Mihai Isac
The recent decision by the Supreme Council for National Defense (CSAT) in Bucharest to donate a Patriot missile system to Ukraine puts an end to months of speculation on the subject, confirming Romania’s commitment to support Ukraine in the face of a Russian military invasion. No one can dispute the enormous support that Romania is giving to Ukraine, taking in more than a million refugees from Ukraine or ensuring the transit of goods, especially grain, from Ukraine to the world market, thus allowing Ukraine to have the financial resources necessary for the functioning of the state.
The authorities in Bucharest prefer not to publish precise figures on Romanian military support for Ukraine or on the weapons systems donated or sold by other countries that have passed through Romanian territory to the front. The first evidence of the transfer of Romanian weapons systems to Ukraine emerged only a few months after the start of the large-scale invasion, following the public appearance of films and photos on Telegram channels run by the Ukrainian side.
This strategic communication strategy has led to numerous speculations used for electoral purposes by extremist political forces in Romania, such as the party led by Diana Șoșoaca (from the SOS Romania party), who became an MEP after the 9 June 2024 elections, or by party AUR, which will send 6 MEPs to the European Parliament. It can be expected that the election campaign for the Romanian parliamentary and presidential elections in 2024 will also be marked by conspiracy theories promoted by the archangels of Russian geopolitical interests in Romania.
Challenging support for Ukraine means challenging the legacy of Greater Romania, so dear to Romanian nationalist radicals, namely the importance of the French mission led by Major General Henri Berthelot, who was at the same time a military adviser to King Ferdinand of Romania during the First World War. In addition to the vast quantities of armaments supplied to Romania, the mission personnel were seconded to Romanian commands up to the divisional command level. The mission made a particular contribution to the process of rebuilding and reorganizing the Romanian army in the first half of 1917, an army that played an important role in the battles of 1917-1918 and especially in the formation of Greater Romania.
Romanian Prime Minister Marcel Ciolacu, one of this year’s presidential candidates, said before the CSAT vote that ‘Romania’s security is not linked to Patriot missile systems, but to the partnership with the United States and in the fact that we are a member of NATO. It is not with the Patriot system that we guarantee Romania’s security’. The donation is made on the condition that negotiations continue with NATO allies for Romania to receive a similar anti-aircraft system, and that a “temporary solution must be found to cover the operational vulnerability thus created.” This bargaining strategy has drawn informal criticism from officials of NATO countries that have so far contributed massively to Ukraine’s defense efforts, such as the UK, Germany, France, Spain, Italy and others.
These statements fully reflect the position of the political elite in Bucharest, which relies exclusively on its membership of the North Atlantic Alliance when thinking about the national security architecture. Even now, part of the political class in Bucharest believes that NATO membership automatically solves every national security problem, preferring to ignore investment.
Even if the war deployed by the Russian Federation against Ukraine started de facto in 2014, it was only the large-scale invasion deployed by the Russian army in February 2022 that forced Romania to find ways to strengthen its own defence capabilities.
Romania faces serious problems when it comes to the human resources that can be employed in the standing armed forces or those needed to train reserve units. The advisability of reintroducing compulsory military service on the model of other European NATO member states is fiercely contested by a section of the political class and, above all, by the absolute majority of public opinion in Romania. It can be expected that such a decision, if taken after the 2024 elections, will arouse massive public protests, especially in the context of a massive outflow of the conscript population to other European countries with stronger economies.
It should be recalled that the Romanian state has ordered seven Patriot systems for almost USD 4 billion, one of the most important military procurement contracts concluded in recent decades. Apart from the obvious military component, this contract is also a consistent geopolitical signal: Romania is the centre of NATO and the US in the Black Sea basin.
According to Romanian military experts, only four of these systems have been delivered so far and only two of them are currently operational, while the third will be operational by the end of 2024. The fourth is expected to enter the Romanian army’s equipment in early 2025. The Patriot system is the newest and most expensive system in the latest configuration available, complete with several hundred interceptors.
