Paul Hurmuz: Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey can do more together to strengthen their defence in the Black Sea

Vladimir Mitev, Mediapool, 8 November 2026

Summary

Here is a brief summary of the interview with retired Romanian General Paul Hurmuz:

• The Black Sea crisis and attacks on shipping: In 2026, over 570 commercial vessels were attacked in the Black Sea, creating an extremely dangerous situation near the coasts and exclusive economic zones of Romania and Bulgaria. The lack of a prompt response from NATO and the EU, as well as the targeting of neutral vessels, is leading to a serious escalation of the situation.
• Restrictions imposed by NATO and the Montreux Convention: Due to Turkey’s closure of the straits, in accordance with the Montreux Convention, Alliance military vessels not originating from the Black Sea cannot enter these waters. The general proposes that this shortcoming be addressed by a permanent fleet of aerial, surface and underwater drones, as well as by cost-effective anti-drone systems.
• Cooperation between Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey: The meeting in Sofia represents an important step, but much stronger and more consistent coordination is needed between the three countries, including joint pressure and dialogue with both Russia and Ukraine, to protect commercial traffic.
• Imbalance vis-à-vis the Baltic region: The United States and its allies allocate resources and pay far greater attention to Poland and the Baltic states than to the Black Sea region. Romania and Bulgaria must overcome their rivalry and advocate jointly for their security, just as the Baltic states do.
• The role of the EU and NATO: The two organisations must complement one another – NATO provides defence plans and command structures (including the future maritime security hub in Varna and Constanța), whilst the EU makes financial and industrial instruments available. The objective remains to deter conflict with Russia, without it escalating into a direct confrontation with the Alliance.

Interview

Introduction

Paul Hurmuz is a retired Romanian general and one of the most respected security experts in the Romanian media. He served as Romania’s defence attaché to the United Kingdom between 2003 and 2007. Between 2013 and 2016, he was deputy director of the Intelligence Department at NATO headquarters in Brussels. From 2016 to 2017, he served as Deputy State Secretary for Defence Policy and Planning at the Romanian Ministry of Defence. Paul Hurmuz is a member of the Centre for a New Strategy – a leading Romanian think tank comprising experts in international relations and security.

Meeting of the defence ministers of Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey in Sofia

Vladimir Mitev: General Hurmuz, on 28 October 2026, the defence ministers and chiefs of staff of Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey gathered in Sofia for a meeting prompted by the escalation of the war in the Black Sea and attacks on commercial vessels. To what extent does the cooperation that is now beginning to take shape between the three countries reflect your vision, and is it unfolding as you had hoped?

Paul Hurmuz: Good afternoon! As the Financial Times recently reported, in 2026 alone there were over 570 commercial vessels struck in the Black Sea. So the number is extremely high and, at one point, the Western press reported that there were more deaths and injuries in such attacks in the Black Sea in 2026 than there were in the Red Sea. This is, indeed, a cause for concern and, from this perspective, I believe the meeting you refer to is, first and foremost, a political signal. A positive political signal.

Now, there is quite a long way from a political signal to practical implementation, and whilst the initiative by Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey to launch a joint mine-clearance mission was taken some time ago and was welcomed as an encouraging sign, we must also be realistic and acknowledge that this mission was only a temporary one. It was not intended from the outset to be a permanent mission, but rather to activate this demining mission, because, at that time, the danger posed by the sea mines lost in the Black Sea by both the Russian Federation and Ukraine represented a real threat.

The reality is that, from that moment until now, the situation has developed in a dangerous manner. I would like to point out that the Romanian Ministry of Defence’s website features an up-to-date overview of Romania’s and its Allies’ interventions against drones that have been operating against Ukraine. From February 2022 to the present (30 October 2026), Romania has recorded over 164 drone attacks on Ukrainian territory near the Romanian border, over 54 violations of Romanian airspace, 81 instances of drone debris landing on Romanian territory, and the Romanian and allied air forces have been deployed over 112 times, during which time 6 drones were neutralised. There was also an incident involving a maritime drone near a Romanian extraction platform in the exclusive economic zone.

