Romania – Bulgaria: Why is (inter)connectivity needed?

Răzvan Munteanu, Adevărul, November 25, 2024

Not infrequently, looking to the West, the Euro-Atlantic vision in Bucharest tends to relegate to second place partners on the natural border, even if they are also members of the same geostrategic space

An eloquent case in this respect is Bulgaria, where, beyond the Schengen issue, the bilateral relationship with the neighboring country is almost unknown in the public space of the two countries, even though cooperation on the Sofia-Bucharest axis is becoming increasingly important, not only in the two capitals, but also in Brussels. In addition, the differences in strategic vision, where Sofia focused on road interconnectivity and Bucharest prioritized the dredging of the Danube, have contributed to the hindering of a vision assumed bilaterally. For example, Romania has been unhappy about the delay in approving the Bulgarian part of the Fast Danube (FD) project, particularly because of the political instability in the neighboring country, which has seen a succession of governments in the last two years.

But let’s take them one by one, starting with terrestrial interconnectivity.

The European Union has allocated €23 million for the gas interconnector linking Giurgiu-Comasca to Marten (Bulgaria), completed at the end of 2016, and this year the energy ministers of Romania and Bulgaria, together with their Greek counterpart, signed the Declaration of Intent for the Development of a Renewable Energy Pillar in South-East Europe, which entails a series of joint energy projects.

At the same time, the strategic partnership signed in March 2023 should boost cooperation between Romania and Bulgaria, all the more so as the entire regional security context, which has emerged in the wake of the Russian-Ukrainian war, requires increased land interconnectivity between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea. Against this backdrop, the construction of new bridges across the Danube linking Romania and Bulgaria should become a priority for the governments of the two countries. Unfortunately, however, at the moment, on the entire Danube route, from Germany to the Delta, the density of interconnectivity bridges is at its lowest level between our country and Bulgaria, despite the 307 km crossed by the second largest river in Europe between us and Bulgaria. Between Germany, Austria and Slovakia, for example, there are a total of 159 such bridges with an average distance of 6.7 km. As such projects, coupled with rail transportation lines, would lead to an increase in regional traffic, developing tourism, increasing investment and economically developing the towns and villages in the border area, their absence is certainly one of the reasons why both Romania and Bulgaria are at the bottom of the economic league tables in the European Union.

Romania must capitalize on the EU and NATO’s growing interest in the region. The European Commission has approved a budget of more than €13 million from European funds for Military Mobility for the construction of the Giurgiu-Ruse 2 bridge, which should be completed by 2035. The project is Romania’s, Bulgaria is only responsible for carrying out some works on its bank, but until the feasibility study is finalized we do not yet know its shape – if it will include rail transport – or its exact location.

In February 2024, Adina Vălean, in her position as Commissioner for Transport, said: 

“the project for a feasibility study came relatively late, it was submitted by Romania on the Military Mobility funds. It was approved, but (the approval) is only for the feasibility study at the moment. I hope that things will move as soon as possible, so that it can apply for the actual financing of the works. At the moment it is only submitted as a road bridge, with an option for rail. I hope it will also be a railroad bridge, because it is on this North-South Corridor, which needs to be served by a modern crossing over the Danube”.

From a military point of view, the land and rail interconnectivity creating the Mediterranean-Black Sea corridor is important because it brings rapid transportation alternatives, as the presence of naval forces in the Black Sea is conditioned by the Montreaux Convention. Then, the creation of new bridges to Ukraine, especially Galati-Reni, increases Romania’s strategic potential. Last, but not least, the corridor can be exploited by our country in the reconstruction process of Ukraine. In August 2024, the defense ministers of Romania, Bulgaria and Greece signed a memorandum in which they want to increase interconnectivity, including by building a bridge between Călărași and Silistra. The project is not a new one, with the governments in Sofia and Bucharest having signed a series of agreements back in 2014 to build bridges between Călărași-Silistra and Turnu Măgurele-Nicopole. Existing only on paper, the initiatives were lost, and the opportunities with them. Putting this year’s memorandum into practice would not only attract funds from Brussels, but like any project of this kind will increase the economic and industrial potential of the cities on the Danube bank, which are components of the infrastructure.

