Bulgaria, caught between Russia and the West. What’s at stake in today’s presidential elections, explained by a journalist from Sofia

Interview with Vladimir Mitev for Adevărul

Ștefan Lică Published: 27 October, 2026 | Updated: 27 October, 2026 16 minutes read

Ștefan Lică, Adevărul, 25 October 2026

Summary
Interview

Summary

This interview with Bulgarian journalist Vladimir Mitev, published by Adevărul on October 25, 2026, details the geopolitical stakes, candidate dynamics, and regional implications of Bulgaria’s presidential election.

Key Candidates & Frontrunners:
- The leading pair is Iliana Yotova (current president backed by Rumen Radev’s Progressive Bulgaria and the Bulgarian Socialist Party) paired with Kiril Valchev, leading in the polls with over 40%.
- Their main challengers are former interim Prime Minister Andrey Gyurov and Georgi Kandev, polling at 26–27%, who ran a strong social media campaign focusing on anti-corruption and public outreach.
- The sovereignist “Revival” party ticket (Kostadin Kostadinov and Petar Volgin) trails in third with around 10–11%.
Campaign Tone & Controversies: Mitev notes that the race lacked a substantive debate of visions. Yotova faced criticism for mixed messaging on international stances regarding Russia and Ukraine, while Gyurov capitalized on public frustration—including a backlash over a campaign incident involving security guards shoving a journalist.
Diminished Presidential Powers: Following constitutional reforms, the Bulgarian presidency has had its powers significantly curtailed (losing direct influence over secret services and certain interim government formation rights). Mitev emphasizes that the Bulgarian president is much weaker compared to the executive influence wielded by the Romanian presidency.
The Second Round (November 1, 2026) & Voter Splits: Because no candidate secured a majority, a runoff is set for November 1. The outcome depends heavily on how supporters of major unrepresented parties (such as Boiko Borisov’s GERB and Delian Peevski’s DPS) and pro-Russian voters choose to align or whether they abstain.
Rumen Radev’s Political Profile: Often mischaracterized in Romania as strictly “pro-Moscow,” Mitev describes Radev as a pragmatic “pro-everyone” politician trying to balance ties between the West (leaning into a pro-Trump alignment) and regional dynamics. While drawing comparisons to Hungary’s Viktor Orbán, Mitev stresses that Bulgaria lacks Hungary’s economic levers and remains heavily dependent on Western Europe.
Black Sea Security: Amid October 2026 maritime attacks on commercial vessels, Mitev argues that Sofia and Bucharest are recognizing the need for tighter defense coordination.

Interview

Foreword

The first round of the presidential election in Bulgaria was marked by a historically low turnout of just over 22 per cent. Proceeding to the second round on 1 November are the incumbent president, Iliana Yotova, backed by ‘Progressive Bulgaria’ and the Bulgarian Socialist Party, and the former caretaker prime minister, Andrey Gyurov, backed by the anti-corruption groups ‘We Continue the Change’ and ‘Democratic Bulgaria’. With 100 per cent of the ballot papers counted, Iliana Yotova and her vice-presidential candidate Kiril Valchev have secured 34.76 per cent, whilst Andrei Gyurov and his vice-presidential candidate Georgi Kandev have received 31.95 per cent. The presidential ticket of the Sovereignist Party has 12.54 per cent, whilst 4.43 per cent of voters chose the ‘I do not support anyone’ option.

The interview with Vladimir Mitev conducted by Ștefan Lică took place on election day, 25 October 2026, and was published on the Adevărul website before the end of the working day.

Intro

The Black Sea has become an area of intense geopolitical tension, and Bulgaria is going through an extremely turbulent election period. As polling day on Sunday, 25 October 2026, draws to a close, polling stations south of the Danube are tallying the votes following a turnout closely monitored by the entire region. Throughout the campaign, the labels applied to Bulgarian leaders risk obscuring a far more nuanced reality. In a comprehensive analysis, Bulgarian journalist Vladimir Mitev unravels the intricacies of his country’s political scene and explains, in an interview with ‘Adevărul’, what Rumen Radev’s political stance really means, what the candidates’ vulnerabilities are, and how these developments mirror the situation in Romania.

