas not controlled by the Cypriot government. The possible use of a tailored formula for the Republic of Moldova would require separate negotiations. The precedent demonstrates the existence of a legal possibility, without guaranteeing its replication or the resolution of the conflict. [8]
Chișinău has reasons to pursue both accession and reintegration simultaneously, whilst ensuring that the Transnistrian settlement does not become a veto over its European choice. At the same time, a negotiated reintegration should protect the rights of residents and allow democratic institutions to function. An arrangement that would grant separatist structures the ability to block external or internal reforms could actually undermine the very objective it purports to serve.
The stakes for Romania and the region
These two challenges illustrate why the credibility of enlargement has implications that go beyond the technical timetable of the negotiations. For Romania, supporting reforms and interconnections contributes to the stability of a close neighbour. For Bulgaria and the other European partners, a more resilient Republic of Moldova means reducing a vulnerability in the Black Sea neighbourhood. This shared stake can underpin a European approach that goes beyond the bilateral relationship between Bucharest and Chișinău.
A successful accession would provide the Republic of Moldova with greater resources to consolidate its state and make reintegration an attractive prospect. A prolonged deadlock could give credence to calls for emergency solutions, but it would not eliminate the difficulties of unification with Romania, nor the Transnistrian issue. Therefore, the most sound policy is to build a verifiable European perspective, in which institutional progress is accompanied by visible benefits on both banks of the Dniester.
Sources
[6a] Government of the Republic of Moldova, ‘In Context’ with Valeriu Chiveri, 28 September 2026.
[8] The 2003 Act of Accession, Protocol No. 10 on Cyprus, in particular Articles 1–3.
[10a] TV8, statements by Vasile Costiuc on the programme ‘Cutia Neagră’, 15 January 2026.
[12] AGERPRES, the PSRM’s reaction to Maia Sandu’s statement on unification, 13 January 2026.
[13a] AGERPRES, report on Maia Sandu’s interview for *The Rest Is Politics*, 12 January 2026.
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