Rumen Radev’s stance on Romania was misinterpreted before Bulgaria’s presidential runoff

Bulgarian National Radio, October 29, 2026

Summary of the Interview

Spas Krainin’s interview with BNR journalist Vladimir Mitev (October 29, 2026) examines the reactions in Romania following the meeting of the defense ministers of Bulgaria, Romania, and Türkiye in Sofia, as well as the context surrounding the attacks on civilian and commercial ships in the Black Sea.

Key points:

• Romanian media focus on Türkiye: In Romania, Türkiye’s key role in Black Sea security is highlighted. Türkiye’s warning to Russia and Ukraine to cease attacks on commercial vessels underscores Ankara’s neutral stance, as it does not allow military ships from countries outside the Black Sea region to operate in the Black Sea.
• A Comparison of the Bulgarian and Romanian Positions: Although Romanian authorities more often point to the Russian Federation as the perpetrator of the attacks, the positions of the two countries are similar in their shared concern over the escalation of the conflict, and there have been statements by Romanian President Nicușor Dan that echo those of Rumen Radev regarding the difficulty of “technically” determining who is carrying out the attacks, even though logic allows for a reasonable assumption to be made in this regard. It is also noted that NATO currently has no policy for direct escalation or invoking Article 4, with the priority remaining on deterring new attacks rather than expanding the conflict.
• Rumen Radev’s Statement: The Bulgarian prime minister’s remarks regarding the premature identification of a culprit prior to an official investigation created false impressions and tension in the Romanian public sphere.

• According to Mitev, the full transcript of the statement reveals a positive tone toward Romanian institutions, a desire for bilateral cooperation, and the argument that escalating rhetoric alone does not prevent actual incidents near the coast. Radev’s policy of “ambiguity” regarding who the perpetrator is also does not prevent these incidents. So he is right about one thing—the issue of attacks on civilian ships in the Black Sea is complex and has no easy solution.
• Regional Cooperation and NATO’s Limitations: Threats to maritime transport and the economy are driving closer cooperation between Bulgaria, Romania, and Türkiye (building on the existing mine-clearing group). However, experts note the limitations on NATO’s ability to deploy large-scale forces to the Black Sea for an extended period due to specific conventional and political constraints.

Introduction

On October 26, 2026, Bulgarian Prime Minister Rumen Radev delivered a speech to participants at the Sofia Economic Forum, in which he outlined his government’s position on key issues such as regional security, infrastructure development, and others. His remarks from that speech were presented in Bulgarian and Romanian media as accusations against Romania, suggesting that because it had named Russia as the culprit behind the attacks on civilian shipping earlier in October, it had suffered new strikes and had only itself to blame. Two days later, a ship was attacked in Bulgaria’s special economic zone in the Black Sea, demonstrating that Radev’s ambiguous stance on identifying the perpetrator of the attacks does not help his country achieve greater security.

However, the Romanian media’s interpretation of Radev’s words sparked intense anger, which was compounded by traditional Romanian suspicions that he is pro-Russian, if not something worse. Thus, over a period of perhaps two days, a certain unease arose in the attitudes of some Romanian elites and citizens toward the Bulgarian state. Once again, people recalled the famous phrase by the national poet Mihai Eminescu, that Bulgarians have “thick necks” and are “bulgaroi,” not “bulgari”—which suggests that there is something wild and boorish about them. 

I, Vlad Mitev, initially also misreported that Radev had said something rude. However, Radev’s speech is available on YouTube, and upon listening to it, his message to Romania sounds very different—friendly and well-intentioned toward Romanian President Nicușor Dan, the new Romanian Prime Minister Luca Niculescu, and Romanian Ambassador Brândușa Predescu in Sofia. Radev expressed a desire to cooperate with them and outlined what he has already done together with his Romanian partners in response to the attacks on civilian ships in the Black Sea. Radev’s remarks regarding Romania’s “identification of the culprit” (Russia) sound different in his speech than reported, as they were intended to convey that there is no easy solution to the security problem that has arisen regarding civilian shipping in the Black Sea. Radev points out that Romania has done what the Bulgarian opposition wants him to do, yet has not achieved greater security. However, his conclusion contains no accusation against Romania. He simply notes that the issue of the threat to ships in the western Black Sea has no easy solution.

