What Romania lacks to carry Poland’s weight in the EU: ‘They knew how to get close to the inner circle of the real power holders’

Ștefan Lică, Adevărul, February 16, 2025

Harvard-educated career diplomat Ovidiu Dranga explains, in an interview for “Adevărul”, what Romania lacks in order to have a say in the European Union and the North Atlantic Alliance. An example from which those who set the lines of foreign policy in Bucharest could start would be that of Poland, a country that has come to sit at the table of the important players since the fall of the Iron Curtain.

Ovidiu Dragna is a career diplomat

Adevărul: Who are you, Ambassador Ovidiu Dranga?

Ovidiu Dranga: I am the son of teachers. I went to a mathematics-physics high school, and to this day I remain passionate about history, foreign languages and mathematics. After graduating in 1990 from the Polytechnic Institute (now the Polytechnic University) in Bucharest, I took a competitive examination and started working as a journalist for the magazine “Lumea”. In the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MAE), I also entered, in 1991, through a competitive examination, for a diplomatic post in the Political Planning Directorate. After I was hired, I found out that my articles had been noticed by the Ministry’s management. Since then, I gradually worked my way up the diplomatic hierarchy to the rank of ambassador. I have held/exercised leading positions since 1999, when I became the first collaborator of the Romanian Ambassador to NATO. Between 2001 and 2005, I was seconded to the Romanian ministry of Defense, as Deputy Secretary of State for Defense Policy, during which period (2003-2004) I completed my Master’s studies at Harvard University, JFK School of Government (Master in Public Administration – MPA).

You also have extensive experience in diplomacy, you have also been decorated internationally and you have an important academic activity. How would you summarize all this?

I served three terms as ambassador: to Belgium, Poland and Japan. I returned from Tokyo, by resignation, exactly one year ago, after which I was seconded to the Euro-Atlantic Resilience Center (E-ARC) for six months. I am currently working in the directorate of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in charge of preparing Romania’s participation in Expo Osaka 2025. I have published dozens of articles in the Romanian and international press, I have lectured at SNSPA, Romanian diplomatic institute and the National Defense College and I have been decorated by the Presidents of Romania and Poland, as well as by Princess Margareta, Crown Custodian of Romania.

How Warsaw always manages to stay one step ahead of Bucharest

You were Romania’s ambassador to Poland for 8 years. You are therefore very familiar with the country’s history, diplomacy and economy, its social and political realities. How would you characterize modern-day Poland compared to Romania, at least in terms of foreign and security policy? What do they have that we don’t and vice versa?

Poland is one of the great success stories of modern and contemporary Europe. To understand why Poland has today become one of the most influential and respected states on our continent, we need to look at history. As you know, Poland was for several hundred years a great power in Eastern Europe, with the Polish-Lithuanian Union virtually dominating the space between Russia, the Habsburg Empire and the Ottoman Empire. Then, in 1795, it simply disappeared from the political map of the continent, divided between Tsarist Russia, the Habsburg Empire and Prussia. Poland’s spectacular return to the world map came after the First World War. Throughout the absence/suspension of statehood, the Polish elite kept alive the desire for national revival, based on a high sense of cultural and religious identity of the Polish people, in times of great social and economic hardship, marked by political oppression/repression.

And what is the key to Polish success?

Constantly subject to geopolitical pressure from three directions, Poland has historically chosen to resist aggression, even if it has not been victorious in all confrontations/war. The first great victory of the last century was in 1920, when Polish troops led by Marshal Pilsudski defeated the Red Army at the gates of Warsaw (‘Miracle on the Vistula’), preventing Bolshevik Russia’s advance towards the Great War-weary west of Europe. The second great victory, this time a moral one, was the heroic and at the same time tragic resistance to the invasion of Nazi Germany and the USSR in 1939. Let us not forget that Poland withstood, through heroic struggle, for several weeks the overwhelming, simultaneous and coordinated onslaught of Hitler’s and Stalin’s troops, who occupied and divided the country, putting its sovereignty and independence in brackets for almost 6 years, during which the Polish people were the victims of destruction and atrocities unprecedented in the recent history of Europe and the world. The third episode of symbolic value is the Warsaw Uprising of August-October 1944, when the Poles rose up against the Nazi occupiers, hoping that the approaching Soviet troops would help them, unaware that they were under orders not to intervene. In retaliation, Hitler completely destroyed Warsaw, which rose from the ashes after the war. The fourth victorious moment was the overthrow of the communist regime, which began long before other former Soviet camp countries and ended peacefully with the first free elections in a USSR-ruled country after 1945.

In other words, Poland has developed a level of pride and ambition that is hard to find in other European nations, based on the determination to endure and the strength to revive, the ability to build sustainably and the courage to assert itself. In my opinion, this is the key to Polish success.

The secret of the “Polish miracle”

Would you say the secret of the “Polish miracle” is resilience, identity and ambition?

