The Transition and Post-Transition Period in Bulgaria: Bulgaria’s Political and Economic Development from 1990 to the Present

Vladimir Mitev, Punctul Critic, 1–3 (55–57) 2026

Summary

Here is a concise summary of Vladimir Mitev’s article tracing Bulgaria’s political and economic evolution from 1989 to the present:

1. From Palace Coup to Financial Collapse (1989–1996)

• Top-Down Transition: Bulgaria’s transition began on November 10, 1989, via a Communist Party “palace coup” rather than a popular revolution.
• Economic Chaos: The early 1990s were marked by unregulated private banks, pyramid schemes, and parasitic intermediaries looting state enterprises.
• 1996–1997 Crisis: Refusal to meet IMF terms under the Videnov government culminated in hyperinflation, the wipeout of savings, and the January 1997 protests that forced the BSP from power.

2. Stabilization, Privatization, and Euro-Atlantic Integration (1997–2009)

• The Currency Board: The Kostov government (1997) introduced a currency board pegging the lev to the German mark (later the euro), halting hyperinflation and establishing a market economy despite painful privatizations and emigration.
• Diplomatic Pragmatism: Bulgaria’s accession to NATO (2004) and the EU (2007) succeeded largely due to veteran, Soviet-trained diplomats who brought vital institutional know-how to Euro-Atlantic integration.

3. The Borissov Era and the 2020 Awakening

• GERB’s 12-Year Rule: Boyko Borissov led three governments (2009–2021), balancing fiscal discipline, strong backing from Brussels and German Christian Democrats, and a multi-vector foreign policy bridging Washington, Moscow, Ankara, and regional allies.
• 2020 Anti-Corruption Protests: Widespread crony capitalism and captured institutions triggered massive 2020 protests, reflecting a deep social impulse to break Bulgaria’s “static identity” and clientelist in-groups.

4. Parliamentary Instability and Post-Transition Realities (2021–Present)

• Political Fragmentation: Post-2021 snap elections and fragile coalitions revealed voter fatigue and institutional gridlock, while President (and later Prime Minister) Rumen Radev acted as a key stabilizing anchor navigating domestic business interests and foreign policy.
• European Milestones: Despite political instability, Bulgaria entered the Schengen Area (January 2025) and the eurozone (January 2026), even as deep socio-economic inequalities and elite-driven resource allocation persisted.

5. Romanian-Bulgarian Bilateral Relations

• Thawing Regional Ties: Following the war in Ukraine, bilateral relations warmed significantly through strategic declarations and trilateral infrastructure initiatives with Greece.
• Infrastructure Deficits: Unlike the deeply integrated Greek-Bulgarian economic corridor, southern Romania and northern Bulgaria remain under-connected due to a lack of Danube bridges and historical inertia.
• The Post-Transition Horizon: Mitev emphasizes that stronger grassroots and elite cooperation between Bulgarians and Romanians is vital to overcoming peripheral insularity and aligning more closely with the European core.

Article

Intro

The transition from a state of ‘developed socialism’ to a modern parliamentary democracy and a market economy represents the most significant and, at the same time, the most painful process in Bulgaria’s modern history. The beginning of this transition, marked on 10 November 1989, bears the hallmarks of a specific ‘palace coup’, carried out by the top leadership of the Bulgarian Communist Party. Unlike the mass popular revolutions in Central Europe, the profound changes in Bulgaria stemmed from a decision taken from above, in the absence of any initial mass social mobilisation. Although the so-called Round Table (3 January – 15 May 1990) – which brought together both representatives of the elites in power before 1989 and the newly – accelerated, legitimised and channelled the transition, eliminating the party’s leading role and paving the way for the first free elections to the Grand National Assembly, the decade that followed proved to be a chronicle of chaos, illusions and institutional immaturity. In this context, the actual and profound restructuring of the state and the economy only began after the catharsis of the financial catastrophe of the mid-1990s.

The true beginning of the transition: The financial collapse of 1996 and the era of the currency board (after 1997)

The early years of the Bulgarian transition were marked by chaotic attempts at reform, economic collapse and a lack of clear strategic direction. The period between 1990 and 1996 saw the emergence of pyramid schemes, the uncontrolled proliferation of private commercial banks and the destructive activities of economic groups that acted as intermediaries between state-owned enterprises. These parasitic structures sell raw materials to state-owned enterprises at inflated prices, and then buy the finished products at artificially low prices, amassing huge profits at the expense of the state budget, which covers the systemic losses.