Main candidates

Bulgarians are heading to the polls today for the first round of the presidential election. Who are the main favourites in the race for the Bulgarian presidency, and what do the polls show ahead of the first round?

The main intrigue of these elections centres on the pair of candidates for president and vice-president, comprising, on the one hand, the current president, Iliana Yotova, and the director of the Bulgarian News Agency (the equivalent of the Agerpres Agency), Kiril Valchev, on the one hand, and the pair comprising former interim Prime Minister Andrey Gyurov and the Secretary of the Ministry of the Interior in his cabinet, Georgi Kandev, on the other. Polls on the eve of today’s round indicated support of over 40 per cent for Yotova-Valchev, whilst support for Gyurov-Kandev stood at around 26–27 per cent.

In third place, the polls placed the candidates of the sovereignist “Revival” party – its leader, Kostadin Kostadinov, and MEP Petar Volgin. The polls attributed results of around 10–11 per cent to them. Far behind them was a group of candidate pairs with openly pro-Russian messages, as well as others, such as, for example, a pair targeting the environmentalist and anti-corruption vote.

How would you assess the quality of this campaign, and how did the candidates fare in the debates and in the exchange of ideas? How did the main frontrunners stand out?

In my view, there was no campaign in the true sense of the word – that is, a competition of visions, strategies and concepts regarding the governance of the country. No debate took place between Iliana Yotova and Andrey Gyurov. Iliana Yotova, a former MEP from the Party of European Socialists, entered the campaign as the clear favourite, but her conduct, in many respects, was not convincing. She is backed by Rumen Radev’s ruling party – Progressive Bulgaria – and the Bulgarian Socialist Party. Consequently, she has targeted a segment of the sovereignist electorate – she has demonstrated closeness to the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, whilst her candidate for vice-president, Kiril Valchev, is very close to the Bulgarian Orthodox Church. Yotova holds conferences and events praising the Cyrillic alphabet as a civilisational contribution by Bulgaria to the world, and so on. However, she appeared unconvincing when explaining how, on the one hand, she endorsed joint documents in support of Ukraine and against Russia, for example at the UN, as happened in September 2026, yet, at the same time, she consistently offered various explanations through which she distanced herself from the line taken by her country and her institution within international forums. Of course, Yotova had announced a vision for de-escalating the conflict in the Black Sea, even before the attacks on commercial vessels in October 2026.

For his part, Andrey Gyurov trailed Yotova significantly in the polls at the start of the campaign, but over time he increased his support by probably 10–11 per cent, whilst Iliana Yotova’s standing in the polls appears to have fallen slightly. He did not say much in the way of concrete details, such as promises or visions. He described his role as president as that of a sort of ombudsman, someone who would listen to what people want and incorporate this into the country’s agenda. However, Gyurov ran a strong campaign on social media, including through videos showing him interacting with ordinary people in markets across the country. Last but not least, Gyurov accused Rumen Radev of failing to name Russia as the culprit behind the escalation of the conflict in the Black Sea, which took place in October. Radev began to mention Russia more openly as the possible or logical perpetrator of the drone attacks on commercial vessels near, or even within, Bulgarian and Romanian territorial waters, only after the second wave of attacks on 13 October 2026, when the general threat to shipping to Romanian and Bulgarian ports prompted Sofia and Bucharest to jointly seek support from the European Council and within NATO.

Gyurov has not presented a concrete vision of what he proposes as an alternative to the government of Radev and Yotova, but it seems he is gaining some additional support from their mistakes. Here I would like to draw attention to the incident on 22 October 2026, in which a journalist, seeking to provoke a reaction, sneaked past the security guards of the Speaker of Parliament from the Progressive Bulgaria party – Mihaela Dotsova, opened the door of the car in which the politician had just taken her seat and, immediately afterwards, was pushed by the security guards, falling onto her back and sustaining, in her own words, injuries. The behaviour of the guards from the National Service of Protection in the first few seconds after the incident was widely criticised on social media as insensitive, and led Gyurov’s supporters to claim that Bulgarians must decide whether they want people with such an insensitive attitude towards the people to lead them for another presidential term.

