What can Romania and Bulgaria do following the attacks on commercial vessels in the Black Sea?

B1 TV, 18 October 2026

Summary

The programme, hosted by Răzvan Munteanu on Check Media, analysed the deteriorating security situation in the Black Sea, marked by the interception of Russian Geran-4 drones by the Romanian Army’s F-16s and the attacks on commercial vessels in the exclusive economic zones and territorial waters of Romania and Bulgaria.

Here are the main points and ideas discussed by the guests:

• Statement by the Minister of Defence, Radu Miruță: He confirmed the recent shooting down of two jet-powered drones flying at 450 km/h towards Tulcea and Ukraine, noting that the F-16s acted on the basis of pre-calculated predictive models. He highlighted efforts to promote a NATO command with a physical presence in the Black Sea (CTF) and to acquire four new vessels through the SAFE mechanism, reaffirming the need for firm diplomatic action, as peacetime resources cannot permanently cope with the frequency of such incidents.
• Political scientist Radu Carp’s perspective: He argued that the Russian Federation is deliberately testing the reaction of Romania and Bulgaria, taking advantage of the decline in public vigilance caused by disinformation. He pointed out that the intensity of attacks in the Black Sea has doubled compared to that in the Baltic Sea, warning that the next targets could be the critical infrastructure at gas deposit Neptun Deep and the port of Giurgiulești (Republic of Moldova), given that the joint Romanian-Bulgarian intervention mechanisms are still in their infancy.
• Security expert Iulian Fota’s perspective: He criticised the lack of firmness on the part of NATO and Romania in the Black Sea, pointing out that no allied (non-littoral) has entered the region since November 2021. He pointed out that Russia is waging an aggressive, widespread hybrid/political war against the entire Alliance and that Romania has failed since 2014 to modernise its naval capabilities (opting only for patrol vessels), leaving institutional responsibility for the security of maritime and energy platforms unclear.
• The perspective of Bulgarian journalist Vladimir Mitev: He stated that the media and society in Bulgaria are following these events with growing concern, particularly due to the significant economic risks to grain exports and industrial supply chains. In Bulgaria, a package of measures is awaited from NATO regarding the strengthening of air defence and anti-drone capabilities, with general sentiment being pessimistic – further escalations are expected.
• Analyst Ștefan Popescu’s perspective: He emphasised that the national territory and the exclusive economic zone are increasingly becoming part of the immediate theatre of war, jeopardising freedom of navigation and future energy investments. He called for much firmer diplomatic action on Romania’s part to secure military support and concrete equipment from allies, not just declarations of solidarity .

Video with auto-generated English subtitles

Programme

Introduction

Răzvan Munteanu, presenter:

Good evening, dear friends! I’m Răzvan Munteanu on Check Media. In the first part of our programme, we will be discussing the Black Sea. The Black Sea is becoming an increasingly unsafe region, as today the Romanian Armed Forces’ F-16s shot down two more drones that had entered our country’s airspace. Furthermore, commercial vessels have been struck by drones, both in Romania and in Bulgaria.

We even had a meeting between the President of Romania, Nicușor Dan, and Mark Rutte, the head of NATO. What lies ahead for our country and how do we respond to these security threats? We are about to discuss and debate this with my guests.

Professor Radu Carp, good evening!

Radu Carp, political scientist:

Good evening!

Răzvan Munteanu:

Professor Iulia Fota, good evening, Professor Fota!

Iulia Fota, security expert:

Good evening!

Interview with the Romanian Minister of Defence, Radu Miruță

Răzvan Munteanu:

To begin with, we’d like to welcome the Minister of National Defence, Mr Radu Miruță, who is joining us by telephone. Good evening, Minister!

Radu Miruță, Minister of Defence:

Good evening!

Răzvan Munteanu:

Minister, regarding today’s incidents, in which F-16s shot down two drones, do we know anything about the origin of the drones? What targets were they intended to strike? What specific information do we have about these events?

Radu Miruță:

Firstly, the events took place last night at 6.00 pm, not today.

Răzvan Munteanu:

OK.

Radu Miruță:

We know that these drones – the first of their kind to be shot down by the Romanian Armed Forces – were the new jet-powered drones, which were flying at much higher speeds than those shot down previously, at 450 km per hour. They descended from 3,000 metres, entering Romanian airspace.

They were intercepted and shot down by fighter jets, which had been dispatched to that area to intercept them. Imagine that the first drone entered at 17:59 and by 18:01 it had already been shot down. The second entered at 18:00, that is, one minute later, and was shot down at 18:05. We are moving forward, trying to learn as much as possible from all the characteristics and types we observe every time a drone enters Romanian airspace. And bear in mind that this time it turned out that the predictions we had calculated at the Ministry of National Defence turned out to be correct, because in the two minutes since the drones entered, it would not have been possible to take off and reach the interception point in that area; therefore, the aircraft had already been dispatched there, and it was demonstrated that the model we had calculated was correct. Congratulations to my colleagues who are constantly working on such improvements to the models we use! Given that the drone was flying at 450 km per hour, based on radar data and the pilots’ accounts, it was a Geran-4 model drone.

This leads us to believe that it was of Russian origin, as that is where this type of drone comes from. Furthermore, the area from which it came and to which it was heading was in Tulcea; it was due to enter Ukraine. These characteristics indicate, with a fairly high degree of probability, that it does not belong to the Ukrainian drone fleet.