I would say, to a very large extent, yes. In fact, recent studies, such as the one conducted by the Rand Corporation, confirm that these are the ingredients of a state’s strength, or at least the most important ones. There are others, such as intelligent patriotism, favourable international circumstances, advantageous external ties or the country’s geographical/geopolitical particularities, but it is the fibre, the resources, the mentality, the will and the way the nation/state is organized/administered that are the starting points.

Coming to the present day, what do you think is the explanation for the respect, reputation and influence that Poland enjoys in the world at the moment?

First, starting from the fundamental premise that international relations are power relations, Poland quickly understood after the end of the Cold War that in order to be relevant in the Euro-Atlantic space, it had to approach persistently and pragmatically the narrow circle of real power holders in the EU and NATO, which are not charitable organizations. Hence the formation of the Weimar Triangle and the accelerated rapprochement with the USA, including through the huge and highly influential Polish diaspora in America.

Secondly, it quickly realized that influence in Central Europe or in the Baltic area translated into influence in Brussels or Washington, and meticulously began to increase its specific geopolitical weight, assuming a proactive regional posture of positioning and diplomatic action fueled by generous resources, which allowed the promotion of ambitious ideas and projects. For example, this gave birth to the Visegrad Group and then, in coordination with Sweden, to the Eastern Partnership.

Thirdly, Poland has realized that political and economic advantages can be gained in relations with European partners and allies by strengthening interactions with states on other continents, particularly in Asia, where there are actors with global aspirations, but also significant opportunities for trade development, which must be taken into account when calibrating your own foreign policy or economic diplomacy. Poland has about six times as many trade attachés as Romania, for an economy that is only twice the size of ours.

Last but not least, Poland has learned from the great mistakes or failures of modern/contemporary European history, peppered with episodes of appeasement, and has been consistent in loudly signaling, without fear of “reprisals” or “admonishments”, that the fundamental, almost existential danger to Europe is Russia. Consequently, Poland has been preparing for years to cope, primarily with its own forces, with possible Russian aggression, or at least with the assertiveness of Moscow, which will always see Central and Eastern Europe as an area belonging to its traditional geostrategic sphere of influence.

What does this say about Poland, and how can we explain the fact that the Poles have helped Ukraine and Moldova more than a great power like France?

By everything it has done so far, Poland has proved that it is capable of anticipating the future, which is also an essential attribute of power. This explains the massive aid given to Ukraine in the current war, as well as Poland’s activism in the Republic of Moldova.

In all this very sophisticated game, based on interests and not emotions, in which there is no place for minuteness/timidity, Poland has entered without complexes, without remorse or guilt and without reservations, with fresh forces, trained in decades of real dissidence/resistance, relying on the moral arguments outlined above. Who could, after 1989, have stopped the rise or given lessons in democracy or dignity to Poland, which had managed to free itself, first of all by its own efforts, from communism, after having resisted, admittedly at enormous cost, the Nazi and then Soviet invasion and occupation?

What should the Polish example inspire us to learn from and apply?

What do you think Romania’s position should be in the current European and global context? What can we take from the Polish example and what not?

As ambassador in Warsaw, my main objective as ambassador was to establish and strengthen the Romanian-Polish tandem in regional, European and Euro-Atlantic affairs. I believe that we succeeded in achieving this goal, at least this was the situation in 2021, before my departure to Tokyo, when the sixth summit of the Bucharest Format (B9), launched by Romania and Poland in 2015, took place and President Duda was making his third visit to our country. This entailed understanding the way Polish institutions work, but above all getting to know the springs behind certain Polish foreign policy gestures or actions.

On the one hand, I think that the Polish model is interesting for us in terms of strategic indispensability. Romania’s apprenticeship in NATO and the EU is over! No one is preventing us from becoming indispensable in Central and Eastern Europe, the Black Sea area and the Balkans, drawing inspiration from Warsaw, which has been able to profile itself as an indispensable interlocutor and player when it comes to the Baltic Sea, Central Europe and the former Soviet area. This means ensuring that nothing sustainable can be conceived and/or implemented without Romania in the neighborhoods of major interest for our security and prosperity, just as Poland is present at all discussions about and involved in all processes in the regions of primary interest for it. From now on, for the next 10-15 years, I believe that one of the items of major relevance for the foreign policy agendas of both countries is the future of Ukraine, including the end of the conflict and reconstruction. I believe that we need to synchronize/coordinate more and better, we would only have everything to gain.

On the other hand, I think we can take inspiration from Warsaw’s conduct of big politics. For example, we could approach the much-needed reform of the European Union, including its competitiveness and relevance in the context of the major geopolitical realignments to come, or global security issues, including economic security, professionally and without hesitation.

Strategic boldness/initiative is the modus operandi in Warsaw. I believe that being permanently on the diplomatic offensive creates a great advantage in negotiations, that of being able to influence or even control the common agenda so that the agreed steps satisfy one’s own objectives or priorities to a significant extent. I suppose it is better/indicated to impose/propose themes/issues/actions than to react to the actions of others.