The BSP (Bulgarian Socialist Party) government led by Jean Videnov (1995–1997) was directly confronted with the accumulated structural flaws.

The attempt to meet social expectations by refinancing loss-making enterprises and avoiding radical reforms led to the breakdown of negotiations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). By the end of 1996, the country had entered an unprecedented financial, banking and agricultural crisis. The widespread granting of unsecured loans led to the collapse of several banks, wiping out the savings of millions of citizens.

The crisis escalated into hyperinflation, during which the US dollar exchange rate soared to 3,000 leva, whilst the real value of wages and pensions fell to record lows. Short-lived hyperinflation is deliberately used by economic groups to wipe out their huge debts to bankrupt banks, whilst the general public is completely marginalised. The mass civil protests of January 1997 and the storming of the National Assembly on 10 January forced the Bulgarian Socialist Party to relinquish power, paving the way for radical restructuring.

The real structural and institutional transition in Bulgaria only began in 1997, under the government of the United Democratic Forces (SDS), led by Prime Minister Ivan Kostov. The key measure for stabilising the state was the introduction of a currency board on 1 July 1997, whereby the Bulgarian lev was firmly pegged to the German mark (and, subsequently, to the euro).

The currency board stripped the Bulgarian National Bank (BNB) of its right to refinance commercial banks and to print unbacked money, which instantly eliminated hyperinflation and restored confidence in the financial system. Under IMF diktat, the ‘Kostov’ government embarked on a rapid, large-scale and aggressive privatisation of major state-owned giants (such as the ‘Neftochim’ refinery and the ‘Kremikovtsi’ metallurgical complex). This privatisation, however, proved largely a failure and led to the closure of a huge proportion of enterprises. Unemployment rose, and those made redundant from the closed enterprises were forced to become economic migrants outside Bulgaria. Despite the corruption scandals linked to the so-called ‘workers and managers’ privatisation’, it was precisely in 1997 that the foundations of a market economy were laid in Bulgaria, bringing an end to economic stagnation.

Diplomatic pragmatism: The path to NATO and the EU and the role of the old guard

Bulgaria’s geopolitical reorientation is often viewed as a linear process, driven exclusively by the new pro-Western political forces. Historical facts, however, reveal a profound internal paradox: the country’s actual accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (2004) and the European Union (2007) was achieved thanks to the efforts of veteran diplomats who had studied in Moscow during the socialist era.

This phenomenon is a telling sign of the pragmatism of the Bulgarian state leadership during the transition period. Although the first SDS government (1991–1992), led by Filip Dimitrov, carried out high-profile purges within the diplomatic corps under the banner of decommunisation, the actual state apparatus quickly realised that international treaties and complex integration negotiations required specific ‘know-how’ which young and inexperienced officials did not possess.

Bulgaria’s foreign policy in the late 1990s and early 2000s – during the governments of Ivan Kostov, Simeon Saxe-Coburg-Gotha and Sergei Stanishev – relied heavily on old-school diplomats. These experts, who undertook their higher education at elite Soviet universities such as MGIMO, were loyal to Bulgaria’s national interest, which was synonymous with the country’s integration into Western structures. This pragmatism demonstrates that, unlike the ideologised slogans of the parties in public squares, the effective shaping of a state’s foreign policy requires continuity. These veteran diplomats have succeeded in transforming their contacts and knowledge from tools of the socialist system into instruments for Euro-Atlantic integration; this does not, however, necessarily imply a confrontation with the East, but rather a positioning as a bridge — not only towards Russia, but towards a range of other countries beyond the member states of NATO and the EU.

GERB’s 12-year era: Boyko Borissov and international legitimacy

Immediately following Bulgaria’s full accession to the European Union on 1 January 2007, the country entered a new political cycle. Public disillusionment with the corruption scandals surrounding the Tripartite Coalition government (BSP, NDSV, DPS), led by Sergei Stanishev, brought a new political force to the fore – GERB, led by Interior Ministry General Boyko Borissov. The elections of 5 July 2009 marked the beginning of a 12-year era in which Borissov became a central figure in Bulgarian politics, leading three governments.

Borissov I (2009–2013): Single-party minority government; GERB’s autonomous governance; restrictive fiscal policy (the so-called ‘pizza without toppings’ policy).

