Mihai Isac, Karadeniz-Press, February 21, 2025
The 2025 Munich Conference brought new agreements and discussions on European and global security to the forefront. At the same time, the new “Trump 2.0” administration in the White House has come with a change of tone in terms of US engagements in the region, putting more emphasis on narrow national interests and direct alliance bargaining.
The Black Sea region is an area of heightened strategic interest due to the armed conflict in Ukraine, but also as a convergence point for economic and energy interests (infrastructure, gas pipelines, transportation corridors).
The region remains a barometer of relations between NATO and the Russian Federation, playing a crucial role in EU security policies and in the stability of the Eastern borders.
Romania’s interest in strengthening the security of the Black Sea was also underlined by the Romanian Foreign Minister’s participation in the event on ‘A Free and Open Black Sea: Evaluating Challenges on Connectivity, Global Food Security and Energy in the Region’, highlighting the strategic importance of the Black Sea from the perspective of ensuring Euro-Atlantic security and facilitating connections between Europe and Asia. The head of diplomacy in Bucharest signaled the further deterioration of the security situation in the Black Sea region, amid Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine.
The Romanian high dignitary presented regional projects and initiatives aimed at contributing both to the security of the region and to its potential in terms of connectivity. Hurezeanu emphasized the importance of cooperation at European and Euro-Atlantic level to achieve these objectives, including through the continuation of a robust NATO presence in the Black Sea, the adoption of an EU Black Sea Strategy and the full implementation of the US Black Sea Strategy, according to the MFA.
Earlier, the Romanian Minister of Defense, Angel Tîlvăr, stated that ‘the security environment in the Black Sea region will continue to be unpredictable and will require a high level of attention from the allies bordering the Black Sea. As part of Romania’s efforts as a security provider in this region, the Romanian Naval Forces are one of the main guarantor structures for the protection of NATO’s eastern flank in the area under our responsibility. All these efforts are visible in the fact that today, with an armed conflict in the northern part of the Black Sea, it is safe to sail, and the fight against drifting sea mines is a Euro-Atlantic success to which Romania has made and continues to make an important contribution’.
According to military sources in Bucharest, in order to ensure freedom of navigation in the Pontic Basin, the Romanian Naval Forces have carried out specific monitoring and research missions both under national command and as part of the naval group of the Mine Countermeasures Black Sea Task Group (MCM Black Sea TG), together with partners from Bulgaria and Turkey.
The security situation in the wider Black Sea region is decisively influenced by the war in Ukraine. After escalations in recent years, the conflict is in a complicated phase. Russia’s actions, both military and diplomatic, have reshaped the balance of forces in the region, and NATO’s support for Ukraine has been constant, even if varying in intensity from one ally to another.
As tensions in the Black Sea have escalated, maritime defenses, military exercises and the monitoring of straits have become priorities for littoral states. Trade routes, especially for grain and energy products, have also been affected, leading to a reassessment of transportation corridors and port infrastructure.
The worsening security situation led to the Montreaux Convention, concluded in 1936, being called into question. It regulates the passage of ships through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits, laying down strict rules on tonnage and the period of stay of warships outside the region. It is considered a crucial legal pillar for Black Sea security, giving Turkey the role of “guarantor” of access to and from the Black Sea.
The pressures and dilemmas in the new geopolitical context are evident, with discussions on possible reinterpretations or even renegotiations (at least at a declaratory level) to allow or further restrict maritime access. Turkey, amid its regional ambitions, may try to use Montreux as a bargaining tool with Western allies and Russia.
Romania is the “eastern gateway” to NATO and the European Union and is focused on securing its borders and maintaining stability on the Black Sea. Romania is interested in protecting strategic infrastructure (the port of Constanta, gas pipelines, transportation corridors). Bucharest strongly supports Ukraine’s territorial integrity and is actively involved in support initiatives (humanitarian, economic, defensive military).
Turkey is a major regional player with ambitions of influence in the Middle East and Caucasus. Turkey uses its geographical position and the Montreux Convention to control maritime flows. Ankara finds itself in a geopolitical dilemma, between the desire to maintain trade and energy relations with Russia and the need to preserve its status as a NATO ally.
Bulgaria has a cautious foreign policy, trying to maintain a balance between NATO/EU pressures and historical relations with Russia. Sofia focuses on energy security and economic stability, given Bulgaria’s partial dependence on Russian energy resources.
For Moldova, the war in Ukraine heightens fears of a potential conflict in Transnistria. The Republic of Moldova is trying to move towards European integration and strengthen its security capabilities, although its resources are limited.
Ukraine continues efforts to maintain its territorial integrity, with political and military support from the West, but the conflict remains intense amid recent statements by US President Trump.
