Vladimir Mitev
Sergiu Mișcoiu is Professor of Political Science at the Faculty of European Studies, Babes-Bolyai University in Cluj-Napoca (Romania) where he serves as a Director of the Centre for International Cooperation and as Director of the Centre for African Studies (Cestaf). He holds a PhD in Political Science (Paris-Est University), a PhD in History (Babes-Bolyai University), and a habilitation in Political Science (Paris-Est University). He is permanent member and PhD tutor of the LIPHA Laboratory at the University Paris-Est (France), associate professor of the universities of Créteil (France), Szeged (Hungary), and Cheikh Anta Diop Dakar (Senegal), and has been leading five major international research projects. His main research interests are populism, discourse theory, deliberation, political conflicts, French politics, transition in Central-Eastern Europe and Francophone Africa.
Mr Mișcoiu, we are discussing just 12 hours after the end of the Romanian presidential elections, on the morning after they finished. What is your general impression of the campaign and the results, and what do you think they mean for Romania?
Thank you for having me. This campaign was totally atypical. These elections took place after the annual elections in November 2024, and they were atypical in that foreign intervention and the strength of the anti-system movement against the established political parties were so significant.
In the end, the candidates of the established parties were eliminated altogether, and the confrontation took place between two candidates, each of whom posed as an anti-system runner in their own way. The result was the fruit of the huge mobilisation of Romanians, who realised the dangers of having the far right in power during the two rounds. This would have had consequences for Romania in terms of internal policies, social and economic implications, and cultural implications for collective freedoms and the diversity of Romanian society. Geopolitically, this main victory for the far right could have meant Romania turning its back on the European Union and settling into a grey area in its relations with the major powers, such as Russia, China and the US, while denying the European project of which Romania is a part.
Due to the significant mobilisation of civil society and academia, as well as various other influences, the people were able to discern the true nature of the far-right movement, including its connections to the interwar period, criminal organisations behind certain leaders, the highly opaque financing of the campaign, and the ties linking Mr Georgescu and Mr Simion to Moscow via various businessmen and think tank leaders.
And because of that, yesterday’s huge mobilisation resulted in a clear defeat for the far-right candidate, who nevertheless started with a huge lead of 20% and was close to 50% after the first round with 41%.
Nicușor Dan won not just as a guarantee of Romania’s pro-Western or pro-European orientation, but also because of his reformist agenda and action.
He spoke about tackling corruption more effectively. He proposed the digitisation of certain public services. He generally has a reputation for modernisation and for being a pro-change, pro-modernisation politician. What specific actions do you expect him to take with regard to this reformist, anti-corruption and modernisation agenda?
Because, so far, it’s all very general.
It’s definitely very general, and the margin for manoeuvre is limited because the President of Romania can only guide the country’s general direction and has competencies in foreign and security policies, which are not Nicușor Dan’s main focus. However, these messages came after the huge demand from the people for change in relation to the endemic corruption of the political parties, which has become subtle, with the parties making deals, working together, covering each other and promoting incompetent people in particular. The second demand relates to the first: people want competent leaders and competent people.
Incompetence has been revealed to be one of the most significant challenges facing decision-makers in Romania. After 35 years of democratic transition, the counter-selection that was specific to these political parties has led to poor decisions and a huge incompatibility with their counterparts in the European Union and abroad. These demands are also related to higher efficiency in public policies and state action, which is still slow and self-sufficient, and not actually willing to serve citizens.
Due to these developments, Nicușor Dan is, of course, keen to implement a series of reforms. His approach primarily involves the appointment of prosecutors and the reinstatement of a robust prosecutor’s office, including both anti-corruption and general prosecutors. This comes after a prolonged period during which these prosecutors were severely restricted in their ability to act. This is particularly true of the anti-corruption track. The promotion of competent people will also be a very important task, which is more related to the informal capacity of a president with huge legitimacy to appoint key figures to different public offices and refuse the appointment of incompetent people, starting with the Constitutional Court and moving down to other functions, in order to oppose these nominations and make them public via permanent communication with Romanians.