The situation is becoming increasingly dangerous and serious, and this meeting is a start. It is clear that, of the three countries, Turkey is the most militarily capable of intervening. However, we must acknowledge that Turkey takes a very cautious approach to interventions in the Black Sea and, from this perspective, we can view with encouragement the decision taken at the Ankara summit this summer, whereby the joint demining mission involving Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey was extended to include the protection of critical infrastructure in the Black Sea, namely the undersea infrastructure. As you know, both Romania and Turkey have gas extraction operations in their exclusive economic zones, and the protection of this critical infrastructure – as well as the pipelines and cables running beneath the Black Sea – is a priority.

Now, returning to the current situation, it is clear that there is a shortfall in capabilities in the Black Sea region, from the perspective of both NATO and the European Union. Romania and Bulgaria have repeatedly called for such capabilities – such as maritime patrol aircraft – to be made available, to detect these drones and, if necessary, to neutralise them before they enter territorial waters. So far, the allied response has been a political one, and let us hope that a military response will follow as soon as possible. But, obviously, all these measures must be carried out in close coordination between the three allied states in the Black Sea region and with the other allies and members of the European Union.

Trilateral cooperation and its deterrence capabilities

Vladimir Mitev: The Turkish Defence Minister, Yaşar Güler, issued a warning from Sofia to both Ukraine and Russia to this effect, calling on them to cease attacks on commercial vessels in the Black Sea. Right, the warning has been issued; moreover, on 21 October 2026, President Erdoğan himself endorsed this idea of a moratorium on attacks on commercial vessels. But these are, as you said, statements, perhaps political decisions, or political intentions. But, in fact, what can be done to stop these attacks, which we see have continued even during the talks in Sofia? So, apart from words and political decisions, what other tools are available to the Black Sea littoral states and, if you like, to their allies?

Paul Hurmuz: As far back as about three years ago, international organisations dealing with maritime security drew attention to the fact that attacks on commercial vessels set a dangerous precedent. I myself mentioned, at a conference in Paris in March this year, the danger posed by attacks on commercial vessels in the Black Sea, and earlier this year there were reports of attacks on ships, most of which were owned by Greek companies and were transporting oil from Kazakhstan. As you know, there is an international consortium comprising many Western firms involved in this Kazakhstani oil, which has long been transported via the Black Sea, obviously from a Russian port.

However, the lack of discernment regarding the drone attacks on these commercial vessels, without taking into account the fact that those vessels belonged to and represented the Western interests of NATO and EU countries, was, in my view, a mistake. The fact that there was no clear and precise response in this regard, including what happened in June this year — that Ukrainian naval drone which reached the port of Constanța and which could have… it was only by sheer luck that it did not result in a major tragedy. On that day, there were several Ukrainian naval drones tracking ships leaving the port in Romania. The fact that those ships were not struck was, once again, a matter of luck.

However, from my point of view, the three NATO countries in the Black Sea — Turkey, Bulgaria and Romania — should have, how shall I put it, spoken with a clear, united voice to deter any kind of attack on these commercial vessels, which were in no way involved in the conflict in Ukraine between the Russian Federation and Ukraine. The fact that this was not done in time is something we are still seeing the consequences of today. Recently, these attacks have increasingly reached the western Black Sea, into the exclusive economic zones of Bulgaria and Romania. There was even an attack within Romania’s territorial waters.

Now, just recently, ships heading for a port in Romania have been struck. So we are witnessing an escalation that could have been prevented. It was not. And I believe that what needs to be done urgently now is for the three countries, with the support of their allies and of international organisations responsible for maritime security, to engage with the belligerents and ensure that commercial vessels operating in the Black Sea are no longer attacked, because this escalation seriously affects the interests of the three allied countries in the Black Sea, and this must not be allowed to continue.