Răzvan Munteanu:

Minister, President Nicușor Dan, as we mentioned in the introduction, had a meeting with the NATO Secretary-General, Mr Mark Rutte. What specific measures to enhance security in the Black Sea might Romania request from its NATO allies from a military perspective?

Radu Miruță:

First of all, one thing must be understood in relation to reality: the surface area of the Black Sea is twice that of Romania. Not everything that happens in the Black Sea is Romania’s responsibility.

We, at national level, have a huge interest in ensuring that the Black Sea is a safe area for navigation. Several things are happening. Firstly, there is, at the level… .and Turkey, alongside Romania, a memorandum of understanding regarding the assurance of free navigation routes, to which the provision of protection for critical infrastructure in the area has also been added. Secondly, following a discussion I had with him last week, I asked the Bulgarian minister I sent him a letter, which he confirmed he would sign, so that there might be a NATO command in the Black Sea with a physical presence in Romania as well. Turkey wishes for this command to have a physical presence on the Turkish Black Sea coast and to operate with officers also hosted by Romania, but there. We want this rotation to take place not only in terms of personnel, but also in terms of location. No such CTF currently exists within NATO.

We want it to be put into operation, because that would mean a NATO command with resources provided by all countries or by any NATO member state – in other words, more than we have had so far.

Romania has considered these matters, taking into account the SAFE mechanisms through which we have commissioned four new capabilities – four ships – because it is not enough for us simply to want, to ask for and to say that we need them; we must also put some resources on the table. These four ships, for which contracts have now been finalised, are a further element of credibility for Romania when it makes such requests.

Things are happening, given that Romania is shooting down drones over the Black Sea. It is not as though no measures whatsoever are being taken. I would remind you of a decision that is somewhat historic in the context of recent decades, taken a month ago, when the Romanian Army decided to dispatch a fighter jet with a shoot-down order to a depth of 160 kilometres over the Black Sea — a situation that had never before occurred at such an altitude, with an aircraft dispatched with orders to fire and which actually did so. I am referring to the incident involving that drone which had come within 150 metres of the critical infrastructure at Neptun Deep and which was ultimately destroyed by fire from fighter jets.

Such things do happen, but on the other side too, the frequency is very high. And yet, the situation is viewed from a different perspective. The war between Russia and Ukraine involves a different scale of resources.

Romania is not a country at war, and in peacetime Romania’s defence plans involve a certain type of resources. We cannot expect to respond to situations of such magnitude and frequency with the resources available or made available in peacetime. There must be a very firm protest at diplomatic level, because Romania, not being a country at war, is not in a situation where it is normal – and we must not get used to the situation – where we scramble fighter jets several times a week, sometimes to counter drones that illegally enter Romanian airspace.

This is a rule of international law that Russia must respect.

Răzvan Munteanu:

Minister, you have said – and made a very good point – that not everything that happens in the Black Sea is Romania’s responsibility. Beyond these issues which you listed earlier during your telephone interview, there are, however, two other NATO member states here in the Black Sea region: Bulgaria and Turkey. Are you considering developing joint mechanisms, at least with these two other coastal states, Bulgaria and Turkey, so that we have a jointly operated system for detecting and intercepting drones?

After all, it could be carried out under the auspices of NATO – why not?

Radu Miruță:

Not everything that happens in the Black Sea is Romania’s responsibility, but absolutely everything that happens in the Black Sea is of interest to Romania.

We are a NATO member state; we are a European Union member state with extensive access to the Black Sea; we have the largest shipyard amongst the European NATO member states; we are interested in absolutely everything that moves in the Black Sea. Yes, not only do we take this into account, but we are also taking action.

Mine-clearing operations to ensure clear shipping lanes or to protect critical infrastructure are carried out using both ships and military personnel — from both Bulgaria and Turkey. This is a joint operation.

This command, this CTF, the Black Sea Task Force, is an initiative that we are promoting at both the military and diplomatic levels, putting forward proportionate arguments, which entails joint action by NATO, not just by the three NATO member states bordering the Black Sea. There are also discussions within the European Union regarding joint action in the Black Sea, but Romania cannot decide on behalf of other countries. Romania is perfectly capable of defining its interests clearly and can fight diplomatically and politically to ensure that these interests are achieved.

Romania’s relevance in the Black Sea region is essential, and there is a need to increase NATO’s presence in the Black Sea region; this is achieved through joint action under the NATO umbrella, such as this CTF, which does not currently exist even in Turkey.

Analysis of the current situation from a Romanian perspective

Răzvan Munteanu:

Very well, Minister! Thank you very much for joining us by telephone. That was Radu Miruță, Minister of National Defence. Mr Fota, Mr Carp, I’d like us to continue our analysis, and I’d like to ask you both – starting with you, Professor Carp – do you believe that the Russian Federation is deliberately testing NATO at the moment?

Radu Carp, political scientist:

Obviously, the Russian Federation is deliberately testing, but I wouldn’t necessarily say NATO; rather, Romania and Bulgaria in recent times. Why? Because it has become apparent that these countries, well, sometimes retaliate, sometimes less so, depending on their technical capabilities, but it has become clear that the intensity of the reaction amongst the public has diminished considerably.

In other words, whilst at the start, when the first such incursions by Russian drones took place, there was a more widespread outcry. Today, if we ask ordinary people who are behind these drones, half will tell you that it is actually the Ukrainians. This is where we have ended up, unfortunately, due to disinformation. And this is what the Russian Federation is testing: trying to erode public support for Ukraine.