These tasks won’t be easy, of course, because there is no majority and the parliament is fragmented. Furthermore, Romania is on the verge of being downgraded by some rating agencies, which could be a very bad sign for foreign investors. Given these circumstances, Dan’s plans would generally be supported by Romanians rather than the political class itself, especially by structures like those involved in this campaign. These structures are not interested in gaining anything personally from this reform process, but are working voluntarily to remedy the situation, which many perceive as severe.
You mentioned that Nicușor Dan has popular support. His political stance appears to be techno-populist because he is anti-corruption and has good ties to the IT sector. However, more than 5 million voters opted for a different type of populism — let’s call it conservative populism — embodied by George Simion.
How do you expect Nicușor Dan to integrate and reconcile with this huge segment of the Romanian population, which is most likely sceptical of him right now, and influence them positively?
While I think there was huge polarisation between the two camps in these elections, I don’t think Simion’s voters are as different from Nicușor Dan’s as they are presented to be. Ultimately, both electorates shared the desire for change and reform to make the system more efficient. The solutions proposed by Simion’s voters are more radical and reactionary, whereas Dan’s voters are more progressive and rational in their approach. But, in a nutshell, the objective is not radically different.
Besides change, one of the common elements is that most of Simion’s voters are still pro-European. They wish to continue on the path of the European Union and do not want to abandon liberal democracy. However, voting for Simion would have resulted in a huge democratic backlash. This vote of protest and despair could find a clear embodiment in the thoughtful, dialogical presidency of Nicușor Dan.
In other words, he has the potential to reconcile these voters by presenting reforms that consider the needs of individuals. He could reconcile the technocratic discourse with the input from those who have little time for technicalities and are inclined to follow a leader of change. It won’t be easy, but I think there is a common denominator that should be exploited quickly to create bridges and a dialogue in an increasingly reconciled society. After all, it’s a very divided one right now.
If we consider the foreign policy orientations of both candidates, it is clear that they hold very different views on certain issues. For example, George Simion campaigned against Macron, while Nicușor Dan is likely to have supported him or to have held pro-French views. In Poland, George Simion sided with the sovereignists, whereas Donald Tusk recorded a video message in support of Nicușor Dan.
There also seem to be differences regarding Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova. If George Simion had won, the European path or support from the EU for these two countries might have been reduced or even eliminated, whereas Nicușor Dan clearly supports the continuation of European support and the European path for these two countries. So, based on the foreign policy orientations of the two candidates and what they stand for, what are your conclusions? Who won and who lost in terms of foreign policy in Romania?
To be quite clear, I think Simion adapted to Donald Trump’s victory in the US. He and Georgescu repeatedly invoked Romania’s strategic relationship with the United States. In fact, Simion made the mistake of talking about it first on French conservative television, ignoring the strategic relationship with France completely.
This was clearly an opportunistic stance. Previously, both Simion and Georgescu used to criticise the United States of America and even the partnership with them. They also criticised Biden, Obama and other Democratic leaders.
The most important difference between the two views is that Nicușor Dan has clear values and principles related to liberal democracy. In the Trump era, these values bring Romania closer to EU countries promoting such values as the Franco-German couple than to Trump’s America. However, the strategic relationship with the US remains paramount, as it is the real owner of Romania — the leadership in Washington.
It goes beyond who is in charge of the United States. Trump is there for the time being, but this relationship has been built over more than 25 years. Having said that, I don’t think most Simion voters are particularly keen on his foreign policy ideas, especially with regard to Moldova. They are either ignorant of his de facto rapprochement with Russia or rather indifferent to it.
They voted with him because they thought it was a protest vote above all else. So, all in all, the relationship with the states in the European Union will certainly strengthen in the following years with Nicușor Dan. This mainly includes France, due to cultural and historical affinities with Romania, as well as common geopolitical interests, which are supported by the majority of Romanians, according to polls and the results of these elections.
This could only strengthen the European voice in relation to the United States. I also believe that Donald Trump will lose interest in trying to divide and overwhelm European countries individually, and will develop a more positive view of Europe and the European Union within the next six months.