NATO does not have a policy of escalation towards Russia, but rather seeks to deter it

Vladimir Mitev: What is NATO’s stance in the current situation in the Black Sea; to what extent does NATO seek deterrence, and to what extent is it seeking an escalation of tensions? In this regard, some experts have suggested, for example, that all Bulgarian or Romanian political leaders are discouraged from invoking Article 4. I do not know whether you can confirm this, but it has been discussed in the Romanian press and in various circles. What does ‘deterrence’ actually mean, if we assume this is NATO’s official policy, and how does this deterrence differ from the idea of an escalation of tensions, or even a much stronger response in the opposite direction?

Paul Hurmuz: Ever since the Russian Federation invaded and occupied Crimea, NATO has taken steps to strengthen its deterrence posture, and this has primarily consisted of the four battle groups that were scheduled to be deployed at that time in Poland and the Baltic states. Unfortunately – and this is a recurring theme – NATO was not in a position at the time – as I have said on several occasions, half-jokingly, half-seriously – to ensure that all the measures taken at the time of the invasion of Crimea were implemented in the Black Sea, even though Crimea is in the Black Sea. In the Black Sea, only limited, minimal measures were taken, I might say.

For example, Romania insisted very strongly at the time that appropriate reassurance measures (tailored measures) be taken in our region, in contrast to the Baltic Sea, where measures were enhanced. Following February 2022 and the open conflict launched by the Russian Federation against Ukraine, NATO did indeed react, and battle groups were deployed in Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Slovakia. This led to a relative balance between the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea.

However, these measures were taken primarily in the air and land domains, and to a lesser extent in the naval domain. In the Baltic Sea, even as recently as about two years ago, naval measures were strengthened, but the same could not be done in the Black Sea, because there is this difference between the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea. In the Black Sea, we have the Montreux Convention.

And this 1936 convention effectively allows Turkey, in the event of military escalation, to close the straits to military vessels. For this reason, no military vessel from a NATO country can enter the Black Sea at present, because, since February 2022, Turkey has effectively closed the straits and so we cannot benefit from this naval support from our allies. However, these capabilities can be compensated for.

I have said it before and I repeat that one solution would be to establish a NATO Standing Maritime Force in the Black Sea, composed entirely of aerial, naval and submarine drones from NATO countries, which would thus compensate for the lack of naval capabilities in the area and ensure a deterrent posture. We have not managed to achieve this. At present, we have little more than detection capabilities for most of these threats.

In this regard, I would mention, for example, the fact that for a long time, since 2021, the United States has had the so-called MQ-9 Reaper drones deployed at the 71st Air Base in Câmpia Turzii, Romania. These drones, which were used for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance missions in the area, remained in operation until recently, when, following the losses suffered by the United States in the war against Iran – as you know, over 45 MQ-9 Reaper drones of this type were lost in Iran, representing almost a quarter of the United States’ entire fleet – and so they decided to withdraw them, including from Romania. These American drones have been replaced in Romania, at Câmpia Turzii, by the Netherlands, which has essentially the same type of drones at its disposal and which are used for surveillance missions in the area.

However, they are not sufficient. It would be necessary for other types of drones, including naval drones, to be made available to allies in the Black Sea, so that we have better surveillance and, potentially, a response capability against these naval or aerial drones operating near the territorial waters of Romania and Bulgaria and which, as we are seeing, attack and sink commercial vessels, seriously affecting our interests. From this point of view, I believe more can be done. Much more than we have done so far, and let us hope that we will succeed in finding the best methods to combat these threats.

Vladimir Mitev: In October, the European Parliament voted on a resolution concerning European policy towards the conflict in the Black Sea. You said that more could be done. To what extent does the EU’s position on security in the Black Sea differ from NATO’s? To what extent can the European Union – or, if you prefer, Western Europe – do this ‘more’ that you are calling for?

Paul Hurmuz: There is a great deal of talk – in political and diplomatic circles, as well as in the press – about establishing a maritime security hub in the Black Sea under the auspices of the European Union, which would effectively be based in Varna and Constanța. As far as I am aware, negotiations are ongoing. The foreign ministries of the two countries are in talks. The responsibilities for the two countries have already been defined.

Just last week, when I attended the regional security and defence summit in Sofia, I discussed this topic and mentioned that establishing this maritime security hub in Bulgaria and Romania would enable the two countries to benefit from the funding and capabilities of EU Member States to strengthen their defence and deterrence posture. That would be a welcome development. I believe it would be very good.