Because things aren’t being explained, and there is a communication gap here. Why does the Russian Federation want to strike in this area specifically? I saw a map in the French press today – which, unfortunately, hasn’t appeared in our own media – showing Russian drone attacks on NATO territory since July.

And I noticed something very interesting: the number of attacks in the Black Sea is double that in the Baltic region, which effectively means a reversal of the Russian Federation’s priorities. This has happened over the last three months.

This must be highlighted, and Romania must also make this point in Brussels, before NATO: namely, that at present, the entire eastern flank is under threat from Russia and, moreover, the Black Sea has become a focal point of the conflict. And there is another aspect which, once again, I believe we are deliberately ignoring, namely the fact that the Russian Federation is attacking any vessel attempting to enter Ukrainian ports on the Black Sea and the Danube, as well as any vessel leaving these ports — which has somehow managed to enter and then succeed in leaving. Regardless of where it is — whether in Ukrainian territorial waters, in Romanian territorial waters, in the exclusive economic zone, or in Bulgarian territorial waters — Russia deliberately attacks these vessels.

And the final point I wish to make is that, well, Romanian-Bulgarian cooperation is lacking. We are only just beginning to consider how we might interconnect these mechanisms. And I’ll give a very simple example: the rules for intercepting these drones, for engagement, differ between Romania and Bulgaria. So it will take time.

The Russian Federation is exploiting the fact that, as Mr Miruță also said, these Romania–Bulgaria–Turkey cooperation mechanisms are still in their infancy in the Black Sea. It is the fault of all these countries that, for five years now, they have practically failed to take this scenario into account.

Răzvan Munteanu:

Mr Fota, what is your view?

Iulia Fota:

Well, my view is that we’re deluding ourselves into thinking that something will be resolved regarding NATO. Nothing will be resolved, because NATO has certain limits to its action, and we’re well aware of those limits and can see them. Or at least some of us are aware of them and can see them.

Let me give an example: in an article in Foreign Affairs a few months ago, Julie Smith recounted something very interesting. In 2024, the issue of a strategy towards Russia was raised within NATO — a matter which I, too, when I was at the Foreign Ministry, raised,

and it was also raised by the Poles and the Balts. Because, following Russia’s second aggression against Ukraine, we wanted to know: ‘Sir, where do we stand in our relationship with NATO?’ I’d like to make a side note here: when I left the Foreign Ministry in early 2024, there were still some NATO countries that weren’t convinced that the NATO–Russia Founding Act was no longer valid, even though it had been signed during a more favourable period, when there was still a modicum of cooperation with the Russians.

And, finally, I don’t want to go into matters here that are too sensitive. But this shows you that there is still confusion within NATO regarding how the issue with Russia should be addressed, due to certain member states.

And what does Julie Smith say? Although it was discussed in 2024 and the strategy was proposed in 2025, so a year later, Russia isn’t even mentioned in the summit’s final communiqué. So it’s clear there was resistance there. One or more states didn’t want to make Russia an issue for NATO in this way. Obviously, to put it bluntly.

So, why am I emphasising this point? Because we have a situation that we won’t resolve any time soon, as some NATO countries are unwilling to do so and are therefore blocking the decision. The last NATO vessel in the Black Sea was in November 2021. A ship – I believe it was a French frigate or corvette – left the Black Sea via the Bosphorus.

And since then, no NATO country – we’re not talking about the coastal states: Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey – has sent a warship into the Black Sea. And the Russians are well aware of this. For them, this is a signal that NATO will not have the courage to confront them at sea in the Black Sea and, obviously, it is a constant source of encouragement for them, especially now. Two points to note here:

1. They are determined and have already waged all-out war against Ukraine; that much is clear.

2. They have stepped up their efforts… and here I disagree with Professor Carp: the Russians’ war is not solely against Ukraine. The conventional military aggression is directed against Ukraine. But Russia is waging a political war – we could also call it ‘hybrid warfare’ if you like, although there is a difference between the two.

They’ve stepped it up again in recent months, which is why we have drones in Leipzig. OK, the Black Sea is the Black Sea: the Ukrainians export grain and the Russians want to cripple their grain exports first and foremost, because that’s where a great deal of money comes from. But what are Russian drones doing in Leipzig? And that’s just one example amongst many.

So Russia has also stepped up its war against the Alliance as a whole, and the Alliance is lagging behind in its response. And now, given that we’re seeing these developments in America – so ugly, so unpleasant and so surprising… and here I’d like to share a piece of information with you and the viewers.

Răzvan Munteanu:

Please go ahead!

Iulia Fota:

I posted it on Facebook this morning as well. I’ve learnt from an article or a press analysis that Witkoff and Jared Kushner asked the Ukrainians to give in completely to the Russians, without Russia making any concessions.

So we had this impression that negotiations were taking place, that a compromise was being reached, which meant that each side was giving something. No! The two American envoys and negotiators recently asked the Ukrainians to give in completely to Russian demands — in other words, to hand over the Donbas entirely to the Russians — without the Russians making any concessions whatsoever in this whole conflict over their aggression against Ukraine.

Just imagine how bleak the picture is! So, if we expect NATO to deter the Russians, I think we’re deluding ourselves. What can be done?