Radev’s statement came after two intense weeks during which he, together with Romanian President Nicușor Dan, sought greater support in Brussels from the European Council and NATO. It also comes a day after the first round of the presidential election, in which the candidate and incumbent President Iliana Yotova—backed by Rumen Radev’s ruling party, “Progressive Bulgaria”—received just 3% more of the vote than her opponent, Andrey Gyurov, a former caretaker prime minister supported by the anti-corruption parties “Change Continues” and “Democratic Bulgaria”.

Two days later—on October 28, 2026—the defense ministers and chiefs of the general staffs of Bulgaria, Romania, and Türkiye gathered in Sofia. From Sofia, they expressed a shared commitment to increasing coordination and the exchange of intelligence among themselves. Turkish Defense Minister Yasar Güler issued a warning to Ukraine and Russia to stop their attacks on ships in the Black Sea. A day later—on October 29, 2026—at 6:45 a.m., the founder of “The Bridge of Friendship” gave the interview published below as a transcript. Preceding this is the transcript of Rumen Radev’s speech, which sparked such heated debate.

Full Transcript of Rumen Radev’s Speech at the Sofia Economic Forum (2026)

Interview

Introduction

Spas Krainin: Continuing on the topic of the attacks in the Black Sea, we turn to our colleague, journalist Vladimir Mitev, who is monitoring the reactions from the Romanian authorities. Good morning!

Vladimir Mitev: Good morning!

Reactions in Romania to the meeting of the defense ministers of Romania, Bulgaria, and Türkiye in Sofia on October 28, 2026

In fact, since yesterday, you’ve had the opportunity to follow the news coverage in Romania following the high-level meeting that was organized here in Bulgaria. What are the reactions of the Romanian authorities following yesterday’s strikes in the Black Sea, and what are analysts saying on the subject?

This meeting received quite a lot of attention in the Romanian media. It’s perhaps important, of course, that they’re following the activities of their minister, Ștefan-Radu Oprea, but I find it more interesting that there’s a strong focus on the actions of Türkiye and Turkish Minister ‌Yașar Güler, since Romania is well aware that Türkiye is currently key to security in the Black Sea.

Yes, he warned yesterday… Türkiye warned Russia and Ukraine to cease attacks on merchant ships in the Black Sea. But what follows such a warning? What does this mean?

First, it means there is reciprocity, there is mutuality. Usually, since we focus only on the western part of the Black Sea, criticism flows in one direction—toward Russia—but Türkiye takes a more holistic view. Türkiye has a policy of not allowing military ships other than those of Black Sea countries into the region, yet it remains open to various forms of support. In any case, Türkiye is the key NATO country that will likely drive greater cooperation at the NATO level.

The Official Positions of Bulgaria and Romania Regarding the Attacks on Civilian Ships in the Black Sea

Do you see any distinction, however slight, between the positions of the Bulgarian and Romanian authorities on this issue? Because the Romanians were unequivocal in their statement that these were, in fact, attacks carried out by the Russian Federation. Or am I mistaken?

My impression is that the positions are similar. Perhaps I’m mistaken, but in any case, I noticed that Nicușor Dan, the Romanian president, also made a similar statement—namely, that technically it isn’t entirely easy to determine who is responsible for these attacks.

So, in my view, there’s simply a moment in our political struggle surrounding the elections when this rhetoric—whether you’re tough or soft on Russia—might score some points with certain voters.

But it seems to me that Romania, too—even though it has, of course, traditionally maintained a firm and unequivocal Euro-Atlantic or anti-Russian stance—is in fact also very concerned about the threats and risks posed by the escalation of the conflict. Last but not least, I should perhaps point out that Romania has a new government. The current foreign minister, for example, is very familiar with relations with NATO, as he was the one who handled precisely these issues at the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

And here, too, it seems to me that I can once again cite some of my informal contacts. Attention is being drawn to the fact that NATO apparently has no policy of escalation, and this is actually evident from some interviews published in the Romanian media.

At the same time, from what I’ve read, I understand that our allies would rather not invoke Article 4 or escalate tensions by adopting a more confrontational stance toward Russia. Rather, the idea is to deter Russia from attacking. Yes, I know there is perhaps a slight difference here in rhetoric or terminology, but NATO is a defensive alliance, and it seems to me that this is also recognized in Romania. If the issue were to escalate or to attack Russia, that would be a different situation. The goal, in fact, is to deter conflict.