Inevitably, the increased interest of the EU and NATO represents a unique opportunity for us and our Bulgarian neighbors.

Thus, the construction of an interconnectivity architecture will also facilitate road transportation on the Turkey-Central Europe route, making Serbia much less attractive, and not only for freight transportation, where the time/cost ratio will be much more advantageous compared to using the Bulgarian-Romanian route.

At present, both built bridges have a rail component that is far from reaching the desired potential. Due to the old infrastructure, the railroad Giurgiu-Ruse can travel at a maximum speed of 15 km/h, while on the much newer Calafat-Vidin route, the infrastructure on the Romanian side is in an advanced state of disrepair, making it less attractive to use this route. Not only the reconsolidation of these routes must be a priority for us, but also the construction of a new line on the Oltenița-Tutrakan route, which would shorten the route of carriers in the Turkey-Bucharest direction by about 130 kilometers.

In turn, the rail lines will come to the carriers’ aid, especially during the summer periods when the level of the Danube falls and shipping traffic is blocked, even for a few weeks. Here Romania proposes one more solution.

Let’s go back to the FD. The Fast Danube 2 project was approved by the EU this summer and will make the Danube navigable for 340 days/year, 60 days more than at present.

The budget is provided 85% by European funding and 15% funding from Romania’s state budget, and the project aims, according to the official website, to identify the technical solutions to be implemented in order to ensure navigation conditions on the joint Romanian-Bulgarian section of the Danube and the safe transportation on the Danube all year round, in line with the recommendations of the Budapest Danube Commission.

Nearly failing in 2022, Fast Danube 2 was then restarted and in the summer of 2024 it received a favorable opinion and Environmental Agreement from the Romanian authorities, with a seven-year implementation period. In October the Bulgarian side took the same decision. Surprisingly or not, all the war in Ukraine has favored the EU’s decision to finance the project, all the more so as Bucharest has become the main transit route for Ukrainian grain to the global market, which increases the importance of the Danube’s year-round navigability. This unblocks the traffic on the Lower Danube in the context of the Rhine-Danube corridor on a 14 percent stretch.

Finally, the Bulgarian initiative to resume plans for the construction of the Turnu Măgurele-Nicopole hydroelectric power station is to be welcomed. The project, similar to Iron Gates I and II, dates back to 1975 but was abandoned a year later. It would generate 800 MW of electricity annually, at a total cost of around €6bn, including the construction of a road bridge between the two towns. The impact would not only be economic, but could also turn Romania and Bulgaria into suppliers of cheap electricity in the Balkans, increasing the strategic potential. At the same time, the construction and shape of the power plant must meet the need to maintain navigability on the Danube, at least in line with Fast Danube 2.

Martin Georgiev, director of the Bulgarian National Electricity Company, said earlier this year that “this is a cross-border project where the hydropower plant is only a small part of the benefits – it is an important infrastructure project that will provide important connectivity between the two countries – roads, railways, energy networks, because there will be a substation and improved flotation, and flood risk management”.

In August, the hydropower project passed its initial assessment and was included in the EU’s list of cross-border renewable energy projects, pending final approval.

Because when we talk about Romania and Bulgaria we pronounce the European Union just as often, just listing the above should answer Eurosceptic questions in both Romania and Bulgaria.

The implementation of these large infrastructure projects must be understood from the perspective of prioritization for each state. The outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian war has not only created insecurity, but also opportunities. Certainly, Romania has prioritized, among other things, increasing transit capacity on the border with the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine, opening new border points with Ukraine, increasing transit capacity on the Sulina canal or expanding the intake capacities in the ports on the Maritime Danube and Constanta, while Bulgaria has seen the development of the land transport network as much more important.

But geopolitical dynamics are now creating a favorable framework for Romania and Bulgaria, with the two governments ultimately having to choose whether the Danube will separate or unite us.

Photo: The Friendship Bridge (source: Agency for Road Infrastructure (Bulgaria))

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