Borissov II (2014–2017): Coalition government. Broad political spectrum: GERB, the Reformist Bloc, ABV; strengthened international support and stabilisation of the law enforcement sector.

Borissov III (2017–2021): Coalition government comprising GERB and the ‘United Patriots’; EU Presidency (2018), infrastructure projects and geopolitical balance.

Boyko Borissov’s continued hold on power is largely due to his ability to generate strong international trust and legitimacy. As leader of a party belonging to the European People’s Party (EPP), Borissov quickly became the favourite of German political foundations (such as the ‘Konrad Adenauer’ Foundation) and enjoyed the unconditional trust of German Chancellor Angela Merkel. In the eyes of Brussels, his government was a guarantee of fiscal stability, predictability and strict adherence to the official European line.

His pragmatism in foreign policy enables Borissov to build personal, almost friendly, relationships with a wide range of world leaders with radically different ideologies. He demonstrates an enviable ability to navigate between the major global powers. He welcomed US Secretaries of State Hillary Clinton (2012) and John Kerry (2015) to Sofia, demonstrating loyalty to Washington and procuring F-16 fighter jets. At the same time, he maintains a constant dialogue with Russian President Vladimir Putin, facilitating the transit of Russian natural gas projects through Bulgarian territory. He establishes close ties with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, which helps to keep the wave of migrants at the border under control after 2015. He finds common ground with leaders such as Viktor Orbán and Donald Trump, employing conservative and sovereigntist rhetoric when it is politically advantageous.

At home, Borissov consolidates his power by building a massive patronage network, exerting strong influence over the media and the prosecution service. Despite periodic crises, resignations and social protests (in 2013 and 2016), he has repeatedly managed to win the trust of voters by speaking the language of the man in the street and positioning himself as the only alternative to the ‘communist left with revanchist tendencies’.

The 2020 anti-corruption protests and the post-transition experiment

Despite its international prestige and apparent stability, GERB’s model of governance accumulated enormous internal tension. Pensions were low. The wages of large sections of the population were rising slowly. During Borissov’s time in office, social protests have taken place periodically, which he has quelled by providing additional funds, without radically improving the socio-economic situation of disadvantaged citizens.

The pervasive sense of unpunished corruption, the takeover of key institutions by oligarchic circles and the lack of a genuine justice system led to the outbreak of mass anti-corruption protests in the summer of 2020. The trigger was the brutal raid by armed staff of the Public Prosecutor’s Office, led by Ivan Gheshev, on the presidential office on 9 July 2020. This act prompted President Rumen Radev to address the public with his fist raised and the slogan ‘Mutri, get out!’ (The term ‘mutra’ – the singular of mutri, refers to the criminal elements of the 1990s who, in alliance with the former State Security elites, act as racketeers preying on ordinary citizens, carry out the primitive accumulation of capital and thus create the structures of Bulgarian capitalism).

I claim that the 2020 protests are not merely another expression of political discontent; they represent a vast, unconscious social impulse to enter the era of post-transition. From a theoretical perspective, the Bulgarian transition generated a profound ‘socialising trauma’, which shaped a static identity amongst citizens. This static identity is characterised by a sense of powerlessness to influence the social environment and the hegemonic interests entrenched within it, by helplessness in the face of institutions said to be ‘controlled’ and ‘co-opted’, by the obsession that everyone is someone’s man and belongs to a particular lobby, as well as by a lasting tribal division of society into ‘us’ and ‘them’ (that is, society is dominated by cliques – small circles of close-knit people – known in English as in-groups).

Under the banner of anti-communism, in the 1990s and at the start of the 21st century, a ‘capitalism of connections’ (crony capitalism) was built, which dehumanises both the winners and the losers, forcing hundreds of thousands of people to emigrate. And Borissov’s government cemented these roles – the winners of the transition feel they have achieved an eternal victory, to the detriment of those who lost have no path to social advancement unless they join the new party-state – Borissov’s GERB party. GERB held local power almost everywhere and maintained a firm grip on the government. If anyone wanted their business to thrive, if anyone wanted a job in the civil service or for their company to grow, it was clear that GERB is the only political force capable of securing the necessary financial resources to achieve this.

