Georgescu Doctrine vs. the Snagov Consensus: Pro-Atlantism or Neo-Ceaușism for Romanian foreign policy?

Marius Ghincea, Contributors, March 2, 2025

This article was originally published on Contributors and is reprinted with the author’s consent. The subtitle belongs to the Bridge of Friendship.

Romania is today at a crossroads in terms of its foreign and security policy: does it remain on the trajectory established by the Snagov consensus, which guaranteed Euro-Atlantic integration, or does it reconsider its international orientation in a geopolitical context undergoing profound change? Călin Georgescu and the radical right-wing coalition around him propose a profound break with the Euro-Atlantic paradigm that has defined Romanian foreign policy for the last thirty years. He advocates a new foreign policy doctrine of a neo-Ceausescean nature-because it shares important elements of the strategic thinking of Nicolae Ceausescu’s regime-based on economic self-sufficiency, diversification of international relations, a strategic hedging approach, non-alignment with the emerging global power structure and a highly skeptical discourse regarding Western institutions and formats of European cooperation and integration, which he sees as anti-Romanian.

The Georgescu Doctrine is in direct conflict with the fundamental principles of the Snagov consensus, which defines the operational parameters of Romania’s foreign and security policy. The Snagov Consensus, established in 1995 and reaffirmed in 2001, is Romania’s foreign policy doctrine, an expression of the main elements of the grand strategy that guide Romania’s behavior and positions in European and global politics. Adopted and followed by all parliamentary parties over the last three decades, this doctrine is built around a “strategic trinity”: NATO membership as a guarantee of collective defense, integration into the European Union as the foundation of economic and democratic development and the strengthening of the strategic partnership with the United States as a pillar of geostrategic stability and guarantor of last resort for the country’s security. These three elements of the strategic trinity have been achieved gradually, with much hard work, culminating in the elevation of bilateral relations with the US to the level of strategic partnership in 1997, NATO membership in 2004 and EU integration in 2007. These remarkable achievements have placed Romania among the European liberal democracies and integrated it, for the first time in the multi-secular history of the Romanian people, into the most exclusive clubs of the world.

However, after these ambitious strategic goals of Romania were achieved, the country’s political elite, in a process of inter-generational change and defined by conflicts between the various patron-client networks controlling the major parties, switched Romanian foreign policy on automatic pilot. The resources allocated to foreign policy have decreased significantly, the prestige of the diplomatic corps and service has declined at an accelerated pace, to the point where the foreign minister is ranked among the last in the order of precedence set by the prime minister, and top political leaders have refused to come up with ambitious ideas or visions for the country’s foreign policy. In Brussels, whether we are talking about the EU or NATO, Romania aligns itself with the positions of other member states or the Commission, but rarely comes up with its own initiatives, ideas or substantial proposals to contribute to solving collective challenges or problems. Overall, this has created the general impression that Romanian foreign policy lacks the visibility, assertiveness and influence that Romanians believe it should have in these exclusive clubs that we have worked so hard to join. In other words, once entered into the world’s most important formats and organizations, the country’s political elites have not seen fit to do anything with this new and much coveted status.

In this context, and aware of this widely accepted diagnosis of the state of Romanian diplomacy and foreign policy, Călin Georgescu proposes a cure: distancing from the West, a distributist economic theory incompatible with the logic of the single European market, including by limiting the influence of foreign capital, and a reassessment of relations with Russia and China. The diagnosis remains correct, but the treatment proposed by the Georgescu doctrine risks killing the patient called Romania, along with all the successes, achieved with many sacrifices, of the Romanian people over the last three decades.

Given this ‘surgical’ treatment proposed by Călin Georgescu and the radical right-wing counter-elites, the question arises as to whether the Euro-Atlanticist elites can come up with a less invasive treatment, one that maintains the fundamental principles of the Snagov consensus, on which the country’s prosperity and security are based, but which does not kill Romania. A treatment that takes into account, at the same time, the erosion of the geopolitical certainties that defined the strategic thinking of the 1990s, when the consensus was first formulated and institutionalized. So far, the Euro-Atlantic elites have merely reaffirmed the fundamental principles of the consensus but have failed to come up with a coherent solution to the very real diagnosis of foreign policy ills. And the clock is ticking against them-and us, the whole nation.

