Twelve important months for Moldova

Posted by Marcus Popov Damgaard | Jul 15, 2024 | Magasinet Røst

MOLDOVA | The next twelve months could prove to be defining for Moldova. The country on the threshold of EU membership is currently experiencing extreme polarization, and the presidential election on 20 October will be the first major test after the country gained EU candidate status in December 2023. Here, pro-European Maia Sandu, who started her office with unheard of popularity, will , see if she can bring the divided population back together.  No later than July 2025, parliamentary elections will be held, where Sandu’s support party PAS will try to stand against the pro-Russian parties and muster just some of the massive support of 52% they got back in 2021.  Over the last 3 years,  the support for PAS however, decreased significantly. There is therefore much evidence that it could turn into a close race between the country’s wings, which seem to lean unconditionally on either the EU or Russia. Why has PAS been challenged in Moldova and where does the arrow point for the small country between Romania and Ukraine? 

One of Europe’s focal points

The international community’s attention to Moldova in the past few years undeniably has a lot to do with Russia’s invasion of neighboring Ukraine. In the aftermath of the invasion, Moldova saw an opportune moment to submit its official application for EU membership. It was followed by a fierce work to receive the official designation as an EU candidate country. It was granted in December 2023 – after having met almost all nine demands from the EU regarding, among other things, de-oligarchisation, media freedom and minority rights. At the same time, the government in Chisinau has also been good at securing the favor of the Western European countries; in the summer of 2023, the international forum, “European Political Community” (EPC), held its second summit in the capital, Chisinau, with the participation of a large number of top European leaders. 

The many European praises for Maia Sandu contrast in many ways with the situation domestically: Despite a fine percentage result in the autumn local elections, her supporting party PAS failed to win the mayor’s post in any of the largest cities – most shockingly, not even in Chisinau, where a large part of the voter base resides. At the same time, opinion polls since the invasion have consistently shown that PAS faces a large drop in support among the population, which, despite overwhelming support for EU membership, is polarized in terms of relations with Russia and the West. 

Legal reforms in a quandary

I caught up with Chisinau-based Romanian journalist and political analyst, Mihai Isac, to hear about PAS’s challenges in the run-up to a series of crucial elections. Isac has lived in Moldova for a number of years, where in addition to being the founder of the media Karadeniz and editor of politicaexterna.ro, he also hosts a weekly political analysis program on the Romanian-language TV channel TVR in Chisinau. In other words, Isac is busy with developments in the region and is in the middle of preparations for this afternoon’s broadcast when I catch him over a connection at noon one day in the spring.  

In relation to the challenges of the governing party PAS, Isac mentions partly the Russian success in polarizing the population, partly a widespread experience that the critical reforms of the legal system have come to a standstill. After a promising beginning, in which PAS succeeded in a wide range of measures and perhaps even seemed invincible, a certain kind of inertia has begun to show itself. Particularly because the reforms have reached the legal area, which is considered the most important, as it has been challenged and exposed in a large number of cases for several decades.

The most notorious case saw the light of day in 2016 and concerns, among other things, oligarch and former Member of Parliament, Vlad Plahotniuc. According to the prosecutors, in the period 2012-2014, in close cooperation with judges, oligarchs and politicians such as Ilan Shor and former Prime Minister Vlad Filat, Plahotniuc should have committed what is described in the country as the “theft of the century”. Over a billion dollars was stolen from the Moldovan banks via loans for fictitious investments. It is suspected that the judges have shown a striking lack of interest in investigating all those involved – and not least their own involvement in the case – as a thorough investigation would also affect them themselves. “Theft of the century” is just one case in a long series that shows that the country’s legal system is thoroughly politicized and prone to abuse of power. 