The 2020 protests were attempting, largely unconsciously, to heal these wounds of the transition. The young, educated and urban population was taking to the streets demanding an overhaul of the system, meritocracy and the transformation of the state into a modern liberal democracy, free from captured institutions. The protests sought to break the model of tribalism, in which the law did not apply to the ruling clique. This was an attempt to revitalise a static identity – a shift from passive discontent to active civic engagement, which would heal the traumas of the transition and transform Bulgaria into an equal and integral part of the European core. Although Boyko Borissov managed to see out his third term through a series of defensive manoeuvres, the 2020 protests irreversibly shattered the status quo and opened a Pandora’s box within the Bulgarian political system.

Parliamentary merry-go-round and political instability (2021–2024)

Following the general election on 4 April 2021, Bulgaria entered an unprecedented institutional crisis, characterised by a fierce struggle within the political system. In less than four years, the country held a record number of snap parliamentary elections, as the fragmented National Assembly proved incapable of producing stable governing majorities.

The chronology of this parliamentary merry-go-round reveals the deep divisions within society:

• 4 April 2021 (45th National Assembly): GERB is isolated, but the new protest parties cannot find common ground. Parliament is dissolved without a government.
• 11 July 2021 (46th National Assembly): Slavi Trifonov’s party, ‘There Is Such a People’ (ITN), comes first, but its aggressive approach leads to the failure of negotiations. Another resignation by the incumbent.
• 14 November 2021 (47th National Assembly): The new anti-corruption party ‘We Continue the Change’ (PP), led by Kiril Petkov and Assen Vassilev, is formed. A fragile government is formed, comprising four parties (PP, BSP, ITN, DB), which falls after just 7 months (June 2022), following the withdrawal of ITN.
• 2 October 2022 (48th National Assembly): Total inability to form a majority. The three seats were returned vacant.
• 2 April 2023 (49th National Assembly): An exotic coalition arrangement, dubbed an ‘assembly’ or ‘non-coalition’, emerges between the PP-DB (DB being Democratic Bulgaria) and GERB-SDS, with Nikolai Denkov as Prime Minister and parliamentary support from the Movement for Rights and Freedoms led by the influential politician and businessman Delian Peevski – who had previously been regarded by PP-DB as a symbol of corruption in Bulgaria. Clashes within this government are constant, and the attempt at a reshuffle in March 2024 fails spectacularly.
• 9 June 2024 (50th Parliament): GERB wins, but the DPS splits spectacularly along the Ahmed Dogan–Delyan Peevski divide following the vote on Rosen Zhelyazkov’s cabinet. Parliament dissolves itself once again. Subsequently, Delyan Peevski takes full control of the DPS, whilst Ahmed Dogan’s faction shifts towards supporting Rumen Radev.
• 27 October 2024 (51st National Assembly): A record number of eight parties enter parliament. Voter turnout remains extremely low (approximately 38 per cent), demonstrating the citizens’ complete alienation from the party system. After a month-long deadlock over the election of the president (Natalia Kisselova), on 16 January 2025 a fragile coalition government comprising GERB-SDS, BSP and ITN was voted in, with Rosen Zhelyazkov as prime minister, indirectly supported by Dogan’s parliamentary group.

This history of instability demonstrates that the traditional parties have lost their legitimacy, whilst the new parties are rapidly wearing themselves out in internal struggles, heightening Bulgarians’ disillusionment with parliamentary democracy itself.

Alongside this political instability, however, Bulgarian governments are pursuing a policy of increasing incomes and pensions and stimulating economic growth by boosting consumption. This policy leads to changes that enable Bulgaria to join the eurozone on 1 January 2026, having already become a full member of the Schengen Area from 1 January 2025. In other words, regardless of political fragmentation and instability, Bulgarian society is developing and taking steps towards closer integration with Western Europe and neighbouring countries.

Rumen Radev’s regime: Stability versus the preservation of the oligarchy

In times of constant parliamentary deadlock and a governmental vacuum, the centre of gravity in Bulgarian politics was shifting towards the Presidency. The election and subsequent re-election (November 2021) of General Rumen Radev created the illusion of stability within the political system. Due to the inability of party leaders to form governments, Radev was forced to appoint a record number of caretaker governments (led by Stefan Yanev, Galab Donev and others), concentrating immense real power in his own hands.