The powers of the president in Bulgaria

Following recent constitutional reforms, what powers does the Bulgarian president actually retain, and how does this weakening of the institution compare with the profile and influence of the Romanian president?

The powers of the Bulgarian President were significantly curtailed following a constitutional reform a few years ago. This removed his ability to exert direct influence over the secret services, with the exception of the National Service of Protection, which we have already discussed. At that time, the President’s right to form interim governments when parliament is unable to form a cabinet was also significantly curtailed. The Bulgarian President plays a role in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy. He, and in particular the Vice-President, also have responsibilities towards Bulgarians living abroad. In short, the Bulgarian president is currently, without a doubt, a weaker figure than the Romanian president, who over the years has played an active role in political life during Traian Băsescu’s time and even now exerts influence over the formation of the government and over state processes at various levels. Bulgaria is a parliamentary republic.

The enigma of the second round. How will the GERB and DPS electorates split their votes

An extremely close second round is on the cards for 1 November 2026. How will the electorates of key parties, such as Boiko Borisov’s GERB or Delian Peevski’s DPS, align themselves, and where will the sovereignist and pro-Russian vote go?

It is predicted that, in the first round, none of the candidates will secure the required majority of over 50 per cent.

This means that there will certainly be a second round of the presidential election, to be held on 1 November 2026. The decisive factor then will be how the voters of Boiko Borisov’s GERB party – which has not nominated a candidate – those of Delian Peevski’s Movement for Rights and Freedoms (DPS) party, which has also not nominated a candidate, as well as how the pro-Russian vote – which went to the candidates with weaker results in the first round – will be distributed.

Members of GERB were part of the initiative committees for both Iliana Yotova and Andrey Gyurov. In certain respects – for example, at the meeting of the Consultative Council for National Security concerning the attacks on commercial vessels in the Black Sea – GERB supports the line taken by Progressive Bulgaria and Iliana Yotova. In other instances, such as the recent vote in the European Parliament on the EU’s position regarding the escalation of tensions in the Black Sea, GERB MEPs voted in favour of the resolution which, amongst other things, criticises Radev for his weak response to Russia. For the time being, at least as far as I am concerned, it is unclear who GERB voters will vote for, or whether they might prefer to stay at home on election day.

There has been much talk recently about DPS voters; some of them have moved into Rumen Radev’s sphere of influence. Be that as it may, it is anticipated that the ongoing conflict between the government and the influential businessman Delian Peevski, who is the DPS party’s president, as well as the arrests of several prominent mayors from within this party, will lead a large section of the DPS electorate not to support Iotova.

As regards the pro-Russian vote, the most significant trend within this group is that the Revival Party’s rhetoric is directed against both Progressive Bulgaria and the anti-corruption parties supporting Gyurov. In particular, with regard to Yotova, comments have appeared on social media from supporters of the Renaissance Party claiming that she is, in their view, linked to Soros, which is likely to be seen as a negative factor by them. So, in this respect too, we are dealing with a ‘riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma’, to borrow the phrase attributed to Churchill, with which he described Russia, but which, in this case, is being used in relation to the preferences of the pro-Russian electorate.

Rumen Radev: a pro-Russian leader or a pragmatist caught between East and West?

In Romania, Rumen Radev is frequently labelled a pro-Moscow leader. How accurate is this oversimplification, and how would you actually describe him – as a ‘pro-everyone’ politician, a pragmatist caught between East and West, or a leader tempted to follow in Viktor Orbán’s footsteps?

I believe Radev is part of a trend amongst high-ranking Bulgarian politicians to be ‘pro-everyone’. Another contemporary representative of this trend is Borisov, about whom the renowned political scientist Ivan Krastev, who received the ‘European of the Year’ award this week, said years ago that he is ‘more pro-American, more pro-European and more pro-Russian’ than anyone else. Of course, in Radev’s case, we are talking about a politician who made his mark during Donald Trump’s first term in office, and who now – during Trump’s second term – has even come to represent the dominant political trend in the country.