1. Capabilities. I’d like to praise Minister Miruță for one good thing he did, which I appreciated: he had the courage to engage Russian targets with live fire. That’s commendable, and it’s good that he did it, because the next minister to succeed him won’t have quite so much courage, and then we’ll always have a contrast that we can draw on:

Răzvan Munteanu:

Let’s wait and see, let’s not jump to conclusions…

Iulia Fota:

Ah, I have my suspicions… Anyway.

2. Where would I criticise Minister Miruță? I praised him at first, but now I’d criticise him: he didn’t have enough courage to stand up to the generals when the issue of shipbuilding came up, to be more ambitious and more resolute in pursuing what we want. Because what’s going to be built in Mangalia? Two patrol vessels. A patrol vessel isn’t a warship.

Răzvan Munteanu:

Hold on a moment, Mr Fota! So you’re saying that the generals who imposed their vision on…

Iulian Fota:

Well, I don’t think it comes from the minister.

Răzvan Munteanu:

Right, those generals…

Iulia Fota:

I have my own theory, but it’s not a very pleasant one.

Răzvan Munteanu:

That those generals weren’t acting in the national interest?

Iulia Fota:

They don’t have the courage to confront Russia’s navy in the Black Sea, to tell you what I think.

Răzvan Munteanu:

And even if the Romanian generals don’t have the courage to confront Russia’s navy in the Black Sea, are they still undermining the national interest?

Iulia Fota:

No, no. It’s a different way of looking at protecting the national interest. Well, it’s actually a discussion about the policy of balance; anyway, it’s complicated. I mean, we can discuss it – I’ve no problem with that.

So I don’t understand… Don’t tell me it’s a coincidence that, ever since Cioloș’s story about the three or four — I can’t even remember how many there were — frigates… I think they were frigates or corvettes, in any case they were superior vessels… Those are warships! There’s a marked difference between frigates, corvettes and these patrol vessels. Those can wage war; they can withstand hits.

They’re built differently; they have what’s called an internal stronghold – a metal cage that ensures their survival even when the ships are hit. These patrol vessels don’t have anything like that.

And that’s why they’re patrol vessels. If they’ve got some armament on board, fine, but they’re not warships.

So, since 2014, when the Russian aggression began, and especially since 2022, we haven’t been able to carry out any significant modernisation of our warships. Pusher tugs, tugboats, patrol vessels… Yes, mate, but you can’t keep the Russians at bay with those! No, you can’t keep the Russians at bay.

Radu Carp:

If I may follow on from what Ion Fota was saying: it’s true, these NATO ships haven’t entered the area since before the war in Ukraine began.

Iulia Fota:

November 2021.

Radu Carp:

This is a crucial point. Because Romania, as you may have noticed, hasn’t asked NATO for something extremely simple: namely, the escort of these ships into the Black Sea.

An escort cannot be carried out as a deterrent by Romanian ships — of which we have few anyway — or Bulgarian ones, right? But it can be done with NATO’s involvement.

Yet Romania hasn’t even asked for this.

Iulia Fota:

We’re going too far here. By providing an escort, we would already be becoming a party to the conflict.

Radu Carp:

No, I was talking about civilian ships carrying grain.

Iulia Fota:

There’s no such thing. I don’t agree. The Ukrainians have asked us for all sorts of things; something like that cannot be accepted.

Because, I repeat, at that point the Russians would have grounds to strike you too. And what did you do?

Radu Carp:

If ships registered in Romania, Turkey and Bulgaria are escorting Ukrainian vessels, it is clear that this is not an act of war directed against the Russian Federation. It is, however, a powerful act of deterrence. Yet we didn’t even consider this possibility.

Iulia Fota:

Russia doesn’t see things that way. And if it strikes you, NATO will tell you: ‘Don’t get upset, you’re unprofessional, you don’t know what you’re doing and you’ve got yourself into this – sort it out yourself!’ And we’ll find ourselves in a very serious situation.

Răzvan Munteanu:

We all agree, and I think we understand that even in…

Iulia Fota:

So those NATO ships shouldn’t come to act as escorts.

Răzvan Munteanu:

Both Romania and other countries have held much more extensive discussions than what has actually taken place.

Iulia Fota:

It’s an international body, so the Russians aren’t allowed to impose their own rules. And NATO, in my view, has shown weakness by accepting the Russian viewpoint.

Răzvan Munteanu:

We’ve been discussing Bulgaria here in the studio, and we’ve been joined by an expert from Bulgaria, Vladimir Mitev, a Bulgarian journalist and expert who speaks Romanian. Mr Mitev, good evening!

Yes, I think we’re having a problem with the internet connection. We’ll come back to Vladimir Mitev.

Radu Carp:

I’d like to add to what Ms Iulia Fota was saying: regarding the actions of these so-called negotiators. Today, reports appeared in the press suggesting that they had called for the resumption of Nord Stream, that is, the resumption of Russian gas transit to Europe.

And they have officially requested this of European leaders. It appears that Germany has strongly opposed this. But the mere fact that the issue of resuming Russian gas supplies is once again being raised directly by the United States means that developments are, indeed, very worrying.

Răzvan Munteanu:

Yes. Mr Fota, do you know what’s interesting? Why has the security architecture in the Baltic Sea region been strengthened since the start of the war in Ukraine, whilst here, in the wider Black Sea region, it hasn’t been strengthened to the same extent?