The conflict between Ukraine and the Russian Federation, as well as the security crises in Gaza, Yemen, Taiwan and Sudan, have made the lead times for certain types of next-generation military technology extremely long. At the same time, the price of these weapons systems has risen sharply, putting some international actors, such as EU countries, in situations unthinkable a few years ago. Although these states have resources commensurate with the threat, they are unable to find the sources to purchase the necessary armaments – a situation that requires rapid measures to revive the EU states’ own arms industries. Unfortunately, this process is also jeopardised by political disagreements between the Member States, with each country trying to take advantage of them, including for domestic political electoral reasons. Any initiative to launch joint armament projects, such as the European frigate programme, is sure to spark behind-the-scenes wars over the choice of the country in which they will be produced, thus increasing the lead time and the actual costs.
Unlike Bulgaria, which has a viable arms industry, Romania lacks the capacity to meet its own defense needs, despite the bellicose declarations of the leaders in Bucharest. Bulgaria’s military industry played an important role in sustaining Ukraine’s military capability during the first months of the massive invasion unleashed by the Russian army.
The failure of efforts to strengthen the Romanian naval fleet by acquiring French warships or building them in Romanian shipyards is evidence of the Romanian politicians’ lack of understanding of the real security needs of the Romanian state. The lack of a strong Romanian naval presence in the Black Sea basin puts additional pressure on Bucharest’s intentions to exploit the region’s economic energy resources. The Black Sea could once again become a Russian lake in the absence of concrete security arrangements implemented with the support of NATO allies.
The situation with the Romanian navy is just one example, with Romania being forced to follow Poland’s example and acquire weapons systems from South Korea, especially heavy artillery systems. This is only a short- to medium-term solution, as Bucharest is forced to look for new sources to purchase defense products, entering into direct competition for these purchases, even with NATO or EU allied countries.
Unfortunately, military relations between Romania and Bulgaria, a neighbouring country and NATO and EU ally, go only through Brussels, with politicians in Sofia and Bucharest ignoring the common threats to both countries. Only after pressure from NATO and EU allies and the growing threat from the Russian Black Sea Fleet was it decided to launch joint mine clearance operations in the western Black Sea waterways.
As a result of the aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine, the threat of drifting mines installed by both countries has increased, affecting the safety of navigation and the population, as shown by the numerous incidents in the Black Sea near the borders of Romania and Bulgaria.
The first operation of the Bulgarian, Turkish and Romanian demining group in the Black Sea will begin on July 2, 2024, Chief of Defence Admiral Emil Eftimov said recently, adding that three operations will be conducted by the end of this year. The first stage will coincide with the Breeze 2024 naval exercise, while the second and third activations of the group will take place in September and November 2024, the top Bulgarian military official added, as quoted by Sofia media.
The formation of the Mine Countermeasures Task Force Black Sea (MCM BLACK SEA) is the first large-scale measure implemented by NATO’s Black Sea littoral states. MCM Black Sea is a limited initiative by the three Black Sea littoral allies – Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey – to facilitate maritime safety by countering the threat posed by sea mines. The new structure is unlikely to form the basis for a permanent NATO naval presence in the Black Sea basin in the medium to long term, given Turkey’s opposition to amending the Montreux Convention.
Events on the Ukrainian front have a direct impact on the security of all countries, including Moldova. The former Soviet republic, populated mainly by ethnic Romanians, is a strategic target for Bucharest. Support for de facto European integration is the only major foreign policy project launched and consistently supported by Romanian state institutions. The threat of Russian interference in the Republic of Moldova during the 2024-2025 elections worries Bucharest, which seems to understand that it cannot stabilise the region without Ukraine, especially when it comes to Transnistria.
This pattern of Patriot missile diplomacy could set a precedent for Bucharest to provide Ukraine with other types of advanced weaponry, including Himars systems or even F-16s. Romanian officials need to understand that these systems protect Romania much better when used in Ukraine, keeping Russian tanks as far away as possible from the borders of Moldova and Romania. The re-imperialisation of Russian foreign policy is a long-term threat to all countries in the region, and the resumption of direct security relations with Bulgaria, Turkey and Ukraine could provide Romania with the role of a key pillar of the Black Sea flank of NATO and the EU. Strengthening the security architecture can no longer remain a Romanian national effort alone, but must be carefully coordinated with allied countries in the region, regardless of their historical legacy.
Photo: The idea of supplying Ukraine with a Romanian Patriot system came up during President Klaus Iohannis’ visit to the White House in May 2024 (source: YouTube)
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