Both Borisov and Radev were praised by Viktor Orbán during his visit to Sofia in December 2024, on the eve of Bulgaria and Romania’s full accession to the Schengen Area, as politicians who defend Hungary against its enemies both within and outside Bulgaria.

However, not only I, but also people who understand Hungarian politics far better than I do – such as Stefano Bottoni and Sergiu Mișcoiu – are of the opinion that a new Orbán in the region is not possible, as no one possesses the resources of Hungary and of Viktor Orbán himself to pursue the policies he has pursued. What Radev is doing bears a resemblance to Orban’s approach – as Bulgaria is currently opening up more actively to American and Chinese capital. Furthermore, Radev graduated with distinction from an American military university and gives the impression of being pro-Trump – an orientation that is also reflected in specific actions – for example, in the fields of energy or technology. Radev’s support for the diesel agreement between Trump and Putin has sparked much debate in Brussels, while even politicians with sovereigntist leanings, such as the Czech Prime Minister Babiš, have spoken in this context of “betrayal of Europe” committed by Trump.

At the same time, however, Rumen Radev was the only EU politician mentioned by the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, in her State of the Union address this year, in the context of the summit on infrastructure connectivity between Europe and Asia, which they will co-host in Sofia in early 2027. In other words, Radev can be compared to Orbán not only in a negative sense, but also in a ‘positive’ sense, in that, as Stefano Bottoni puts it, Orbán was a rebel with the authorities’ permission.

Radev, however, is still a long way from rebellion and may never reach that point, as Bulgaria lacks the American and Chinese investment that Hungary benefits from and which allows the latter to develop its own, sovereign economic dynamism. Bulgaria remains heavily dependent on its economic ties with Western Europe. This probably also explains why Radev faces strong resistance at a national level in Bulgaria.

I do not wish to act as Radev’s advocate, nor do I feel that I am one. I do not support his policies in favour of the business community and against the trade unions, or to the detriment of Bulgarians’ social rights. There is no conclusive evidence that he has defeated the oligarchy, as he claims; on the contrary, we are seeing businesspeople from this oligarchy and supporters of ‘Progressive Bulgaria’ being killed, including on the day before the elections.

Bulgaria and the Black Sea crisis

Against the backdrop of the recent escalation of the conflict in the Black Sea and tensions surrounding attacks on commercial vessels, how do you view the need for closer coordination between Sofia, Bucharest and Turkey, as well as the role played by Radev in this security equation?

Against the backdrop of the renewed escalation of the Black Sea conflict in October 2026, I observe a growing realisation in both Sofia and Bucharest that the common threat to the economic interests and security of the two countries requires them to coordinate and cooperate more closely – both with each other and with Turkey. And here, I believe, Radev plays a positive role.

Furthermore, from what I have observed and from media reports, our own NATO allies do not wish to escalate the conflict with Russia, but rather to deter its spread. And, once again, our partners do not want us to invoke Article 4 of the NATO Treaty following another attack, because if Article 4 were invoked for every such attack, it would be triggered every week. And the outcome of invoking it would probably not be very different from that without it.

In other words, Radev is genuinely trying to be loyal, whilst sticking to his own line. In this case, Russia is seeking an escalation, and perhaps it makes sense that it should not get what it wants. And given that there are differences between the centre and the periphery of the EU, as well as between Trump and Western Europe, Radev’s task of striking a balance to some extent between all sides is difficult to achieve; he faces a lack of understanding, and even he himself struggles to explain it, and time will tell to what extent this gamble – including on the part of Bulgarian voters and the Bulgarian state – was justified.

Photo: The two candidates in the Bulgarian presidential election – Iliana Yotova and Andrey Gyurov – at the moment when she handed him the mandate to form a caretaker government on 12 February 2026 (source: government.bg)

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