In the effort to clean up the legal system, PAS has tried to implement a wide range of reforms that will limit the judges’ competences and impunity. This has led to a long, dirty battle between the institutions with very few tangible results. The latest attempt has been a so-called “pre-vetting” commission, consisting of Moldovan and foreign experts with the aim of assessing whether the candidates for positions in the legal system have the necessary ethical standards. A large number of them failed the test, and this led in the spring of 2023 to the fact that the judges and prosecutors, after being assessed as unfit, have actively opposed attempts to change to the judiciary. 

In this connection, Isac mentions how a case with a Dutch expert suspected of corruption a few years before his involvement in the Moldovan “pre-vetting” commission has turned out to be extremely bad PR for the whole case. “Such a case is naturally used by the pro-Russian media in the country,” he notes. 

But “there is also no great interest in implementing the reforms,” ​​he continues. “Many of the ministers who originally wanted to implement the reforms are no longer in the government. Someone like Olesea Stamate is probably still part of it in her role as Deputy Minister of Justice, but this also means that she is no longer among the leaders. And that is among the biggest problems. It is not only my position, but also something that the EU and the US have stated.”   

Isac continues and says that “due to the entanglement of the legal system with political interests, legal reforms have gradually been stalled for over 10 years. And the mechanisms that made themselves felt during the case with Vlad Plahotniuc are still there to this day. And at the same time, these are also some mechanisms that Russia makes use of in connection with their support for opposition politicians – such as the two oligarchs Ilan Shor and Veceaslav Platon. And as a result of the Russian use of the corruption in Moldova as a kind of hybrid weapon, the reforms are coming to fruition.”   

The population is tired of the government’s abdication of responsibility

The legal reforms are thus among the most challenged. At the same time, it is also one of the areas where Moldova has been particularly exposed to Russian influence. In 2014, the case of the Moldovan “laundromat” saw the light of day. The case showed how black Russian money flowed into various European banks – including Danske Bank – in a cunningly devised money laundering scheme. Here, the Moldovan bank Moldinconbank was among one of the main vessels for laundering a staggering 20 billion dollars. In other words, there is much that indicates a close connection between Russian influence and corruption in what, after 24 February 2022, has transformed into a geopolitical conflict between Russia and the West. That the pro-Western actors in their fight against corruption are also fighting a fight against precisely Russian influence in the region is also how it is often presented in the liberal media in South-Eastern Europe – also in Moldova. 

But appearances have in several cases proven to be deceiving, and there have been several cases in the region of politicians who have followed the flow of time and decorated themselves with borrowed EU feathers, or conversely EU politicians who have been caught with their fingers in the cake tin. I therefore ask Isac, whether in Moldova there is always an identity between the two factors – i.e. the fight against Russian influence and corruption, or whether there have also been corruption cases involving the self-styled provost actors? 

“There is that too. For example, in the current government (PAS, ed.) there are corrupt politicians who try to use the legal system for their own benefit. And as a result of the current foreign policy situation, they use Russia as an excuse in almost every imaginable situation. Among other things, the blame is placed on the Russians for failing to implement the legal reforms. In other words, everything is the Russians’ fault, which large parts of the population are tired of hearing. Understand me correctly, the Russians bear a very big responsibility, but this kind of discourse is used far too extreme, and it tires a large part of the population, who consider it an abdication of responsibility on the part of the government.” 

I have heard from many that PAS has monopolized pro-European politics and presented itself as the only alternative to Russian influence and corruption in the country. Is it a strategy that now affects them themselves?

“Yes, to a great extent. PAS does not have a very good local presence in the country. There are many local, smaller pro-European parties that had quite good elections in the autumn. Many of the parties would like to join PAS. But either PAS sets too high demands on the local politicians, or they are unable to offer them the political support that the local politicians themselves believe they are entitled to. In addition, there are often also many personal relationships involved in politics, which means that PAS does not really manage to create the broad alliance that is necessary for consolidation. A form of cannibalization is therefore taking place on the pro-European wing. Such a situation is of course also something that Russia takes advantage of,” he says. 