However, we must bear in mind, as far as I am aware, that this maritime security hub on the Black Sea will, in practice, be operated by the forces of the Ministries of the Interior of Bulgaria and Romania, not by the navies. The navies of the two countries will provide support only, but in practice the coastguard will be essential to this development.

And from this perspective, although there does not appear to be – at least in the public message – a clear distinction between what NATO can do and what the EU can do, it is evident that the most important thing is for there to be a coherent approach between the two organisations – the EU and NATO – and a clear demarcation of what each organisation can do. After all, NATO is a military organisation; it has standing defence plans, including for Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey, of course, and a command and control system, a permanent command structure, including the new NATO command structures established in Romania and Bulgaria. The EU, on the other hand, has other financial, industrial and military mobility instruments that can facilitate the development of the two countries’ capabilities; in this way, the two organisations, the EU and NATO, can help one another.

Personally, I do not see any divergence between the two organisations; we must find the best ways to cooperate. Obviously, in the Black Sea region, for the two organisations to cooperate, there is, how shall I put it, a specific factor: Turkey. The fact that Turkey is not a member of the European Union and that, to date, I have not seen the European Union showing greater openness towards Turkey in order to resolve the issues we face in the Black Sea region. This is a shortcoming that I have observed.

From this perspective, I believe that the efforts some are making – perhaps consciously or unconsciously – to separate NATO and the EU in addressing security and defence issues in Europe are, to me, a cause for concern. I am referring here to a recent article signed by distinguished diplomats from Germany, the United Kingdom and France, published on 30 September 2026, which discusses these efforts to create an autonomous European collective defence. Options such as the collective defence of the European Union or a European defence union are even being discussed. All sorts of options are being discussed.

In my view, the best course of action for Europeans is to develop the European pillar of NATO.

Under no circumstances should the efforts currently being made at European level lead to a weakening of NATO, but rather to a strengthening of NATO, and in particular of the European pillar, through Europeans assuming ever greater responsibilities for their own security. It is clear that the United States is currently engaged in a process of reflection, seeking to determine how it can fulfil its responsibilities and defend its interests in both the European and Indo-Pacific theatres. So far, the message from the Trump administration has been very clear.

So far, the message from the Trump administration has been very clear: the US nuclear umbrella over Europe will continue to exist. What Europeans need to do more of is to strengthen their conventional capabilities so that they are able to maintain a serious and realistic posture of defence and deterrence, even in the event that the US military contribution in Europe were to be reduced. Although, to be honest, when I look at certain figures, I realise that, in fact, what we are seeing, particularly in Europe, is a rebalancing of the US military posture.

Whilst last October the United States announced a withdrawal — effectively, the suspension of rotational US troop deployments to Romania, thereby reducing the US military presence from around 1,700 to just about 1,000 US troops — in Poland the US currently has around 10,000 troops. I have recently seen articles in which the President of Poland convened the National Security Council to discuss and make serious preparations for more US bases in Poland, where there would be around 5,000 troops on a permanent basis, plus a further 10,000 on a rotational basis.

When we compare the figures, when we compare the theatres of operations in the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea, we can clearly see a shift in US attention and interest towards the Baltic Sea rather than the Black Sea. I do not know how this can be reversed in favour of the Black Sea, but we must face reality and realise that there is a lack of attention and interest on the part of the United States and, at times, even of our allies in Western Europe, towards the Black Sea.

In my view, this needs to be rectified, and the only way the governments of Romania and Bulgaria can rectify this is through a concerted, sustained effort and serious coordination, as Poland and the Baltic states have demonstrated to us. When the Baltic states go to the US to promote their interests, they do so in an admirable manner. We still sometimes have the impression that we are, in a sense, competing amongst ourselves to see who is better received by our Western allies. Let us hope that the new government in Romania, together with the new government in Bulgaria, will succeed in finding the best methods and solutions to cooperate and project an image of collaboration and coordination, in order to protect our interests in the Black Sea.