Iulia Fota:

For several reasons. Firstly, the Baltic Sea is a NATO sea. With Sweden and Finland joining NATO, the Baltic Sea has become a NATO lake.

Although the Russians know this, they’ll still carry on causing trouble in the Baltics. Another factor… although they didn’t create these themselves – others did – but never mind. So they’ll find all sorts of hybrid warfare tactics to test the Balts and the others – the Swedes, the Nordics – and to rile them up. But the strategic stakes are different for the Russians.

Because, firstly: Ukraine doesn’t export via the Baltic states. They do transport goods via Poland by train, yes, and Poland exports – how shall I put it – to this part of the West. And as such, the Russians don’t have the nerve to go that far.

Secondly: Ukraine exports via the Black Sea. These exports — and we’re talking here of several tens of billions a year when it comes to Ukraine’s agricultural exports, as the country is a major player in agriculture — mean the Russians are doing everything they can to prevent Ukraine from accessing that money.

That’s one thing.

Two: furthermore, the issue of Novorossiya remains unresolved. Because the Russians know that, if they do manage to take the South and find a way to seize southern Ukraine, Ukraine as a state will eventually cease to exist; it won’t be viable.

And thirdly: the opportunities. Because up there, the northerners are, how shall I put it, cohesive; they’re a homogeneous group; they cooperate. Well, now, before the second invasion, around 2020 or 2021, the Nordic countries had integrated their air forces. And I thought: ‘Goodness me, two integrated NATO countries – why do they need a regional framework as well?’. Because they — and then I realised — thought that, if NATO isn’t capable or isn’t interested, if we have problems with the Americans and the Americans block us, they should be able to operate and help one another. Which is something you don’t have here, in this region! I don’t think we and the Bulgarians have integrated air forces – let alone Turkey – based on the Nordic model.

So the Russians have no opportunities for action there, nor do they have much interest in the region, because the route to the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East is via the Black Sea, not via the Baltic, which is a much longer route. So the stakes for the Russians are much higher here and, as Gorchakov said after they were defeated in the First Crimean War, the Black Sea is, for them, the gateway to world domination. So, as long as they control the Black Sea and impose their viewpoint, they will continue to harbour such ambitions.

Secondly: they are keeping Ukraine in check, Romania in check, Bulgaria in check, and Turkey to a certain extent as well. From this, you can see that the Russians are careful not to step on the Turks’ toes, and Turkey is getting off lightly, because their routes to the Caucasus do not intersect with this war zone.

The Black Sea is a paradoxical place: the northern part is a war zone, with the Ukrainians fighting the Russians, and the Russians are bombing and attacking these ships. But the southern part of the Black Sea – that is, from the Bosphorus straight to the Caucasus – is calm and peaceful, because that’s where the Russians export their oil under… well, via the ‘ghost fleet’ they have.

Răzvan Munteanu:

Professor Carp, do you think that President Dan’s meeting with Mark Rutte changes anything in this context?

Radu Carp:

To me, this actually seems to show that Romania has not broken free from a certain paradigm and a certain routine. I mean, we’ve once again asked for enhanced capabilities, anti-drone systems and so on, but we haven’t gone any further. Because it’s clear that the Russian Federation will continue to escalate, and it’s clear that at the moment there are only local solutions.

Of course, this mechanism, which Minister Miruță has also initiated, is running on autopilot. So there are procedures in place; the procedures have been set in motion. Some are successful, others are not. But the intensity of these Russian attacks, you should know, gives me a great deal of cause for concern. Because, you see, it began with the Danube sector, then spread to Romania’s exclusive economic zone in the Black Sea, then moved into Romania’s territorial waters, and, subsequently, here we are, Bulgaria’s territorial waters.

So, practically speaking, all the areas bordering Ukraine on the part of the two NATO states, Romania and Bulgaria, are currently under attack. What’s more: this vessel, which was somehow saved by the timely intervention of the Romanian Armed Forces, had set sail from the port of Giurgiulești – in other words, effectively from the Republic of Moldova. This is because the Republic of Moldova also has access to the sea and can contribute to the navigation system in the Black Sea.

What can Romania do in the current situation?

Răzvan Munteanu:

Gentlemen, here’s a question for both of you: what should Romania do to break out of this stereotype of how we handle the situation? What should we demand?

Iulia Fota:

We put up with it, we suffer, we grumble, we swear… Nothing happens.

Răzvan Munteanu:

So we can never do anything?

Iulia Fota:

I’m talking about national security. They say it’s like air: you only realise how important it is when you’re without it.

I always teach this lesson to my students and tell them: ‘Listen, when it comes to national security, if you don’t sort things out in good time, you’re done for!’ Because that’s when you’re left gasping for air!

And if you don’t have a gas cylinder, or something like that to sort out the problem, you’re dead. So we should have, from 2014 – which is what the Poles did, but our responsible politicians were unable to do – taken some major decisions in light of the situation. Because the Poles classified the motorway linked to the annexation of Crimea as an existential threat, whereas our own… Well, just look at Iohannis’s strategy from 2015: a disaster, a shambles! Why are we surprised now that we’re powerless?

Răzvan Munteanu:

Iohannis tried to set up that NATO fleet in the Black Sea.

Iulia Fota:

We don’t need a fleet; that’s just a fairy tale.

Răzvan Munteanu:

No, I was just giving you an example.

Iulia Fota:

You do need a fleet! You need some ships with powerful capabilities which, when the Russians come out, can keep an eye on them and keep them in check. Did you know that at the start, after the second Russian aggression in 2022, they sent two ships out to sea?