The Georgescu Doctrine: Neo-Ceaușism in the 21st Century

The foreign policy vision proposed by Călin Georgescu claims to be a radical “sovereignism”, which I call “neo-Ceaușism”. This is because, although Georgescu proposes a foreign policy doctrine aimed at stopping Romania’s synchronization with the West, in neo-Lovinescian terms, he takes over key elements of the Ceaușescu regime’s foreign policy thinking, albeit in a form adapted to the 21st century, which implies the need to define this thinking in “neo”Ceaușescuist terms.

Thus, the Georgescu doctrine has several defining elements. First, it implies a significant distancing from the West, including NATO and the EU, which are seen as sources of unacceptable constraints. Georgescu, like the radical right-wing counter-elite, believes that Romania has surrendered its political and economic sovereignty by joining these structures, and that the result is subordination to Western capitals.

Secondly, the doctrine promotes a strategic hedging approach. Georgescu believes that, in a multipolar world, Romania should not put all its eggs in the Western basket, but cultivate pragmatic relations with states outside the Western sphere, from Russia and China to Turkey or the countries of the Middle East. In theory, this should reduce strategic risks by diversifying international relations, maximize foreign policy room for manoeuvre, and allow for economic or political benefits to be reaped from different parts of the globe. In reality, however, such an approach entails a significant risk of diluting Euro-Atlantic solidarity and may lead to placing Romania in an ambiguous position between geopolitical blocs in direct competition – the perfect victim for subversion, co-optation and harassment if it is alone in a geopolitical gray zone. Strategic hedging approaches are common in international relations, but they are rarely effective, and Romania is far from having the geostrategic conditions to ensure the effectiveness of such approaches.

Thirdly, on the economic front, Georgescu insists on a distributist autarky, in which the state would have greater control over strategic resources and sectors, arguing that the European single market and foreign capital have entrenched inequalities and jeopardized national industries. Moreover, any regulation or rule coming from the EU is perceived as a form of interference in Romania’s internal affairs. From this point of view, the Georgescu doctrine resonates with populist currents that reject globalization and attribute responsibility for domestic problems to supranational entities.

Last but not least, the Georgescu doctrine also includes elements that are highly critical of the international liberal order, seen as a system through which the major Western powers perpetuate their domination. By comparison, the Eastern partners, Russia, China, are presented in a more benign light, being praised either for their cultural conservatism or for their ability to provide rapid investment without political strings attached. But this romanticization of potential authoritarian partners ignores the long-term costs of dependence on capital from these regions, as well as the deep differences in values and interests. More than anything, it would create the conditions for state capture by patron-client networks that would no longer have the restraints imposed by the liberal conditions and rules coming from Brussels. In other words, free to steal without consequences, much like what is happening these days in Georgia or the countries of Central Asia.

But this doctrine proposed by Călin Georgescu does not come from nowhere. As I mentioned in the introduction, it comes in response to a real and serious diagnosis of the ills of Romanian foreign policy. Problems that have not received an adequate response from the Euro-Atlantic elites, promoters of the Snagov consensus, the current foreign policy doctrine.

The Snagov Consensus: Pro-Atlantism on auto-pilot?

The Snagov Consensus, formalized in 1995 and consolidated in 2001, is the domestic political agreement that defines Romania’s foreign and security policy direction: NATO membership, integration into the European Union and strategic partnership with the United States. This “strategic trinity” continues to be seen as the optimal solution for ensuring national security and achieving the West’s democratic and economic standards.

In the post-Cold War context, Romania was looking for firm security guarantees and wished to dissociate itself from its status as a former Soviet bloc country. The objective of joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization thus became a national priority, especially to ensure long-term military protection. In addition to security, Romania needed economic development and far-reaching structural reforms to bring it up to Western standards. EU membership gave the country access to development funds and the single market, as well as an institutional framework to accelerate reforms in areas such as justice, administration and the rule of law. At the same time, the US was seen as the main guarantor of regional stability and security, both through its predominant role in NATO and its ability to exert political and economic influence at the global level. Romania has therefore sought to strengthen bilateral relations with Washington by becoming a partner for the United States in Eastern Europe.