Vladimir Mitev: Romania has a new government in which the Foreign Minister is, as I understand it, very knowledgeable on strategic matters, including those relating to NATO, as he has dealt with this subject for some time within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. But, on the other hand, you also have 11 ministers from the Social Democratic Party in the government, which, from what I have gathered at least from Romanian discussions, is traditionally less sceptical towards Russia — I am not referring to the present, but historically. So, in short, what are your expectations regarding foreign policy, particularly in relation to the Black Sea, defence and regional defence cooperation, when you consider this new Luca Niculescu government?

Paul Hurmuz: I do not get involved in politics. I did not do so whilst I was in active service, nor have I done so since, because my role is to protect and promote Romania’s security and defence interests. From this perspective, I can say without a doubt that the political persuasion of the Romanian government since 1990 has been irrelevant when it comes to promoting Romania’s fundamental interests. In fact, Romania’s accession — as the first country to actually join NATO’s PFP programme (Partnership for Peace) — took place under a PSD government (as it was known at the time). Romania’s admission to NATO in 2004 also took place under a PSD government.

From this perspective, I believe it is worth mentioning the meeting at Snagov, during which President Iliescu, who was then at Cotroceni, invited the leaders of all political parties and they decided what Romania’s fundamental interests were. From this perspective, I have not noticed any fundamental differences over the last 35–36 years when it comes to Romania’s pro-Western stance. I am trying to draw a distinction here between the political rhetoric that some parties and politicians sometimes use in an attempt to portray themselves as more pro-Western than others. I’m not interested in that subject.

What I’m telling you is that, in reality, Romania’s pro-Western stance has not changed, regardless of the political leanings of the parties. Sometimes it has been handled better, other times less so; this has depended very much not so much on the political or strategic objective as on the competence of those who held certain posts.

I have every confidence in both our current Foreign Secretary and Defence Secretary. As it happens, I know them – that is to say, I am familiar with their track records – and they are serious and capable individuals.

As for the Foreign Minister, since you asked me quite specifically: Romania’s new Foreign Minister is the person who served as State Secretary at a time when Romania was making efforts, following the invasion of Crimea, to make its voice heard. He is one of the architects of what was termed the appropriate deterrence posture in Romania, in the NATO decisions at that time, because Romania effectively had nothing. As I said earlier, the decisions were aimed at strengthening the deterrence and defence posture in the Baltic Sea, not in the Black Sea. Now, Mr Nicolescu was Secretary of State at the time, and I am personally aware of the extraordinary efforts he made, alongside his colleagues at the Ministry of Defence, to promote these projects, which were successful at the summits in Warsaw and… well, Warsaw and subsequently… never mind.

I have confidence; I believe that both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence in Romania have sufficient high-calibre, capable and patriotic people who know how to promote Romania’s interests.

Vladimir Mitev: I share your confidence and respect your wish not to get involved in politics, but I nevertheless feel it is relevant to ask one more question, perhaps straddling the line between political matters and issues of national interest and NATO. I had the impression that Rumen Radev, who is Prime Minister of Bulgaria — currently the most influential political figure — is facing a degree of mistrust in Romania. To what extent is this a problem at the elite level, if I may put it that way, or a problem concerning cooperation between the two countries at regional level or within NATO?

Paul Hurmuz: I do not think it is a very serious problem. It is quite possible that some of Prime Minister Radev’s statements were intended for domestic consumption and do not necessarily have a negative impact on relations between the two countries. Obviously, a great deal of skill and openness is required on the part of the authorities in Romania and Bulgaria to develop cooperation and understanding. I would like to see, for example, a joint government meeting between the two countries in the relatively near future, as has been the practice on other occasions. It is clear that, ultimately, Romania’s closest geographical ally is Bulgaria.

I know that, a few years ago, I was discussing at one point with some experts the efforts that had been made to ensure that allied military aircraft stationed in Romania or Bulgaria could fly in both countries. This was not easy, and yet we are allied countries; it was resolved in the end. My view is that all these small steps, all these administrative measures which seem, how shall I put it, unimportant, are in fact very important. We must find a way for the air force, the navy, the army, the coastguard and so on to cooperate more effectively.