Kiev sees the Black Sea as a crucial corridor for grain and resource exports and any naval blockade or maritime tensions directly affect its economy.
Russia is implementing a “power projection” strategy, seeing the Black Sea as a historic area of influence, including using the military fleet in Sevastopol (Crimea) or other Pontian bases to exert military pressure. Moscow seeks to maintain control over the region through military presence and bilateral agreements with key states (Turkey, potential partners in the Caucasus).
Georgia has a strategic position on the Black Sea and the Caucasus. In the wake of recent developments Tbilisi has strengthened its relations with Russia, with Tbilisi’s decisions condemned by the Western world. The country is trying to profile itself as an alternative energy corridor for Central Asian resources, but is limited by regional pressures.
The new “Trump 2.0” geopolitical era brings many changes. US foreign policy centered on “America First” means reassessing the costs of maintaining military bases and support for allies. Against this backdrop, pressure has emerged on NATO member states to increase their defense budgets and contributions to joint missions.
The Trump administration seems to adopt a more transactional attitude towards allies and adversaries, which may create uncertainty in the region and incentives for more intense bilateral negotiations.
If the US reduces its naval presence in the Black Sea (while respecting the Montreux limits in any case), Russia could take advantage to strengthen its position. States in the region will have to rely more on their own forces and European partners (EU, France, Germany) or negotiate directly with Washington.
Romania, Bulgaria and Poland may be asked to take on a significant share of the security burden. Increasing the military presence of European allies in the Black Sea would be a sign of joint commitment, following the Baltic model.
Turkey can become a key arbiter, with the ability to use its geographical position and the Montreux Convention as diplomatic leverage. Certain decisions, such as possible tighter restrictions on NATO or Russian ships, can be barga bargaining chips in negotiating political or economic advantages.
Moscow will certainly implement a strategy of limited escalation of hybrid conflicts. Russia may resort more to hybrid tactics (e.g. “de facto” naval blockades, cyber-attacks, disinformation) to maintain its influence and create dissent among Black Sea littoral states.
The European Union could try to fill a possible “gap” left by less US involvement by boosting EU security and defense projects (PESCO) and investment in regional infrastructure.
Neighbouring states – such as Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey, Ukraine, plus Moldova (as a smaller but relevant actor) – need to find mechanisms for dialogue and cooperation on common issues (energy security, transport infrastructure, maritime conflict prevention).
In a volatile geopolitical context, diplomatic channels become essential. Montreux remains a key tool that Turkey can use and the US, through the new administration, can choose to negotiate directly with individual states.
Even if the US administration’s approach is more transactional, EU/NATO states need to show solidarity and find common ground to counter Russian influence and instability in the wider Black Sea region.
If we are talking about strategic planning for Black Sea security, a coherent regional strategy is needed to manage potential crises: joint exercises, naval modernization and rapid reaction measures against hybrid threats.
Romania and Bulgaria can initiate regional formats involving Turkey, Georgia, Ukraine and even the Republic of Moldova, under the umbrella of cooperation with the EU and NATO.
In the new post-München 2025 context, the Black Sea region has become an area where the interests of the major powers and regional states intersect more intensely than ever before. The Munich conference opened crucial discussions about the future of Euro-Atlantic security, and the Trump 2.0 administration is adding a note of uncertainty with its unconventional policies. Against this backdrop, the importance of cooperation, agile diplomacy and continued investments in security to maintain stability and protect the interests of each regional actor is emphasized.
Romania does not seem to have a clear policy in the Black Sea region, even though there are various diplomatic contacts, including with the Turkish side. The two sides constantly emphasize the good Romanian-Turkish cooperation, in the spirit of the strategic partnership between the two countries. Let’s not forget that last year, the first edition of the High Level Strategic Cooperation Council between Romania and Turkey was organized, this format having the potential to strengthen the dialogue at bilateral, regional and NATO levels.
Bucharest has consistently emphasized the good Romanian-Turkish cooperation in maintaining security in the Black Sea area, including the Turkish side’s participation in the NATO Enhanced Air Policing Mission in Romania last year. Official sources in Bucharest also underline the importance of the operationalization of the Black Sea Task Force to Combat Sea Mines, in which Romania, Turkey and Bulgaria participate. This trilateral cooperation will help maintain naval security in the Black Sea.
The economic dimension is extremely important in any cooperation format, and the Republic of Turkey is one of Romania’s main trading partners. It is the largest trading partner outside the EU and the first non-EU destination for Romanian exports. Over 19,000 companies with Turkish capital operate in Romania. Recently, senior Russian officials have emphasized the need to intensify cooperation in areas of strategic interest from a bilateral and regional perspective. He cited energy, transport and defense industries as examples.
Photo: American vice president J.D.Vance at the Munich Security Conference (source: YouTube)
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