In achieving these goals, the Snagov Consensus has acted as a strategic anchor for Romania. The agreement has signaled to external partners that Romania is resolutely committed to reforms and is moving in a clear and irreversible pro-Western direction. At the same time, in a period marked by the tensions of transition, the consensus has helped to maintain a coherent and predictable foreign policy line, regardless of changes of government or electoral fluctuations. But perhaps most importantly, consensus ensured access to resources and development mechanisms. NATO and EU integration opened the way for investment, infrastructure projects and initiatives to modernize the economy, administration and other key sectors.

However, as mentioned in the introduction, once the central objectives of the Snagov Consensus were achieved, Romania has visibly diminished its efforts to be a relevant actor in these Euro-Atlantic structures. The authorities in Bucharest have prioritized other domestic political agendas and foreign policy has gone into autopilot. However, this weakening of the diplomatic initiative does not undo the progress achieved, nor does it demonstrate that a radical shift towards foreign policy diversification is necessary. Rather, it shows that Romania’s political elites need to assume a more active role in Euro-Atlantic organizations in order to fully exploit the strategic potential they have so painstakingly negotiated.

What needs to be done? A more visible and assertive Romania

The fact that Romania faces shortcomings in the foreign policy sphere does not justify adopting the “surgical” treatment proposed by the Georgescu doctrine. The many shortcomings that define Romanian foreign policy and the Romanian diplomatic and consular service today can be resolved by actively re-engaging and launching initiatives within Western structures, not by leaving them.

1. We need to upgrade the diplomatic service and increase the resources allocated to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This at a time when the government has cut the Romanian diplomacy budget by almost 20% in the recently approved budget. As we have pointed out in previous years, Romanian diplomacy is one of the worst funded in the region, so you cannot ask for performance when you do not invest enough. We need a new minister with political breadth and vision for Romanian diplomacy and foreign policy, one who can make the necessary reforms in an institution still closed by nepotistic clans and defined by an organizational culture that is not conducive to collaboration and the personal and professional development of young diplomats.
2. We need political leaders who will promote a more assertive and dynamic pro-Atlanticist vision, which will produce pride, satisfaction and contentment among the disaffected Romanians who believe that Romania is too submissive to foreign powers. In other words, we need political will. That implies vision, ambition and tact to promote new initiatives, ideas and concrete proposals in key areas, which they can then promote appropriately both abroad – more visibility is also needed – and at home, among Romanians, in an accessible way. However, this should not imply abandoning the strategic trinity or a departure from the Snagov consensus, but simply using the potential and opportunities offered by our membership of the Euro-Atlantic area to promote our interests proactively and visibly. But for this to become possible we need Bucharest to invest more in the human and intellectual resources of both the parties and the MFA.
3. We need a different communication approach. The characteristic wooden language and style of political and diplomatic communication of the MFA and political leaders on foreign policy issues needs reinvigoration. Political leaders and the MFA need to re-package foreign policy in a language that is sexier for the average Romanian, especially those with limited attention spans and a somewhat poorer education. This comes in opposition to a long, deep-rooted tradition in foreign policy circles that values an extremely rigorous discourse and valorizes institutional semi-opaqueness. But the needs of the moment call for a change of discourse, a repackaging of the Sinaia consensus in a more appealing garb for the broad mass of voters.
4. We also need a recalibration of the hierarchy within the strategic trinity, in line with the evolution of transatlantic relations and the participation of the US in guaranteeing European and Romanian security. In the event of confirmation of American withdrawal from Europe, the pillar of European integration must become more prominent. This recalibration seems to have already taken place, given the messages of Ilie Bolojan, but the defining role will be played by the next president, who will have the obligation to implement the new defense strategy and reconfigure the foreign policy vision.

Conclusion

A radical reorientation of a neo-Ceaușescean type, such as that proposed by the Georgescu Doctrine, risks undoing the efforts and progress of the last three decades. Instead, a more visible, more assertive and better explained pro-Atlanticist stance can correct current foreign policy shortcomings while maintaining the stability and prosperity achieved under the umbrella of the Snagov consensus. Romania needs to redefine its role within Euro-Atlantic structures, not abandon them, in order to strengthen its country profile and respond to new geopolitical challenges.

Photo: Romanian foreign ministry (source: Facebook)

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