When Romania and Bulgaria joined the European Union, they undertook to develop surveillance systems in the Black Sea, particularly for the protection of the European Union’s borders. The data collected by these systems — which, as far as I am aware, fall under the responsibility of the Ministries of the Interior in both countries — should benefit from exceptional cooperation between the relevant institutions. The exchange of information must take place in real time, so that we have a clear picture of the threats in the Black Sea, whether they come from the sea or the air.

At NATO level, as far as the air domain is concerned, these matters are already resolved; there is an integrated system. However, we still have work to do on the naval system, and I believe there are concrete steps that can be taken and developed to ensure that cooperation between Romania and Bulgaria is even better than it is at present.

Vladimir Mitev: Would you like to elaborate further on specific next steps that could benefit regional security?

Paul Hurmuz: I believe that the two countries, alongside Turkey of course — as we cannot exclude Turkey from this effort — must ultimately carry out a serious assessment of the measures that need to be taken, first and foremost by the three countries themselves and then with the help of our allies, in order to restore our defence and deterrence posture in the Black Sea. In my view — and this is merely my view — the attacks in recent months on commercial vessels in the western Black Sea, near the coasts of Romania and Bulgaria, effectively constitute a threat to the deterrence posture of those two countries and of NATO as an organisation. We must restore this posture and we must deter.

Deterrence is always preferable to resorting to military measures that would lead to an escalation and, ultimately, to an open conflict between NATO and Russia. Nobody wants this, but Russia must understand that it cannot be allowed to continue doing what it is currently doing. And our Ukrainian allies must understand that when they attack commercial vessels in the Black Sea, they must take into account the interests of the NATO and EU states that support Ukraine. So we need better coordination with Ukraine to avoid our interests in the Black Sea being undermined, and greater firmness, both from NATO’s and the European Union’s perspective, so that Russia can no longer get away with launching such attacks near the coasts of Romania and Bulgaria.

This must be decided by the NATO member states present in the region and, where they lack the necessary capabilities, they must request support from our allies. From this perspective, I believe that the SAFE programme can also help us to develop our capabilities, to have high-performance surveillance systems for detecting aerial, naval and submarine threats in the Black Sea, as well as the means by which we can combat these drones. As you know, the six drones that have been shot down by the Romanian Air Force and our allies this year alone were, in Romania’s case, shot down using F-16s and air-to-air missiles. We must find cost-effective solutions that ensure sustainability; the F-16 was not designed for such missions, and there must be better solutions.

From this perspective, we can learn a great deal from the Ukrainians, who have developed numerous systems to counter the vast number of drones that Russia is launching over Ukrainian territory. We must be able to learn from them, collaborate with them and develop our own appropriate capabilities to counter such threats.

I would now like to put forward an idea that may seem a little revolutionary, but let us remember that, when commercial vessels were attacked by pirates in the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean and other areas, they had armed crews on board to protect themselves against the pirates. Perhaps the time has come for these merchant ships – until matters are regulated and we have all the necessary systems in place to protect our interests in the Black Sea – to carry on board systems exactly like those used by ships to defend themselves against pirates, namely commercially available anti-drone systems, and thus ensure their own protection.

As you know, NATO countries can, in practice, protect their interests within their territorial waters; no drone has been shot down, for example, in Romania except when it entered the 12-nautical-mile limit. In the exclusive economic zone, the situation is rather unclear, but it is evident that NATO cannot intervene there. We must therefore find more revolutionary, more interesting and more innovative ways to combat such threats.

Photo: General Paul Hurmuz (centre) alongside Czech General Petr Pavel (who would later become the fourth President of the Czech Republic) (left), at the time when Hurmuz was serving under Pavel at NATO headquarters (source: Paul Hurmuz)

Subscribe to the channel of the blog “The Bridge of Friendship” in YouTube, where a number of video and audio interviews are published! The blog can also be followed in Facebook and Twitter. Its Telegram channel is here. And here is its Substack account.

About Author