However, Rumen Radev’s rise to power and his strong influence concealed a profound paradox in both domestic and foreign policy. On the one hand, his interim cabinets ensured the functioning of the state during times of crisis and serve as an incubator for new political figures (it was Radev himself who brought Kiril Petkov and Asen Vasilev into office as ministers, and they subsequently founded the anti-corruption party ‘We Continue the Change’). On the other hand, in the eyes of a significant section of Bulgarian society, Radev took on the aura of a fighter against the oligarchy, insofar as this is personified by the political tendencies of Borissov and Peevski. Thirdly, Radev’s government can also be seen as a major attempt by the Bulgarian business community – and, consequently, by influential factions within the oligarchy – to safeguard their interests in the face of profoundly changed foreign policy conditions.

The Bulgarian oligarchy has traditionally been heavily dependent on Russian energy resources and the economic influence of the East. The outbreak of war in Ukraine in 2022 sent shockwaves through these circles. Radev’s stance – which officially favours ‘de-escalation’, a refusal to send weapons to Ukraine (a position that has support amongst the Bulgarian population, according to opinion polls) and his criticism of the Euro-Atlantic elites of the transition period – contributes, in its own way, to maintaining the socio-economic balances of the transition period. At the same time, Radev comes from a military background and is personally involved in the construction of two factories – one for ammunition and one for gunpowder – in partnership with the German giant Rheinmetall. He advocates allocating 5 per cent of GDP to defence and shows many signs of being perfectly in tune with the Trump era, including with regard to culture wars (he expresses support for Orthodoxy and sovereignist attitudes within society), but also from the perspective of the military’s global rise during the current US president’s term of office.

This orientation represents a strategic anticipation of the moment when Russia might once again set to become an economic and political partner for Western Europe (against a backdrop of sanctions fatigue and a search for pragmatic solutions on the part of European capitals). Radev’s regime (during his times as a president) was manoeuvring skillfully, managing popular discontent and pro-Russian sentiments, whilst at the same time protecting major national enterprises from radical changes. Thus, the Presidency was turning into a sort of ‘island of timelessness’, blocking the genuine de-hegemony of economic interests rooted as far back as the transition period.

This political line continued even after Rumen Radev left the presidency, won the parliamentary elections on 19 April 2026 and became Prime Minister.

Maintaining the need for a post-transition period

Thirty-seven years after the fall of Todor Zhivkov and nearly two decades after Bulgaria’s accession to the European Union, the major task of qualitatively renewing Bulgarian society remains unresolved. The state continues to function as a conglomerate of closed circles made up of close associates (in-groups), groups, cliques and clientelist networks, in which ‘the wolf does not eat the wolf’, but all together they mercilessly drain public resources.

There is an acute lack of authenticity and cosmopolitanism, and citizens are deliberately moulded by the elites to be ‘incapable’, byliving in a fog of misinformation, distrustful of one another, and subjected to constant pressure to oppose one another, whilst the elites themselves are far more interconnected and homogeneous, than it appears at first sight.

Joining the eurozone at this stage ensures a greater inflow of foreign investment and a higher status for the Bulgarian Stock Exchange (upgraded by MSCI to ‘frontier market’ status), but it is also associated with higher prices for basic foodstuffs and services. The business community remains in a dominant position, and it is clear that the Radev government is primarily concerned with how to respond to the demands of influential economic interests, whilst the interests of employees or socially disadvantaged groups are of little significance to the government.

The need for a genuine post-transition remains as relevant as ever. Post-transition does not merely mean replacing one government with another, but rather a profound social and psychological transformation. It occurs when we cease to be an island of a sort of peripheral exceptionalism and come to see ourselves in step with others in the region and within the EU. This means humanising social relations and gradually realising the motto ‘People before profits!’.

True change requires the de-hegemonization of the dominant interests from the transition period. This means empowering citizens and increasing their resources in relation to those of the winners of the Bulgarian transition. This can be achieved by rejecting the misguided lessons of the transition, which lead to mistrust and an inability to cooperate amongst Bulgarians, as well as by creating the necessary conditions for them to develop their social capital, critical mass and power. The logic of the post-transition era will manifest itself in the country’s foreign and domestic policies when these cease to be interpreted through the prism of camps and representatives (the West versus the East, Russia versus the US) and a greater awareness of the interconnectedness of these poles is achieved – both at the Bulgarian level and internationally.

The post-transition era will only come about when a critical mass of citizens has been reached – people who live in peace, enjoy security and self-confidence stemming from their own qualities, and who refuse to surrender their fundamental freedom to narcissistic political leaders. The struggle for a modern Bulgaria continues, and the transition will only be definitively consigned to the past when institutions begin to serve the people universally, rather than various deeply entrenched cliques.