Popular in Brussels – challenged on the plain

Challenges at home thus stand in contrast to the recognition that President Maia Sandu and, among others, former foreign minister Nicu Popescu has reaped abroad. Here, as mentioned, they have managed to strike while the iron was hot, which led to Moldova gaining the status of a candidate country in December 2023.

In this connection, they have also managed to gather the West’s attention to Moldova’s security situation. As previously described in RØST, the breakaway republic of Transnistria poses a significant risk by virtue of being a base for Russian psychological operations in the region. After the Russian invasion of Ukraine, there have reportedly been a number of them: Among other things in the winter of 2023, when President Maia Sandu announced that there were plans for a coup attempt by the pro-Russian groups in the country. As a consequence, then Foreign Minister Nicu Popescu called on the EU to tighten the sanctions net around leading pro-Russian actors. This has led to the sanctioning of, for example, Dmitry Mitulhin, head of the FSB’s operations in Moldova. In this connection, the previously mentioned oligarch Ilan Shor and other key actors have been sanctioned. The West has thus, in its own way, been more active in supporting Moldova and restraining Moscow. 

The challenges of support at home in Moldova are striking. In many ways, it goes against the widespread notions in Western Europe of a powerful PAS and a popular Maia Sandu?  

“Maia Sandu and former foreign minister, Nicu Popesu – who is also a very skilled diplomat – had implemented a form of “peer-to-peer” diplomacy. They thus have quite good personal relations with many Western European top politicians. And they are very good at talking to Europe. But politics in the high offices of Europe is one thing – being able to conduct politics in a small village on the Moldovan plain is quite another,” says Isac. 

Where at the beginning of the government’s mandate it was possible to build up a large amount of goodwill in the population on the basis of the European network, it is gradually evaporating. “Now it is being replaced by a rejection of PAS, which is largely due to pro-Russian oligarchs such as Ilan Shor’s and Vlad Plahotniuc’s effective communication”, he adds.

I’ve heard people describe PAS as arrogant – is that something you can relate to? 

“ It is very accurate, yes, absolutely. They are arrogant. And this is how they appear not only to the population outside the cities, but also to the media, to such an extent that they prefer to use their own “in-house” journalists.” 

The situation is worsened not least by the fact that they are bad in their strategic communication. “Like so many other governments in Eastern Europe, PAS is terrible at communicating. In fact, the government will not communicate at all, and it is a big mess that the pro-Russian parties are exploiting to their own advantage. They do this by slandering the EU, NATO and all attempts to reform the system.”

Sandu probably wins after all

But if you ask Isac, all this does not necessarily mean that Sandu will risk losing the presidential election in the autumn. That it does not happen, however, is due to the incompetence of the other candidates and the lack of strong pro-European alternatives to PAS’s own efforts. If you look at the latest polls, Sandu stands to get a good 35%. Although it does not look like widespread support for her, it is a very solid lead of 20% down to Igor Dodon, former prime minister and leader of the Socialist Party. He stands to get 15%.

PAS and Sandu will also make use of the quite large Moldovan diaspora for the election in the autumn, just as they did in the presidential election back in 2020, explains Isac.

Those votes may well be decisive, he says, before concluding by pointing out that it will also be important, “how the pro-Russian voters and parties react. Because there are rumors that they will both boycott the presidential election and the controversial referendum on writing EU membership into the country’s constitution.”  

There are indications that at least Maia Sandu will get four more years in the presidency. Whether the governing party PAS also manages to remain in office after the parliamentary election within a year is, however, for now an open question. Perhaps the rural-urban conflict between the progressive urban party PAS and the local politics of the provinces, where the effects of inflation and unemployment, the continued corruption and the declining pace of reform, as well as the effects of the intense Russian hybrid war, will end up straining the party. As said, the next twelve months could be defining for Moldova. 

Photo: EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen (tv) and Maia Sandu (th) in spring 2023 (Source:  Dati Bendo/European Commission ) (Creative Commons 4.0) 

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