And when they… My suspicion is that the Russians used certain methods, like firing signal flares at that helicopter… I mean, sending out signals of dissatisfaction, like ‘get out of here or you’ll get it’… Right. And we immediately put our foot in it, because we realised: well, with what, those frigates?

Radu Carp:

Look at what Romania promised and didn’t deliver! For example, regarding the protection of critical infrastructure: when this project called Neptun Deep was launched, of course the economic, political and strategic aspects were highlighted, but the idea that this infrastructure needed to be protected came very late. What’s more: when… as I told you, there is still no solution. The scenario of an invasion of Serpent Island in the event of an armed conflict has never been taken into account by Romania since 2014. And this happened, I repeat, on the very first day of the war.

So we are still unprepared to deal with such a situation.

Iulia Fota:

In 2016, Cioloș wanted to set up – and had created with Damen – a ‘super shipyard’ and a ‘super company’ to build – I can’t quite remember – three or four frigates or corvettes; I don’t recall the details. Right, okay, but the deal was done and dusted. Then the PSD came along and ruined the whole thing. Just imagine, we’d have had them all out at sea by now, and we’d have kept the Russians at bay in a different way!

Răzvan Munteanu:

Now, with all due respect, I don’t think the PSD is to blame for absolutely everything that isn’t working in the Romanian Armed Forces.

Iulia Fota:

Dragnea stopped it, didn’t he? So the deal that Cioloș had signed with Damen was blocked by the next government, after Cioloș was ousted. The elections took place and the whole lot were replaced.

Well, these are decisions that are costing us now – that’s a fact!

Intervention by Bulgarian journalist Vladimir Mitev

Răzvan Munteanu:

Gentlemen, gentlemen, I’m afraid I must interrupt you. Vladimir Mitev has managed to join us again. Hello, Vladimir!

I hope your internet connection is working well now. Welcome back to Check Media!

Vladimir Mitev:

Yes, good evening!

Răzvan Munteanu:

Vladimir, we’re well aware — we were discussing this here before you joined us — of the incidents involving drones that have struck commercial vessels in both Romanian and Bulgarian waters. The first thing I’d like to ask you is how the media in Sofia is reporting on these security incidents and what the public mood is like. Because here in Romania, we’re discussing these issues a great deal, and the public is becoming increasingly anxious. What’s the situation like in Bulgaria?

Vladimir Mitev:

In my view, there is a great deal of media attention. I can even use myself as an example: this week I gave three interviews to various television and radio stations, because they were looking for people who could offer a certain perspective that also encompasses Romania. It is clear that a period is approaching in which Romania and Bulgaria will probably cooperate much more closely in these areas of defence and security.

Furthermore, there is concern — I would say considerable concern — in the economic sphere, because this commercial shipping in the Black Sea is linked to Bulgaria’s wheat exports. Bulgaria is a major wheat producer, just like Romania. Last but not least, there are industries which, for example, receive materials from Ukraine. So there is also a problem at an industrial level, I would say. There have been interviews on this subject.

And, likewise, last but not least, I believe that all those with expertise in these areas of security and defence have been invited onto Bulgarian television and radio programmes over the last few days. And, of course, I can say very briefly — before you ask me any further questions — that the discussions you have had in the studio are very similar to those taking place in Bulgaria.

For example, the idea that Bulgaria and Romania should cooperate — this was highlighted by Mr Carp. On the other hand, the fact that, well, NATO supports us, but I have also heard views on what else can be done given that ships not belonging to Black Sea littoral states cannot remain in the Black Sea for very long.

So, of course, this is just an introduction. Perhaps we can discuss this in more detail if there are any further questions.

Răzvan Munteanu:

We’ll explore this topic further after the advert break. I’d ask you to stay with us, Vladimir Mitev. I have one more question before we reach that break we were talking about: Bulgaria has requested additional support from NATO, in particular defence systems against drones. I’d like to know what Bulgaria has managed to secure, especially given that, of course, your leader also had a meeting with Mark Rutte.

Vladimir Mitev:

I might add here that the meeting was, as far as I understand, with Nicușor Dan in Brussels. So, for the time being, it has been stated in general terms that air defence will be strengthened, including through NATO aircraft coming to our country. On the other hand, as you said, Bulgaria will join the NATO anti-drone programme and such support will be provided.

But I can say that we actually expect it to become clearer next week exactly what NATO members will offer Bulgaria. We do not yet have a definitive answer, but such support will certainly be provided. Bulgaria reacted very quickly following this escalation, and I believe there is a political will to support it.

Răzvan Munteanu:

Yes, these questions are relevant in Bucharest too, but we’ll take a short advertising break and be back shortly. Perhaps we’ll get a glimpse of what the answers to these questions will be.

[After the advertising break]

Răzvan Munteanu:

Iulia Fota, Professor Radu Carp and Vladimir Mitev, a journalist from Bulgaria, remain with us.

Vladimir, I have one final question for you: at the start of the discussion, we were talking about the incidents in the Black Sea and how Bulgarian society and the political class perceive these threats. How is the overall situation viewed there? Is there talk in Bulgaria of an escalation of these situations in the Black Sea region in the near future, or are the scenarios more optimistic?