Romanian–Bulgarian relations through the prism of change in Bulgarian society

Following the start of the large-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, Bulgaria and Romania initiated a process of thawing bilateral relations. This led to the joint declaration on strategic partnership issued by Presidents Rumen Radev and Klaus Iohannis on 15 March 2023. The document outlined various areas of political, economic, cultural and infrastructure cooperation between the two countries. In December 2025, Bulgaria, Romania and Greece added a further strategic document demonstrating the new spirit of relations in the region – a memorandum of understanding aimed at developing infrastructure corridors between them.

Developments in Romanian-Bulgarian relations from 2022 to the present day show that the two countries are genuinely striving, at the highest level, to foster greater trust and cooperation between their citizens, after decades were wasted in perpetuating indifference and tacit rivalry between them – from the 1990s until the start of the war in Ukraine. It is evident that cooperation in areas such as security and defence is proceeding smoothly – probably because Western partners guarantee that there will be no unpleasant surprises in this regard. At the same time, in many areas, the inertia of past decades is hindering rapid change. The two nations and their elites are still faced with the challenge of building greater trust, respect and commitment in their relations.

Relations between Bulgaria and Greece in this regard are an example of what can be achieved if there is a lasting desire and ambition for better relations. Even during the socialist era, when Bulgaria was part of the Warsaw Pact and Greece was part of NATO, cooperation agreements were signed between Sofia and Athens and there were people-to-people links. Following the changes of 1989, the Greek business community established a strong presence in Bulgaria, whilst thousands of Bulgarians became migrant workers in Greece. EU accession intensified the flow of middle-class Bulgarians to northern Greece and its Aegean coast for tourism purposes. Gradually, economic ties between northern Greece and southern Bulgaria are becoming very strong. Today we find ourselves in a situation where northern Greece’s economic dynamism is largely due to Bulgarians who are buying homes there, visiting as tourists or setting up businesses.

Meanwhile, southern Romania and northern Bulgaria remain economically underdeveloped regions, with relatively little interaction between them. In terms of infrastructure, there are only two bridges across the Danube between the two countries. There have been proposals for ferries, but these have not materialised for years. The Bulgarian motorways in the south of the country have been built, but in northern Bulgaria work is progressing extremely slowly.

Under these circumstances, and against the backdrop of the challenges facing Bulgarian society, the strengthening of Romanian-Bulgarian relations represents an opportunity for the Romanian state, the business community, and the academic and cultural elites to build a better understanding of Bulgarian society and to be part of its renewal process – in other words, of the changes that give the post-transition era its rationale.

A dynamic Bulgarian-Romanian identity amongst certain sections of the population in both countries, that is to say, relationships based on trust, equality, mutual enrichment and synchronisation, could also enable Romanian society to move towards banishing its own demons – which have been widely discussed in recent years and which have plunged Romania into a political, fiscal and economic crisis. At a time when the leading countries of Western Europe, together with Poland, are creating a new core of the EU, the future of both Bulgaria and Romania probably lies in a stronger presence in their region and in good neighbourly relations. To the extent that Bulgarians and Romanians manage to view themselves and their neighbours with fresh eyes, we shall also witness a revitalisation of Romanian-Bulgarian relations. If this process is carried out with reason, but also with heart, the two countries may experience a qualitative change, as is already evident in relations between Bulgarians and Greeks.

And here, too, the idea of ‘post-transition’ comes to the fore once again. Post-transition in Romanian-Bulgarian relations will mean a new experience, a transformation – that is, a loosening of the insular mindset of the two countries and a much higher degree of trust amongst the elites and ordinary people in both nations. If the positive processes initiated in bilateral relations continue, and if their momentum stems not only from Western partners but is driven by the Bulgarians and Romanians themselves, life in South-Eastern Europe will, logically speaking, increasingly resemble that in the heart of the EU. A region connected in terms of infrastructure, where Bulgarians and Romanians see opportunities – rather than an obstacle – in their neighbours across the Danube, could become a centre of growth for the area stretching from the Western Balkans to Ukraine. However, for this to happen, it is important that Bulgarians and Romanians have the insight and intelligence needed to understand how they can be part of the change taking place among their neighbours across the Danube.

Photo: (source: Pixabay, CC0)

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