Rumen Radev’s remarks at the Sofia Economic Forum, which sparked widespread outrage in Romania

And how do you interpret the Bulgarian prime minister’s remarks—that, in fact, naming the culprit before an official investigation has determined who owns the drones further escalates the already high tensions in the Black Sea? He criticized the behavior of the Romanian authorities—at least that’s how I interpreted his words.

Well, it created the impression—and I think some people may have been misled to some extent—that these were hostile remarks toward Romania. In Romania, there’s generally a certain sensitivity toward Radev. There’s, you know, a sort of distrust toward him, just as in our country there are theories that he’s far too open toward the East. But the point is that you can look at the statement—it’s available on YouTube; anyone can listen to it or read it…

For example, I took the trouble to transcribe it and shared it with some Romanian acquaintances who, before hearing it for themselves, were also convinced before reading the transcript that Radev was somehow saying offensive things about Romania. In fact, the tone of this speech is quite positive toward Romanian institutions. For example, he mentions the Romanian ambassador by name, says he’s working with Nicușor Dan, and that he’s also been in contact with Romania’s new prime minister; in fact, he emphasizes that he wants cooperation with Romania and that there’s no other way.

As for his specific words, of course, there are statements such as his remark that “Romania has named the enemy, yet the attacks have not stopped,” but he says this more to illustrate how difficult the situation is and that there is no easy solution. What justifies his not naming Russia so categorically, according to his arguments, is that even if he were to name it—as Romania, for example, has done—the attacks would still not stop, and we see that even if he does not name it, the attacks still do not stop. Yesterday we had such an example near the Bulgarian coast. So perhaps he is right, at least in this respect, that there is no obvious or easy solution.

I, for example, recall a talk show I appeared on—if I’m not mistaken, about 10 days ago—on one of the Romanian television stations. Some of the leading experts on defense and security were there. And in fact, this was also on Romanian television—once again, this was the focus of the discussion: that there doesn’t seem to be much clarity on what can be done in this situation. Of course, various measures are being taken—defense capabilities are being strengthened, surveillance is being stepped up, and cooperation among the three NATO countries in the Black Sea is being enhanced. In other words, the steps that can be taken are obviously being taken. But it’s not very clear what more can be done beyond that.

Cooperation between Romania, Bulgaria, and Türkiye on defense in the Black Sea

“Through sensitive and careful diplomacy, we must avoid approaches that would increase tension and danger in the region. It is essential to make rational decisions at both the tactical and strategic levels”—I am quoting Turkish Defense Minister Yasar Güler. What would these rational decisions look like? Have the Romanian authorities commented on this to the Romanian media, and do you have the opportunity to compare this with the behavior of the Bulgarian authorities? What would these rational decisions look like in the search for a solution to the problem?

I’m not exactly a defense expert; I’m more of a person who reads or occasionally talks with such experts, so perhaps what I’m about to say isn’t the most comprehensive answer. It seems to me that, traditionally, cooperation between these three countries—Bulgaria, Romania, and Türkiye—has been limited so far, in the sense that there was this group clearing mines in the Black Sea, but that was perhaps the only format in which they did anything together. It seems to me that this emerging threat is serious for economic dynamics and maritime transport, and in a way, it’s bringing these countries together. It may take some time to simply get used to it—to share information more often, to discuss things together more frequently—but I think things are moving in that direction.

Petitions, memorandums, signatures, statements—is this the right path toward a final solution?

The Romanian media also notes that there are expectations regarding NATO, but simply, as far as I understand at this stage, NATO cannot, for example, send warships to the Black Sea, since policy dictates that these ships cannot remain there for very long, so such decisions cannot be implemented at the moment.

Thank you, colleague Vladimir Mitev.

Photo: Rumen Radev (source: YouTube)

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The Bulgarian National Radio

Bulgarian National Radio (BNR) is the national public broadcaster in Bulgaria. Founded on 25 January 1935 by decree of Tsar Boris III, it is one of the oldest and most respected media institutions in the country, established as a mainstay of freedom of speech, culture and information security.

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