Vladimir Mitev:

I’ve also had some informal discussions with people who are more knowledgeable about the topics discussed in the studio, and the sentiment among those I spoke to is rather pessimistic, in the sense that they perhaps expect an even greater escalation. For Bulgaria, this escalation is something relatively new. Until now, Romania had been much more exposed to these effects of the war. Now Bulgaria, perhaps somewhat in shock, is also coming to realise that it is in the immediate vicinity.

So I haven’t noticed a very optimistic attitude. I might even say that we have a Prime Minister who has spoken with Mark Rutte and visited Brussels. He, of course, is conveying positive messages; he has no other option — that is probably how it must be for any leader — but it seems to me that, beyond the optimistic or positive messages that we have support and that we are not alone, there remains a sense of concern even at the highest levels of government.

Răzvan Munteanu:

Vladimir Mitev, thank you very much for joining us on Check Media!

Expectations regarding the situation in the Black Sea

Gentlemen, let’s continue our analysis, and I’d like to know what we can expect, Professor Carp, in the coming period.

Radu Carp:

It depends very much on how events unfold.

Răzvan Munteanu:

The question is simple: will such incidents escalate? Will we remain in a stalemate where we see the occasional drone? Or might things de-escalate?

Radu Carp:

On the contrary, they will escalate, because, I repeat, at present, practically all areas in the vicinity of Romania have been targeted by the Russian Federation. What’s more, as Minister Miruță pointed out, the Russians are using far more advanced drones. These Geran drones have been in use since this summer – to be more precise, in Ukraine – and now they have already targeted areas within Romanian territory.

So the Russian Federation has a specific objective, namely to intensify the attacks and to create the impression in Romania that this is, in fact, a common occurrence; that we must understand that we, too, are part of a war; that, in fact, we are on Ukraine’s side and that is why this is happening to us. So this is what the Russian Federation is aiming for, and so, obviously, these attacks will be a daily occurrence. But you have seen that they are also pursuing something else: there was an attack in September on a border crossing between the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine.

I fear that the attacks on precisely these border crossings – Moldova-Ukraine, Romania–Moldova, and even Romania–Ukraine. Because the Russians have identified a weak spot, namely the fact that the Republic of Moldova does not enjoy the same air defence as Romania, and they will almost certainly step up their attacks across the entire Black Sea region.

Răzvan Munteanu:

Mr Fota, is Romania’s national defence industry prepared — we did have the SAFE programme, didn’t we? — to rapidly develop military defensive responses to such incidents in the Black Sea region?

Iulia Fota:

I don’t think so, because that sort of preparation takes time. Honestly, I’m still not convinced that we’ve even started building the munitions and gunpowder factory from scratch… Anyway, this is an absolutely grotesque situation, because the basis of any war is being able to produce at least the gunpowder for bullets and some TNT — because, after all, anyone who’s done military service can still fight a tank with a sock and some TNT, if they know how to use it.

Yet we don’t even have these things anymore; we’ve imported them from all over the place: from the Serbs, from the Brazilians… Well, all sorts of stopgap solutions like that. So there’s no special focus on the defence industry. I’ve been saying this for a few years now: it doesn’t work the way our leaders think it does!

A clear government official needs to be appointed, reporting either to the Prime Minister or to the President, with certain powers, holding at least the rank of Secretary of State, and who knows exactly what needs to be done and can really get on their backs and push them all forward. Because I still see chaos, I see private interests and corruption in the defence industry, I see — how shall I put it — a lack of clear strategic direction and a lack of ambition. I’ve said it before and I’ll say it again: if we let the bureaucracy decide our fate, we deserve it!

Because bureaucracy has no interest in being ambitious; it’s just going round in circles. So ambition must come from the political sphere, yet the political sphere remains uninterested in defence. Can we say… that with Ilie Bolojan we’ve seen the country’s defence treated as a priority? We’re now discussing pensions, all sorts of things…

Răzvan Munteanu:

You know how it is, Mr Fota: Prime Minister Ilie Bolojan is currently focusing on issues that are more of an electoral nature for the general public. Romania’s defence and national security is a more sensitive issue.

Iulia Fota:

In which seven sailors died…

Răzvan Munteanu:

Sir, it is a rather sensitive issue which the political class has failed to address properly for public opinion over the last few decades.

Iulia Fota:

We have been at war for four and a half years, almost five years. In this acute phase, or even worse, the aggression…

Comment by geopolitical analyst Ștefan Popescu

Răzvan Munteanu:

Mr Fota, we should also consider another point of view. Ștefan Popescu, a foreign policy analyst, is with us on the phone. Good evening, Ștefan!

Ștefan Popescu:

Good evening!

Răzvan Munteanu:

Ștefan, what is your analysis of these security incidents in the Black Sea region which, as we can see, no longer concern only Romania, but increasingly Bulgaria as well?

Ștefan Popescu:

I have no other point of view; I agree entirely. It is worrying that Romania’s national territory is becoming part of the theatre of war. Until now, it was the neighbouring areas – that is, the security zone (you’ll be familiar with Gheorghe Brătianu’s concept of the security zone, which is somewhat broader) – that is, the exclusive economic zone of Romania and Bulgaria. The problem is that we risk losing our freedom of action in this area, which formally remains under our control. We have investment projects there; we have major interests in the Black Sea.

I would remind you that from 2027, Romania’s energy hub will move to the Black Sea region.