What other lessons could we learn from the Polish model?

Concretely, we can learn from the Poles how to coalesce promoting majorities or blocking minorities, depending on our interests, especially in the EU but also in NATO, by improving our capacity to negotiate simultaneously on several levels. Poland joined the EU and NATO only a few years before Romania, but it has learned, even better than some long-standing member countries, when/how to use its veto or when/how to trade its weight in voting mechanisms/procedures, without fear of “bothering” anyone. In this way, Poland has achieved multiple targets with minimal costs, while proposing Polish solutions to some of Europe’s pressing problems. Apart from the fabulous rate of absorption of European funds, which is very much a matter of technical skills and internal administrative capacity, Warsaw’s political performance was to turn some of its national interests into objectives or even priorities of both organizations, for the achievement of which it was able to mobilize resources pooled by partners and allies.

Where Bucharest and Warsaw can work together

What can Romania and Poland do better together? What makes us different and what brings us closer?

The bilateral relationship is increasingly dynamic and complex. I initiated the organization of joint government meetings, the first two during my mandate. I don’t know exactly how things have evolved over the last three or four years, but certain constants or elements of continuity can be highlighted, of course. For example, I imagine that political dialog has increased in frequency and density, as has economic cooperation. It is clear that we must continue to manage our interdependencies effectively and profitably. Rivalry does us no good, whereas deepened cooperation will always pay dividends. Support for Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova, the revitalization of the Three Seas Initiative and the Bucharest 9 format, as well as bilateral military cooperation should remain high on the common agenda. I would add preparing for a serious discussion on the future of Europe and the transatlantic relationship, as well as NATO’s defense posture along the Eastern flank for the next 5-10 years, in the run-up to the Hague Summit. In my view, the southern and northern extremities of the eastern flank must be treated equally so that any aggression is credibly deterred. Energy, connectivity, infrastructure and transport could also continue to figure as dominant sectors of intensified cooperation, alongside innovation. In my opinion, it would be absolutely natural for Romania and Poland to contribute to the transformation of Central Europe into a ‘start-up region’, which would become one of the driving forces for restoring EU competitiveness and attracting investment in cutting-edge areas, including artificial intelligence.

As for the differences, they are visible to the naked eye. Take a look at the representation of Poland and Romania at the recently concluded Davos Forum, as well as Poland’s stance on the idea of setting up a European rearmament bank, and you will understand…

Romania joined NATO in 2004 and the EU in 2007, the biggest Romanian successes in recent years. Since then, Romania has seemingly stumbled and achievements are lacking. Is it possible to speak of a cone of obscurity into which Romanian diplomacy has entered today compared to that of the end of the last century – the first decade of the 2000s? Why is Romanian foreign policy suffering and why are we failing to promote our interests in the EU and NATO?

Romania has not been slow in its stride, the Black Sea Synergy, the Danube Strategy, the setting up of the E-RCA (The Euro-Atlantic Resilience Centre – note of the translator), the Bucharest Format (B9) or the Strategic Partnership with Japan are proof of this, but I agree that the achievements could have been much greater. I think, however, that it would be better to ask this question to those who have led or had direct responsibility for Romania’s foreign policy over the last 10-12 years. A serious audit of foreign policy would probably reveal how opportunities have been seized, how resources have been allocated and the concrete way in which priorities have been set.

You see, I belong to a vanishing world in which competence, creativity and initiative were prized and in which imposture, inadequacy, convenience and indifference were rarely present except in manageable proportions, only accidentally reaching the decision-making level. For those of my generation, who made the victory of the 1989 Revolution possible (I had friends who died for freedom then!) and who went through the hardships of the transition at the age of early adulthood, the satisfaction of building always compensated for the pains of doing. Now, from what I see, things seem to have changed. Therefore, I can only assume that the current state of affairs in our foreign policy reflects the general evolution of Romanian society.

In the fever of preparation for EU and NATO accession, huge efforts have been made to reform the institutions, which has produced positive effects in society, with the benefits of European and Euro-Atlantic integration being visible to all. I can only note that the pace of change in our society today, which has made huge progress, is different from that in public administration, where there is progress, but it seems to be in the opposite direction. Then, the institutions pulled society up; now, when society has modernized, its elites no longer seem capable or interested in modernizing the administration, even if the resources would be there. It is a paradox that I cannot explain. I don’t know if the necessary motivation for real state reform can be recreated today with the same ease. Twenty-five years ago, many things were still done out of passion, today stepping out of one’s comfort zone is often costly or even dangerous. I am beginning to become convinced that the politics of least resistance is the rule, with taking responsibility or risk becoming the exception…

Note: the views and opinions expressed in this material are those of the interviewee and do not engage the responsibility of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Photo: Warsaw’s skyscrapers (source: Pixabay, CC0)

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