You mentioned that you expect Romanian ties with Western European countries, especially France, to improve. An interesting aspect of these relations is that Poland recently signed a security agreement with France. We have also seen in recent times that Romanian society and Romanian elites, both sovereignist and liberal, are becoming fascinated with Poland.
What do you expect will happen in Polish–Romanian relations in the foreseeable future?
Yes, that’s a good question. The two countries form the backbone of the eastern flank of NATO and the EU. They are here to protect the Western countries from a potential Russian threat.
Because of this, the two countries’ shared destiny has become increasingly intertwined, especially since the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Of course, this depends to some extent on the political regimes and political orientation of those states. However, even if Mr Nawrocki wins in Warsaw, Poland has always been clever enough geopolitically not to jeopardise its relations with European allies while consolidating its access to London and Washington. The governments of all these countries — the UK, the US, France, Poland and Romania — are not the same. There are variations in ideological attitudes and strategies. For this reason, I believe that pragmatism is the most important principle to follow.
Pragmatically speaking, I think that whoever becomes president of Poland will try to maintain good relations with Romania, because these two countries are facing an objective Russian threat that goes beyond ideological nuances. Therefore, I expect this relationship to continue developing, whatever happens in Poland in two weeks.
The joy of Nicușor Dan’s victory will soon be over, and he will have to take on the challenging role of presidential politics. He will have to negotiate with political parties regarding the future government. Even though the government is responsible for most of the politics in Romania, his reign will most likely be associated with an austerity period in the Romanian economy and social affairs.
What challenges do you expect in the first months or year of Nicușor Dan’s rule? What could go wrong? What could go right?
Many things could go wrong and only a few things could go right. This is one of the most important challenges. He doesn’t have a government coalition or electoral alliance to support him.
He stood as an independent, so of course, with this fragmented parliament, it would be very difficult to organise a government majority. The first challenge would therefore be establishing a stable government in the medium term. At the same time, due to the evolution and fluctuation of the international situation, many of Romania’s economic challenges could also be a consequence of global or regional stagnation or crisis.
This could severely limit Dan’s ability to impose his reform programme. The good news is that these elections also showed that a huge number of ordinary Romanians were willing to sacrifice their time and energy to work on collective projects. So, I think the key would be for him to empower those forces in the country — the individual talents and groups who are willing to work more or less for free to implement modern reform programmes and ideas for change.
This would also be the only possible option, given the current political and economic situation. There are many threats and not many feasible solutions. However, the fact that society is mobilising to prevent a huge catastrophe — namely, the far right taking over the country — is a sign of democratic vitality that could be transformed into concrete actions, at least in the near future.
A lot of young people were celebrating Nicușor Dan’s victory and the opening of his campaign office. What are the relations generally between Nicușor Dan and the younger generations? To what extent is he a role model, or at least an example of a successful Romanian?
What do you expect will happen to this younger generation of Romanians who voted for him? What role will they play in politics and society from now on?
This is a good question because there are two possible scenarios. If the parties continue as they are, they could become very inert because they control parliament, so very few reforms could be enacted, and all the energy we saw yesterday could be exhausted quite rapidly, leading to disappointment in one or two years. On the other hand, the second, more positive scenario is based on Nicușor Dan’s example: he emerged through hard work in difficult conditions and circumstances, and he is not really interested in material success.
This is one of the most important lessons from his model: the lack of interest in becoming rich, projecting this wealth, and transforming it into a political tool. All these elements could motivate youngsters to become more civically and perhaps politically involved in creating structures that are more resilient to attempts to seize power from the people and misuse the state for private gain.
This could mean that Nicușor Dan is interested in establishing a political party or organisation, or rebuilding the Save Romania Union. From his position, he could inspire others to follow his example and restore the initial energies of the civic movements that emerged in 2012 and 2016. This time, they could be stronger than before.
This is the positive scenario in which a new generation of politicians could emerge, free from the influence of the old guard through the established parties.
Photo: Sergiu Mișcoiu (source: YouTube)
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