And there is something else: maintaining the logistics flow to Ukraine is not solely Romania’s responsibility. Indeed, there are many issues — and Professor Fota, whom I listened to earlier, pointed out that not much groundwork has been done — but it is also an allied responsibility. In other words, I see this as a moment of truth, because the logistical flow to Ukraine is an issue for the entire coalition of the willing, for the European Union, and I therefore hope that Romania will have the diplomatic capacity to secure more than just declarative solidarity. We need equipment.

Equipment, of course, to make up for our own shortcomings, but at the same time this is also a matter of a political commitment from our Black Sea allies, because we will not be able to cope on our own. I have seen that… you know, I do not wish to look for extenuating circumstances; in many instances the gunpowder factory has been mentioned – I fully agree – but in the Gulf, in Saudi Arabia, there are countries that possessed ultra-sophisticated weaponry and yet failed to defend their critical infrastructure.

As for us… we’re not even stopping to gauge the economic shockwaves should, God forbid, something strike that would have a major economic impact on Romania. Because nobody invests in vulnerable areas. We haven’t had — I hope it never comes to that — a government vessel that could become the target, I don’t want to dwell on worst-case scenarios, but of hostile actions. I also believe that would be very serious.

Security in the Neptun Deep area

Răzvan Munteanu:

Thank you very much, Ștefan Popescu! Professor Radu Carp, is Neptun Deep at risk? Could we see critical infrastructure in the Neptun Deep area come under attack?

Radu Carp:

At present, there is no solution for protecting critical infrastructure in the Black Sea in the event of a drone attack. The Russian Federation is aware of this. The fact that it has not targeted this infrastructure is due to its strategy of advancing gradually in this type of warfare. The Russian Federation’s next targets will likely be the Port of Giurgiulești and Neptun Deep.

We do not know when this will happen, but logically I believe these will be the next targets.

Iulia Fota:

Who is responsible for Neptun Deep? We have a question to which there is still no answer: which Romanian state institution is responsible for the security of the Neptun Deep platform and project?

We saw this at the port, when we were at a loss and things were unclear: the Ministry of Transport came forward with a draft bill to at least clarify who is responsible for the port’s security. It’s a step forward, but who is responsible for the platform’s security?

Răzvan Munteanu:

Do you think that after the incident…

Iulia Fota:

…that it’s a private entity! Fair enough, but the Romanian state has a major stake here.

Răzvan Munteanu:

Following the incident at the Port of Constanța, do you think the Romanian state has put the necessary legislative and operational framework in place? I saw in the press that the Ministry of Transport — it strikes me as a bit odd that they were the ones to take the initiative, but anyway, at least that’s something…

Iulia Fota:

It’s still good that we’re taking a step forward. There’s a draft bill regarding the security of the Port of Constanța, but it will need to be properly organised.

Macron held a meeting about three weeks ago with the prefects, and the prefects were assigned special responsibilities for protecting critical infrastructure across France, including in the context of Russian actions, whether sabotage or other types. However, the Romanian state should at least follow others’ example, and we too should follow in their footsteps, unless we have the creativity to come up with our own solutions. But we need to get a move on!

We are far too stagnant, we are slow and we are lagging behind events.

Radu Carp:

Today I read a report by a journalist who was on site at this new thermal power station we’re always boasting about, and he reported from the scene that there is absolutely no protection against drones. And this is at a thermal power station that is essential to the energy system!

Răzvan Munteanu:

Yes, there are a great many questions to which we must eventually find answers. But, Professor, we are in this critical situation; we must acknowledge it…

Iulia Fota:

And Zaharova has already threatened Giurgiulești.

Răzvan Munteanu:

It is only natural to consider the worst-case scenario. What should we be preparing for in the worst-case scenario? Very briefly, Professor.

Radu Carp:

It all depends on how relations between the Russian Federation and the United States develop and what the outcome of these mid-term elections will be. Because we can see that, at the moment, the United States is attempting an overt rapprochement with the Russian Federation, despite all the warnings from European leaders. We do not know how long this policy will last, nor do we know what influence the mid-term elections will have on this policy.

Răzvan Munteanu:

Mr Fota, looking beyond what lies ahead in the United States and the mid-term elections, what specific steps must Romania take today to prepare for the worst-case scenario in the future?

Iulia Fota:

This strategy, from this ‘pot’ we’ve had since 2025, contains a few good ideas. One of the ideas was to make Romania strong — well, phrased as ‘a regional power, second only to Poland’, anyway… Sir, you’ve got no other option! Everyone has their own problems; everything is dysfunctional in the West at the moment.

We’ve also got the EU, by the way — I’d meant to mention something earlier, when our Bulgarian colleague was here: we’ve got the European Union’s security hub; does anyone even talk about it anymore?

Răzvan Munteanu:

Gentlemen, can you hear the music in the background… Unfortunately, the first part… Mr Fota, you’re an exceptional discussant, but you never let me finish my point!

Thank you very much for joining us on Check Media! Professor, we haven’t had time to speak, but I’d like to present this book to you. You’re a co-author of The Republic of Moldova: Elections and Political Choices During Hybrid War, published by the Romanian Academy Press.

It’s a book that might bring us back together in the same format on set – all three of us – to discuss the situation in the Republic of Moldova, which is very, very tense. And when we talk about the Republic of Moldova, we’re talking about Romania. A short commercial break, and we’ll be back with other conflicts and wars that are already emerging in the Middle East.

Photo: (source: Ministry of National Defense (Romania), via Gemini)

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